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Thesis Abstract  
 
The ideological scramble for Africa tells the story of an international competition between the 
US, France, Ghana and the UK. Against the background of rising Soviet interests, these 
countries worked to convince leaders and peoples in Sub-Saharan Africa of their pan-African, 
capitalist and imperial plans. Between 1953 and 1963, Africa’s position in the international 
system was not primarily determined by the struggle between the USSR and the US. African 
leaders did not simply play off the Cold war superpowers against each other to extract gains. 
Kwame Nkrumah, the leader of Ghana, projected his own pan-African ideology to other parts 
of the continent. 
What was at stake in this scramble were the so-called ‘minds’ of African peoples. 
Nkrumah blamed colonialism for instilling non-white populations with an inferiority complex, 
while policy makers in the West drew on the insights of ethno-psychology to argue that 
underdevelopment was a psychological problem. To develop men into the modern mindset or, 
conversely, to create an ‘African Personality’, policymakers relied on education and 
information media. 
When other African statesmen were unwilling to support Ghana’s pan-African vision, 
Nkrumah’s public discourse became more stridently anticolonial, in an attempt to mobilise the 
African general public. With the atrocities of the Congo crisis in mind, President John F. 
Kennedy and the Europeans began to see anticolonial nationalism as an emotional response to 
the tensions that came out of the modernisation process. Western officials therefore decided to 
modernise the socio-economic structures of ‘emerging’ societies, since psychological 
modernisation had failed. 
Those shifting views on African development profoundly influenced the way in which 
the Bandung Conference, the Suez Crisis, the independence of Ghana, the Sahara atomic 
bomb tests and the Congo crisis were understood. As a whole, this analysis presents a sharp 
departure from a narrative in which non-Western actors are depicted as subaltern agents who 
can only resist or utilise Cold War pressures. It seeks to address the broader question of why 
pan-Africanism ultimately failed to become a fully developed interventionist ideology, 
capable of rivalling communist and capitalist proscriptions for African development. 
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Introduction 
 
An Africa-Centred International History. 
 
The journey was much too swift. I should probably have stayed twice as long in each place. 
 
– D.A. Roberts, an official of the British International Research Department, during his Africa 
trip in 1960.1 
 
 
It is the night of 17 January 1961. In the bush of Katanga, the secessionist province of the 
former Belgian Congo, Patrice Lumumba is pushed in front of a tree and shot. As the 
headlights of the cars that lit the execution site blare out, Frans Verscheure, a white Belgian 
police inspector, Julien Gat, the Flemish head of the military policy and two other white 
service men order the African soldiers to bury him together with the bodies of Maurice Mpolo 
and Joseph Okito, two party militants of the Mouvement national congolais (MNC). 
Lumumba – a postal clerk turned politician – had been ousted as prime minister by President 
Joseph Kasavubu, on 5 September 1960. When Lumumba in turn fired Kasavubu, a political 
crisis was created amidst riots, ethnic tensions and secession which prompted Joseph-Désiré 
Mobutu to stage his first military coup. 
This transition to independence became an international crisis. As the blood of 
Lumumba and his supporters soaked the humid soil of the bush ten kilometers outside of 
Elizabethville, the Belgians, the Americans and – reportedly – Baroness Park of Monmouth at 
MI6 could file away their assassination plans. The Belgian Operation L and the hiring of a 
Greek assassin, named Georges, in September 1960, coincided with the landing of Sidney 
Gottlieb, a doctor employed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who carried a toxin 
that could generate an indigenous disease.2 The CIA field officer, Lawrence Devlin, knew his 
guest had received orders from the director, Allen Dulles, who in the National Security 
Council (NSC) had characterised Lumumba as a ‘Castro or worse.’3 President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower also muttered that he wished Lumumba would ‘fall into a river full of crocodiles.’ 
1 Secret report, D.A. Roberts to FO, “Information Work in West Africa”, 5 August 1960, 1, INF 12/1338, TNA. 
2 Luc De Vos et al., Lumumba: De Complotten? De Moord. (Leuven: Davidsfonds, 2004), 69–135; Götz 
Bechtolsheimer, “Breakfast with Mobutu: Congo, the United States and the Cold War, 1964-1981” (Ph.D. 
dissertation, London School of Economics, 2012), 20; “MI6 ‘arranged Cold War killing’ of Congo prime 
minister”, The Guardian, April 10, 2013; Michael Evans, Francis Elliott, and Charles Bremner, “MI6 Told to 
Reveal Truth behind Lumumba Death”, The Times, April 3, 2013. 
3 Memorandum of Discussion at 452nd Meeting of the NSC, 21 July 1960, FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. 14: Africa, 
338-41; Memorandum of Discussion at the 456th Meeting of the NSC, 18 August 1960, FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. 
14: Africa, 424; Larry Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2007), 62–63. 
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He was committed to keeping the troops of the United Nations (UN) ‘in the Congo even if 
[…] such action was used by the Soviets as the basis for starting a fight.’4 
Why did the Congo attract so much attention? Why was Eisenhower willing to be 
dragged into a possible proxy war with the Soviet Union in a part of the world that had – 
according to his critics and historians – never before captured the attention of this prudent 
president? Africa in the 1950s offered little political or military gain, there had been no 
African counterpart to the Berlin crisis, communism and Soviet intrusion were considered to 
be a minor threat while a policy in support of the colonial powers could mean the loss of 
anticolonial leaders’ support, and backing African nationalism could alienate the European 
partners. And yet, Lumumba was suddenly considered to be a threat to continental and 
international stability. 
To understand Lumumba’s assassination we must look beyond the Cold War and 
consider the role of African leaders and the multi-centric nature of Africa’s international 
history after 1945. Lumumba’s flaming indictment of Belgian colonialism in his 
independence day speech and his inability to halt the rioting on top of a constitutional crisis, 
triggered dormant fears about what might happen if the continent went without imperial 
guidance. In the 1950s the Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah and the Americans had already 
turned to public diplomacy as a way to make the transition process fit their goals. Their use of 
pamphlets, newspapers and education as modernisation instruments generated an ideological 
competition that forced France and Britain to rethink the way in which they used their former 
colonial management tools. 
The day after Lumumba’s execution, local miners stumbled upon an arm protruding 
from the soil. With the Congo at the centre of global attention, the conspirators acted quickly. 
The bodies were hacksawed into pieces, dissolved in acid and other remains burned. What the 
flames could not consume, however, was the symbolic value of this African leader. An 
internal report of the United States Information Agency (USIA) – the American institution 
responsible fore public diplomacy – described how the ‘Lumumba symbol’ was used by the 
‘so-called “radical” African countries (the Casablanca group) which claim to be the voice of 
the future’.5 When reports about Lumumba’s murder hit the press stands, riots broke out in 
4 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 140; Luc De Vos et al., Les Secrets de L’affaire Lumumba 
(Brussels: Éditions Racine, 2005), 142; Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War and 
the Twilight of Empire (London: HarperPress, 2013), 349; Memorandum of Discussion at the 456th Meeting of 
the National Security, FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. 14: Africa, 421-424. 
5 Report, Office of Research and Analysis, “The Lumumba Symbol in Africa”, 13 July 1961, RG. 306, A1 1029, 
Box 4, Research Notes 1958-1962, f: RN-17-61, NARA. 
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Accra as Nkrumah made an emotional radio speech about the threat of neocolonial 
infiltration. For the French, who were preoccupied with the propaganda coming from Radio 
Cairo and the Algerian Front de Libération National (FLN), and the British who were waging 
a psychological war of their own against the Mau Mau in Kenya, Lumumba’s rise to the status 
of anticolonial symbol was an unwelcome development.6 Viewed as a hero by some, a 
Communist and a demagogue by others, and above all a threat to stability and murdered in the 
‘year of Africa,’ Congo’s first prime minister embodied Africa’s new engagement with the 
international system, a relation that was highly symbolic. 
At the heart of this thesis is an attempt to explain how a continent captivated by 
postcolonial problems in the 1950s became a Cold War arena from the mid-1960s onwards. 
Specifically, why was pan-Africanism overtaken by the Cold War ideologies? International 
historians stress that the salient feature of the Cold War outside of Europe was the violent and 
interventionist nature of modernisation programmes, while Africanists view the Cold War as a 
static, realist element that crushed emancipatory aspirations and alternative political projects.7 
However, in Africa proxy wars only became vital in the 1970s. The shifting views of 
liberationist thinkers and modernisation theorists on the psychological and cultural impact of 
colonialism and modernisation characterised the preceding era between 1945 and 1963.  
The symbolic dimension of decolonisation was heightened mainly because emerging 
countries in Africa and the Third World could not ‘indulge in power politics’ but had to rely 
on ‘moral and political strength’ as Sukarno, the leader of Indonesia, phrased it at the 
Bandung Conference of 1955.8 Africa became the target of an ideological scramble. 
This introduction defines the concepts that sustain the argument of an ideological 
scramble, outlines the principal research questions in relation to the historiography, makes a 
case for the multi-centric approach and the Africa-centred perspective and presents the 
archival sources on which the following eight chapters are based. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-
Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 28–29. 
7 See particularly Westad, The Global Cold War; Heonik Kwon, The Other Cold War (New York, Chichester 
and West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 2010). 
8 Memorandum for the Operations Coordinating Board, “Subject: Bandung Conference of April, 1955”, 12 May 
1955, 3-4, OCB Central File Series, WH Office, NSC Staff Papers 1948-1961, Box 86, f: OCB 092.3 (Fie #2) 
(2) [April-November 1955], DDEL. 
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Key Concepts 
 
Conceptualising Africa’s post-war international history as an ‘ideological scramble’ for hearts 
and minds enables us to think about Africa not just as a Cold War problem, but as a ‘crowded 
house’ with many different actors who had diverging interpretations of Africa’s international 
issues.9 Some key concepts such as the ideological scramble itself, but also psychological 
modernisation, cultural assistance, informational diplomacy, public diplomacy, pan-
Africanism, decolonisation, Third World and Cold War are defined in this section. 
Unlike the scramble of the 1880s, the ideological scramble was not a European 
competition to carve up the continent, but an international struggle between the USSR, the 
US, France, Ghana and the UK to convince African leaders and peoples of their plans for the 
future. As cultural centres multiplied, the United States Information Agency, the British 
Information Policy Department (IPD) and the Direction générale des relations culturelles 
(DGRC) did not only focus on their target audience but were also forced to contain ‘the 
unfriendly propaganda of our friends.’10 President John F. Kennedy was told that the ‘people 
who call themselves our allies’ did the greatest damage to the American image.11 
In the Third World, and particularly in Africa, public diplomacy was employed to foster 
what was called psychological modernisation. Social psychologists like Talcott Parsons 
developed techniques to draw men and women into the modern mindset. Parsonian theory 
was related to the reception of European social theory in the US and had its origins in 
academic debates of the 1920s and 1930s, a time when classic ethnography began applying 
psychiatric and psychological theories to analyse the so-called ‘native mind’. Consequently, 
the influential Harvard Department of Social Relations approached modernisation as a process 
that affected entire societies. 
Yet, in 1957 Walt W. Rostow and Max F. Milikan did away with this attention for 
developmental psychology, claiming values could be instilled more effectively through 
‘programs of common action.’ People would gain confidence by seeing new factories, better 
farming methods and improved health care facilities. Improving the social, political and 
economic structures as well as the ability of poorer nations to absorb investments was crucial. 
This division between psychological modernisation and socio-economic modernisation is 
9 Reid uses the term but upholds the idea that the continent became a Cold War battleground in the 1950s, see 
Richard J. Reid, A History of Modern Africa: 1800 to the Present (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 293. 
10 Report, “A Study of the Cultural Program In Africa With Especial Reference To Education”, October-
September 1957, 83, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, FRC 2, f: Regional, NARA. 
11 Confidential memorandum for the president, Carl T. Rowan, “An Analysis of the Press in Africa”, 24 March 
1961, RG. 306, P 249, f: Press in Africa [Folder ½], NARA. 
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presented here as a fundamental break in Africa’s international history. Nonetheless, the idea 
that underdevelopment was at its core a psychological problem remained influential.12 
The endurance of ethno-psychology allowed the settlers in Algeria and Kenya to explain 
away violent resistance as the symptom of a mental disorder.13 This psychological conception 
of modernisation theory, the liberation from the backwardness of tradition and the 
convergence with the social practices and living standards of the West, was also part of the 
French imperial ideology, which saw its colonial subjects as potential ‘black Frenchmen’ a 
status that could be attained by assimilating the French language and culture. Local 
populations and French officials, however, approached those cultural tools as instruments to 
climb the social ladder.14 Parallel to shifting modernisation paradigms, the French replaced 
‘assimilation’ – which aspired to substitute African cultures with French culture – with 
‘association’ in which France and Africa became partners for development. British indirect 
rule made civilizational ideology less explicit, but in practice the British shouldered the ‘white 
man’s burden’ through education in schools such as Achimota in Ghana.15 
As the world of empires gave way to a postcolonial order, cultural assistance and 
informational diplomacy, jointly referred to as public diplomacy became vital in dealing with 
so-called ‘transitional’ societies. Public diplomacy has been defined as ‘an international 
actor’s attempt to conduct its foreign policy by engaging with foreign publics’. It also 
included cultural diplomacy, an interaction with the public that relies on exhibitions, art and 
theatre rather than pamphlets, radio and film.16 ‘Cultural assistance’ employs those media to 
12 Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2004), 94–103, 170; Max F. Millikan and Walt W. Rostow, A Proposal: Key to an 
Effective Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Row: Greenwood Press Reprint, 1957), 38, 33; Robert B. 
Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 41–42; 
Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2000), 79. 
13 Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts, 79; Gilman, Mandarins of the 
Future, 73. 
14 Tony Chafer and Emmanuel Godin, The End of the French Exception?: Decline and Revival of the “French 
Model” (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 14, 15; Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, 
Knowledge, History (San Francisco: University of California Press, 2005), 9; Even in the 1990s African 
historians such as Agyman turned to assimilation to explain the African ‘preference for colonial servitude, 
particularly those of them who were products of the French policy of assimilation,’ see Opoku Agyeman, 
Nkrumah’s Ghana and East Africa: Pan-Africanism and African Interstate Relations (Teaneck: Fairleigh 
Dickinson University Press, 1992), 51. 
15 Tony Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa: France’s Successful Decolonization? (New York: 
Berg Publishers, 2002), 29; Reid, A History of Modern Africa, 208; David Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah. Vision and 
Tragedy (Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers, 2007), 25; Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 9; Gilman, Mandarins of 
the Future, 94–103. 
16 Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public 
Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), x; Jessica C. E. Gienow-
Hecht, “What Are We Searching For? Culture, Diplomacy, Agents and the State”, in Searching for a Cultural 
Diplomacy, ed. Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried, vol. 6 (Oxford and New York: Berghahn 
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speed up the psychological modernisation process, rather than win the Cold War although 
those aims could not be rigorously separated.  When USIA operatives and British Council 
officials debated the rationale behind their joint English language programme, they concluded 
that English could be considered ‘a neutral skill (aid programs)’ as well as ‘a vehicle of 
cultural projection (information programs).’17 
In practice, cultural assistance was never clearly defined. Eisenhower referred to the 
term in a speech in 1956 as helping the new states, ‘with their ancient culture’, in spreading 
education.18 The Central Office of Information (COI) made an attempt at a definition only in 
1961, by distinguishing between bilateral aid and technical assistance. The financial aid 
enabling a country to purchase capital items had to be distinguished from the latter term, the 
training of personnel. Moreover, by 1961 the COI – unlike the British Council – saw the 
offering of a radio transmitter not as a way to generate gratitude, but as a means to facilitate 
the COI’s influence over content.19 Conversely, cultural assistance, foreign aid and 
information were inextricably linked in France, leading to confusing conversations. When 
Roger Seydoux, the French director of cultural affairs explained to the director of the British 
Information Research Department (IRD), Ralph Murray, that he was responsible for cultural 
and technical assistance, Murray responded that ‘technical assistance fell outside his purview’ 
even though their tasks were the same.20  
Pan-Africanism rejected the claims of psychological modernisation. Historically, pan-
Africanism refers to a conscious movement that began at the end of the nineteenth century 
among men and women of African descent and has embraced at particular times both abstract 
ideas of the cultural and ‘racial’ unity of all peoples of African descent, as well as a drive for 
continental unification. Although it embraced specific movements, such as Garveyism, 
Books, 2010), 4–5; Nicholas J. Cull: “Public Diplomacy' Before Gullion: The Evolution of A Phrase”, 18 April 
2006. http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/newsroom/pdblog_detail/060418_public_diplomacy_. 
before_gullion_the_evolution_of_a_phrase/) explains how the 'earliest use of the phrase ‘public diplomacy’ to 
surface is actually not American at all but in a leader piece from The Times in January 1956. It is used merely as 
a synonym for civility in a piece criticizing the posturing of President Franklin Pierce. The modern meaning of 
the term ‘public diplomacy’ was coined in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy at Tufts University and a distinguished retired foreign service officer, when he established an Edward 
R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy; A further distinction can be made with cultural diplomacy. 
17 Report on Proceedings Sessions I and II, “Anglo-American Conference Ditchley Park, November 19-22, 1965, 
The Future of the English Language Abroad”, [November 1965], 249, RG. 360, P 249, Box 1, f: English 
Teaching, NARA. 
18 Dwight D. Eisenhower: “Address and Remarks at the Baylor University Commencement Ceremonies, Waco, 
Texas”, 25 May 1956. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10499. 
19 Letter, D.V. Bendall to all departments, “Bilateral Aid and Technical Assistance”, 26 April 1961, FO 
953/2050, TNA. 
20 Confidential report, “Report on Anglo-French Discussions on Education, Cultural and Information Questions 
concerning Africa held in Paris”, 8 January 1960, BW 1/329, TNA. 
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particular individuals like W.E.B. Du Bois and events like the Pan-African Congresses, it 
became a political ideology when it was adopted by the newly independent state of Ghana.21 
Decolonisation is defined here as a process whereby a formal power relation between 
the colonial powers and indigenous political elites was exchanged for a range of possible 
futures. In the 1970s and 1980s optimism about the opportunities that came with flag 
independence was overtaken by dependency theory, a model that posited a wealthy centre and 
a dependent poor periphery. It has led evaluations of African decolonisation to cohere around 
two positions. Scholars, like Mahmood Mamdani and Basil Davidson argue that the culture of 
authoritarianism, which came with the indirect colonial rule, was perpetuated after 
independence. Others, like Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, maintain that colonialism 
was unable to change the African social and political structures, making the Western nation 
state model unstable after independence.22 Decolonisation, as Frederick Cooper has noted, 
also allowed colonisers to shed obligations and avoid colonial subjects’ claims to 
citizenship.23 Todd Shepard further argues that decolonisation reshaped the West. The term 
gained currency at the end of the Algerian War, when the French state failed to convince 
people in its territories to identify themselves as French. De Gaulle and France began defining 
decolonisation as the tide of history and in that way ended the relative colour blindness of 
French republicanism. After 1962, Algerians of ‘Muslim origin’ could no longer be 
‘European’ or ‘French’.24 Decolonisation was thus a complex two way process of change that 
affected the international system. 
Frantz Fanon’s definition of the Third World as a project that consciously rejected the 
notion that non-whites were unfit for self-government is vital here.25 The concept of the Third 
World – Tiermondisme – came into existence in the 1950s. The French demographer Alfred 
21 Leslie Elaine James, “‘What We Put in Black and White’: George Padmore and the Practice of Anti-Imperial 
Politics” (London School of Economics, 2012), 11; Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The Legacies of Bandung: 
Decolonization and the Politics of Culture”, in Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its 
Political Afterlives, ed. Christopher J. Lee (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), 53. 
22 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Basil Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of 
the Nation-State (London: James Currey, 1992); Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder 
as Political Instrument (Oxford and Bloomington: James Currey and Indiana University Press, 1999). 
23 Frederick Cooper, “Possibility and Constraint: African Independence in Historical Perspective”, Journal of 
African History 49, no. 2 (2008): 179. 
24 Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2008), 5. 
25 Vijay Prashad has used Fanon's definition in an uncritical way and describes the different conferences that 
dealt with an anticolonial theme, for instance in Brussels in 1928, Bandung in 1955 and Belgrade in 1961 as 
expressions of the same Third World project, see Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance 
Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 314; Vijay Prashad, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History Of The 
Global South (London and New York: Verso, 2012), 1–13; Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s 
History of the Third World (New York: The New Press, 2007), xv – 1. 
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Sauvy launched the term when he made an analogy with the so-called ‘third estate’ to refer to 
the poor and populous areas of the world. Adopted by French journalists, it was quickly 
redefined by Fanon and used at the Bandung conference because of its ability to create 
coherence among the poor, non-white and uncommitted areas of the globe. The intellectual 
debate about the meaning of the Third World resurfaced in the 1970s. In the Anglophone 
world, Immanuel Wallenstein rejected the term and argued that there was only one ‘world 
system’ with a dominating capitalist centre and semiperipheries. In France, Claude Liauzu 
wrote about how, by the 1980s, the term had become a symbol for New Left students who 
wanted to advance their own cause.26 The Third World was not solely created through 
superpower intervention, but also wielded as a symbolic weapon.27 
Alternatively, the attempts to write African American internationalism into Cold War 
historiography in order to conceptualise the post-war era as the age of international race 
relations has done little to inform us about the international history of Africa after 1945. 
While convincing in its effort to analyse how Afro-American activists tried to internationalise 
their struggle for civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s, the writings of Jim Meriwether and 
Gerda Plummer remain accounts of a transnational civil rights struggle, not US foreign policy 
towards Africa.28  
The views of civil rights activists in the US should not be confused with how others saw 
the world. The claim that African-American views of Ghana motivated Eisenhower to 
develop a policy towards Africa is not supported by the sources.29 Further, the focus on race 
narrows the possible range of international interactions, while paternalism is often cited to 
explain inaction on the part of American policy makers leaving many questions unanswered. 
Moreover, American officials on the ground in Africa were more concerned with education 
than with the impact of US segregation. American decision making towards the emerging 
26 Claude Liauzu, L’enjeu tiersmondiste débats et combats (Paris: l’Harmattan, 1987); Immanuel Maurice 
Wallerstein, The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations : Essays 
(Cambridge and Paris: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 1–15; Robert J McMahon, “Introduction”, in The 
Cold War in the Third World, ed. Robert J McMahon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3. 
27 Global Cold War historians acknowledge the diverse origins of the Third World concept, but see its political 
importance only in relation to the Cold War, see Westad, The Global Cold War, 111; McMahon, “Introduction”, 
3. 
28 Brenda Gayle Plummer, In Search of Power: African Americans in the Era of Decolonization, 1956-1974 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); James H. Meriwether, Proudly We Can Be Africans: Black 
Americans and Africa, 1935-1961 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). 
29 Grimm makes this claim by showing how African-American activists petitioned Eisenhower. However, he 
never mentions a response, nor does he show how and when Eisenhower took civil rights into account: Kevin E. 
Grimm, “Gazing Toward Ghana: African American Agency in the Eisenhower Administration’s Relations with 
Africa”, Journal of Contemporary History 48, no. 3 (July 1, 2013): 578–96. 
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African nations therefore has to be considered within the larger sweep of the international 
history of the twentieth century and the Cold War. 
The Cold War was a term introduced by George Orwell in 1945 to criticise the state of 
undeclared war between the US and USSR. Intense debate about its origins has been replaced 
by an effort to define its conceptual limits. The Cold War is considered to be a project, a 
period and an international system. For Anders Stephanson the Cold War was a US project. 
The Cold War was the manner in which the US reversed isolationist tendencies and engaged 
international politics.30 Odd Arne Westad’s Global Cold War makes the case for a pluralist 
conception of the conflict: the Cold War as the spread of US and Soviet-centred concepts of 
development, which fuelled a global war of ideas. For Westad, the Cold War is a period 
between 1945 and 1991 in which the US and the USSR dominated international affairs, but it 
is also an international system that was exported to the Third World where local conflicts 
intensified because of it.31 Federico Romero, by contrast, limits the Cold War to a conflict that 
was ultimately about Europe, the only area where the prospect of superpower war was 
plausible.32  
Westad’s view of the Cold War as a clash of two interventionist ideologies is 
analytically valuable, but runs the risk of becoming a catch-all label for every international 
event of the twentieth century. It is important to stress that if the history of colonialism is not 
the history of development, as Cooper writes, it is also true that the Cold War and 
interventions to promote a different model of society are not the same. When we accept 
Westad’s definition of intervention, ‘a concerted state-led effort by one country to determine 
the political direction of another country’, it is clear that revolutions in Africa were not just 
Soviet-inspired or US-sponsored.33 France, the UK, Ghana and Egypt were all eager to 
influence the direction of African countries in the 1950s and 1960s. Pan-Africanism or Pan-
Arabism might have been less universalist, but it was not less interventionist. On the ground 
they were ranked besides communism or capitalism and not understood in solely racial terms, 
but viewed as alternative models. 
30 Anders Stephanson, “Fourteen Notes On The Very Concept Of The Cold War”, H-Diplo Essays, February 
2007, http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/essays/PDF/stephanson-14notes.pdf; Anders Stephanson, “Cold War Degree 
Zero”, in Uncertain Empire: American History and the Idea of the Cold War, ed. Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 26. 
31 Odd Arne Westad, “Exploring the Histories of the Cold War”, in Uncertain Empire: American History and the 
Idea of the Cold War, ed. Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
52. 
32 Federico Romero, Storia Della Guerra Fredda. L’ultimo Conflitto per l’Europa (Turin: Einaudi Storia, 2009); 
Federico Romero, “Cold War Historiography at the Crossroads”, Cold War History 14, no. 4 (2014): 697. 
33 Westad, The Global Cold War, 3; Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 115–116. 
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It is therefore productive to think about the Cold War in line with the literary study 
perspective as one – admittedly important – mode of knowing that shaped the way reality was 
understood and analysed.34 The Cold War was not simply an international system that hatched 
in Europe and was exported to the Third World. Its foray into an area that was wary of 
intervention and keen on keeping the Cold War out of its territories required the superpowers 
to constantly negate that they were waging Cold War, something that profoundly influenced 
the battle for hearts and minds. The Cold War was present in the background, but actors were 
preoccupied with more immediate concerns. 
 
 
Historiography and Research Questions 
 
This analysis is an attempt to break away from a Cold War understanding of postwar Africa 
by rethinking agency and Africa’s position in the international history of the 1950s and 1960s. 
Specifically, Ghanaian and other African diplomats are presented here as the central historical 
agents, while the developments which affected the continent are understood as the outcome of 
a multi-centric interaction between the French, the British, the Ghanaians and the Americans, 
rather than the result of a Cold War encounter between East and West.  
The focus on Nkrumah’s Ghana stems not only from the fact that it was the first African 
colony with an African prime minister that gained its independence in the 1950s, but more 
importantly that it had an interventionist ideology of its own: pan-Africanism. With it, Ghana 
determined the parameters of inter-African diplomacy and how other African leaders on the 
continent interacted with the wider Cold War world. 
Two questions structure the narrative and recur in each of the eight chapters. First, what 
was the aim of public diplomacy within the different strategic blueprints for Africa? Second, 
what was the most effective way to influence so-called ‘African’ attitudes, according to the 
practitioners? The answers to these questions engage writing on the global Cold War, African 
decolonisation, the history of public diplomacy and the literature on cultural transfer and 
Americanisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
34 Steven Belletto, “Inventing Other Realities: What the Cold War Means for Literary Studies”, in Uncertain 
Empire: American History and the Idea of the Cold War, ed. Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 75–90. 
                                              
I n t r o d u c t i o n  | 11 
 
The Global Cold War and African Agency 
 
An Africa-centred perspective challenges a global Cold War narrative in which Sub-Saharan 
Africa is still approached as a ‘heart of darkness’, located outside of the normal dealings of 
diplomacy. Admittedly, the study of the history of South Africa and Rhodesia has generated a 
complex and nuanced literature in which the interaction between white settler governments, 
local African populations and international actors is studied closely.35 The scholarship on 
Sub-Saharan Africa has lagged behind. 
Overall, international historians have written about the continent’s relation to the Cold 
War in three ways. The groundbreaking work of Odd Arne Westad and the insightful analysis 
of Heonik Kwon deal with the broader Third World and remain close to the subaltern 
resistance narrative. They argue that the US and the USSR were ideologically driven to prove 
the superiority of their social models and in that way perpetuated and exacerbated ongoing 
violent civil wars.36 A second group of historians and journalists argue that the Soviet threat 
enabled the colonial powers to retain their empire.37 Jason Parker has argued that the link 
between the Cold War and anticolonial resistance was more complex. He distinguishes two 
stages: an early repressive period from 1945 to 1955 characterised by a crackdown on the new 
states and the progressive-internationalist projects of the civil rights movement and a post-
Bandung phase in which the Cold War rivalry accelerated the demands and the American 
recognition of self-rule, as shown by Suez, Ghanaian independence and Little Rock.38  
A third group of studies has emphasised that postcolonial diplomats were not mere 
pawns or proxies in the Cold War game. The work of Elizabeth Schmidt, Matthew Connelly 
and Salim Yaqub has presented postcolonial leaders, such as Gamal Abdel Nasser, Sékou 
Touré or Ahmed Ben Bella, as realists who are not driven by ideological conviction, but 
exploit the only weak spot of the Western powers, namely the fact that their foreign policy 
35 Sue Onslow, Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation (New York: Routledge, 2009); 
Jamie Miller, “Things Fall Apart: South Africa and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire, 1973-74”, Cold War 
History 12, no. 2 (2012): 183–204; Ryan Irwin, Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal 
World Order (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
36 Westad, The Global Cold War, 1–14; Kwon, The Other Cold War, 1–14; Sergey Mazov, A Distant Front in 
the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956-1964 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 
1–9; In his conclusion, Westad points out that ‘if there is one big lesson of the Cold War, it is that unilateral 
military intervention does not work to anyone's advantage, while open border, cultural interaction, and fair 
economic exchange benefit all.’ 
37 Guy Arnold, Africa: A Modern History (London: Atlantic Books, 2006), 55–76; Reid, A History of Modern 
Africa, 250–255; Richard Dowden, Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles (London: Portobello Books, 2008), 
44; Arthur Gavshon, Crisis in Africa: Battleground of East and West (New York: Penguin Books, 1981), 27–84. 
38 Jason Parker, “Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the 
Reperiodization of the Postwar Era”, Diplomatic History 30, no. 5 (2006): 890. 
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was shaped by Cold War ideology.39 The ability of Third World leaders to harness the Cold 
War and appropriate ideological discourses in an attempt to maximise its potential benefits 
has thus been acknowledged.  
At the same time, however, non-Western actors remain subaltern in character. They 
engage the rest of the world on Cold War terms and are only able to resist or utilise Cold War 
pressures. The agency of Third World actors is narrowed to harnessing ‘the dominant 
international reality of their age, the Cold War, to maximize potential benefits.’40 Ghana is 
solely seen as a target, even though Ghanaian diplomats unfolded a public diplomacy 
operation that had to project the idea of African unity to other parts of the continent. What the 
perspective of the global Cold War obscures is how Nkrumah’s project competed with and 
impacted upon the Western blueprints for the continent.41 Even Matthew Connelly, who 
makes a case for removing the Cold War lens, writes about an Algerian FLN that worked to 
exploit Cold War tensions as well as every other international rivalry that offered potential 
leverage.42 While Jeffrey Byrne’s work looks more closely at the ways in which Ben Bella 
and Houari Boumedienne worked out a separate socialist ideology the Algerian project 
remained national. In Byrne’s analysis, African nativist ideologies, such as pan-Africanism, 
relied for their substance on Leninism and Marxism, which he sees as quintessential Cold War 
ideas.43 
Historians have thus cracked open the bipolar world and have come to use post-colonial 
studies not only as a source of inspiration, but have also criticised it for its dismissal of an 
historical narrative, international historians are still unable to see African leaders and other 
postcolonial diplomats as independent actors on the international stage.44 The subaltern 
39 A classic example is: Matthew Connelly, “Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: The Grand Strategy 
of the Algerian War for Independence”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 33, no. 2 (2001): 221–45; 
James R Brennan, “Radio Cairo and the Decolonization of East Africa, 1953-64”, in Making a World after 
Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives, ed. Christopher J. Lee, 1st ed. (Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 2010), 173–96; Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the 
Middle East (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 181. 
40 McMahon, “Introduction”, 9. 
41 International Relations theory has taken more significant steps in the direction of assessing the position of 
Africa in the international system, see John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, Africa in World Politics: 
Engaging A Changing Global Order, 5th ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2013); Kevin Dunn, “Introduction: 
Africa and International Relations Theory”, in Africa’s Challenge to International Relations Theory, ed. Kevin 
Dunn and Timothy Shaw (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 1–10. 
42 Connelly, “Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization”, 239, 222. 
43 Jeffrey James Byrne, “Africa’s Cold War”, in The Cold War in the Third World, ed. Robert J. McMahon (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 101–23; Jeffrey James Byrne, “Our Own Special Brand of Socialism: 
Algeria and the Contest of Modernities in the 1960s”, Diplomatic History 33, no. 3 (2009): 427–47. 
44 Dane Kennedy famously called upon the historians of decolonisation to integrate postcolonial theory in a 
critical way into their work, see Dane Kennedy, “Imperial History and Post-Colonial Theory”, Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 24, no. 3 (1996): 345–63. 
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resistance narrative persists, which is problematic because it flattens the complex strategies 
that diplomats from (former-) colonies pursued. The possibility that African action might 
actually alter the significance of the Cold War for Africa is underestimated.45  
 
 
The History of Decolonisation, African Studies and Multi-Centric History 
 
While paying more attention to the agency of African leaders can help us better understand 
the events that make up the international history of Africa, the multi-centric approach allows 
us to refine the connection between the developments on the continent and the international 
environment. Recent work in African studies by scholars such as Jean Allman and Frederick 
Cooper has paid sustained attention to transnational networks and the role of imagined 
political futures beyond the nation state.46 Nonetheless, those alternative African projects are 
considered to be inevitably flawed due to their susceptibility to the machinations of the Cold 
War. The question with which Africanists grapple is how radical pan-African experimentation 
could persist despite the damaging effects of the Cold War. Even Frederic Cooper – whose 
subtle writing informs much of the scholarship – argues that outside powers could ‘either 
provide the sustenance an unpopular regime needed or sponsor alternatives’ – a pattern set by 
the ‘American and Belgian action against Patrice Lumumba.’47  
This realist understanding of the international system which excludes the continent 
itself, is widely accepted by Africanist scholars.48 The field of African studies finds itself 
divided between afro-optimists49, who see the continent’s potential wasted by incompetent 
45 I paraphrase Cooper who made this point for colonial and post-colonial history, see Frederick Cooper, 
“Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History”, in The Decolonization Reader, ed. James D. 
Le Sueur (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), 28. 
46 Jeffrey S. Ahlman, “A New Type of Citizen: Youth, Gender, and Generation in the Ghanain Builders 
Brigade”, Journal of African History 53, no. 1 (2012): 87–105; Jeffrey S. Ahlman, “Road to Ghana: Nkrumah, 
Southern Africa and the Eclipse of a Decolonizing Africa”, Kronos 37, no. 1 (2011): 23–40; Jeffrey S. Ahlman, 
“The Algerian Question in Nkrumah’s Ghana, 1958–1960: Debating ‘Violence’ and ‘Nonviolence’ in African 
Decolonization”, Africa Today 57, no. 2 (2010): 67–84; Jeffrey S. Ahlman, “Living with Nkrumahism: Nation, 
State, and Pan-Africanism in Ghana” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 2011); Jean Allman, “Nuclear 
Imperialism and the Pan-African Struggle for Peace and Freedom: Ghana, 1959–1962”, Souls 10, no. 2 (June 13, 
2008): 83–102; Jean Allman, “Kwame Nkrumah, African Studies and the Politics of Knowledge Production in 
the Black Star of Africa”, International Journal of African Historical Studies 46, no. 2 (2013): 201; Cooper, 
“Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History”, 1516. 
47 Cooper, “Possibility and Constraint: African Independence in Historical Perspective”, 187. 
48 ‘Until the Cold War ended in the later 1980s, foreign aid gave African rulers extensive patronage at very little 
cost in dependence’, see John Iliffe, Africans: The History of a Continent, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 271. 
49 An excellent critique on afro-pessimism has been written by Waful Okumo, “Afro-Pessimism and African 
Leadership” The Perspective, 5 April 2001. http://www.theperspective.org/afro_pessimism.html; Goren Hyden, 
“African Studies in the Mid-1990s: Between Afro-Pessimism and Amero-Skepticism”, African Studies Review 
39, no. 2 (1996): 1–17; Stephen Ellis, Season of Rains: Africa in the World (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2011), 5. 
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leaders, and afro-pessimists, who argue that Africa’s exceptional link with poverty and 
corruption eroded its potential for unification.50 In Nkrumah’s case, the gap between ideals 
and reality has been explained by blaming him personally or by pointing to his lack of 
qualified advisers. In recent years however, Nkrumah has acquired the reputation of a 
charismatic leader whose radical pan-African experiment was thwarted by the pressures of the 
Cold War. 
Moreover, as Stephen Ellis points out, African historians are generally more interested 
in commentary about present day Africa which can accompany an accurate description of the 
past. A resistance narrative remains popular in a context where many historical essays are 
seen less as the product of academic labor and valued more as expressions of nostalgia or 
tragedy.51 Paradoxically, Africanist scholarship and African history can therefore not 
adequately explain the international positions that were taken by a first generation of African 
leaders who saw the world through an anticolonial, rather than a Cold War lens. Nkrumah was 
not only preoccupied with jet propelling Ghanaian society into modernity, but also worked to 
project pan-African ideas abroad.  
This work seeks to demonstrate how the literature on African studies and the global 
Cold War could engage in a more constructive dialogue and attempts to address certain 
questions that have gone unanswered as a consequence of the disregard for African agency 
and the multi-centric nature of change. 
 
 
Public Diplomacy as Strategy: a Comparative Approach 
 
The widely shared commitment to cultural assistance exerted a profound influence on the 
direction of the overall strategy for Africa, particularly in the areas of foreign aid and the 
sustenance of authoritarian regimes. Close examination of the evidence rejects the idea that 
public diplomacy is a separate section of foreign policy governed by its own logic,52 or that it 
50 Emery Roe, Except-Africa: Remaking Development, Rethinking Power (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 1999), 1–12; Manthia Diawara, In Search of Africa (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); 
David Reiff, “In Defense of Afro-Pessimism”, World Policy Journal 15, no. 4 (1999 1998): 10–22. 
51 Stephen Ellis, “Writing Histories of Contemporary Africa”, Journal of African History 43, no. 1 (2002): 7, 25; 
Idesbald Goddeeris and Sindani E. Kiangu, “Congomania in Academia: Recent Historical Research on the 
Belgian Colonial Past”, BMGN - Low Countries Historical Review 126, no. 4 (2011): 54–74. 
52 Alain Dubosclard, L’action artistique de La France aux Etats-Unis, 1915-1969 (Paris: CNRS, 2003), 27; 
Laurence Saint-Gilles, La présence culturelle de la France aux Etats-Unis pendant la guerre froide: 1944-1963 
(Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007), 274; Dominique Trimbur et al., Entre rayonnement et réciprocité : contributions à 
l’histoire de la diplomatie culturelle (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2002). 
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was solely a means of disguising state interference.53 Neither can public diplomacy be viewed 
as simply another diplomatic instrument to project influence through controlled cultural 
exchange.54 The analysis of public diplomacy as a development tool in Africa provides us 
with a powerful perspective that can address the contradictions in the scholarship on 
American, French, British and Ghanaian policies towards sub-Saharan Africa. 
In the case of the US, Eisenhower emerges not as a cynical president who ignored 
Africa whilst having a coherent psychological strategy for Europe. On the contrary, providing 
education to the Third World allowed Eisenhower to act in ways that reconciled his long-term 
aim of global stability and his short-term willingness to be ‘on the side of the natives for 
once’55 For the president, the direct communist threat took a back seat to paternalistic 
concerns about leadership skills, a claim that is advanced in the first chapter. 
The way in which the Kennedy administration approached public diplomacy towards 
Africa elucidates how an appreciation for public opinion and a downgrade of the United 
States Information Agency to a polling institution could go together. Moreover, his call to 
appreciate nationalism as a force outside of the Cold War has been seen as a plea for more 
understanding of Third World leaders. However by reflecting on the manner in which the 
Kennedy administration used education and information material, it becomes clear that the 
president did not necessarily see nationalism as something that constituted a positive force for 
change. American driven modernisation had to convert an anticolonial attitude, which was the 
expression of frustrated and passive behaviour, into a rational can do attitude. In doing so this 
dissertation rejects the prevailing view of Kennedy as sympathetic to African nationalism. 
Similarly, apparent contradictions in Nkrumah’s foreign policy become comprehensible 
through the public diplomacy perspective. When Nkrumah voiced disappointment about his 
53 Lucas Scott, “‘Total Culture’ and the State-Private Network: A Commentary”, in Culture and International 
History, ed. Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher (Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books, 
2003), 54; Frances Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper?: The CIA and the Cultural Cold War (London: Granta 
Books, 1999), 55; Giles Scott-Smith, Networks of Empire: The US State Department’s Foreign Leader Program 
in the Netherlands, France and Britain 1950-1970 (Brussels: Peter Lang Publishing, 2008), 31; Mario Del Pero, 
“The United States and ‘Psychological Warfare’ in Italy, 1948-1955”, Journal of American History 87, no. 4 
(March 1, 2001): 1304; Paul Koedijk, “Van ‘Vrede En Vrijheid’ Tot ‘Volk En Verdediging’: Veranderingen in 
Anti-Communistische Psychologische Oorlogsvoering in Nederland, 1950-1965”, in In de Schaduw van de 
Muur: Maatschappij En Krijgsmacht Rond 1960, ed. Ben Schoenmakers and J.A.A.M. Janssen (Den Haag: SDU 
Uitgeverij, 1997), 57; Marja Wagenaar, De Rijksvoorlichtingsdienst: Geheimhouden, Toedekken En Openbaren 
(Amsterdam: SDU Uitgevers, 1997), 24. 
54 Volker R. Berghahn, Transatlantische Kulturkriege: Shepard Stone, Die Ford-Stiftung Und Der Europaische 
Antiamerikanismus (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004), xvii; Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: 
Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), 11, 223; Gregory 
Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin: America’s Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956 (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2000), iv. 
55 Memorandum of Discussion at 375th NSC Meeting, 7 August 1958, FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. 14: Africa, 21 
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policy of African Unity and at the same time proposed it as a solution, he was not irrationally 
obsessed, as David Rooney has argued.56 In reality, this plea was a public diplomacy strategy 
to mobilise the population behind his plan for direct unification. The assertive and emotional 
way in which he did so after 1960 has been interpreted as a form of rapprochement with the 
Soviet Union. Yet Nkrumah remained staunchly nonaligned, even after Lumumba’s 
assassination, believing that the Cold War had to be kept out of the continent if he wanted to 
realise his own ideological project of African unity, a project based on the propagation of 
ideals outside Ghana’s borders. 
France has been credited with being the first country to understand the potential of ‘soft 
power’57 – the ability of one nation to attract other nations to its cultural values and 
consequently adopt its way of thinking – which is distinct from hard power where others are 
coerced through offers of compensation, through bargaining and negotiating, or by making 
threats.58 However in a comparative history that includes the US, the UK and Ghana it 
becomes clear that French public diplomats were not interested in projecting a set of French 
ideas. Rather officials sought to promote cultural links between African elites and France as a 
way to gain a higher social status. With de Gaulle’s return in 1958, French culture came to be 
used in a more political way, but this did not mean that the French ideas would be promoted. 
Instead, cultural and educational resources were more consciously granted to those countries 
that were expected to remain closely allied with France, particularly after 1960. 
Similarly, a focus on the successes of the BBC has obscured the fact that the British 
believed a campaign in support of the British Empire to be unnecessary. The gift of 
information tools would generate goodwill. Only after the Congo crisis, did Macmillan realise 
that a more integrated approach was required. 
By approaching public diplomacy as a perspective on strategic decision making, rather 
than a completely separate area of international relations, we are better able to understand 
areas of the world that were not obvious hotspots of Cold War conflict.  
 
 
 
 
 
56 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah. Vision and Tragedy, 320. 
57 ‘Elle contribue pourtant à façonner un milieu favorable à la réalisation de ses objectifs: c’est ce que les 
politologues de Harvard appellent aujourd’hui le pouvoir doux […] la France qui fut le premier pays au monde à 
recourir au soft power,’ see Laurence Saint-Gilles, “La culture comme levier de la puissance: le cas de la 
politique culturelle de la France aux Etats-Unis pendant de la guerre froide”, Relations Internationales 28, no. 4 
(2009): 99. 
58 Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power”, Foreign Policy, no. 80 (Autumn 1990): 160. 
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The Power of Culture, Beyond Soft Power and Americanisation 
 
Lastly, this study considers propaganda techniques from a cross-national perspective. What – 
according to the practitioners – was the most effective way to influence the African psyche? 
Instead of turning to the soft power logic of attraction or to Gramscian cultural hegemony to 
explain the logic behind the public diplomacy programme, this thesis presents a close 
examination of cultural assistance activities.59 It does so not only to offer a historical critique 
of the easily employed dichotomy between hard and soft power, but also because an analysis 
of day-to-day public diplomacy activities tells us what American cultural power – or French, 
British and Ghanaian ideological influence for that matter – looked like to others. In this way, 
we can address the difficult issue of reception.60   
The power of culture, how exactly public diplomats believed their operation would 
create influence, was not simply a matter that occupied armchair theorists. In the beginning of 
the 1950s it became the single most important factor shaping the trans-Atlantic relation on the 
ground in Africa. The settler government in Kenya and the British Colonial Office, for 
instance, believed that information programmes could only affect African attitudes if 
messages were explained clearly and slowly. In this respect, the American operation was 
harmless since African target audiences would be unable to understand the subtle anticolonial 
narrative behind American ideas. 
An examination of the propaganda techniques used reveals that the perception of 
American power or Ghanaian influence was often determined by external factors. 
59 The concept of Gramscian hegemony is invoked by historians who present it as a model distinct from soft 
power. Yet, it is very much akin to Nye’s work, who has on several occasions acknowledged the impact of 
Gramsci’s thinking on his own work. The neo-marxist Antonio Gramsci understood hegemony as the capacity to 
create submission to the ideas of a dominant social class through a network of cultural institutions. The existence 
of an institution disseminating material culture is considered to be sufficient proof of influence. This thesis 
therefore also addresses the Gramscian way of explaining the mechanism behind cultural diplomacy. Historians 
who refer to Gramsci are:Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, Sound Diplomacy: Music and Emotions in Transatlantic 
Relations, 1850-1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 8, 40; David Ellwood, “What Winning 
Stories Teach: The Marshall Plan and Atlanticism as Enduring Narratives”, in Defining the Atlantic Community: 
Culture, Intellectuals, and Policies in the Mid-Twentieth Century, ed. Mariano Marco (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2010), 111–131; Victoria De Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through Twentieth-
Century Europe (Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005); Benedetto 
Fontana, “Hegemony and Power in Gramsci”, in Hegemony: Studies in Consensus and Coercion, ed. Richard 
Howson and Kylie Smith (New York and London: Routledge, 2008), 80–106; An in depth analysis of the 
concept of Gramscian hegemony is: Robert Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in 
Method”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 12, no. 2 (1981): 126–55. 
60 A critique on soft power is already offered for the Belgian case in Frank Gerits, “Taking Off the Soft Power 
Lens: The United States Information Service in Cold War Belgium”, Journal of Belgian History 42, no. 4 
(2012): 10–49; As Osgood and Etheridge observe, ‘Important issues associated with the practice of public 
diplomacy have been obscured’ by other debates, see Kenneth A. Osgood and Brian C. Etheridge, eds., 
“Introduction: The New International History Meets The New Cultural History: Public Diplomacy and U.S. 
Foreign Relations”, in The United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in Cultural and International 
History, Diplomatic Studies 5 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), 10. 
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Specifically, while public diplomats might fear or sympathise with the ideas that were spread 
by a competing information office, they disagreed on how certain media – such as film, 
pamphlets or even classroom education – worked to affect the so-called ‘African mind’. Thus 
a technique considered harmless by the Americans might be seen by the French or the British 
as having a destabilising effect on the attitudes of their African subjects. 
By analysing how public diplomats believed they could establish influence, the notion 
that public diplomacy was a form of soft power is called into question. Soft power is partially 
a post-Cold War justification of the strategy to project American ideals abroad. Joseph Nye 
devised the concept in response to Paul Kennedy’s thesis of decline. Labelling USIA strategy 
as soft power, therefore, comes close to circular reasoning.61 Edward Lock and others have 
furthermore pointed out that Nye takes structural forms of power, the power that is exercised 
by social structures such as shared norms or values, together with relational forms where an 
actor exercises power by changing the values of others.  
Nye’s confusion stems from the fact that he has not taken into account that American 
soft power can only exist when the US more or less conforms to international norms.62 Nye 
sees soft power as a uniquely American resource. However, as Christian Reus-Smith has 
indicated, power can only exist within a social relation and is not a resource that can be 
accumulated. Political science has yet to untangle these knots. Some, like Reus-Smith, have 
dismissed Nye’s concept of soft power entirely, while others, like Sarah Graham, have sought 
to address its deficiencies, extend the concept and widen its scope both geographically outside 
of the US and historically before the Cold War.63  
Because of the cultural turn, an analysis of the way cultural resources were used to 
produce power has been subordinated to understanding the larger cultural forces at work upon 
61 Joseph S. Nye Jr, Bound To Lead: The Changing Nature Of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1991); 
Melvyn P. Leffler, “Bringing it Together: The Parts and the Whole”, in Reviewing the Cold War: approaches, 
interpretations, and theory, ed. Odd Arne Westad (New York: Routledge, 2000), 57; The synonym he uses for 
soft power is co-optive power and his triumphalism is mirrored by Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and 
the Last Man, New Ed. (New York and London: Penguin, 1993). 
62 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics”, International Organization 59, no. 1 
(2005): 39; Edward Lock, “Soft Power and Strategy: Developing a ‘Strategic’ Concept of Power”, in Soft Power 
and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Inderjeet Parmar and 
Michael Cox, Routledge Studies in US Foreign Policy 14 (New York: Routledge, 2010), 34. 
63 Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, “The Anomaly of the Cold War: Cultural Diplomacy and Civil Society since 
1850”, in The United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in Cultural and International History, ed. 
Kenneth Alan Osgood and Brian C. Etheridge (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), 29–56; Sarah Ellen Graham, 
“The (Real)politiks of Culture: U.S. Cultural Diplomacy in Unesco, 1946–1954”, Diplomatic History 30, no. 2 
(April 2006): 231–51; Christian Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order (Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 
2004), 38. 
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foreign policy.64 How public diplomacy activities were expected to create influence is 
therefore not clearly understood.65 A public diplomat is presented as someone who wants to 
reach a target audience, which in turn is able to resist the ideological message. Within this 
configuration however, it becomes difficult to grasp that propaganda or cultural assistance 
was often counter-propaganda, developed in competition with other information services.66   
In this way, the issue of reception is also addressed. Instead of attempting to measure 
the reception of public diplomacy by the target audiences, this study analyses the way in 
which public diplomats, rather than publics, perceived their own and their competitors’ 
propaganda. Contrary to the existing studies of reception, we are able to hear the voice of the 
receiver. More importantly, instead of only registering practitioners’ discontent about the 
outcomes of their efforts, a study of the learning process becomes the analytical focus. Public 
diplomats on the ground as well as strategists in different capitals adopted and adapted each 
other’s strategies and techniques in effect producing hybrid products of propaganda and 
education.  
This focus on techniques is an essential explanatory element in the scramble. Diverging 
opinions and misperceptions about how public diplomacy affected target audiences had 
concrete political effects and accelerated the scramble. In the American logic, for instance, 
education created responsible citizens. For the French, education was about granting access to 
higher forms of culture and prestige, leading them to interpret the US activities as an attempt 
to displace them. These subtle misunderstandings deepened the animosity among the different 
players. These dynamics can only be analysed by integrating multiple vantage points into one 
analysis. 
 
 
Multi-Centric Approach, Africa-Centred Perspective and Cross-National 
Dynamics 
 
The historians who take a multi-centric approach, writing history from multiple vantage 
points, have come in for a fair bit of criticism. Even Matthew Connelly, a principal advocate 
64 David Reynolds, “Culture, Discourse and Policy. Reflections on the New International History”, in From 
World War to Cold War. Churchill, Roosevelt and the International History of the 1940s (Oxford, 2006), 335; 
Frank A. Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 3; Morrell Heald and Lawrence S. Kaplan, Culture and 
Diplomacy: The American Experience (Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1977), 3. 
65 Power can be defined as ‘the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of 
actors to determine their circumstances and fate,’ see Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics”, 39. 
66 Historians in the field of public diplomacy acknowledge that there is no sustained attention to workplace 
culture, see Osgood and Etheridge, “Introduction: The New International History Meets The New Cultural 
History: Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Relations.” 
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of this approach, observed that: ‘[i]n terms of both geographical areas or areas of inquiry, 
ranging too far afield can result in a work without real insight into any particular one.’67 Much 
of the critique stems from this concern. Multi-centric history, because of its scale, magnifies 
certain methodological problems that characterise history as an academic discipline. In 
particular, the highly constructed nature of the narrative – which is held together by theory 
and transnational lenses – is considered to be a problem for many more empirically driven 
historians. 
The most-repeated, and yet perhaps the most curious criticism, pertains to the scope of 
the topic. Combining the diplomacy of multiple countries and understanding their 
interconnections is simply too taxing for one historian to handle, or so the argument goes. 
Concretely, books that deal with American foreign policy that span five presidents or the 
entire Cold War period are considered to be more convincing because they deal with the same 
context, whereas the global perspective integrates many seemingly unconnected worlds. This 
raises an important question: should the explanatory power of a historical analysis be judged 
on its ability to give a dense contextualisation or is a more abstract and general sketch of the 
historical milieu also acceptable?  
Two considerations are important here. First, every choice to structure a narrative in a 
certain way entails the loss of some context, the loss of some part of history that is not 
adequately explained. This very notion drives historical revision. Second, a broader analysis 
reveals things that close examination cannot. The plea to contextualise seems to be informed 
by a positivist notion that it is possible to address every aspect of a certain topic. What 
historians do, however, is highlight which aspects of reality are relevant to explain the studied 
phenomena. International historians consider the international context to be the most 
appropriate. Ultimately, an inevitable question arises: how important is the national setting in 
explaining foreign policy when we acknowledge that in multi-centric history, the units of 
comparison are each other’s point of reference? Sergei Shenin’s America’s Helping Hand, for 
instance meticulously reconstructs the bureaucratic infighting during the creation of the 
Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) and Eisenhower’s ability to compromise between 
the aid and anti-aid groups within the Republican Party. However, it does little to illuminate 
what Eisenhower’s own conception of aid was and how it fitted with the existing aid 
paradigms that were put forward in the UN, by France or the UK.68  
67 Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, ix. 
68 Sergei Y. Shenin, America’s Helping Hand: Paving the Way to Globalization (Eisenhower’s Foreign Aid 
Policy and Politics) (New York: Nova Publishers, 2005). 
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A better way of approaching this problem is by acknowledging that the task of the 
historian is not to provide as much context as possible, rather, he has to re-conceptualise the 
historical narrative. Even though many still believe that international and global historians 
want ‘to tell the story of the world as a whole’, what really drives research is the ambition to 
reframe the debate by focusing on international interaction.69  
A second point of criticism pertains to the handling of archival sources. Mario del Pero 
claims that the abundance of American and British sources makes a balanced, multinational 
approach impossible. At the same time he criticises historians for their eagerness to integrate 
sources from all over the world.70 In short, the approach is condemned for not being source 
driven enough, while suffering from documentary fetishism. Ultimately, the multi-centric 
approach never wins. Essentially, Del Pero draws our attention to the perils of archival 
research, which are exponentially increased by the international approach but common to 
historical research of the twentieth century. Historians not only diligently search through 
archives, they also know when they have enough material to understand the events under 
study. The stacks of paper that are located in archives are ultimately only fragments of past 
events and an exhaustive use of sources is, while laudable and crucial as a working method,  
ultimately utopian.  
What is important is the kind of questions we ask. The use of French, British and 
American sources still allows for an internationalist way of seeing by looking at the 
international connections of choice and problems. For instance, the notion that Eisenhower 
had no policy towards Africa could only be rejected because French, British and Ghanaian 
sources made clear that the US was part of an internationally shared strategy in which public 
diplomacy was used to make minds modern. Moreover, it allows us to capture a reality that 
lies beyond the sources. For instance, we can only understand why Kennedy and Nkrumah’s 
initially excellent relationship deteriorated so rapidly when we appreciate the history of 
mutual misunderstanding and misinterpretation that preceded it.  
 A third problem concerns individuals, prime movers, and causation. Fredrik Logevall 
issues a warning: ‘to privilege the foreign as much as the United States […] is to risk being 
ahistorical, by assigning greater influence to some actors than they may in fact deserve. The 
69 At the same time David Bell points out that ‘a remarkable amount is absent as well,’ see David Bell, “This Is 
What Happens When Historians Overuse the Idea of the Network”, The New Republic, October 25, 2013, 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114709/world-connecting-reviewed-historians-overuse-network-metaphor. 
70 Mario Del Pero, “On the Limits of Thomas Zeiler’s Historiographical Triumphalism”, Journal of American 
History 95, no. 4 (2009): 1082. 
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United States is not merely one power among many’.71 As Connelly has concluded, though, 
rather than accepting America’s exceptional power, this methodology allows us to test it. 
American power appeared less or more threatening from different vantage points, enabling us 
to define more clearly what American power looked like to others.72 
The last allegation leveled at the multi-centric historian is that he is not so different 
from the old diplomatic historian and his ‘orthodox form of diplomatic historiography, which 
consists simply of telling what a second secretary or a chargé d’affaires has said.’73 However, 
diplomatic historians in the past tended to focus on the diplomatic interaction of one state 
whereas a history from multiple perspectives channels our attention to how the decisions of 
other international actors, state and non-state, influence the decision making process, how 
representation and misinterpretation shaped decisions that cannot otherwise be explained.  
Specifically, a cross-national approach is adopted here by focusing on the interstate 
competition rather than the government to people activities.74 Governmental propaganda 
agents are seen here as independent actors, who had encounters with the agents of other 
governments and non-private actors, which shaped their own strategies. The information and 
colonial talks, the Africa talks within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
bilateral meetings were the three major encounters where the views of target populations and 
strategies were directly or indirectly exchanged. The adoption and adaptation of public 
diplomacy techniques and strategies will be referred to as a cross-national phenomenon, as it 
is something governmental actors did, whereas the freedom fighters stationed in Accra are 
considered to be transnational actors who operate outside of the framework of the state.  
The study of public diplomacy and cultural assistance in different national environments 
nonetheless requires caution. Marc Bloch was alarmed by homonyms that could trick the 
historian into believing that terms and concepts that appear to be similar indeed mean the 
71 Fredrik Logevall, “Politics and Foreign Relations”, Journal of American History 95, no. 4 (2009): 1076. 
72 Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, viii. 
73 Del Pero, “On the Limits of Thomas Zeiler’s Historiographical Triumphalism”, 1081. 
74 The internationalisation of public diplomacy history, also known as the agenda to de-centre America, has been 
most powerfully set forth by Jessica Gienow-Hecht who calls on researchers to study how other countries spread 
propaganda in the US and encourages the study of periods beyond the Cold War, see Jessica C. E. Gienow-
Hecht, “Introduction: On the Division of Knowledge and the Community of Thought: Culture and International 
History”, in Culture and International History, ed. Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher, 
Explorations in Culture and International History Series (Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books, 2003); 
Gienow-Hecht, Sound Diplomacy; Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, “What Bandwagon? Diplomatic History Today”, 
The Journal of American History 95, no. 4 (2009): 1083–86; Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, “Decentering 
American History”, in Decentering America (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 1–22; Justin Hart by contrast 
emphasizes the continuity between the American information effort before and after the war, see Justin Hart, 
Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of US Foreign Policy (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 5. 
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same. Connected with this was Bloch’s preference to compare only the comparable.75 Bloch’s 
view presents a limitation, however, because a comparison of seemingly different things can 
often highlight similarities and shed new light on hitherto unstudied issues.76 Nonetheless, in 
comparing European, American, and Ghanaian public diplomacy a conceptual problem is 
evident. On the one hand, the more formalised American concept of ‘public diplomacy’ 
differs from European ‘cultural relations’ and the strident Ghanaian propaganda and 
assistance to freedom fighters. On the other hand, European and Ghanaian information offices 
fulfilled tasks similar to those of the ICA and USIA with whom they came into contact and 
saw as competitors. It is precisely for that reason that they are considered here together as 
characters of the same story. 
 
 
Organisation and Sources 
 
This international history of Africa is a triangular story that centres on the emergence of the 
United States and Ghana as new ideological players and the response of the former imperial 
powers, France and the UK, to their presence. The period between 1953 and 1963 began with 
the psychological warfare campaign against the Mau Mau in Kenya, Eisenhower’s 
inauguration and the French defeat in Dien Bien Phu in 1954, which shifted French attention 
to its possessions in North and West Africa.77 The narrative ends with Macmillan’s 
resignation in October 1963, Kenya’s independence, the creation of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU), the break-up of the Ghana-Guinea Union and the termination of the 
Algerian War with the signing of the Évian agreement in 1962. In the US, Kennedy was 
assassinated and attention shifted to Apartheid South Africa as the first Cubans landed in 
Guinea-Bissau in support of Amílcar Cabral.78  
The need to understand how concerns about the so-called ‘native mind’ shifted in 
conjuncture with the Cold War and decolonization has influenced the structure of the story 
75 Marc Bloch, Mélanges historiques, vol. 1 (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1963), 17; George M. Fredrickson, White 
Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1981), xv. 
76 Maura O’Conner, “Cross-National Travelers: Rethinking Comparisons and Representations”, in Comparison 
and History: Europe in Cross-National Perspective, ed. Deborah Cohen and Maura O’Connor (New York and 
London: Routledge, 2004), 137. 
77 Frederick Cooper, “Reconstructing Empire in British and French Africa”, in Post-War Reconstruction in 
Europe: International Perspectives, 1945-1949, ed. Mark Mazower, Jessica Reinisch, and David Feldman, Past 
& Present Supplement 6, 2011, 203; Most famously, Leopold Senghor's acceptance of the mandate of secretary 
of state in the Cabinet of Edgar Faure. 
78 Pierre Lellouche and Dominique Moisi, “French Policy in Africa: A Lonely Battle against Destabilization”, 
International Security 3, no. 4 (1979): 114; John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British 
World-System, 1830-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 632, 638. 
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told here: a ten year period is divided into two sections with eight chapters in which a 
different actor was able to shape how Africa was perceived internationally. Part 1 explores 
how ideas about psychological modernisation shaped international decision making until 
1960. Chapter 1 describes Eisenhower’s attempts to convince Winston Churchill and Pierre 
Mendès-France of the need to prepare their colonial subjects for self-government. Calls for 
independence were not ignored by the president because of a Soviet threat, as argued in the 
1960s, nor did foreign aid plans fail due to domestic resistance as revisionists suggest. 
Eisenhower believed that he was supporting the case of self-government by offering 
education. Claims about his ad-hoc decision making, or his indifference to Africa in the belief 
that the Third World was not ready for democracy, become less credible in light of his 
commitment to cultural assistance. Conversely, on the ground, French and British public 
diplomats were convinced that US officers shared their understanding of education as a 
colonial management tool, leading to Anglo-American cooperation and French-US 
competition. 
Chapter 2 analyses the Bandung Conference of 1955 not as a racial event, or as an 
attempt to reject or utilise the Cold War, but as a symbolic manifestation of the Third World 
project. Participants rejected the notion that ‘emerging peoples’ were not capable of self-
government while newly independent states in Asia offered assistance to dependent territories 
in Africa. They wanted to deliver on the promises of the civilising mission, to succeed where 
the West had failed. To British, French and American ears however, the Bandung delegates 
did not reject Western guidance, but demanded an enhanced colonial project with more and 
better aid. Paradoxically, the West expanded its activities in the areas of assistance. 
Chapter 3 assesses this issue of foreign aid in the aftermath of the Bandung conference. 
In the French and British foreign aid schemes, public diplomacy was now used as a shield 
against foreign influence and a way to promote aid schemes, Eisenhower, however, believed 
foreign aid could only work if it was linked with education. It explains why aid in real 
numbers remained low even though Eisenhower vocally supported assistance policies: he 
invested in cultural assistance. Particularly after the Suez crisis of 1956, public diplomats 
worked hard to convince African peoples that they wanted the civilization mission to succeed. 
Chapter 4 assesses how Nkrumah and the Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs built a 
network of political activists throughout Africa and the spread of the so-called ‘African 
Personality’. The claim that Nkrumah exchanged his peaceful policy of ‘Positive Action’ for 
violence is challenged. Violence in itself was never considered to be sufficient, it needed to be 
backed by an effort to strengthen the self-confidence of the African by spreading the ‘African 
I n t r o d u c t i o n  | 25 
 
Personality’ in an attempt to break the psychological chains of colonialism. Public diplomacy 
thus shaped Nkrumah’s diplomacy at every turn. 
Chapter 5 dispels the myth that France completely withdrew from Guinea after the 
territory refused to enter into the French Community in 1958. While the British and the 
Americans have long been cast as hesitant players, the ideological scramble reveals how their 
initial caution dissipated because of Ghana’s appealing propaganda. The ideological scramble 
allowed the French and British to believe they were in control of decolonisation, while 
Nkrumah could claim he had an impact on Western policies. Even though ‘orderly transition’ 
remained the watchword, Ghana’s actions forced public diplomats to take their African target 
audience into account and led them to imitate each other’s successful public relations 
techniques. 
Part 2 looks at how the socio-economic paradigm became a dominant lens through 
which events in Africa were understood. Chapter 6 describes the collapse of psychological 
modernisation. As independent African countries multiplied, doubts arose about the 
competence of existing cultural assistance schemes. When the French tested a bomb in the 
Sahara desert, Nkrumah embarked upon a propaganda campaign that showed the West that 
African leaders were able to operate in an international environment. The brutality of the 
Congo crisis in turn underscored that psychological modernisation had failed and made 
Nkrumah realise he would need to mobilise mass support for there to be any chance of 
attaining African unity. Rather than understanding both events as episodes of the Cold War, it 
is argued here that Ghana’s campaign against the bomb forced the US, the UK, and France to 
take a public stance. Moreover, the chapter argues that rather than the rumors about the 
communist sympathies of the Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, it was his 
reputation as a demagogue that led to his assassination.  
Chapter 7 explores how policy makers in the global north sought to harness the second 
dominant reality of their age besides the Cold War, namely decolonisation, by offering 
African leaders education and economic assistance. Even though Kennedy, de Gaulle and 
Macmillan all presented their aid as a way to attain pan-African goals, the evidence suggests 
that anticolonialism was seen as the outcome of piecemeal colonial modernization, which had 
made African leaders emotional and envious. In doing so the image of Kennedy as someone 
who had sympathy for the cause of African nationalism is rejected.  
Chapter 8 elucidates how after 1961 the relations between Ghana and the Western 
nations, particularly the US, were shaped by misperceptions about each other’s public 
diplomacy. For many African leaders, the activities at the cultural centre became weapons that 
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were aimed at undercutting the African cultural identity. Modernisation theorists on the other 
hand considered those same cultural centres as places to demonstrate the gains that came with 
modernisation and increase the benevolent American image. Unknowingly, Ghana and the US 
deepened their animosity towards each other. Where pan-Africanism became an emotionally 
charged and unconstructive force in the eyes of American policy makers obsessed with 
technical change, US public diplomats were cast as neocolonial shock troops. 
Taken together these eight moments challenges a narrative in which non-Western actors 
remain subaltern agents with significant influence but without the ability to present a viable 
alternative to the Cold War pressures that they can only resist or utilise. The principal actors 
analyzed here are the Americans, the Ghanaians, the French and the British officials who 
listed each other as their most important competitors. The Communist challengers – the 
Soviet-Union, Cuba, China and the Eastern Bloc – only appear in the margins because the 
first generation of African leaders considered the Cold War to be a sideshow to the fight for 
independence in the 1950s. Even though Egypt, Belgium, and Israel were important they only 
occasionally appear. Nasser was a force to be reckoned with and his influence extended as far 
as Zanzibar and East Africa, but his main foreign policy goal was leadership in the Middle 
East.79 Belgium for its part created the Centre d’information et de documentation du Congo 
Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi (CID) in 1950. These archives, however, are lost.80 
The geographical area studied here has several names such as Tropical Africa, Sub-
Saharan Africa and Non-Arab Africa. The term that will be employed here is Sub-Saharan 
Africa, a region defined in line with the United Nations Statistics Division as all of Africa 
except the Western Sahara, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, but with the Sudan 
included in sub-Saharan Africa.81 Apartheid South Africa and the Portuguese colonies fall 
outside of the purview of this study because they constitute a separate problem and only 
79 Brennan, “Radio Cairo and the Decolonization of East Africa, 1953-64”, 175; Zach Levey, “The Rise and 
Decline of a Special Relationship: Israel and Ghana, 1957-1966”, African Studies Review 46, no. 1 (2003): 155–
77; Mary Ann Heiss and Piero Gleijeses, “‘Flee! The White Giants Are Coming!’: The United States, 
Mercenaries, and the Congo, 1964-1965”, in Empire and Revolution: The United States and the Third World 
Since 1945, ed. Peter L. Hahn (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2001), 71–93; Alaba Ogunsanwo, 
China’s Policy in Africa 1958-71 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1–14; Louise Woodroofe, 
“Buried in the Sands of the Ogaden”: The United States, the Horn of Africa, and the Demise of Détente (Kent: 
Kent State University Press, 2013), 14–38. 
80 Guy Coppieters, Inventaris van het archief van het Belgisch instituut voor voorlichting en documentatie - 
INBEL en de federale voorlichtingsdienst (FVD) 1962-2003 [1945-2003], Algemeen Rijksarchief Inventarissen 
405 (Brussels: Algemeen Rijksarchief, 2007), 1; Matthew G. Stanard, Selling the Congo: A History of European 
Pro-Empire Propaganda and the Making of Belgian Imperialism (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012). 
81 “United Nations Statistics Division - Standard Country and Area Codes Classifications (M49)”. 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm. 
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gradually became a priority for Nkrumah, who initially even sought rapprochement with 
South Africa.  
The Gold Coast/Ghana (1957), Guinée-Conakry (1958), Congo-Léopoldvile (1960), 
Kenya (1963) and Senegal (1960) have been selected because these territories became 
symbols of the African struggle for independence and were involved with the ideological 
debates about Africa and emerge in diplomatic correspondence. This selection further offers a 
representative set of countries: one ‘loyal’ (Senegal) and one ‘rebellious’ (Guinée) French 
former colony, one ‘loyal’ (Gold Coast/Ghana) and one ‘rebellious’ (Kenya) British former 
colony and the Belgian colony of the Congo, a key territory for imaginations and hard 
economic interests. 
The events in Nigeria, Liberia, Algeria, (British) Sudan, Tanzania and Egypt have been 
surveyed in a less systematic way. Nasser’s propaganda campaign is only studied in so far as 
it influenced the decision making of the four principal actors. Julius Nyere’s African 
socialism – Ujamaa – was crucial to Tanzania’s domestic politics and was noticed in other 
parts of Africa. His bid for regional influence, however, falls chronologically outside the 
period under study here. The low priority given to countries such as Nigeria or Liberia stems 
from the fact that these countries did not aspire to present their own overall view for a new 
Africa. They were not therefore major ideological competitors, only minor players in the 
international history of Africa during this early period. The decade between 1953 and 1963 
was an era in which ‘blueprints’ were crucial sources of international influence. 
With the opening of new archival collections in Ghana, and facilitated access to 
documents in the UK, the US, France and Belgium it is possible to tell a new story. The recent 
declassification at the national archives of Ghana and the Padmore Library in Accra were 
vital, particularly because many documents were destroyed after the coup of 1966. The 
sources from this ‘accidental archive’ were supplemented with documents from institutions 
like the Bodleian Library in Oxford and the Moorland-Spingarn Research Center at Howard 
University. In recognition of the important place of oral history within African societies, the 
last living diplomat under the Nkrumah regime, K.B. Asante, was also interviewed.82  
Although declassification requests were made in the British and French archives, it was 
the declassification at the national archives in College Park Maryland as well as the 
Eisenhower and Kennedy libraries that proved to be vital in shedding new light on American 
82 Jean Allman declassified the Presidential Office Files without which this thesis could not have been written. 
The documents in the Padmore Library were indexed by Jeffrey Ahlman in 2010, see Jean Allman, “AHR Forum 
Phantoms of the Archive: Kwame Nkrumah, a Nazi Pilot Named Hanna, and the Contingencies of Postcolonial 
History-Writing”, American Historical Review 118, no. 1 (2013): 128. 
                                              
28 | T h e  I d e o l o g i c a l  S c r a m b l e  f o r  A f r i c a  
 
public diplomacy between 1961 and 1963. In the Eisenhower library, the often-overlooked 
collection of Abbott Washburn has been studied more closely. While the archives in Kew are 
easily accessible, the history of British information policy in Africa has not been written. 
Many boxes therefore still contained unopened letters.83 
Within postcolonial theory the archive is perceived to be a site of power. Achille 
Mbembe argues that the postcolonial state requires archival technologies to exercise rule. 
Consequently a failed state is a state that is unable to deploy archiving technologies.84 The 
historian, however, is not swayed by his claim. The foreign affairs archives in Europe and the 
US are also filled with piles of unprocessed and mislabeled material. Nonetheless, it is those 
reams of papers and the improved access to African archives that hold the potential for an 
Africa-centred international history and offer the possibility to better understand Africa’s 
changing relation with the rest of the world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83 For instance confidential letter, Douglas W. Williams, “Note on alleged Anti-Americanism among British 
Officials in East Africa”, 23 April 1958, Secret and personal letter, JW Stacpole to CO, CO 1027/332, TNA. 
84 Achille Mbembe, “The Power of the Archive and Its Limits”, in Refiguring the Archive, ed. Carolyn Hamilton, 
Verne Harris, and Graeme Reid (Cape Town: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 23. 
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PART I. THE GOSPEL OF STABILITY (1953 – 1957) 
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1. Orderly Transition 
 
Eisenhower’s Strategy for Africa versus the British and French Plans for 
Empire (October1952 - October 1955) 
 
Self-government is not an end in itself. It is a means to an end, to the building of the good life […] Our 
aim is to make this country […] a shining light throughout the whole continent of Africa, giving 
inspiration far beyond its frontiers. 
 
  – Kwame Nkrumah, Motion of Destiny Speech, 10 January 1953.85 
  
One must always keep in mind that the initiatives undertaken by the United States aimed at increasing its 
cultural influence on the African continent – with the exception of Liberia – are recent. After the 
improvisation of the post-war period, a more organized approach is now pursued. 
 
– Letter from Henri Bonnet, the French ambassador in Washington to Robert Schuman, the 
minister of foreign affairs, 30 March 1950.86 
 
Self-government! Self-government and education. Put the vote before the people. […] and that there 
would be some internal political turbulence. That had to be expected. 
   
– Andrew Goodpaster, Eisenhower’s staff secretary, when asked to clarify Eisenhower’s stance 
on colonialism, 10 April 1982.87 
 
A nationalism is developing out of frictions and frustrations and not out of the smooth working out of 
colonial policy. […] favourable in some respects to the development of an anti-imperialist front and the 
first stage of the colonial revolution. Counter-communist propaganda will not cure this, and it may 
inflame it. 
   
– William Harold Ingrams, adviser on information services and the expert on communism in 
the Colonial Office, 4 March 1952.88 
 
 
In 1951, Margaret Trowell, the head of the Makerere Art Institute in Uganda visited schools 
in Kenya together with one of her African pupils, Joseph Nitro to encourage the European 
settlers to take an interest in the trainees. According to Richard Frost, the British Council 
representative in East Africa, Nitro and his fellow students often felt isolated because they 
could only interact with uneducated Africans. The visitors coincidentally stayed with Jocelyn 
Grant, mother of the British writer Elspeth Huxley – whose article on Ghanaian independence 
and the supposed African appetite for authoritarianism, would resonate with British, French 
85 Kwame Nkrumah, Axioms of Kwame Nkrumah (London and Edinburgh: Nelson, 1967), 51. 
86 ‘Il faut toutefois se garder d’oublier que l’action entreprise par les Etats-Unis en faveur de son influence 
culturelle sur le continent africain est, sauf au Liberia, toute récente; improvisée au lendemain de la guerre, elle 
cherche maintenant seulement à s’organiser à la lumière des premières expériences,’ see Letter, Henri Bonnet to 
Robert Schuman, ‘Effort Culturel des Etats-Unis en Afrique,’ 30 March 1950, 3, DAL, Généralités 1944-1952, 
49QO/57, AMAE. 
87 “Interview with Andrew J. Goodpaster, Jr. on April 10, 1982 for Dwight D. Eisenhower Library”, 33-35, in the 
Columbia University Oral History Research Office Collection.  
88 Notes, W.H. Ingrams, 4 March 1952, CO 537/7779, TNA. 
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and American officials who referred to her in their writings.89 In the beginning of the 1950s, 
though, there was little to suggest the continent was becoming a theatre of ideological 
conflict. During their visit Trowell and Nitro were invited to a cocktail party organised by a 
group of settlers who had become curious when the dean of Makerere spoke about educated 
Africans, because none of them ‘had ever met one’. Nitro was judged to be a peculiar 
specimen: ‘charming and so cultured and interesting’. The British Council official, Richard 
Frost, complained that the settlers made his educational mission difficult.90 
With Frost’s sense of duty but also the settlers’ bigotry in mind, historians have viewed 
the Western commitment to cultural assistance and education as insignificant, merely public 
posturing or – at best – enlightened self-interest. Kennedy and academics such as Walt 
Rostow even claimed Eisenhower ‘wanted to avoid Africa as much as possible’, a lead many 
historians since have followed.91 Winston Churchill’s age – he was 79 in 1953 – and his 
tendency to pepper casual conversations with remarks about British imperialism have sparked 
a multitude of attempts to determine which parts of the Churchillian lexicon were genuine and 
which elements were political-tactical manoeuvering.92 Likewise, while accounts on Charles 
de Gaulle are more polemicised, the narrative on French Africa in the early 1950s sustains the 
view that cultural ties with France eased decolonisation. Even Tony Chafer, who has 
convincingly deconstructed the myth of a transition managed by French officials and local 
elites argues that it was the French language and republican ideals that allowed both groups to 
present decolonisation within the métropole as progressive.93 
Such a narrow understanding of cultural assistance neglects the extent to which policy 
makers in capitals, officials on the ground and academics at universities all struggled to come 
89 Elspeth Huxley, “Two Revolutions That Are Changing Africa”, New York Times Magazine, May 19, 1957, 9. 
90 Highly confidential report, Richard D. Frost, “Visit to District Commissioners in Western Kenya 21st to 26th 
August 1950”, 4 September 1950, 6-8, BW 95/3, TNA. 
91 Vernon McKay, Africa in World Politics (New York: Harper & Row, 1963); Philip E. Muehlenbeck, Betting 
on the Africans: John F. Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist Leaders (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012); Walt W. Rostow, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Foreign Aid (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1985), 75–109; Quote taken from: Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race 
Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 116; Even historians who have 
analysed Eisenhower's public diplomacy strategy towards the Third World still conclude that it lacked strategic 
coherence, was ad-hoc and misguided by a focus on the Cold War. Militant nationalism, Vaughan concludes, 
was perceived as a threat, tied to Kremlin or not, see James R. Vaughan, The Failure of American and British 
Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-57: Unconquerable Minds (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 
244; Kenneth A. Osgood, “Words and Deeds: Race, Colonialism, and Eisenhower’s Propaganda War in the 
Third World”, in The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, ed. 
Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 9–10; Penny Von Eschen, Race 
against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 
122–144. 
92 Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 225. 
93 Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa, 5, 12. 
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to terms with a new phenomenon: nation-building.94 The term surfaced in the 1950s and was 
consciously used by Lucian W. Pye who argued that nation-building required leaders with a 
stable psychology and societies that had, or could, come to terms with their former rulers.95 It 
is argued here that calls for independence were not ignored by the Eisenhower administration 
because of a Soviet threat, but rather seen through the lens of psychological modernisation. 
American officials already believed they were supporting the case of self-government by 
offering preparation. Conversely, Churchill and Mendès-France did not simply reject 
Eisenhower’s requests because they feared ideological intrusion. Since education and 
information were not part of a war of words but perceived to be a form of assistance for which 
the ‘native’ would be thankful, the cultural assistance operation was not significantly 
expanded. Access to French culture represented social mobility, while the offer of British 
communication infrastructure would create goodwill. 
Disregard for the centrality of cultural assistance has made it difficult to reconcile 
contradictions that emerge from the documents. Eisenhower, for instance, has been seen as 
someone who wanted to create stability at all costs, ignored the demands for independence 
and supported right wing dictatorships and the NATO allies. At the same time, he tried to 
uphold the American anticolonial ideal when writing to French and British policy makers or 
at NSC meetings. Revisionists blame domestic resistance for the gap between Eisenhower’s 
discourse in support of aid and his limited results,96 Africanists and many historians of 
decolonisation discern a subtle but effective pressure in favour of independence,97 and post-
94 Although political science distinguishes more rigorously between state-building – the construction of a 
functioning state – and nation-building – with more of a focus on identity – in the fifties, both concepts were 
used interchangeably. Tilly’s paradigm shifting work on state-building theory was actually sponsored by the 
Social Science Research Council and the Ford Foundation and was explicitly meant to assist the emergence of 
organised independent countries in the Third World, see Charles Tilly, Gabriel Ardant, and Social Science 
Research Council (US) Committee on Comparative Politics, The Formation of National States in Western 
Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), i–xiv. 
95 Gilman, Mandarins of the Future, 170. 
96 Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower. The President 1952-1959, vol. 2 (London and Sydney: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1984), 387. 
97 Olajide Aluko, “Politics of Decolonization in British West Africa, 1945-1960”, in History of West Africa, ed. 
Ade Ajayi and Michael Crowder, vol. 2 (Essex: Longman Group, 1987), 694–95; H.S. Wilson, African 
Decolonization (London: Edward Arnold, 1994), 54–56; William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, “The 
United States and the Liquidation of British Empire in Tropical Africa, 1941-1951”, in The Transfer of Power in 
Africa: Decolonization 1940-1960, ed. Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1982), 48–49; Jeffrey A. Frieden, “The Economics of Intervention: American Overseas Investments and 
Relations with Underdeveloped Areas, 1890-1950”, Comparative Studies in Society and History 31, no. 1 
(1989): 55–80; Cameron D. Watt, Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain’s Place, 1900-1975 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 250–252; James P. Hubbard, The United States and the End of British 
Colonial Rule in Africa, 1941-1968 (McFarland, 2010), 364; Hubbard, a modern day Africanist however comes 
to the same - unconvincing - conclusion as his colleagues of the 1980s. The shift from working with an 
extremely limited set of sources to handling the enormous American documentary record leads Africanists 
almost inevitably to this conclusion. 
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revisionists argue that the president conflated nationalism with communism.98 The notion that 
Eisenhower saw Africans as racially incompetent, thus making a genuine policy in support of 
independence impossible has become widely accepted among historians of the global Cold 
War and even those writing on public diplomacy.99  
Likewise, two equally convincing views on Churchill’s imperial stance exist. Drawing 
on his opposition to Indian independence, some have cast him as a staunch imperialist.100 
Others, who look at his legislative work – rather than his discourse – wonder if Churchill was 
even interested in empire. As Colonial Office minister in 1920 he was viewed as someone 
opposing imperial expansion, while he did not have an imperial programme as prime 
minister.101 Historians since the mid-1990s have viewed him as a pragmatist who believed in 
the civilising mission but was willing to compromise. However, how Churchill and British 
officials reconciled their belief in the benevolence of empire with its dismantlement remains 
unexplained.102 
In the case of France, it is unclear to what extent the country was able to project cultural 
power in the 1950s, even though a shared set of values is precisely what is seen as a binding 
factor between officials in Paris and elites in Africa. Historians are divided into those who 
believe the French ability to maintain cultural hegemony was debilitated by the swift defeat in 
the Second World War and Americanisation and others who discern a persistent influence of 
98 Robert J. McMahon, “Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists”, Political 
Science Quarterly 101, no. 3 (1986): 457; John Kent, “United States Reactions to Empire, Colonialism, and Cold 
War in Black Africa, 1949–57”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 33, no. 2 (2005): 216; 
Paradoxically, McMahon’s critique drew strength from radical revisionists historians of the Cold War who were 
turning towards dependency theory, which unmasked modernisation programmes as tools of exploitation, see 
Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1980 (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1988). 
99 Attention to modernisation theory has not overturned the view that Eisenhower made ad-hoc decisions rooted 
in racial fears. According to Connelly, the fear of racial war made Eisenhower accelerate decolonisation in 
Algeria, and Westad sees Eisenhower as a president who operated outside of the American interventionist 
tradition, while Long agrees with post-revisionists who argue that Eisenhower intervened in Singapore out of 
Cold War concerns, but the success of cultural diplomacy made for a mixed, rather than a disastrous, outcome. 
See Westad, The Global Cold War, 27; Matthew Connelly, “Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-
South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence”, American Historical Review 105, no. 3 (2000): 741; 
Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, 76; S. R. Joey Long, Safe for Decolonization: The Eisenhower 
Administration, Britain, and Singapore (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2011), xi. 
100 Christopher G. Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1941-1945 
(Oxford and London: Oxford University Press, 1978), 669, 725, 750. 
101 Ronald Hyam, “Churchill and the Colonial Empire”, in Understanding the British Empire (Cambridge and 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 335. 
102 Ronald Hyam, Understanding the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 335–337; 
Roy Jenkins, “Churchill: The Government of 1951-1955”, in Churchill, ed. Robert Blake, William Roger Louis, 
and Robert Blake (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 499; Richard Toye, Churchill’s Empire: The World That 
Made Him and the World He Made (London: Pan Books, 2010), 313, 315; Toye surveys a wide array of sources 
to gives a complex explication of Churchill’s views on empire, but does not explain how these views related to 
policy or why the British prime minister could entertain a whole range of contradicting views about the empire. 
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French ideas.103 As Tony Chafer demonstrates, African elites used their continued intellectual 
link with France opportunistically, which they presented as a progressive project.104 Yet a 
great deal is assumed about the intentions of French public diplomats, making it even harder 
to measure its impact.  
These various interpretations fit together, however, when viewed from the perspective 
of an ideological scramble. A re-examination of the evidence brings two arguments about 
strategy to the surface. First and foremost, the Eisenhower administration had an Africa 
strategy that was derived from civilisational discourses and aimed to export the American 
model through education to ensure an orderly transition. Second, Churchill and Mendes-
France resisted those far-reaching plans, something that was never obvious to Eisenhower 
because the European and American views drew on a shared vocabulary of education and 
preparation.  
Semantic confusion allowed officials in Whitehall to cling to the illusion of the 
civilising mission as they were being forced out of Africa. As long as Africans were educated 
to understand British decisions, influence would be maintained. A genuine effort to convince 
Africans was not considered, because such a move would turn them into political actors – 
unconceivable to the British in the 1950s. Education had to forestall not foster self-
government. In French Africa, that rationale was even more pronounced. French cultural 
centres were used to thwart political movements rather than promote a set of alternative 
cultural norms. In that way cultural superiority and anxiety could coexist. 
Additionally, these misunderstandings among Cold War allies were reproduced on the 
ground through a range of tactics. How did cultural assistance affect the attitudes of Africans 
in the eyes of operatives? It is argued here that more than anything else it was the various 
answers to that question that led public diplomats to fight with each other. How cultural 
assistance worked to affect change was a contentious issue: development aid for some, an 
inflation of African prestige or an attempt to attain stability for others.  
At the same time, these disputes reveal an awareness about the connections between 
political ‘maturity’ and the power of ideas on the one hand and the capacity to maintain the 
empire or sustain American security on the other. The ability of public diplomats to prepare, 
educate and convince Africans ensured at least a minimal form of control over a process with 
103 Jennifer M. Dueck, “International Rivalry and Culture in Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate”, in 
Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy, ed. Jessica C. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried (New York and 
Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010), 151; Dubosclard, L’action artistique de la France aux Etats-Unis, 1915-1969, 
350–351. 
104 Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa, 234. 
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an uncertain outcome. This is the argument about policy making and public diplomacy on the 
ground that is presented here in two parts. 
 
 
Exploring the Links between Preparation and Stability (1953-1954) 
 
In his memoirs, President Eisenhower wrote about how overwhelmed he had been by 
decolonisation: ‘In flood force, the spirit of nationalism had grown in all Africa’. The 
determination of the peoples for ‘self-rule […] resembled a torrent overrunning everything in 
its path, including frequently the best interests of those concerned.’ Although the United 
States had no direct strategic interests on the African continent, with a ‘position of leadership 
in the Free World’, the US – in the words of Eisenhower – did not want to ‘see chaos run wild 
among hopeful, expectant peoples and could not afford to see turmoil in an area where the 
communists would be only too delighted to take an advantage.’105 This often repeated imagery 
of a flood or mighty river that could ‘burst through barriers and create havoc’ was part of a 
burgeoning discourse of modernisation. The destructive force of this flood was reminiscent of 
longstanding imagery of uncontrollable hordes and the ‘yellow peril’. Yet, Eisenhower’s 
choice of words also suggests inevitability, revealing his confidence and determination about 
the fact that he could ‘make constructive use of it.’106 
When he wrote his manuscript in the early 1960s, Eisenhower must have re-read the 
notes he had made during his conversations with Churchill, the living emblem of the British 
Empire. A few days before his inauguration, on 6 January 1953, Eisenhower expressed his 
views on the rise of nationalism in a dinner conversation with the British prime minister. The 
president argued that ‘dependent peoples’ did not automatically look to Europe for guidance, 
but had to be convinced that their only hope of maintaining independence was ‘through 
cooperation with the free world.’ While possibly slower, it had the certainty of being ‘orderly’ 
as well as ‘healthy and sound.’107 For the president, colonialism was on the ‘way out as a 
relationship among peoples,’ the only thing left to do was to focus on eliminating the 
105 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace: 1956-1961 (London: Heinemann, 1965), 572. 
106 In Jim Meriwether’s interpretation, this quotation illustrates how prejudice prevented Eisenhower from 
developing a coherent policy. Matthew Connelly takes the ‘flood’ comment as proof of Eisenhower’s fear of 
racial war, but overlooks the potential that the president also saw, see Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, 91; 
Connelly, “Taking Off the Cold War Lens”, 766; James H. Meriwether, “‘A Torrent Overrunning Everything’: 
Africa and the Eisenhower Administration”, in The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the 
Globalization of the Cold War, ed. Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2006), 176. 
107 Diary Entry on Tuesday, 6 January 1953, 3-5, AWF, DDE Diaries Series, Box 1, DDEL. 
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obstacles that prevented ‘self-government’ and ‘win adherents to Western aims.’108 In short, a 
territory could become independent provided it was sufficiently prepared. 
Initially, Eisenhower asked the leaders of the imperial powers to make speeches that 
impressed upon dependent peoples that their legitimate claim for self-rule came with a heavy 
responsibility. The American presence in Puerto Rico had taught the Americans that people 
would insist upon retaining their connections with the mother country once you explained to 
‘the native the responsibilities and increased costs.’109 While he had also written to the French 
prime minister, Pierre Mendès-France, the president was convinced that ‘no other could’ do it 
‘so well’ as Churchill. When the British prime minister informed Eisenhower about his talks 
with Soviet leader Georgy Malenkov, Eisenhower proposed instead ‘a thoughtful speech on 
the subject of the rights to self-government.’ In the first sentences of this letter he emphasises 
that the speech would have to deal with the need for education and announce the cooperation 
of the ‘Western World to bring educational opportunities to all peoples.’110  The British prime 
minister was more defeatist: 
 
In this I must admit I am a laggard. I am a bit sceptical about universal suffrage for the Hottentots even 
if refined by proportional representation. The British and American democracies were slowly and 
painfully forged and even they are not perfect yet.111 
 
Eisenhower was disappointed, pledging to ‘never stay around in active position so long that 
age itself will make me a deterrent to rather than an agent of reasonable action.’ Even though 
the president was 62 years old he considered himself to be better with the times. 
Eisenhower, together with Henry Byroade and George V. Allen, his assistant secretaries 
of State for the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, had taken the British civilisation mission 
– which claimed to prepare its colonies for independence – seriously. The 1946 development 
plan for Nigeria for instance focused on raising academic standards in view of the country’s 
need for well-educated men in the public services.112 Nonetheless, Eisenhower drew a sharp 
distinction between the American plans and the line taken by the former colonial powers – 
108 Top secret letter, Eisenhower to Churchill, 22 July 1954, 2, 3, International Series, Papers as President 1953-
1961, Box 19, f: Churchill – July-December 1954 (2), DDEL; Andrew Goodpaster also remembers Eisenhower’s 
sense that ‘colonialism has passed,’ see “Interview with Andrew Goodpaster, Jr. on April 10, 1982 for Dwight 
D. Eisenhower Library”, on p. 35, in the Columbia University Oral History Research Office Collection.  
109 Letter, Eisenhower to Alfred M. Grunther, 30 November 1954, AWF, DDE Diary Series, Box 8, DDEL. 
110 Top secret letter from Eisenhower to Churchill, 22 July 1954, 2, 3, International Series, Papers as President 
1953-1961, Box 19, f: Churchill – July-December 1954 (2), DDEL. 
111 Quote taken from Roland Quinault, “Churchill and Black Africa”, History Today 55, no. 6 (June 2005): 31–
36. 
112 Confidential, “Broad Lines of Future Educational Policy in Nigeria”, August 1959, CO 936/564, TNA; 
Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 37. 
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which he considered to be an ‘old-fashioned, paternalistic approach’ – confident that the 
newly liberated people would look to them for guidance. Churchill told Eisenhower that he 
believed that after independence nations would still ‘recognize the wisdom of our 
suggestions.’ For the president this could only be true in the abstract. American or British 
plans would not be accepted unless so-called ‘emerging peoples’ were convinced by 
persuasion and example.113 
 
 
The Gift of British Information Services  
 
Eisenhower did not fully comprehend how accurate his own observation was: for UK officials 
the establishment of information departments was a ‘gift’ to the colonies that were on the road 
to independence.114 Communication technology had been a crucial material pillar of the 
British Empire. Edward Linley Sambourne’s cartoon of Cecil Rhodes holding a telegraph line 
from Cape Town to Cairo became an iconic image of British imperialism, as Harold Innis 
developed his influential argument that empires and the Commonwealth had been shaped by 
communication infrastructures such as the telegraph, the radio and railways. Assisting former 
colonies in the establishment of their radio and press service would turn them into viable 
states and therefore create goodwill towards the UK.115 Harold Evans of the Colonial Office 
(CO) for instance believed it would force local politicians to hesitate before tampering with 
the truth.116   
The notion that information services were a form of aid was so pervasive that when 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Anthony Nutting, appointed the Drogheda Committee to assess 
the value of the government’s information effort in 1952, some members of the committee 
worried that the UK would never be able to handle the overwhelming demand. Privy 
Counsellor J. Boyd-Carpenter felt that if UK information offices were built in Nigeria, the 
Gold Coast and the British West Indies it would become very difficult to deny other colonies 
what they called ‘a similar benefit’.117 The final report thus also recommended shifting the 
113 Diary Entry on Tuesday, 6 January 1953, 3-5, AWF, DDE Diary Series, Box 1, DDEL. 
114 Confidential Notes, “Notes of a Meeting Held at the British Council on Thursday, 8th September 1960 to Hear 
a Report from Mr. Fowells on his visit to the Congo”, 8 September, BW 154/1, TNA. 
115 Simon J. Potter, Broadcasting Empire: The BBC and the British World, 1922-1970 (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 3–4; Harold Innis, Empire and Communications (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 
2007), 1–31; Confidential notes, “Notes of a Meeting Held at the British Council on Thursday, 8th September 
1960 to Hear a Report from Mr. Fowells on his visit to the Congo”, 8 September 1960, BW 154/1, TNA. 
116 Minutes, Watrous for Evans, 16 March 1954, CO 1027/74, TNA. 
117 Andrew Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist: The Information Research Department (New York: 
Routledge, 2007), 243; Letter, J. Boyd-Carpenter to David Maxwell Fyfe, GOVO, Office, 20 January 1954, CO 
1027/70, TNA. 
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information focus to the colonies, because there was no need to preach to the converted in 
Europe.118 
The British Council, founded as a non-official institute of cultural diplomacy, only 
partially agreed with this reasoning. It did not want to scale down its European operations 
because it believed so-called ‘friendships’ would not endure if taken for granted. Moreover, 
the political bias of the report could not be followed because the Council’s usefulness lay 
precisely in its non-political character. The officers at the Council entertained a conventional 
view of cultural exchange as a two-way street, something officers emphasised when a 
Nigerian Council office was set up in 1953.119 
Policy officials only made a step towards that reasoning when they were confronted 
with colonial resistance. When riots broke out in Accra, in 1948 in the aftermath of the war, 
the Watson Commission – tasked with an investigation – concluded that the ‘failure of public 
relations’ had been ‘as a major contributory cause of the Gold Coast disturbances.’ As a result 
an information department was established in that territory.120 The British believed that their 
African subjects would accept the British judgment as long as any decisions were properly 
explained through media. 
Nothing strengthened the British more in this belief than the vicious war against the 
Mau Mau, a section of the Kikuyu, a social group in Kenya. The Kikuyu had lost their land 
and status when the first commissioner of the British East Africa Protectorate, Charles Eliot, 
decided in 1902 to attract white settlers so the Uganda Railway Company could pay its debts. 
Because some of the Kikuyu had been able to profit financially during the Second World 
War, returning veterans, including Jomo Kenyatta, turned the socio-economic conflict into a 
surge for independence.121 Sir Evelyn Baring, governor of Kenya, declared a state of 
emergency on 9 October 1952 and arrested 180 leaders after senior chief Waruhiu was 
murdered. The Mau Mau began to mobilise parts of the population through a set of oaths, 
each expressing a deeper commitment to violent resistance. The dirty war that followed, with 
118 Memorandum, [1954], CO 1027/70, TNA; In the US it would take another six year before the Sprague 
Committee made the same recommendation, although USIA funds were already being transferred to the so-
called Third World. A renewed policy on overseas information services was set out in the White Paper of July 
1957, which took full account of the Drogheda Committee’s earlier report, particularly as it pertains to financial 
resources. Financing for the information services increased each year from £13000000 in 1957 to £20200000 in 
1961, see Reply, Charles Hill to Christopher Mayhew, 10 July 1961, FO 953/2050, TNA. 
119 Vaughan, The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-57, 16; Potter, 
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Memorandum, CO, “Public Relations: Kenya”, 23 October 1952, CO 1027/40, TNA. 
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its connections to the Cold War and transnational networks, has overshadowed the profound 
influence it had for the British information strategy.122 
Nonetheless, for the CO it was clear what made Kenya’s resistance violent: the absence 
of an information department.123 Even though Harold Evans had been struck by fever on his 
flight from Nairobi to Dar es Salaam, he still wrote a pencil note to impress upon the director 
of the Information Service in Kenya, Charles Carstairs, that he had to transform his service 
into a genuine information machine. The problems with the Kikuyu were seen as a failure of 
information services, not as a failure of policy and action. From July 1953 onwards Baring 
was pressured into giving maximal publicity to various schemes for social betterment 
deployed to win over the insurgent Kikuyu, for instance with a booklet in Swahili that 
depicted a helpful multi-racial police, a recurring propaganda theme.124 
To explain why elements within the Kikuyu kept resisting – even after the CO had sent 
out its PR expert Granville Roberts to create ‘publicity’ for the settlers – the Mau Mau were 
diagnosed with a mental disorder. A string of experts such as anthropologists Max Gluckman 
and Louis Leakey and the former Governor of Kenya Sir Philip Mitchell, but most 
prominently John Carothers, all believed the initiation oath of the Mau Mau was a 
manifestation of a psychological defect (illustration 4).125 
Paradoxically, the pathological interpretation of Mau Mau resistance also undercut the 
information effort. Harold Evans even began to doubt if the increase of information was worth 
the effort. He considered the idea that a so-called ‘psychological warfare expert’ would solve 
all difficulties to be misguided. In the end what was needed was someone who knew the 
‘African mind’ in general and the ‘Kikuyu mind’ in particular.126 It was not psychological war 
122 David A. Percox, Britain, Kenya and the Cold War: Imperial Defence, Colonial Security and Decolonisation 
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but psychological modernisation that was needed. The British also faltered on their 
commitment to create a UK information service. Only when a survey in 1954 revealed that 
the presence of offices of the United States Information Agency was creating problems in 
Kenya did the CO decide to step up its information effort in those areas.127 
Ultimately, ethno-psychology was a way to rationalise the predicament British officials 
and settlers found themselves in: the modern imperial enterprise required an information 
effort, but a defence of colonial decisions implied an acknowledgement of political 
grievances. In a conversation with Michael Blundell, minister on the war council in Kenya, 
Churchill displayed this mixture of the pathological and the political. He had been astonished 
by the change that had come over the ‘minds’ of once ‘happy, naked and charming people.’ 
For him the challenge was not of a military nature, but a question of how to get to the rebels’ 
minds. Yet when Blundell agreed that the killing of ‘savages’ was tragic, Churchill retorted: 
‘Savages, savages? Not savages. They’re savages armed with ideas – much more difficult to 
deal with.’128 
 
 
French Culture as the Key to Upward Social Mobility 
 
Eisenhower set himself up for disappointment once again when he wrote to Mendès-France 
whom he found to be ‘Churchillian in his attitude towards dependent peoples’ afraid that his 
prestige would be reduced if he lost ‘one iota of the area […] over which he exercised some 
degree of influence.’129 Mendès-France had shifted the focus to French Africa after 
negotiating an armistice for Indochina in June 1954 and announcing autonomy for Tunisia. 
However, the tools Eisenhower relied on to promote self-government were, in the French 
case, used to defuse political aspirations. In the centres culturels of French West Africa – 157 
centres by 1956 – magazines such as Paris-Match and Bingo were on offer. By granting 
access to French culture the aspirations for social mobility and progress of young people were 
met. Blinded by their experience with évoluées, French officials grossly misread the political 
potential of this situation. The Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), the main 
political party in French West Africa, campaigned against the centres and wanted to transform 
them into maisons des jeunes, under their own control.130  
127 Notes in the file, Carstairs, 30 March 1955, CO 1027/83, TNA. 
128 Quoted in Toye, Churchill’s Empire, x. 
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A direct threat to the colonial authority could only come from the outside. The delegates 
from Cameroun, the Ivory Coast and Senegal, who had attended the festival of the World 
Assembly of Youth in Singapore, for instance, were monitored closely by the French because 
the anticolonial discourse pervaded those gatherings was dreaded by the French colonial 
authorities.131 In addition, the French did not trust the Americans. The ambassador to 
Washington, Henri Bonnet, purposefully exaggerated the communist threat in Africa and 
encouraged every official to do the same even though the French intelligence service had 
informed him that there was no imminent danger. Bonnet also concluded from reading 
Vernon McKay’s books that the Americans were unknowledgeable about Africa, which could 
lead the USIA to underestimate the effects their anticolonial statements could have upon 
Africans.132  
Nonetheless, despite 157 cultural centers, cultural activities were never used to project a 
body of French ideas. When the people within the political section of French foreign affairs 
tried to convince the Direction générale des relations culturelles (DGRC) in 1954 to expand 
into British Africa, arguing that French culture also had a political function, they were simply 
ignored.133 Cultural assistance was a privilege bestowed upon Africans hungry for 
development, not a political instrument aimed at intransigent activists. Wielding it as such 
would only reward such behaviour 
Nevertheless, those significantly different rationales behind cultural assistance were 
hardly ever clear to Eisenhower, Churchill and Mendès-France, men born at the turn of the 
nineteenth century who shared a paternalistic view of African peoples. As a young man, 
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Churchill was involved as a war correspondent in the Mahdist War in Sudan and the Second 
Anglo-Boer War in South Africa. He admired the bravery of his opponents, but in his 
assessment the virtues of barbarism were ‘outweighed by the intelligence of the invaders and 
their superior force of character.’134 Mendès-France for his part was a staunch believer in the 
universality of republican values. As a member of the Popular Front government of Léon 
Blum in 1936 he helped design a colonial reform project that sought to liberalise and 
humanise French colonialism while binding the colonies more closely to France.135  
It was the absence of a colonial tradition or a link to Africa that distinguished 
Eisenhower from his colleagues. His prejudice about other races and his faith in education 
was initially rooted in a narrative about failed Reconstruction after the Civil War, but 
developed fully when he accompanied General Douglas MacArthur between 1935 and 1939 
as assistant military advisor to build a viable Filipino army, in the event of a Japanese 
attack.136  
In his diary, Eisenhower describes the locals as intelligent children who were, however, 
difficult to educate due to their lazy nature. He expected from the Filipinos ‘a minimum of 
performance from a maximum of promise.’ Eisenhower saw them as unaccustomed to the 
requirements of administrative and executive procedure. His relationship with Maneul L. 
Quezon, the Philippine president, remained one of distance. ‘Why in the hell do you want a 
banana country giving you a field-marshalship?’ he had asked Macarthur after he, himself had 
refused this honour.137 
As president, Eisenhower frequently referred to this period of his life in discussions 
about the Third World and Africa, as an example of a society in transition. He claimed to 
understand what drove African leaders because of his experience with ‘primitive people’ on 
the islands in the Pacific.138 During an NSC meeting on 18 June 1959, for instance, he 
remarked that if the US had not trained the Filipinos in democracy for about forty years, the 
134 Winston Churchill, The River War, 2nd ed. (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1933), 7. 
135 Turpin, “La Communauté Française: un avenir pour la république?”, 59; Chafer, The End of Empire in 
French West Africa, 226. 
136 Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890-1952 (London and 
Boston: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 100–104. 
137 Ibid., 106, 109; Diary Entry on Tuesday 20 July 1937, AWF, DDE Diary Series, Box 1, DDEL. 
138 Memorandum of the 397th Meeting of the National Security Council, 26 February 1959, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States, 1953-61, National Security Council Series, Box 11, f: 397th 
Meeting of NSC, DDEL; Also see Memorandum of Discussion of the 432nd Meeting of the National Security 
Council, 14 January 1960, Papers as President, 1953-1961, NSC Series, Box 12, f: 432nd Meeting of NSC, 
DDEL; Discussion at the 410th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, 18 June 1959, 4, Papers as 
President, 1953-1961 [NSC Series], Box 11, f: 410th Meeting of NSC, DDEL; He also referred to the preparation 
of the Philippines in his talk with Nkrumah, see Memorandum of Conversation, 24 July 1958, FRUS 1958-1960, 
Vol. 14: Africa, 647-652. 
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Philippines would have become a military dictatorship. Rather than propaganda,139 his request 
for speeches was motivated by an expansive concept of security that aimed to create a stable 
global environment that valued American ideals.140 
Instead of waiting for the colonial powers, the Eisenhower administration asked Abbott 
Washburn, the deputy director of USIA, in October 1954 to investigate the state of American 
overseas education. Washburn began to cooperate with Waldemar Nielsen, a political scientist 
at the Ford Foundation, resulting only in 1960 in the Program for the Development of 
Education in the Emerging Countries.141 The International Cooperation Administration (ICA), 
however, stepped in and expanded educational programmes in Africa after 1955. Its 
predecessor the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) had, in 1954, worked to establish a 
permanent cooperation between American universities and the Commission for Technical Co-
operation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA) where the French and the British met to 
discuss their joint development programmes. These institutions did not only turn to aid as a 
short term security measure.142 
Eisenhower’s repeated requests for a speech were thus not mere propaganda, but a 
manifestation of an expansive concept of security. For Eisenhower, a stable transition to self-
government could only be produced by applying his so-called ‘great equation’: a combination 
of spiritual force, economic force and military force. In Eisenhower’s national security 
doctrine, NSC 162/1, the export of American values abroad was the keystone.143 In doing so, 
he built upon Truman’s NSC 68 which had already entrusted the US with a special 
139 Nwaubani argues that Eisenhower’s requests for a speech, made in private letters, were a propaganda stunt, 
but he overlooks the fact that the US would not have gained from a speech made by the imperial powers, see 
Ebere Nwaubani, The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950-1960 (Rochester: University of 
Rochester Press, 2001), 39. 
140 Eisenhower called this the ‘great equation’: Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace: 
How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 44. 
141 Washburn Abbott, “Report on American Overseas Education”, 29 October 1954, Washburn Abbott: Papers, 
1938-2003, Box 12, f: Educational Development 1961 (6), DDEL; Letter, Abbott Washburn to Waldemar 
Nielsen, 22 March 1961, Washburn Abbott: Papers, 1938-2003, Box 12, f: Educational Development 1959-60 
(7), DDEL; Larry Grubbs, Secular Missionaries: Americans and African Development in the 1960s (Amherst 
and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009), 25–26. 
142 Letter, le ministre des affaires étrangères to France d’outre-mer, “a/s: conversation franco-américaines ”,  
[1954], Letter, ministre des affaires étrangères to Monsieur l’ambassadeur de France à Washington, “a/s : 
Coopération entre les Universités américaines de la C.C.T.A.”, [1954], Ministère de la Coopération, Direction de 
la coopération technique et culturelle, 19810443/57, CHAN; For the argument that the FOA was a conservative 
institution, interested mainly in using aid as a weapon in the Cold War, see : Shenin, America’s Helping Hand, 
1–14.  
143 Quoted in Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 44; Kenneth A. Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s 
Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad, illustrated edition (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
2006), 73. 
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responsibility for imposing order by means that were consistent with ‘the principles of 
freedom and democracy.’144  
Eisenhower, Churchill and Mendès-France were not kindred spirits as has been implied 
by historians. What distinguished Eisenhower was his obsession with preparing African 
societies for self-government through cultural assistance. By contrast, British communication 
media and French cultural products were only seen as gifts to Africans demanding progress. 
Eisenhower granted Africans a minimal form of agency by stressing the need to convince and 
educate them, rather than assume their reflex to follow the ‘white man’. 
 
 
Strategies of Manipulation and Modernisation (1953- 1955) 
 
In the absence of a clear blueprint, local officers were forced to make it up as they went along. 
The Jackson Committee, appointed by the president to devise a global information strategy in 
1953, not only marked the establishment of the United States Information Agency (USIA) but 
also encouraged every local United States Information Service (USIS) post to develop its own 
policy.145 The confusing and overlapping set of responsibilities within the French bureaucracy 
made it possible for local posts to ignore directives and establish their own strategies.146 
Likewise, the British programme was managed by the Commonwealth Relations Office 
(CRO), the Colonial Office (CO), the Central Office of Information (COI), and the British 
Broadcast Corporation (BBC) with its empire broadcast service. The Information Policy 
Department (IPD) within the Foreign Office (FO) emerged as the key agency, but the 
multitude of institutions effectively ended London’s stronghold over the colonial 
administrations that were also setting up information departments.147 
144 A Report by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on Basic National Security Policy NSC 
162/2, 30 October 1953, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. 2: National Security Affairs, 577-97; A Report to the National 
Security Council by the Executive Secretary NSC 68, 14 April 1950, FRUS 1950, Vol. 1: National Security 
Affairs, 237-290. 
145 Report, “The Report of the President’s Committee on International Information activities, June 30, 1953” in 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: National Security Affairs, Vol. 2, p. 1872; In 1960, a new 
report confirmed that ‘the decentralization […] has been largely achieved.’ see Sprague Report, Sprague to 
Eisenhower, “Conclusions and Recommendations of the President’s Committee on Information Activities 
Abroad”, December 1960, 8, US President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee): 
Records, 1960-61, f: Printed Committee Report, p. 16, DDEL. 
146 Report, Jean Desparmet to DAL, “Mission d’etude des moyens d’information francais en afrique centrale et 
orientale”, 6 May 1964, 33, DAL, Nord Est Afrique 1960-1965, 35QO/8, AMAE; Letter, Guiringaud to DAL, 
“Information Politique”, 14 May 1960, 4, DAL, Ghana 1960-1965, 50QO/72, AMAE. 
147 Vaughan, The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-57, 16; Kate 
Morris, British Techniques of Public Relations and Propaganda for Mobilizing East and Central Africa during 
World War II, Studies in British History 61 (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000), 445. 
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This autonomy required public diplomats to make a decision about their attitude 
towards competitors and allies. The CO and the settlers in Kenya were eager to cooperate 
with the USIS posts in different African territories, contrary to the French who where 
irritated. Why, it is asked here, was this the case, particularly as settlers were not known for 
their hospitality? To explain the different response to American ideological intrusion and 
elucidate how French public diplomats and the settlers experienced American power, we need 
to examine the propaganda techniques they employed. At local posts it was a combination of 
everyday activities, academic insights and assumptions about so-called ‘primitive’ people that 
provided operatives with a working theory and an inkling of how their activities affected 
African attitudes.  
More importantly, this theory about the most effective combination of message, 
medium and target audience profoundly influenced the judgment made of other information 
services. Complaints about the intrusiveness of American culture, the outcry over 
neocolonialism or loathing of anticolonial propaganda were not a response to an expanded 
presence, but resulted from diverging theories about the power of culture. 
Those ideas had an effect at the most basic level, namely on the rate at which 
information offices expanded after the War in key territories such as the Gold Coast, Kenya, 
French West Africa and the Belgian Congo. Comparatively speaking, the USIA deployed a 
massive operation. By 1953, the Americans had thirteen posts in Africa: Algeria, Egypt, 
Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Union of South Africa, Angola, Nigeria, Liberia, 
the Gold Coast and the Belgian Congo.148 In this year the continent still fell under the 
responsibility of the Near East, South Asia and Africa branch, led by Edward V. Roberts. 
Only in 1958, with John Noon as programme coordinator, was a separate branch for Africa 
created.149 
Because of the USIS expansion, the UK information officers did not feel an urgent need 
to increase their presence. Assuming USIA could step in and deliver some of the necessary 
education, the secretary of state for the colonies in 1950, James Griffith, ordered the colonial 
authorities to cooperate with USIS posts that had been set up after the war.150 Until 1954 the 
Colonial Office had no overseas staff to handle the material they sent out. Only two years 
after the Drogheda report, in 1955, UK Information Offices opened in Accra, the Port of 
148 Draft, Peter L. Koffsky, “The United States Information Program in Africa, 1945-1970: A History & 
Interpretation”, 2-1, RG. 306, A1 1072, Box 9, f: African Program, Historical Background 1970, NARA. 
149 Report, “U.S. Information Agency: First Review of Operations: August-December 1953”, Washburn Abbott 
Papers, Box 34, f: Review of Operations 1953-54, DDEL. 
150 Letter, Harold Evans to W.T.A. Cox, “Extract Note by W. Evans of his visit to Washington, February 1956, 
CO 1027/83, TNA. 
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Spain, Trinidad, Kuala Lumpur and Lagos and a branch office was set up in Kingston, 
Jamaica.151 The CO also wanted to plant offices in East Africa and the West Indies, increase 
the number of films and pamphlets produced and expand the British Council services.152 
Unlike the British, Jean Jurgensen, the chief of the Africa section at French foreign 
affairs, only wanted to establish a close relationship with USIA to limit the emergence of 
possible anti-French sentiments.153 His predecessor, G. Monod, had professionalised the 
consular network in Africa, but the cultural diplomacy section of embassies had remained 
underdeveloped.154 In the early 1950s, French cultural officers struck a defensive pose as the 
USIS worked to promote education in the Gold Coast and French West Africa, promoting the 
US image in East Africa and working to ameliorate the effects of Belgian paternalism in the 
Congo. 
 
 
Finding Ways to Foster a Stable Transition in the Face of French Resistance in West 
Africa 
 
In the Gold Coast, education became the USIS’s top priority. In 1951, Kwame Nkrumah was 
elected as the so-called ‘leader of government business’ on a programme that demanded 
immediate independence and promised free compulsory education and the construction of 
institutes for scientific, technical and agricultural training. According to USIS official Eugene 
Sawyer, Nkrumah needed American support because his adherence to education spoke to 
American conceptions of a stable transition to independence.155  
Crucially, the USIS’s drive in support of education determined the way in which 
information material was deployed. It was not only films and pamphlets that were used as 
educational resources, education also had a public relations effect that was unique to Africa. 
151 Draft paper for O.I.S. (Official) Committee, “The Overseas Information Services Prospects for Expansion in 
1956/1957”, [1955], CO 1027/72, TNA;  Colonial Office, “Information activities undertaken by the Colonial 
Office in the African territories”, [1958], INF 12/978, TNA;  
152 Draft paper, “Colonial Office Priorities, Information Estimates 1956/1957”, [1955], CO 1027/72, TNA. 
153 Memorandum of conversation afternoon meeting, “Subject: United States Information Agency”, 14 May 
1954, DAL, Généralités, 49QONT/51, f: Conversations franco-britanniques sur l’Afrique, AMAE; Document 
can also be found in FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. 11: Africa and South Asia, 252. 
154 Letter, Monod to direction du personnel, “Représentation française en Afrique Noire”, 20 April 1945, 27, 
Letter Monod to direction du personnel, “Mission de M. Monod en Afrique Noire”, 22 June 1946, DAL, 
Généralités 1944-1952, 94QO/96, AMAE. 
155 As the ‘Leader of Government Business’ Nkrumah essentially became the prime minister of his own cabinet, 
termed the ‘Executive Council’ which had 7 members besides himself. Defense and foreign affairs remained a 
British responsibility, see Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah. Vision and Tragedy, 92; Foreign service despatch, Eugene 
D. Sawyer to USIA, “Activities of Regional Cultural Affairs Officer” 15 November 1955, RG. 84 Ghana Post 
Files General Records 1952-58, Box 1, f: USIS-Accra Prior to 1952-1956, NARA; Letter, Accra to StateDept, 
“Gold Coast Colony: Report of the Committee Appointed to Examine the Grant-in-Aid System for Educational 
Institutions”, 23 January 1951, CDF 1950-1954, 541.11/3-350-548.93/8-2550, NARA. 
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The USIA believed that its educational policy produced Africans who were more interested in 
the outside world – such as the American problems of the Jim Crow laws and segregation in 
the US. The often-discussed civil rights campaign of the USIA in Africa was not primarily 
aimed at countering Soviet allegations. Principally, it had to repair the damage to the 
American image that was transferred via its own programme to educate Africans.156 The 
challenge was particularly pressing in the Gold Coast where the population was 
comparatively more educated, which led to an ‘almost psychotic concern with the whole issue 
of race-relations in America.’157 African leaders in British Africa were seen as being quicker 
and more direct in their reaction against the civil rights stories coming out of the US because 
they were responsible for internal affairs.  Linking the Soviet threat to the civil rights story 
was part of a strategy aimed at convincing Congress to increase the funding of the USIA’s 
Africa operation.158 
To foster psychological modernisation without damaging the American image three 
principal tactics were relied upon: private foundations, a periodical called American Outlook 
and personal contacts. The cooperation between the American government and private 
foundations, most notably the Phelps-Stokes Fund, was vital in denying that the USIS was 
only interested in fighting the Cold War. In 1955 Fred L. Hadsel of the State Department 
travelled to New York where he offered the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation and 
the Phelps-Stokes Fund financial assistance for their African programmes.159 Private 
foundations were an essential intermediary between the state and ambitious Africans. While 
Eisenhower’s reliance on private initiative has been seen as an indication of his disinterest in 
156 Prominent examples of that argument that USIS propaganda on civil rights was developed primarily in 
response to Soviet allegations, include: Karen B. Bell, “Developing a ‘Sense of Community’: U.S. Cultural 
Diplomacy and the Place of Africa during the Early Cold War Period 1953-54”, in The United States and West 
Africa: Interactions and Relations, ed. Alusine Jalloh and Toyin Falola (Rochester: University of Rochester 
Press, 2008), 139; Eschen, Race against Empire, 122–149; Brenda Gayle Plummer, “Introduction”, in Window 
on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1988, ed. Brenda Gayle Plummer (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 11,15; Kenneth W. Heger, “Race Relations in the United States and 
American Cultural and Informational Programs in Ghana, 1957-1966”, Prologue Magazine 31, no. 4 (1999): 
259–62; Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002); Grimm, “Gazing Toward Ghana”; Justin Hart, “Making Democracy Safe for 
the World: Race, Propaganda and the Transformation of United States Foreign Policy during World War II”, 
Pacific Historical Review 73, no. 1 (2004): 49–84. 
157 Letter, Hyman Bloom to StateDept, “USIE: Need, in all media, for greater emphasis on affairs of U.S. 
Negroes”, 2 April 1951, CDF 1950-1954, 511.45K3/10-1254 – 511.45R3/7-2850, NARA. 
158 The early accounts that emphasise USIA’s civil rights campaign in Africa draw heavily on USIA’s official 
reports to Congress and have therefore firmly established the civil rights narrative, the earliest example is Peter 
Koffsky’s official history: Draft, Peter L. Koffsky, “The United States Information Program in Africa, 1945-
1970: A History & Interpretation”, 2-1, RG. 306, A1 1072, Box 9, f: African Program, Historical Background 
1970, NARA. 
159 Memcon, StateDept, “Interest of Various Foundations in Africa South of the Sahara, June 29-July 1 1955”, 2 
July 1955, RG. 59, A1 3112J, Box 1, f: Ford Foundation, NARA. 
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African developments, it actually suggests a profound understanding of the situation on the 
ground. In the 1960s, the Eisenhower administration was even indirectly praised for its 
approach by Kennedy’s undersecretary of state, George Ball, who pointed out that working 
with non-governmental organisations made Africans more willing to participate:  
 
From the beginning of educational exchange programs [with Africa], the government has played a 
minority role. The success of these programs has been based in major part on the active participation and 
support of non-governmental, voluntary organizations of many kinds. […] it is important that this 
cooperative approach, with a strong private base, be continued. 160 
 
A second effective way to influence the educated mind was found in American Outlook. 
First published in March 1952 as a pamphlet with 750 issues a week, it later also had a French 
version, Perspectives Americaines. Its second page was intended to be inspirational and to 
have some local relevance. The other sections contained world news, American national 
news, items about economic development, news on minorities in the US and labour news 
meant to project an image of the US as a country committed to development and race 
equality.161 To exploit what was believed to be the eagerness of newly educated Africans to 
follow the news on civil rights developments, a special edition was printed in May 1954 when 
the Supreme Court judged separate but equal education in the US to be unconstitutional. In 
1951, a class action suit had been filed against the board of education of the city of Topeka, 
Kansas which called upon the school district to desegregate its education. The newspaper 
presented that story as one part of a broader narrative of progress with ‘setbacks as well as 
advances’ – a message which was illustrated by a timeline reaching as far back as Lincoln’s 
Emancipation Proclamation. 
Ultimately the techniques the USIS employed suggest that repairing the damage caused 
by educating Africans – who were assumed to be more vocal about racial inequality – was 
easy. The USIS sought to exploit the weakness of the so-called African character, namely 
their susceptibility to manipulation which required preparation for democracy. The USIS was 
willing to step in and provide those lessons, but in the meantime published a little comic in its 
newspaper called Did you Know, which always combined two depictions of trivial facts for 
instance about salmon or the length of the Mississippi river with a statement on how India 
160 Summary, George Ball, “Report to the President on Sub-Sahara African Student Programs”, 13 October 1961, 
Papers President Kennedy, NSF, Box 2, f: Africa: General, 9/29/61-10/31/61, JFKL. 
161 Semi-Annual report to NSC, “The Near East, South Asia and Africa (NEA)”, 16 July 1954, 6-7, RG. 306, P 
253, Box 3, f: Reports to NSC, NARA; Note, 19 May 1952, RG. 306, P 46, Box 90, f: Accra American Outlook 
1952-1957 (Folder 2 of 2), NARA. 
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with its ‘free enterprise technique’ was out-producing ‘totalitarian communist China’ or how 
the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 had led to a massive amount of casualties.162 
Besides printing, the USIS staff in Accra also developed personal contacts. Nkrumah in 
particular was often approached after 1952 because he was the archetypical African leader the 
USIS wanted to promote in other parts of the continent: a US educated black man who 
worked towards a stable transition to self-government.  A personal relationship with Nkrumah 
even made it possible for a USIS staff member to draft Nkrumah’s important anticommunist 
speech of 25 February 1954 in which he declared that active communists could not be 
employed within any section of the state, including administration, education, labour, 
information services, police and the army. The inflow of communist or Marxist inspired 
literature was monitored while Gold Coasters were barred from attending conferences behind 
the Iron Curtain.163 
It was these tactics, which the USIS only considered to be stepping stones to education, 
which caught the attention of the French ambassador to Ghana, Marc C. Renner in 1949 
because they clashed with French thinking about cultural diplomacy. He saw USIS officers 
move into the biggest building of Accra, equip an impressive cinema, furnish a vast reading 
room with glossy publications such as Time Magazine and produce sensational exhibitions. In 
short: ‘luxurious,’ but ‘mediocre’ propaganda.164 That judgment was the result of Renner’s 
belief that USIS activities were manipulative. He was convinced for instance that Nkrumah’s 
visit to Lincoln University in the US had been orchestrated. It made the USIS competitor a 
minor threat to French cultural prestige in Africa, which had barely been tarnished by the war. 
That lesson was drawn during an embassy party where indigenous chiefs told him they still 
admired France (illustration 2). For Renner the power to create a positive disposition was 
found in the cultural achievements, not in the way in which messages were conveyed. 
Manipulation, as he termed it, could not compete with the French culture, which had achieved 
grander things.165 
162 Pamphlet, “Negro trod long road in equality battle”, American Outlook Special Edition, June 1954, 8, 
Pamphlet, American Outlook, January 1956, Vol. 2, No. 1, 10, RG. 306, P 46, Box 90, f: Accra American 
Outlook 1952-1957 (Folder 2 of 2), NARA. 
163 Semi-Annual report to NSC, “The Near East, South Asia and Africa (NEA)”, 16 July 1954, 6-7, RG. 306, P 
253, Box 3, f: Reports to NSC, NARA; Secret report, “Communism in the Gold Coast”, [1954], CO 1035/120, 
TNA. 
164 ‘propaganda mediocre mais luxieuse’ see Letter, Monod to direction du personnel, “Représentation française 
en Afrique Noire”, 20 April 1945, 27, DAL, Généralités 1944-1952, 94QO/96, AMAE; Memorandum, DAL, 
“Représentation consulaire américaine”, 13 May 1949, 4, DAL, Nord-Est Afrique 1960-1965, 35QO/17, AMAE. 
165 Letter, Monod to direction du personnel, “Représentation française en Afrique Noire”, 20 April 1945, 27, 
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USIS activities within French West Africa itself, however, were seen as a more 
imminent threat because they ventured into the field of education, which France considered to 
be the bedrock of its colonial power. Already in 1950 the local French came into conflict with 
Perry N. Jester, the US Consul in Dakar, who also ran a small USIS post. Jester was direct 
and confrontational in the eyes of the French. He had harassed a religious leader, Ibrahim 
Diop, with questions about the tensions between Catholics and Muslims, anti-communism 
and Arab propaganda brochures. At the same time he had proposed cooperation in cultural 
matters behind the back of the French authorities. Diop played both parties against one 
another by informing the already irritated French authorities. Jester was replaced by Jane Ellis 
who assured the French Ambassador to Washington, Henri Bonnet, that she wanted to 
improve French-American understanding. France had to prevent the USIS from offering 
Africans an alternative route to a more civilised culture, a concern Jane Ellis seemed to 
understand when she promised to temporarily halt the promotion of university exchange 
programmes and even covered the exhibition windows of the cultural centre.166 
All the while the department of social welfare and community development of the 
colonial authorities in the Gold Coast used the USIS to implement its programme. In February 
1954, Disney films on health such as Cleanliness Brings Health, Insects as Carriers of 
Disease, and Hookworm, were ordered for showing in rural areas, without any concern for the 
potential destabilising effects of American film. Even when USIS advised against showing the 
films because people had been booing, the cinema officer of the public relations department in 
the Gold Coast still purchased them through the UNESCO coupon scheme.167 While the 
presumed limited grasp of African target audiences opened the door for misunderstanding 
from the perspective of USIS officers, it was a safeguard against undesirable ideas in British 
eyes. Meanwhile, France struggled to understand why the UK allowed the US to become a 
provider of social mobility, eroding the basis of colonial power. These differences about the 
166 Haut-Commissaire to ministre d’outre-mer, 6 September 1950, ministre de la France d’outre-mer to direction 
Afrique-Levant “activité Consul des USA Jester à Dakar”, 15 September 1950; Henri Bonnet to Robert 
Schuman, “Chef du Service d’Information  américain à Dakar”, 20 April 1950, DAL, AOF 1944-1959, 34QO/4, 
AMAE ; Louisa Rice does not mention the conflict between Jester and the French authorities in Dakar. She 
paints Jester and Ellis as officers who made the case for an American cultural policy that was completely 
consistent with French interests. Documents in the French foreign affairs archives, however, shows that Ellis was 
actually brought in to solve the problems Jester had caused, see Rice, “Cowboys and Communists.” 
167 Letter, Department of Social Welfare and Community Development to USIS-Accra, “Film Sjanvtrips”, 11 
March 1954, Letter, A.Q. Smart-Abbey to Department of Social Welfare and Community Development, 27 
March 1954, Letter, H.E. Lorini to R.P. Ross, 17 March 1952, Letter, American consulate to StateDep, “IE: 
Motion Pictures-Request for prints of the Disney health films”, 7 November 1951, RG. 84 Ghana Post Files 
General Records 1952-58, Box 1, f: USIS-Accra Prior to 1952-1956, NARA; United States Educational 
Scientific and Cultural Motion Pictures and Filmstrip, 1954, RG. 306, P 257, Box 2, f: IMS Memoranda (IAN), 
NARA. 
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concrete effects of cultural assistance made cooperation between the settlers and the 
Americans possible. 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 2: Picture taken at the embassy party in Accra on 14 July 1948. The French consul, Marc Renner is 
surrounded by chiefs who assured him that France still enjoyed prestige in Africa. Source : Letter, Marc Renner 
to Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères,  “Célèbration de la Fête Nationale”, 31 August 1948, DAL, 
Possession Britanniques 1944 – 1952, 63QO/10, AMAE. 
 
 
Anglo-American Cooperation in East Africa 
 
The settlers in Kenya, who under the pressure of the CO had created a new department of 
information in 1954, called upon the USIS for assistance. How exactly the new information 
department in Kenya was supposed to implement its expansive new mission was left to the 
judgment of local officers, because it was unlikely that the House of Commons would 
approve new funds for the hugely unpopular Kenyan settlers. The CO admitted that the 
information services faced huge practical difficulties, but continued to insist that the settlers 
should implement the guidelines from London, albeit in their own way.168  
Drawing on General Gerald Templer’s counterinsurgency experience in Malaya, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies Oliver Lyttelton advised that the indigenous population 
needed to be made more aware of the benefits that British imperial rule had delivered. 
Templer considered winning the hearts and minds of the people to be 75% of the struggle, 
168 Report, “Kenya Colony Annual Report – 1952 African Information Services”, 19 February 1953, Letter, E.B. 
David to Crawford, 29 July 1953, CO 1027/40, TNA.  
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making information an essential component of good governance, rather than simply a way to 
improve the negative image that was created by the internment of Mau Mau fighters. Harold 
Ingrams, the adviser on information services and the expert on communism at the Colonial 
Office, backed that strategy because he believed that this approach could prevent communist 
propaganda from gaining traction. The African populations, however, did not believe the 
settlers or the British had their developmental interests at heart, which even led British 
Council officials to be identified by Africans as a covert communist organisation. In their 
imagination, only outsiders would be willing to provide them with educational assistance.169 
The CO entrusted Thomas Garrett Askwith, the leader of a small group of liberal 
minded settlers and co-founder of the multi-racial United Kenya Club, with the responsibility 
of devising an information approach that would appeal to African target audiences. He was 
therefore sent on a study trip to Malaya in the summer of 1953. The principal lesson he drew 
was that the target audience needed to be given concrete evidence that the government was 
working to advance development. The ‘multi-racial’ state therefore became a central public 
relations theme. It was a societal model in which Africans and Europeans would work 
together, albeit, with the settlers firmly behind the wheel and African votes carrying less 
weight.170 
To convey this message, the settler government believed that Africans needed to be 
lectured like children. In the racist imaginations of the settlers, this unsophisticated technique 
was found to be suitable for the peoples they were confronted with. Most cynically, a lecture 
series was organised in the detention camps – the so called ‘reserves’ – where the Kikuyu 
were detained in brutal conditions. In March 1954, British Council official Richard Frost for 
instance, worked in three different reform schools in the Nyeri Reserves where he showed 
films explaining the structure of an English village and gave a series of talks about life in 
Britain. According to Frost, the ‘resisters’ who had been forced to attend became gradually 
more interested in how the UK had become prosperous. Frost describes himself as a pleased 
schoolteacher who believed that, because of his teaching skills, he had been able to sew 
169 Minutes, Carstairs, 1 July 1953, Notes, Johnson, 27 July 1953, Letter, E.B. David to Crawford, 29 July 1953, 
CO 1027/40, TNA, Letter, Oliver Lyttelton to Geoffrey Colby, 7 November 1952, M.L.S., Minutes, Fisher, 19 
April 1952, Report, CO, “Communist Prospect in East and Central Africa: Report on a Visit to East and Central 
Africa”, [undated, 1952], CO 537/7780, TNA; Internal Correspondence Sheet, Frost to Colonies, “Visit to Nyeri 
30-31 March”, 2 April 1951, BW95/3, TNA. 
170 Elkins, Britain’s Gulag, 110–111; Memorandum, “The work of the African Information Services in Kenya”, 
8 September 1953, Memorandum, “Information to the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru in Central Province”, 9 
September 1953, CO 1027/40, TNA. 
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doubts into the minds of his audience, making a more ‘constructive education’ which fitted 
Western norms possible.171 
The lecture approach returned in a colourful series of pamphlets in Swahili designed to 
explain how the settlers helped the people of the colony. The first booklet in the series, 
Serkali Inakusaidai, contained a lecture given by a member of the Kenya forest department to 
African students at a School in Kabete (illustration 3). Another booklet explained why 
education was being provided, but the text made no effort to appeal to its audience. Readers 
were spoken to and did not have a say in how goals were to be reached: ‘The increased and 
improved facilities for education which government is placing before the African means that 
in the near future Africans will be graduating [and] tried out in these posts of responsibility 
and it is up to them to show that they can carry out their duties’,172  
The African Information Services of the Settlers informed but did not appeal, turning 
every media outlet into a lecture. This also made broadcasting the strongest weapon to 
influence ‘the minds of Africans’. Gramophone recordings were supplied to the mobile 
information vans to assistant with the rehabilitation of the Mau Mau detainees at the Athi 
River. Films borrowed from other sources were first viewed for suitability by a selection 
committee and turned into lectures by the presence of a live commentator. By providing a 
magnetic sound strip projector the service was able to project a film in different parts of the 
colony simultaneously and have an appropriate commentary in the local vernacular.173 
Multimedia material could never reach African minds without being adequately explained. 
The Kenyan settlers – normally wary of outside influence – had no problem with the 
presence of American officials in East Africa. They even encouraged US officials to execute 
their development programmess so the settlers could reach the goals set by the Beecher 
Report of 1950 and the East and Central Africa Study Group of 1953, which had both 
recommended the expansion of African education, particularly on an intermediate level.174 
They asked the International Cooperation Administration to provide teachers and trainers, 
who had a professional teaching qualification as well as experience in woodwork, metalwork 
171 Confidential Letter, Richard A. Frost to Frederick Crawford, 30 March 1954, BW 95/3, TNA. 
172 Report, “Information to the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru in Central Province”, 24 September 1953, CO 1027/40, 
TNA. 
173 Minutes, “The Work of the African Information Services and the Press Office, November 1953”, 2, CO 
1027/40, TNA. 
174 Letter, Oliver Lyttelton to Geoffrey Colby, 7 November 1952, Minutes, M.L.S. Fisher, 19 April 1952, Report, 
CO, “Communist Prospect in East and Central Africa: Report on a Visit to East and Central Africa”, [undated, 
1952], CO 537/7780, TNA; Highly confidential Report, Richard D. Frost, “Visit to District Commissioners in 
Western Kenya 21st to 26th August 1950”, 4 September 1950, 1-5, BW 95/3, TNA. 
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and other handicrafts. After careful screening by the settlers these candidates were employed 
at the Royal Technical College in Nairobi.175  
The officials at ICA and USIS Nairobi, had their own reasons to cooperate with the 
settlers. For one, the state of emergency had made work impossible. To publish an English-
Swahili version of The Negro in America Life with printing operators that were being called to 
military service, USIS began to rely on the East African Literature Bureau that had been 
founded in 1948 as part of the Colonial Welfare and Development effort. Nonetheless, even 
the Literature Bureau was forced to rely on the British Council because the latter assisted 
small libraries in Kisumu and Mombasa. Apart from the rat infested Pumwani Hall, Nairobi 
had no functioning library in 1954 besides the bookshelves at the USIS and the Indian posts. 
Like the USIS, the BC had its own reason to intervene. They were not interested in the Mau 
Mau, but wanted the hand over the libraries in Mombassa and Kisumumu ‘at some time in the 
future’,176 
The most important reason for the USIS to cooperate were newspapers, such as the 
Eastern Nigerian Guardian, which had ridiculed the American efforts in support of civil 
rights. By supporting the multi-racial idea, John Noon hoped to lend more credence to 
American efforts to stimulate the coexistence of different races. With no prospect of self-
government, educational exchanges turned into a promotional tool for the American image. 
American Consul General Edmund J. Dorsz wanted to address the lack of trained leadership, 
not only to foster stability, but also because the lack of knowledge about the US heightened 
the risk of perpetual misunderstanding.177 
Educational exchanges were therefore not offered to promising Africans, but to officials 
of the settler government, such as Michael Blundell in 1952 in support of his plans to study 
American civil rights efforts as an example for multi-racial cooperation in Kenya. USIS-
Nairobi further participated in a colony wide drive to raise funds for the Girl Guide 
Association of Kenya, by throwing a party and presenting an exhibition of American square 
175 Letter, Richard B. Fransworth to Thomas J. Brennan,  10 February 1956, Memorandum, “Excerpts from the 
Request of the Government of Kenya for ICA Assistance”, RG.469, P206, Box 4, f: Africa – Kenya 55-59, 
NARA. 
176 Foreign service despatch, Nairobi, “IIA: Semi-Annual Evaluation Report for British East Africa”, 15 July 
1953, CDF 1950-54, 511.45K3/10-1254 – 511.45R3/7-2850, TNA; Report, “East African literature Bureau 
Annual Report 1961-62”, 1962, 1, RG. 306, P 43, Box 28, f: Kenya 64, NARA; Internal Correspondence Sheet, 
F.D. Hughes to Colonies, 11 January 1954, BW 7/2, TNA; Memorandum, “East African Literature Bureau 
African Library Service: Plan for further Development of the Kenya Branch of the African Library Service”, 7, 
BW 7/2, TNA. 
177 Foreign service despatch, “Educational Exchange: Contribution of Educational Exchange to Promotion of US 
Interests”, 2 March 1955, CDF 1955-1959, 511.45K/12-2656 – 511.45R5/8-1255, NARA; Eschen, Race against 
Empire, 129. 
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dancing, opened by the wife of the governor.178 In the racial pacification of Kenya, the US 
could lead by example. 
USIS participation in the education department’s first inter-racial physical education 
training course stressed this point further, by sparing no effort to impress and entertain the 
audience. Noon spoke on the American child to a group of 75 European, African and Asian 
teachers. His colleague, Shirley Smith addressed the same group on American women while 
sports films and the USIS film Choosing a Career were employed as a teaching aids. A third 
lecture was devoted to the fundamentals of American square dancing and afterwards the 
teachers were asked to invent their own dance to perform in front of the rest of the class.179  
In contrast to the self-interested, effective US-settler tandem, French activities in East 
Africa were limited to presenting the marvels of French culture. The French consul in 
Nairobi, A.G. Morand, had been trying to ride the wave of educational expansion to promote 
the French language. He offered books to the Royal Technical College in Nairobi, which was 
planning to open its doors in 1956 in the hope that some students would become interested in 
learning French. His attempt to increase the funding for the French school in Zanzibar, built in 
the 1930s to uplift the tiny French speaking community at the Comoros, failed. His successor 
Pierre Meyer, again tried to raise the funds of the school from 12,000 shillings to 20,000 
shillings in 1956 and requested a teacher from France.180   
The repeated refusal to invest in East Africa – and in that way expand French influence 
– underscores that French cultural assistance in Africa was a defensive move aimed at 
keeping competitors out of France’s colonies. Limited by his own understanding of education, 
as a way to provide Africans with the prestige of higher cultures, Morand interpreted the 
choice of settlers in Kenya for technical education as a conscious strategy on the part of the 
Kenyan government. A more academic formation would only be a breeding ground for 
revolts.181 Unlike the settlers, who cooperated in a carefree fashion with the Americans, the 
178 Foreign service despatch, USIS-Nairobi to StateDept, 5 December 1952, Foreign service despatch, John A. 
Noon to StateDept, “IIA: USIS Assists Education Department in Promoting Kenya’s First Inter-racial Physical 
Education Training Course”, 13 May 1953, CDF 1950-1954, 511.45K3/10-1254 – 511.45R3/7-2850, NARA. 
179 Foreign service dispatch, John A. Noon to StateDept, “IIA: USIS Assists Education Department in Promoting 
Kenya’s First Inter-racial Physical Education Training Course”, 13 May 1953, CDF 1950-1954, 511.45K3/10-
1254 – 511.45R3/7-2850, NARA. 
180 Letter, A.G. Morand to DAL, “a.s. fonctionnement école franco-comorienne”, 1 October 1953, Letter, A.G. 
Morand to DAL, “a.s. Visite de l’école franco-comorienne de Zanzibar”, 14 November 1953, Letter, Pierre 
Meyer to DAL, “a.s. Ecole franco-comorienne de Zanzibar”, 29 September 1956, Letter, Pierre Meyer to DAL, 
“a.s. Prévisions budgétaires pour l’exercise 1957”, 10 November 1957, DAL, Afrique Orientale Britannique, 
35QO/6, AMAE. 
181 Letter, A.G. Morand to ministre des affaires étrangères, “a.s. Prochaine ouverture du Royal Technical 
College”, 20 September 1955, Letter, A.G. Morand to ministre des affaires étrangères, “a.s. L’enseignement 
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French understood that education was about more than development. It was about colonial 
power. Through the lens of the international scramble, it is clear that the often-described anti-
Americanism of the settlers only grew gradually as their situation became more dire.182  
 
 
 
 
Illustration 3 and 4: On the left, a pamphlet on education produced by the information department in Kenya, 
outlined the efforts that had been made to educate the African population of the territory. The government also 
produced pamphlets that were intended for the settlers and vilified the Mau Mau insurgents. As the white 
population was advised to keep an eye on their gun, the Mau Mau insurgency was also delegitimised by 
demonising the insurgents. Source: Pamphlet, “Serkali Inakusaidia…Kazi Ya Askari Polisi Wa Kenya”, S.d., 
Pamphlet, “Guard Your Gun”, S.d., CO 1027/40, TNA. 
 
 
Ameliorating the Developmental Wasteland of the Belgian Congo 
 
By contrast, France was more interested in the Belgian Congo. Even though it was not a 
French territory, the importance of the French language, the vicinity of the French territory 
Congo-Brazzaville on the other side of the Congo river and its strategic position in the heart 
of Africa motivated Paul Lorion, the new French consul, in 1954 to coordinate the activities 
of the different centres of the Alliance Française in Leopoldville, Luluabourg, Matadi, 
Elisabethville, Usumbura, Stanleyville and Bukavu.183 Up until then the Alliance Française 
supérieur en Afrique Orientale Britannique. Makerere College”, 17 August 1955, DAL, Afrique Orientale 
Britannique 1953-1965, 35QO/6, AMAE. 
182 Horne traces anti-American sentiment back as far as mid-1928, however the situation was more complex, see 
Horne, Mau Mau in Harlem?, 41. 
183 Letter, Paul Lorion to Georges Bidault, “Alliance Française au Congo Belge”,  7 April 1954, Afrique Pays A 
à D 47-57, f: Congo-belge, AF. 
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had mainly serviced the local French community, despite French anxiety about the American 
presence.184 Like the DGRC, the Alliance Française organised very few cultural events, such 
as theatre shows or art exhibitions which highlights an important aspect of the high culture 
approach as a French strategy of cultural diplomacy. Africans were considered to be 
interested only in the French culture as a means of social mobility and they were certainly not 
expected to be developed enough to appreciate genuine examples of French culture. 
The challenging situation of the Congo, where the watchful eye of the Belgian 
authorities made communicating with the African populations extremely difficult, also 
highlights a particular aspect of the methods of the United States Information Services, 
namely how references to modernisation theory were used to reconcile the American desire to 
support self-government as well as the European powers. Contrary to what Kenneth Osgood 
has argued, the public diplomacy operation was not confined to the minimum necessary for a 
holding operation against Soviet intrusion. On the contrary, USIS officers cleverly played on 
developmental clichés that were harboured by the colonial authorities. Like Eisenhower, 
USIS-Leopoldville found the Belgian authorities to be paternalistic because they made no 
effort to convince Africans of the need for progress.185 
Arthur S. Alberts developed a public relations theme that he summarised as ‘what is 
good for the African helps all’. He believed that in this way he could convince both the 
Belgian authorities and the Congolese of his good intentions. In its communication USIS-
Congo emphasised that the African population had to accept ‘responsible guidance’, because 
even the more evolved Congolese – l’ évolué – were considered to be slow, lazy, emotional 
and unable to fully comprehend democracy. Furthermore the USIS also planned to employ 
informational materials which were specifically designed to ‘influence the African away from 
half-baked attitudes and toward maturity.’186  
By supporting the nascent development efforts of the colonial government USIS hoped 
to obtain the trust of the Belgians. USIS health and hygiene films were distributed by the 
Belgian Congo Information Service and USIS even subscribed to the myth perpetuated by the 
Belgian colonial government to acquire legitimacy, namely the idea that Leopold II had 
liberated the Congo from the Arab slave trade. Without reservation, the American public 
184 Confidential letter, M. de Saint-Martin to Bidault, “Propagande panarabe du Gouvernement égyptien au 
Congo Belge”, 8 February 1947, Letter, Saint-Martin to ministre des affaires étrangères, “Propaganda 
Culturelle”, 4 February 1964, DAL, Congo Belge 1944-1959, 44QO/6, AMAE. 
185 For the argument of the ‘holding operation’, see Osgood, Total Cold War, 127. 
186 Foreign service dispatch, USIS-Leopoldville to USIA, “Covering Despatch for USIA Classified Despatch N° 
30”, 30 June 1954, 4, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, NARA; The Belgian colonial government had established a 
system in which Africans received a degree which ‘proved’ that they were more ‘evolved,’ évolué. 
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affairs officer (PAO) filmed a ceremony at a monument that was dedicated to Belgians who 
had fallen in the war against the Arab slave traders in Maniema. 
Once USIS had gained the trust of the colonial authority, in 1953, it could focus on 
African target audiences and cultivate what it considered to be a developmental wasteland that 
was ‘wide open to any serious cultural activity’. The British Council had left the office 
founded during the war while local activities such as the concerts of Radio Congo Belge and 
overpriced art exhibitions attracted only a few visitors.187 
The USIS, conversely, began to design its information material to bring ‘the African 
away from half-baked attitudes and toward maturity’. Because the so-called psychology and 
degree of advancement of the Congolese was considered to be lower than in other parts of 
Africa, due to the Congo’s relative isolation from the West, some caution was required. To 
head that challenge, the PAO even contemplated cooperating with Pepsi cola, because it was 
selling 48,000 bottles per day in the Leopoldville area and in that way provided the only 
flicker of civilisation.188 By providing cultural assistance to the African population and 
convincing the Belgian authorities that this would foster a better grip on the African peoples, 
USIS officers were able to service both groups.  
In short, the power of culture, the question of how exactly public diplomats thought 
their operation would create influence, was not only a matter that drew the attention of 
armchair theorists. In the beginning of the 1950s, it became the single most important factor 
shaping the trans-Atlantic relation on the ground in Africa. The settler government and the 
CO, for instance, believed that information could only be effective if it was clearly explained. 
Therefore they considered the American operation in Ghana and Kenya to be innocuous and 
even beneficial. 
The French for their part were suspicious of the Americans because they held a radically 
different view on the way in which education affected African attitudes. In the American 
logic, education created responsible citizens. Students acquired the critical thinking skills 
necessary to oppose demagogues. Most French officers, by contrast, had a keen eye for the 
social function of a diploma due to the tradition of evolués. Education – particularly in the 
French language – was about acquiring access to a higher form of culture and consequently 
prestige for African peoples. In that way, local elites remained wedded to France. When the 
187 Foreign service despatch, Charles K. Bevilacqua to StateDept, “Transmittal Report on Belgian Congo and 
French Equatorial Africa – USIS”, 15 December 1952, 8-9, RG. 59, CDF 1950-54, 511.553/1-454 – 511.55A5, 
NARA. 
188 Foreign service despatch, USIS Leopoldville to USIS, 28 June 1954, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, Box 1, NARA. 
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US appeared to offer an alternative educational path, the French could only conclude that they 
did so in order to supplant the French.  
 
 
Conclusion: Taking the Sting out of Transition 
 
In 1899 the popular magazine McClure’s published Rudyard Kipling’s poem, ‘The White 
Man’s Burden, the United States and the Philippine Islands’, a sombre warning of the cost of 
empire, but also a plea for the US to take up its responsibility and encourage the cultural 
development of the indigenous population. With Eisenhower’s ascent to the presidency, the 
US became more willing than ever to address that burden.  
Providing education to the Third World allowed Eisenhower to act in ways that 
reconciled his long-term aim of global stability and his short-term willingness to be ‘on the 
side of the natives for once.’189 For Eisenhower, the direct communist threat took a back seat 
to paternalistically inspired concerns about leadership skills, particularly in the early 1950s 
when full independence was still only one of many possible futures. In this light, the often 
asked question whether Eisenhower favoured independence becomes less relevant: 
independence was inevitable in the eyes of the president, but only acceptable if the countries 
were stable and prepared for the task ahead. The US was more than willing to step in and 
provide this preparation.190  
Churchill and Mendès-France understood Eisenhower’s farreaching plans and resisted 
his repeated requests to put their civilisational discourses into practice. But what Eisenhower 
explained away as old-fashioned colonial intransigence was in fact already a novel way of 
using cultural tools, suited to pacifying African populations who began demanding political 
and socio-economic rights after their participation in the Second World War. In its cultural 
centres, France provided limited access to its superior culture to distract from political claims. 
The absence of a French cultural counteroffensive did not reflect cultural anxieties as has 
been argued, nor can France be presented as the first country to have understood the merits of 
soft power and rely on its culture to build influence as others have claimed.191 In Africa 
189 Memorandum of Discussion at 375th NSC meeting, 7 August 1958, FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. 14: Africa, 21 
190 This conclusion rejects the image of Eisenhower that has been presented in the literature. Based on a 1959 
conversation between Eisenhower and de Gaulle, Brenda Plummer even claims that the Eisenhower 
administration was not prepared to shoulder the burden of educating populations, see Plummer, In Search of 
Power, 65. 
191 ‘Elle contribue pourtant à façonner un milieu favorable à la réalisation de ses objectifs: c’est ce que les 
politologues de Harvard appellent aujourd’hui le pouvoir doux (…) la France qui fut le premier pays au monde à 
recourir au soft power’, see Saint-Gilles, “La culture comme levier de la puissance: le cas de la politique 
culturelle de la France aux États-Unis pendant de la guerre froide”, 99; Dubosclard, L’action artistique de la 
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French culture and values, such as republicanism, were never promoted. Instead, the idea that 
the French culture was superior stood front and centre because this allowed French-educated 
African elites to derive a higher social status and made them eager to maintain their link with 
France. That is why France could continue its cultural operation while the claim of the 
universality of republican values was beginning to crumble. 
The British in turn were confident that as long as they provided their territories with 
radio and press services they could maintain their influence. The discrepancy between the 
violence of Kenya and the cooperative attitude in Ghana was explained by the absence of 
information services in East Africa. The view that African subjects would accept British 
decisions if those choices were explained to them, allowed Churchill to believe he was 
holding on to African possessions while he presided over the liquidation of the British empire. 
Unease about Africans talking back to the colonial authority, as in the Mau Mau uprising, was 
rationalised by depicting them as sufferers of a mental disorder. 
For the British and French the African peoples were only socio-economic subjects, 
while the American view conceived of the indigenous population of African territories as 
potential political agents. As public diplomats on the ground came to see the so-called ‘native 
mind’ as a threat to international security, they acted upon it by establishing educational 
projects designed to foster democratic citizenship. Because the British nor the settlers 
believed the ‘African mind’ was suited to western organisational models they welcomed USIS 
projects as development assistance. The French held comparable views, but considered 
education the source of their colonial power and therefore thought the Americans wanted to 
erode the basis of French influence. The single most important factor shaping the trans-
Atlantic relation on the ground in Africa was therefore not the Cold War, but opposing 
conceptions of the power of culture, how exactly public diplomats thought that their operation 
would create influence. 
With the possible exception of the Trinidadian intellectual, George Padmore, who 
vocally rejected the characterisation of Kenyatta’s political and socio-economic demands as 
the ramblings of ‘black savages,’ Africans were conspicuously absent in the European and 
American blueprints.192  Only the Western imaginations of ‘the African’ – as a racial term – 
structured Western decision making. Even a gathering of Third World leaders at the Bandung 
France aux Etats-Unis, 1915-1969, 350–351; Jennifer M. Dueck, The Claims of Culture at Empire’s End: Syria 
and Lebanon Under French Rule (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), 138. 
192 James, “‘What We Put in Black and White’: George Padmore and the Practice of Anti-Imperial Politics”, 
194; George Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism? The Coming Struggle for Africa (London: Dennis 
Dobson, 1956), 255. 
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Conference would not push Western leaders to expand the role of African agency in their 
plans for a new Africa. It is this story that is explored in the second chapter. 
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2. Bandung as a Symbolic Battle 
 
Moral Strength, The Brown Man’s Burden and Western Assistance (1955) 
 
[The president] expressed the hope that it will heed the universal longing of the peoples of the world for 
peace and that it will seek a renunciation of force to achieve national ambitions. The president hailed the 
Bandung Conference as providing an opportunity, at a critical hour, to voice the peaceful aspirations of 
the peoples of the world. 
   
– Statement by John Foster Dulles, American secretary of state, 17 April 1955.193  
 
We estimate that the importance of the Bandung Conference is exaggerated and that the planned 
developments greatly surpass the real capabilities of the participating countries who often have diverging 
interests, different levels of economic potential and are still very weak militarily. 
 
– Note produced by the intelligence branch of the French government, 6 April 1955.194 
 
The mistakes of my country and perhaps the mistakes of other countries here do not make a difference; 
but the mistakes the Great Powers do make a difference to the world and may well bring about a terrible 
catastrophe. 
 
– Jawaharal Nehru, prime minister of India and prominent organiser of Bandung, 22 April 
1955.195 
 
The Secretary of State said that he also felt some concern about the proposed Afro-Asian Conference. It 
seemed that one of the main items to be discussed would be colonialism and he felt that such discussions 
were somewhat out of date in the modern world. 
  
– William D. Allen, assistant under secretary of state for foreign affairs at the British Foreign 
Office, 25 November 1954.196 
 
 
Between 18 and 24 April 1955, Third World leaders gathered in Bandung, Indonesia, a 
‘sleepy resort town blessed with mild weather’. A few days ealier, on 15 April, the prime 
minister of Indonesia, Ali Sastroamidjojo, had begun welcoming delegates from Asia and 
Africa on behalf of the five organising countries: Burma (Myanmar), Ceylon (Sri Lanka), 
India, Indonesia and Pakistan. At a meeting of the prime ministers of those countries at 
Colombo in April 1954, Sastromidjojo had proposed an Afro-Asian gathering and after a 
193 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1955 : Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and 
Statements of the President, January 1 to December 31, 1955, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1959), 231. 
194 ‘Peut-être estimera-t-on que l’importance de la conférence de Bandung a été exagérée et que les 
développements envisagés dépassent de beaucoup les possibilités réelles des Pays participants dont les intérêts 
sont souvent divergents et dont les potentiels économique et militaire sont encore très faibles,’ see Secret note, 
Rousset for secrétariat général du gouvernement conseil supérieur du renseignement commission du Sud-Est 
Asiatique, “la première Conférence afro-asiatique, Bandung – (Indonésie) 18 April 1955 par le commandant 
Rousset - S.G.P.D.N.”, 6 April 1955, 5, DAO, Généralités, 124QO/190, AMAE. 
195 Quoted in George McTurnan Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1956), 64–72. 
196 Confidential Note, W.D. Allen, “Afro-Asian Conference”, 25 November 1954, FO 371/116978, TNA. 
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second meeting in Bogor, invitations were sent out for the Bandung Conference, a meeting 
often seen to be the birthplace of Third World solidarity.197  
Here was the dream of a turning point in international affairs, an attempt to create some 
form of common ideology whereby Third World states could obtain a place within an 
international system still dominated by imperialism. Yet that sense of Afro-Asian solidarity 
was fragile. First of all there was disagreement about the principles that underpinned the 
gathering. At the Colombo meeting, discussions had centred on different ways in which 
‘anticolonialism’ was to be understood. The Indonesians wanted to heighten their prestige and 
demanded a constructive discussion, for the Ceylon ministry of foreign affairs a ‘colour line-
up against the Europeans’ was central, while the Pakistanis hoped to criticise colonialism and 
confront Nehru over the issue of Kashmir. Territorial, geopolitical, and economic interests 
also divided the delegates at Bandung. Jawaharlal Nehru, the prime minister of India for 
instance wanted the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to attend because both countries 
shared a long border.198 
The complexity of the conference produced a historiography in which myths were 
duplicated and subsequently debunked. Neither Nkrumah nor the leader of Yugoslavia, 
Joseph Tito, attended the conference. The Bandung Conference did not directly lead to the 
Non-Aligned Conference of 1961 in Belgrade and none of the delegates ever explicitly argued 
that anti-white sentiments united them.199 A ‘romantic’ reading of the conference has been 
replaced by three interpretations that extend from ‘realist’ to ‘racial,’ making it easy to see 
what Bandung was not about, but leaving questions about the conference agenda and the 
Western perceptions unanswered.  
A first strand of scholarship, by political scientists in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s 
presented Bandung as the birthplace of the Non-Aligned Movement. In 1989, H.W. Brands 
claimed that ‘those in attendance and those watching Bandung signalled a refusal to accept 
the bipolar scheme, to join the superpower competition.’ Peter Willetts disagreed. For him the 
197 Cable, “Bandung US info”, 17 April 1955, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, FRC 5, f: General – Bandung Conf, 
NARA; Homer Alexander Jack, Bandung: An On-the-Spot Description of the Asian-African Conference, 
Bandung, Indonesia, April, 1955 (Chicago: Toward Freedom, 1955), 1. 
198 Confidential, CRO, “Proposed Afro-Asian Conference to be held at Djakarta about February/March 1955, 
Factual Note”, 17 November 1955, DO 35/4665, TNA; The international system of the 1950s was shaped by 
imperial ideas, see Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the 
United Nations, Lawrence Stone Lectures (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 1–27. 
199 These myths and the critique are drawn from an excellent review article on Bandung: Robert Vitalis, “The 
Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung (Ban-Doong)”, Humanity 4, no. 2 (2003): 
261–88. 
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Belgrade Conference of 1961 and Bandung were two separate phenomena.200 A second group 
of new social and cultural historians has left Cold War claims behind and instead presents the 
meeting as based on racial solidarity. The starting point for scholars such as Penny Von 
Eschen, Jason Parker and Brenda Plummer is the American civil rights movement and 
Richard Wright’s notion of the ‘Color Curtain’. Bandung is presented as a turning point in the 
racialisation of international affairs.201 In response recent debates have tried to determine the 
precise meaning of Non-Alignment as a political project and the role of Bandung in its 
establishment.202  
This chapter, in contrast, presents the Bandung Conference as a pivotal moment in the 
ideological competition of the 1950s when competing plans for a world after empire were 
promoted by the former colonial powers, anticolonial leaders as well as the United States and 
the Soviet Union. Communist and capitalist proscriptions of the future rivalled pan-African, 
pan-Arab plans as well as the French the British development schemes which were promoted 
through diverse public diplomacy programs. Furthermore to understand what motivated the 
Bandung delegates the position of Africa has to be considered. A re-examination of archives 
in France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Ghana and Belgium suggests that 
references to ‘racial solidarity’ and the Cold War were part of a comprehensive and ambitious 
project to end the nativist inferiority complex and expose colonial hypocrisy. The writings of 
liberations thinkers such as Aimé Césaire, Leopold Senghor, and Franz Fanon crystalized the 
core concern of anticolonial leaders. Fanon’s definition of the Third World as a project that 
200 H. W. Brands, The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947-
1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 3; Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins 
of a Third World Alliance (London: Pinter, 1978); Where ‘Non-Alignment’ refers to the meeting of 1961 and the 
movement that sprang from it, the term ‘nonalignment’ defines a certain diplomatic position between the two 
Cold War blocs. 
201 Parker, “Cold War II”; Jason Parker, “Ideology, Race and Nonalignment in US Cold War Foreign Relations: 
Or, How the Cold War Racialized Neutralism Without Neutralizing Race”, in Challenging US Foreign Policy: 
America and the World in the Long Twentieth Century, ed. Bevan Sewell and Scott Lucas (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), 75–98; Chakrabarty, “The Legacies of Bandung: Decolonization and the Politics of Culture”, 
47; Cary Fraser, “An American Dilemma: Race and Realpolitik in the American Response to the Bandung 
Conference, 1955”, in Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1988, ed. Brenda 
Gayle Plummer (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press Books, 2003), 115–40; Kevin Gaines, 
American Africans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2006), 70–72; Plummer, “Introduction”, 1–15.. 
202 Itty Abraham, “From Bandung to NAM: Non-Alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947-65”, 
Commonwealth and Comparative Studies 46, no. 2 (2009): 195–219; Christopher Lee, “Recovered Histories at 
the Rendezvous of Decolonization”, Interventions 11, no. 1 (2009): 87; Cary Fraser, “Decolonization and the 
Cold War”, in Oxford Handbook of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 469–87; Others 
uphold the myth of non-alignment or create a new one about Bandung and human rights, see: Jamie Mackie, 
Bandung 1955: Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity (Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Paris: Editions Didier 
Millet, 2005); Roland Burke, “‘The Compelling Dialogue of Freedom’: Human Rights at the Bandung 
Conference”, Human Rights Quarterly 28, no. 4 (2006): 947–65; Jean Freyss, “La solidarité internationale, une 
profession ?”, Revue Tiers Monde 180, no. 4 (December 1, 2004): 735–72. 
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consciously rejected the notion that non-whites were unfit for self-government was vital and 
produced two shared aims.203 
Firstly, the delegates realised that their efforts to obtain a seat at international 
negotiating tables would amount to nothing if they did not expose the hypocrisy of the 
civilising mission. The claim that the non-white peoples of the world were unfit to govern 
themselves was rejected as a myth. Imperial intervention had led to exploitation and 
destruction, hardly examples of good governance. In his opening speech the Indonesian 
president, Sukarno, pointed out that real statesmanship needed ‘to be based upon the highest 
code of morality and ethics’ rather than a drive to control the world.204 Only Third World 
nations, who had spiritual, moral and political strength on their side could successfully 
promote those norms. 
Secondly – less notably – the Bandung delegates wanted to succeed where the imperial 
powers had failed and deliver on the promise of economic development as a way to speed up 
the independence process, particularly on the African continent. Not only did the conference 
attendees endorse Algerian independence and the struggle against South African Apartheid, 
they also launched calls to bring expertise and knowledge from Asia to Africa. Educated at 
British public schools, leaders such as the Indian prime ministers, Jawaharlal Nehru and John 
Kotelawale, the prime minister of Ceylon, subscribed to the western discourse of premature 
independence: independence could only be granted after sufficient preparation. The 
independent Asian nations of the Bandung coalition therefore had the duty to take on what the 
Asian-African Conference Bulletin termed the ‘Brown man’s Burden’.205 
Even though the delegates could not agree on a programme for practical support, it was 
the critique on botched Western-led development that caught the attention of France, Britain 
and the US. Western concerns about a possible propaganda victory for anticolonial voices or 
the People’s Republic of China were soon overtaken by the issue of aid. In the Western view, 
the Bandung delegates had not rejected colonial guidance, but rather had complaints about the 
aid they received. Doubts about the sincerity of the colonial authorities and their commitment 
to development needed to be addressed. The conference prompted the UK, the US and even 
203 Vijay Prashad has used Fanon's definition in an uncritical way and describes the different conferences that 
dealt with an anticolonial theme, for instance in Brussels in 1928, Bandung in 1955 and Belgrade in 1961 as 
expressions of the same Third World project, see: Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 314; Prashad, The Poorer 
Nations: A Possible History Of The Global South, 1–13; Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the 
Third World, xv – 1. 
204 Quoted in memorandum for the Operations Coordinating Board, “Subject: Bandung Conference of April”, 
1955, 12 May 1955, 3-4, OCB Central File Series, White House Office, National Security Council Staff Papers 
1948-1961, Box 86, f: OCB 092.3 (File #2) (2) [April-November 1955], DDEL. 
205 “World Press Opinion”, Asian-African Conference Bulletin 1, no. 1 (March 1955): 18. 
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France to reaffirm their commitment to colonial development and come up with better plans 
for educational assistance and foreign aid.  
While the call for morality in international affairs has been extensively studied, 
Bandung’s developmental aspiration has gone unnoticed, which has led historians to conclude 
that the Afro-Asian meeting had no effect on Western decision making. Even Odd Arne 
Westad – who puts economic development at the heart of post-war international relations – 
writes that the final communiqué’s main significance stemmed from the ten principles it 
prescribed.206 Historian’s emphasis on race or the Cold War mirrors the observations of 
contemporary commentators. Homer Jack, George McTurnan Kahin and Filipino diplomat 
Carlos Romulo were all struck by the bold rejection of the Cold War, while Richard Wright 
wanted to cast his own struggle for civil rights in a more international light when he wrote 
The Color Curtain.207 However, initial concerns about anticolonial propaganda were 
overtaken by the fear to be outcompeted by the independent Asian nations as the primary 
providers of development assistance. It is argued that Asian paternalism towards Africa 
fundamentally influenced the conference agenda and pushed Western officials to increase 
their commitment to assistance. 
 
 
The Road to Bandung: The Conference as a Propaganda Challenge 
 
Before Sukarno and Nehru had even uttered a single word, countries outside of Asia and 
Africa began assessing the plans on the table and were concerned about this initiative. Even 
after the preparatory meeting in Bogor in December 1954 British Secretary of State for the 
Colonies Alan Lennox-Boyd, wanted to discourage the participation of the African colonies. 
Convincing the leaders of British Africa would not be easy, CO officers noted, because a 
refusal to accept this invitation would turn those African leaders into ‘stooges of the West’, 
Doubts lingered until January 1955 when William Allen of the Foreign Office was informed 
by a French colleague that they would also bar the leaders of their territories from going. 
When in that same month the State Department backtracked on its original decision to 
encourage participation, the British took the necessary steps and approached Nkrumah.208  
206 Westad, The Global Cold War, 102. 
207 Jack, Bandung, 1–13; Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955, 1–38; Carlos P. 
Romulo, The Meaning of Bandung (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1956), 177; Richard 
Wright, The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference (New York: World Publishing Company, 
1956); Appadorai Angadipuram, The Bandung Conference (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1955). 
208 Minutes, W.A.C Mathieson for Gorell Barness, 31 December 1954, Secret letter, Alan Lennox-Boyd to Eden, 
11 January 1955, CO 936/347, TNA; Minutes, W.D. Allen for FO, “Afro-Asian Conference”, 1 January 1955, 
                                              
68 | T h e  I d e o l o g i c a l  S c r a m b l e  f o r  A f r i c a  
 
The Western powers did not believe the delegates would be able to turn the conference 
into a success, let alone set up a third bloc. The French foreign affairs ministry informed 
Prime Minister Edgar Faure that a meeting would result in neverending discussions.209 The 
US and the UK for their part were concerned with what might happen now that inexperienced 
and ‘racially unfit’ leaders had convinced themselves they were able to perform on an 
international stage. After a conversation with Roger Makins, the British ambassador to 
Washington, Dulles began to fear that the conference participants would subscribe to any 
manifesto as long as its contents were racial and anticolonial. R.W. Parkes, counsellor at the 
British Embassy in Djakarta and principal British informant on the meeting, also questioned 
the skill of the organisers. At the Bogor meeting he had already been forced to sit through one 
of the worst shows of Indonesian dancing he had ever seen, in which Sukarno’s young son 
and daughter had participated. For Parkes, this betrayed a lack of knowledge about what 
constituted appropriate conference etiquette.210  
The US and the UK did not take the delegates seriously, but unlike the French they 
dreaded the propaganda fallout. British decolonisation in Africa could be cast as a hoax and 
the American gospel of an ‘orderly transition’ might be presented as support for the colonial 
powers. Some form of action was therefore required. 
 
 
American Low Profile in the Run Up to Bandung 
 
During a meeting at the State Department, it was clear that no-one really knew how to 
respond to this challenge because Bandung presented US policymakers with an unsolvable 
propaganda problem: how could they confront Soviet allegations without being accused of 
exporting the Cold War to the Third World, a key concern of the Bandung delegates?211 An 
Afro-Asian working group under the chairmanship of William S.B. Lacy, US ambassador to 
Korea, recommended a restrained approach in which the US should only take a public 
position on specific issues without referring to the conference itself. Instead of sending out 
Confidential telegram, Washington to FO, 31 December 1954, Minutes, J.E. Cable, 6 January 1955, Minutes, 
W.D. Allen, “Afro-Asian Conference”, 3 January 1955, FO 371/116975, TNA. 
209 Outgoing telegram, 30 December 1954, DAO, Généralités, 124QO/190bis, AMAE; Note pour monsieur le 
president Edgar Faure, 14 February 1955, DAO, Généralités, 142QO/190ter, AMAE. 
210 Confidential, Roger Makins to FO, 8 January 1955, FO 371/116975, TNA; Confidential letter, R.W. Parkes to 
Anthony Eden, 7 January 1955, FO 371/116975, TNA; The British High Commissioner in India had initially 
also thought that the proposals for a conference were ‘half-baked’ and almost impossible, due to the conflicting 
interests of the countries involved, see Nicholas Tarling, “‘Ah-Ah’: Britain and the Bandung Conference of 
1955”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 23, no. 1 (March 1992): 77. 
211 Minutes of a Meeting, Secretary’s Office, Department of State, Washington, 7 January 1955, FRUS 1955-
1957, Vol. 21: East Asian Security, 1-5. 
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information officers, the plan was to keep in close touch with US allies. With little available 
information and without a conference invitation, Dulles could only conclude that Bandung 
would raise many ‘interesting problems’ particularly in the area of propaganda.212 
Much to the irritation of the State Department, the Operations Coordinating Board 
(OCB) – which had to match policy decisions with public diplomacy operations – disagreed 
and established a working group of its own with the aim of fostering ‘Free World awareness’ 
and putting the Soviets psychologically on the defensive. Charles Douglas Jackson, 
Eisenhower’s advisor for psychological strategy, also weighed in with his advice. He 
considered the meeting in Indonesia to be diplomatically insignificant and therefore an 
excellent public diplomacy opportunity. Not only could the first steps be taken towards an 
‘earth-wide racial reconciliation’, but the Soviet allegations of American imperialism could 
also be countered. A public diplomacy operation had to prevent China and North Vietnam 
from dominating the conference, make India the leading power instead of China and inspire a 
resolution that would condemn ‘Soviet colonialism’ in Eastern Europe.213 
He wanted to draft speeches in which a new economic plan for Asia was announced and 
sympathy for the democratic development of Africa and Asia expressed. At the same time, 
Jackson underscored how important it was to avoid the appearance of American interference 
in local politics. This requirement shelved Nelson Rockefeller’s proposal for a presidential 
speech, particularly after Dulles judged a press conference or an informal address to be more 
effective because it created less exposure. Eventually, Jackson’s suggestions made it into a 
collection of press statements on the economic programme for South and East Asia. The 
choice of a boring press statement had to avoid the appearance of a propaganda effort or 
interference.214 
The highlevel debates a few weeks before the Bandung Conference neatly capture the 
duality of the American approach to decolonisation. On the one hand, we have the officials at 
212 Memorandum from the acting chief of the reports and operations staff (Gilman) to the secretary of state, 
“Subject: Main Points of Attached Status Report on Afro-Asian Working Group”, 8 February 1955, FRUS 1955-
1957, Vol. 21: East Asian Security,  29-30; Memorandum of Discussion, “230th Meeting of the National Security 
Council”, 5 January 1955, AWF, NSC Series, Papers as President 1952-1961, Box 6, f: 230th Meeting of NSC, 
DDEL. 
213 Secret memorandum for the under secretary, 12 January 1955, OCB report, “Reactions to the Afro-Asian 
Conference (Compiled by the OCB Staff)”, [1955], RG. 59, A1 1586C, Lot 62D430, Box 35 f: Bandung, 
NARA; Report, “The Bandung Conference Thoughts and recommendations”, [1955], Jackson, C.D.: Papers, 
1931-1967. , Box 78, f: N-Misc. (1), DDEL. 
214 Report, “The Bandung Conference Thoughts and recommendations”, [1955], Jackson, C.D.: Papers, 1931-
1967, Box 78,  f: N-Misc. (1), DDEL; Memorandum for Honorable James C. Hagerty, 6 April 1955, 
Memorandum for governor Sherman Adams, 6 April 1955, Official file, “Proposed Comments by the president 
on economic program for South and East Asia, 1953-1961”, 31 March 1953, Memorandum for governor Adams, 
“Subject: Proposed Presidential Speech before the Bandung Conference”, 31 March 1953, Official File, 1953-
1961, WH Central Files, f: OF II6 ff Asian – African Conference (Bandung Conference), Box 503, DDEL. 
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the NSC and the State Department who considered colonialism to be one of the two major 
propaganda problems, together with peaceful coexistence. When the State Department 
reflected on its interests in Africa, it listed the wide variety of resources it offered such as 
chrome, rubber uranium, diamond, but ultimately concluded that the long term attitude of the 
people provided the key to the continent.215  
On the other hand, Eisenhower and Nixon could not bring themselves to see the 
Bandung participants as legitimate diplomatic interlocutors. In the NSC both men guffawed 
when Eisenhower remarked ‘facetiously’ that the US could best handle the situation by 
handing out a few thousand dollars to each of the delegates. He remarked, again teasingly, 
that the NSC could approve any method ‘up to but not including assassination of the hostile 
delegates’. Using the CIA expression of ‘plausible deniability’ and labelling the Third World 
leaders as bribable politicians, Eisenhower sarcastically signaled that he considered these 
people to be unprepared for a role on the world stage.216 
The Eisenhower administration did not want to physically eliminate the Bandung 
participants, nor did it ignore the potential to win the goodwill of Third World nations in the 
run up to the conference as has been argued, most prominently by Jason Parker. On the 
contrary, the proactive American attitude reflected a deep understanding of the PR problem at 
hand. The State Department, the OCB, Jackson and Rockefeller all tried to come up with an 
acceptable propaganda theme, but struggled with one key problem: vocal support for the 
anticolonial project could be interpreted as insincere and merely an attempt to export the Cold 
War to the Third World.  
On 28 February 1955, the US missions abroad were instructed to coordinate their 
actions with their British colleagues.  The only effective approach was an indirect one, 
working with allies and journalists. The head of the nineteen-strong Philippine delegation, 
215 Report Prepared by the National Security Council, “(NSC 5509): Status of United States Programs for 
National Security as of December 31, 1954”, 2 March 1955, FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. 9: Foreign Economic 
Policy, Foreign Information Program, 504-521; “Notes on Mr. Bissell’s Presentation”, 15 March 1960, US 
President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee) Records, 1959-61, Box 27, f: 
Minutes (2), DDEL; Memorandum Prepared in the Office of African Affairs, “The United States in Africa South 
of the Sahara”, 4 August 1955,  FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. 18: Africa, 13-22; Osgood, Total Cold War, 355. 
216 Despite the explicit reference to sarcasm, ‘again facetiously,’ in the transcript, historians have taken 
Eisenhower’s remark seriously. For only two examples see the work from which this quote is taken: Carol 
Anderson, “The Cold War in the Atlantic World”, in The Atlantic World, 1450-2000, ed. Toyin Falola and Kevin 
David Roberts (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 300; Jason Parker, “Crisis Management and 
Missed Opportunities: U.S. Public Diplomacy and the Creation of the Third World, 1947-1950”, in The United 
States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in Cultural and International History, ed. Kenneth Osgood and 
Brian Etheridge (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), 165. 
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Carlos Romulo, was approached and encouraged to voice his pro-Western and pro-American 
views, while American journalists were phoned and asked to report on the conference.217 
 
 
The British Problem of African Attendance and Nkrumah’s Diplomatic Game 
 
Henry Hopkinson, the UK minister of colonial affairs, agreed with the American analysis. 
The Afro-Asian meeting would be a ‘bogus affair’ but its propaganda impact could be 
damaging for British interests in Africa. 218 In the British analysis the Bandung organisers 
were obsessed with obtaining publicity, which forced the FO to welcome the conference 
publically as it worked to prevent the leaders of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
but particularly Nkrumah, from attending. The State Department approved.219 The propaganda 
experts of the UK bureaucracy believed a communications strategy, whereby a list of 
apologies for colonialism were promoted, would be ineffective. On 13 January 1955, the 
Cabinet therefore approved a behind the scenes approach. An interdepartmental meeting 
decided that resolutions unfavourable to British interests as well as the emergence of an Afro-
Asian bloc needed to be prevented while communism was to be discredited.220  
When Charles Arden-Clarke, the governor of the Gold Coast, went to talk with 
Nkrumah he was surprised to find that the leader of government business had already come up 
with an alternative. Nkrumah told the British representative that he did not want to go to 
Bandung himself, but he was keen to send a representative because non-attendance would 
lower the prestige of the Gold Coast. He charmed Arden-Clarke by suggesting that a Gold 
Coast representative could provide an antidote for anticolonialism by speaking up for the way 
in which the UK had treated the Gold Coast aspiration. The governor was swayed by 
Nkrumah’s proposals because it allowed for Gold Coast attendance without losing face, an 
important concern of the Colonial Office in particular.221 
217 Confidential telegram, R. Makins to FO, 28 February 1955, CO 936/348, TNA; Augusto Espiritu, “‘To Carry 
Water on Both Shoulders’: Carlos P. Romulo, American Empire, and the Meaning of Bandung”, Radical History 
Review, no. 95 (2006): 177. 
218 Minutes, C.R.A. Rae, “Afro-Asian Conference”, 31 December 1954, FO 371/16975, TNA. 
219 Memorandum of a conversation, Department of State, Washington, “Subject: Participation of African States 
in Afro-Asian Conference”, 1 February 1955, FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. 18: Africa, 1-2; Secret and personal 
telegram, StateDept, 31 December 1954, FCO 141/5051, TNA; Minutes, J.E. Cable, 3 January 1955, 
Confidential letter, Parkes to FO, 3 January 1955, FO 371/16975, TNA. 
220 Secret note, E.M. West to A.A.W. Landymore, 4 March 1955, FO 371/116975, TNA; Report, “Afro-Asian 
Conference”, [January 1955], FO 371/116977, TNA; Confidential memorandum, “Afro-Asian Conference”, 2 
March 1955, FO 371/116978, TNA. 
221 Telegram, governor to secretary of state, 8 January 1955, 2, Telegram, secretary of state to governor, 21 
January 1955, FCO 141/5051, TNA. 
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The leader of the Gold Coast was playing a complex diplomatic game in which he 
publically abided with British demands while working behind the scenes. Nkrumah seems to 
have tested the British diplomatic waters by allowing K.A. Gbedemah, the minister of finance 
and number two in the government, to plant an article on a mission abroad which had to 
establish diplomatic ties with other countries. Gbedemah’s plan was a clear violation of the 
agreement with the UK which had left the governor in charge of external affairs.222 When the 
British swallowed Nkrumah’s story – that Gbedemah had acted as a lone ranger – he knew he 
had enough leeway to act independently. 
In a letter to Nehru that had not been approved by the governor, he wrote about the 
efforts to arrange personal meetings with Kojo Botsio, a leading figure in Nkrumah’s 
Convention’s People’s Party (CPP) and Gold Coast delegate. He was also more candid about 
the fact that the UK did not allow him to go: ‘the Governor is still responsible for the external 
affairs of the country, including all matters affecting relations with foreign states’, In his 
approved letter to Sastroamidjojo, by contrast, Nkrumah made no mention of any planned 
personal meetings. After his return, Francis Dei-Anang informed Arden-Clarke that he had 
taken an interest in what was going on behind the scenes but assured the governor’s secretary 
that he had not participated in those informal meetings.223 From the Bandung episode, 
Nkrumah emerges as a shrewd diplomat, which the British at the time, and historians since 
failed notice.224 
 
 
French Optimism 
 
The French regarded Bandung in light of Indochina and North Africa and were angered when 
the FLN appeared at the conference and even obtained diplomatic recognition.225 However, in 
the months leading up to the conference, French officials believed that the resentment about 
the Asian ambition to gain prestige at the cost of Africa would outweigh the anticolonial 
rhetoric. The meeting was seen as an attempt to reattach Africa to Asia, which would 
222 Letter, M.C. Renner to ministre des affaires etrangeres, “Conférence Afro-Asiatique”, 26 January 1955, 
DAO, Généralités, 124QO/190bis, AMAE. 
223 Compare the documents from the Ghanaian national archives and the British national archives: Secret and 
personal memorandum, governor, “Afro-Asian Conference”, 2 May 1955, Memcon, F.E. Cumming-Bruce, 
“Record of Talk with Mr. Dei-Anang”, 2 May 1955,  FCO 141/5051, TNA; Letter, Nkrumah to Nehru, 17 March 
1955, RG. 17/2/800 Miscellaneous 1955-1964, PRAAD. 
224 The most recent account on the Western responses to the Bandung Conference still presents Nkrumah as 
someone who abides by British rules and even states that it was Arden-Clarke who had proposed to let a Gold 
Coast delegation participate, see Kweku Ampiah, The Political and Moral Imperatives of the Bandung 
Conference of 1955: The Reactions of the US, UK and Japan (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2007), 128. 
225 Note, “la première Conférence afro-asiatique, Bandung – (Indonésie) 18 April 1955 par le commandant 
Rousset- SGPDN”, 6 April 1955, 5, DAO, Généralités, 124QO/190, AMAE. 
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exacerbate the overpopulation problem of Asia.226 A history of ‘assimilation’ made it hard for 
officials to see Africans as independent international actors, let alone a serious threat. Like the 
British, the French underestimated the diplomatic skills of the Gold Coast: Kojo Botsio’s visit 
to Nigeria was seen merely as a diverting personal distraction. Moreover, it led them to 
believe that Africans would come to see the problem as they did, in terms of Asian 
dominance.227 The French intelligence officer who had labelled Bandung the beginning of the 
end for the white race found few kindred spirits at the foreign ministry.228 The envoy the 
French government had sent out to Karachi, New Delhi, Rangoon, Bangkok and Saigon in 
mid-March, also concluded after a friendly conversation with Nehru that there was no cause 
for concern. Anxieties, which had been fuelled by the 1954 defeat in Dien Bien Phu and the 
subsequent loss of empire in Asia, were groundless.229  
Despite French apathy, British analysts had concluded that the French were anxious to 
insulate Africa from Asian influence. Jacques Viot, the French ambassador to London, had 
personally asked British officials if it was possible to prevent Ethiopia and Liberia from 
attending.230 When the French remarked to the British that African participation ‘made little 
sense either on geographical or ideological grounds’ they meant exactly that. The Foreign 
Office was wasting its time thinking about an African-Asian connection that simply did not 
exist.231 Even the minister of France d’outre-mer, Peirre-Henri Teitgen, who generally 
responded more quickly to anticolonial activity, was unconcerned.232  
The hasty conclusions the British drew from the French remarks betray a deep anxiety 
about their ability to control the situation. The French ambassador to Singapore wrote in 
January 1955 that the majority of the English on the ground struggled to understand the 
initiative. Unlike the French, the UK officials in Djakarta feared that the conference could 
226 ‘le menace l’Asie surpeuplée’ see Note for direction général des affaires politiques, “A/S: Conférence afro-
asiatique”, [January 1955], DAO, Généralités, 124QO/190bis, AMAE. 
227 Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa, 29, 145; Information report, “Bulletin d’information du 
mois de July 1955, émanant de la Direction d’Afrique-Levant Sous-Direction d’Afrique”, 1955, DAL 
Généralités, 49QONT/32, f: 32/1, AMAE; Letter, W.D. Allen to Alan Lennox-Boyd, “Afro-Asian Conference”, 
6 January 1954, FO 371/116975, TNA. 
228 Connelly quotes him, to show the racial fears in France, but generally speaking there was more confidence 
with regard to Africa, see Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, 81. 
229 Incoming telegram, Auge, “De la part de M.P. Devinat”, 26 March 1955, DAO, Généralités, 142QO/190ter, 
AMAE; Letter, H.S. Stephenson to F.S. Tomlinson, 4 April 1955, FO 371/116980; Note for cabinet du ministre, 
“a.s. Voyage en Asie de M. Devinat”, 14 March 1955, DAO, Généralités, 142QO/190ter, AMAE.  
230 Draft submission, “Afro-Asian Conference”, [January 1955], FO 371/116977, TNA. 
231 Quote taken from: Tarling, “‘Ah-Ah’: Britain and the Bandung Conference of 1955”, 86. 
232 Letter, P.H. Teitgen to DAO, “a.s. Conférence afro-Asiatque de Bandoeng”, 6 April 1955, DAO, Généralités, 
124QO/190, AMAE. 
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increase the feelings of hostility towards the West in countries involved in the anticolonial 
struggle.233  
This wait-and-see attitude has led many to conclude that France, the UK and the US did 
not take the Bandung Conference seriously, or that Eisenhower did not understand that the 
Third World nations could be won for the cause. In light of the ideological scramble it is clear 
that the delegates were not seen as independent actors on the international stage. However, the 
British and the Americans did not underestimate the propaganda appeal and worked to limit 
the propaganda fallout. 
 
 
The Conference Agenda: The Brown Man’s Burden and Moral Strength 
 
On the first day of the conference, Sukarno and Vice President Mohammed Hatta, 
accompanied by the five sponsoring premiers and some chief delegates such as Chou En-lai, 
Nasser and Romulo, entered the conference hall. The delegates came from 26 different 
countries: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast, Iraq, 
Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Pakistan, the People’s Republic of 
China, the Philippines, Siam, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Vietnam, India, Persia (Iran), Saudi 
Arabia, North Vietnam, and Yemen.234  
In spite of this geographical diversity, the practical obstacles and internal divisions, the 
delegates in Bandung were united by the fact that all of them had been labelled ‘unfit’ to 
govern, a claim contested in the writings of Aimé Césaire, Franz Fanon, CLR James, but also 
George Padmore, Nkrumah and even Jomo Kenyatta. These liberationist philosophers made 
two key points. First, they deconstructed how colonial governments had instilled the native 
population with an inferiority complex. Second, they stressed the hypocrisy of the imperial 
enterprise, which had promised development but brought destruction. In 1955, the 
Martiniquan writer Aimé Césaire attacked the European claims of moral superiority. Europe 
bragged about its so-called achievements, the diseases it had cured, and the improved 
233 Letter, consul de France à Singapour to DAO, “a.s. Entretien avec M. Dudley”, 31 January 1955, 6, DAO, 
Généralités, 124QO/190bis, AMAE; This contradicts the findings in Tarling, “‘Ah-Ah’: Britain and the Bandung 
Conference of 1955”, 110. 
234 News Bulletin, “Asian-African Conference News, Published by the Information Department of the Embassy 
of Indonesia in London”, 19 April 1955, FO 371/116981, TNA; Despatch to FO, “Summary of Introductory 
Speeches made on the 18 and 19 April by leaders of Delegations”, [April 1955], FO 371/116983, TNA. 
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standards of living it had delivered, while in fact the Europeans had only taught men to have 
an ‘inferiority complex, to tremble, to kneel, despair and behave like flunkeys.’235  
In Black Skin, White Mask, Frantz Fanon, a psychiatrist and key theorist of the Algerian 
War, rejected the so-called dependence complex. In his Psychologie de la colonisation, 
Octave Mannoni had argued that the Malagasy could not bear the fact that they were not 
white men. Fanon exposed this insight as false: the ‘white man’ had imposed discrimination 
and had robbed the non-whites of their self-worth.236   
Even Richard Wright – in defiance of the persona he has become in history books – 
realised that the meeting in Bandung was less about the racialization of international life and 
more about the elimination of ‘racial shame’. He tells the story of a woman who locked 
herself in the bathroom to whiten her skin, a literary move to demonstrate Bandung’s essential 
aim, namely the eradication of the ‘feeling of inferiority that the white man has instilled’.237 
Wright also asked the essential political question that preoccupied leaders at the 
conference: how could the force unleashed in Bandung be harnessed to mobilise a stagnant 
population whose soul had been corroded by the colonial enterprise?238 To address the nativist 
inferiority complex, the delegates wanted to mobilise moral, political and spiritual strength. 
At the same time they wanted to succeed where the imperial powers had failed and deliver on 
the promise of economic development as a way to speed up the independence process, 
particularly on the African continent. 
 
 
Moral Strength 
 
Sukarno stressed the central theme in his opening speech when he explained that the former 
colonies had little real military power. The only weapon at their disposal was ‘spiritual’ in 
nature. Addressing the representatives that filled the conference hall, Indonesia’s leader 
defined a particular form of soft power available only to those who had suffered the 
humiliations of colonialism in Africa and Asia: 
 
“What can we do? The peoples of Asia and Africa wield little physical power. Even their economic 
strength is dispersed and slight. We cannot indulge in power politics. Diplomacy for us isn’t a matter of 
“the big stick”. Our statesmen by and large aren’t backed up with serried ranks of jet bombers. What 
can we do? We can do much! We can inject the voice of reason into world affairs and mobilize all the 
spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of Asia and Africa on the side of peace. Asia and Africa, 
235 Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, trans. Joan Pinkham (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), 
21–23. 
236 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 73. 
237 Wright, The Color Curtain, 187. 
238 Ibid. 
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1,400,000,000 strong, far more than half of all human population, can mobilize what I have called the 
moral violence of nations in favour of peace.239 
 
The newly emerging nations had little real power and the fight against colonialism would 
have to be fought on the battlefield of ideas and international norms. The primacy of ideas 
also stemmed from the devastating consequences of a possible violent conflict which would 
invite intervention and open the door to the use of atomic weapons. Not only was 
independence at stake, but also ‘the end of civilization and even of human life.’ Sukarno 
found an ally in the Iraqi prime minister, Mohammed Fadhil Jamal who argued that the world 
needed ‘ideological disarmament’, the end of the Cold War. Weapons of mass destruction had 
to be eliminated, but the morality in international relations had to be increased. Jamali made 
an impassioned plea for ‘moral rearmament and physical disarmament whereby men of all 
races and nations […] work for mutual harmony and peace.’240  
When John Kotelawala described the Soviet influence in Eastern Europe as ‘another 
form of colonialism,’ he angered many (illustration 5). Not least because an analogy damaged 
the shared project of moral strength in which the Cold War in its entirety was rejected as 
immoral. Oscar Morland, the British ambassador to Indonesia, was pleased. When Kotelawala 
had stayed overnight at the British ambassador’s residence, Morland had assured him that the 
speech was a good move. Nehru though, gave the Ceylon delegate the cold shoulder at the 
party of the Gold Coast delegation, forcing him to mince his words a day later.241 The Indian 
prime minister had been so shocked that he did not notice that Kotelawala also subscribed to 
the main theme of the conference when stating that the ‘argument of force’ had to yield to ‘the 
argument of spiritual power’.242 
If soft power was about the ability of one nation to attract others to its cultural values 
and consequently come round to its way of thinking – attractive power – moral force was 
about the power to mobilise support.243 Césaire’s and Fanon’s analysis had to be taken 
seriously self-confidence had to be increased. Through emotional appeals and rhetorical flair, 
239 Quoted in memorandum for the Operations Coordinating Board, “Subject: Bandung Conference of April, 
1955”, 12 May 1955, 3-4, OCB Central File Series, White House Office, National Security Council Staff Papers 
1948-1961, Box 86, f: OCB 092.3 (File #2) (2) [April-November 1955], DDEL. 
240 Memorandum for the Operations Coordinating Board, “Subject: Bandung Conference of April, 1955”, 12 
May 1955, 3-4, OCB Central File Series, White House Office, National Security Council Staff Papers 1948-
1961, Box 86, f: OCB 092.3 (File #2) (2) [April-November 1955], DDEL. 
241 Letter, Oscar Morland to FO, 20 April 1955, Pamphlet, “Bandung 1955”, [1955], RG. 306, UD-WW 285, 
FRC 5, f: General – Bandung Conf, NARA; Letter, Singapore to FO, 19 April 1955, DO 35/6098, TNA; 
Personal telegram, Nehru to Eden, 29 April 1955, FO 371/116984, TNA; Confidential letter, British Embassy 
Djakarta, 5 May 1955, FCO 141/5051, TNA. 
242 Secret inward telegram, UK High Commissioner in Ceylon to CRO, 18 April 1955, FO 371/116981, TNA. 
243 Nye, “Soft Power”, 160; See the introduction to this thesis for a critique of Soft Power. 
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calls for action and the potential promise of an increased weight on the international stage, 
anticolonial leaders tried to convince the West that they deserved a place at the table. At the 
same time they wanted to impress upon their populations that they were heading in the right 
direction.  
Nehru’s and Sukarno’s show of statesmanship was not just a matter of self-admiration. 
Statesmanlike behaviour had to make them acceptable in the West and destroy the myth that 
they were unfit for self-government. Nehru’s ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’, also 
known as ‘Panchsheel’, was not simply a move by Nehru to claim leadership of the Afro-
Asian coalition, but a symbolic effort. Formulated in a trade agreement with China  in April 
1954, those principles included mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, 
equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. In Bandung, Nehru declared that Asia 
and Africa were no longer made up of ‘yes-men’. He wanted to work with Europe on an equal 
footing and believed that the growing Asian influence had to be exercised in a direction that 
had integrity.244 
‘Moral strength’ made the Western response to Bandung and the anticolonial project 
difficult. In his report on the conference, the British expert R.W. Parkes, expressed his 
disappointment about the fact that the achievements of empire had not received more 
recognition. The ‘Eastern nations’ as he called the Bandung participants, appeared to have 
been swayed by rhetorical tricks: ‘words, vital, hopeful, constructive words’ had proven to be 
more important than actions. He found that in Asia actions did not necessarily speak louder 
than words and there was little gratitude. He realised that Nehru and his fellow statesmen 
wanted their former colonisers to acknowledge them as equals: 
 
The East is no longer age-old, inscrutable, unchanging. It is young, eager, drunk with new nationalism 
and freedom, but also desperately anxious to behave with maturity and make a good showing before its 
elders if not betters.245 
 
Additionally, as Portugal noted in a NATO meeting of May 1955, Bandung gave rise to an 
Afro-Asian mystique. The British embassy in Djakarta had already seen an example of this 
244 Quoted in Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955, 74–75. 
245 Report, R.W. Parkes, “Some Impressions of the Bandung Conference April 18-24”, [April 1955], 8, FO 
371/116983, TNA. 
                                              
78 | T h e  I d e o l o g i c a l  S c r a m b l e  f o r  A f r i c a  
 
during the conference when it was rumoured that the armistice in Dien Bien Phu of 1954, had 
come about under the impulse of the five Colombo Powers.246  
 
 
 
 
Illustration 5: The Prime Minister of Ceylon (Sri Lanka), John Kotelawala (middle, wearing a garland of 
flowers) with Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, the Indonesian Premier, soon after Kotelawala’s arrival at the airport of 
Bandung. Source: Pamphlet, “Bandung 1955”, [1955], RG. 306, UD-WW 285, FRC 5, f: General – Bandung 
Conf, NARA. 
 
 
 
 
 
246 Memorandum, “Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council held at the Palais Chaillot, Paris, XVIe”, 10 
May 1955, NATO/CR (55) 21, NATO; Confidential letter, British embassy Djakarta to FO, 30 April 1955, FO 
371/116984, TNA. 
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The Brown Man’s Burden 
 
As the conference went on, an alternative to Western-led development emerged, most 
eloquently described in an article reprinted in the Asian-African Conference Bulletin entitled: 
‘The Brown Man’s Burden’ (illustration 6). By inverting the relationship that had been 
envisioned in the ‘White Man’s Burden’, the author called upon the free nations of Asia to do 
what the West had refused: pass on their experience to solve the ‘problems in administration’ 
and invest in ‘underdeveloped economies’. The civilising mission needed an alternative since 
the colonial promises of ‘partnership’ had proven to be false, while the ‘progressive 
realisation of self-government’ had only been used to ‘soften the realty of exploitation.’ 247 
The journalist succinctly summarised the – implicit but pervasive – development agenda 
of the Bandung delegates. Many of the Colombo powers shared the belief that an orderly 
transition depended on being well prepared. Crucially different, however, in their view was a 
commitment to address instability instead of exploiting it: ‘The brown man’ also ‘had a 
burden to carry’, because unrest in one region threatened everyone. Kotelawala for one 
emphasized that states liberated from colonialism had to be assisted to ensure they would not 
relapse into ‘other forms of servitude’ and that those who had won their independence had a 
‘solemn duty’ to offer knowledge and expertise.248  
In his closing speech, Nehru presented Europe, Asia and America as interconnected and 
important areas in the world, while he spoke about Africa as a continent of tragedy and 
slavery. He made a plea to take up ‘the brown man’s burden’, by arguing that it was up to 
Asia to help Africa. The final communiqué of the Asian-African Conference listed economic 
development as its first and most urgent priority as the participating countries pledged to 
exchange know-how, offer experts, trainees, pilot projects and equipment to still dependent 
territories for demonstration purposes and organise regional training programmes.249 
For France the commitment to development was the final proof that the Asian powers 
wanted to replace the West, obtain a ‘rôle titulaire’ and become the new guides to 
247 Also note the inversion of the title Asian-African Conference rather than the Afro-Asian Conference, 
reflecting the discomfort among Asian heads of state about the role of Africa, see News bulletin, “Asian-African 
Conference News, Published by the Information Department of the Embassy of Indonesia in London”, 19 April 
1955, FO 371/116981, TNA. 
248 “World Press Opinion”, 18; Memorandum for the Operations Coordinating Board, “Subject: Bandung 
Conference of April, 1955”, 12 May 1955, 3-4, OCB Central File Series, White House Office, National Security 
Council Staff Papers 1948-1961, Box 86, f: OCB 092.3 (File #2) (2) [April-November 1955], DDEL. 
249 Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955, 74–77. 
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independence.250 A few days before the conference opening the British had already stressed 
that a widely shared idea in Asian countries had to be contested, namely that Asian people 
were the ‘natural saviours and champions of the Africans against the white man.’ The 
unspoken notion of a brown man’s burden further added to the already existing tensions 
between Africa and Asia. In the run up to the conference, the term Afro-Asian had already 
been disliked in Asia because it gave Africans a sense of pride as the UK representative in 
Kathmandu noticed when talking to officials or reading newspapers.251  
The speeches at Bandung also strengthened Nkrumah’s ambivalence about the Afro-
Asian coalition as a separate group in international affairs. He believed Africa’s problems 
could only be solved by establishing an African Union under his leadership, not by means of 
Afro-Asian solidarity. Furthermore, Nkrumah and his adviser George Padmore wanted to 
avoid a scenario in which European guidance would be supplanted by Asian paternalism. 
Padmore proposed a ‘conference to match Bandung on an African scale’ where Asians would 
be observers and Africans would take the lead.252 Contrary to Robert Vitalis’s claim, 
Nkrumah’s diplomatic manoeuvres were not only driven by the need to counteract Nasser. 
Although the Egyptian leader was a formidable opponent – with Radio Cairo and his message 
of Egyptian identity as a confluence of Arab, Islamic and African influences – Nkrumah 
dreaded Asian paternalism.253 
Even though the delegates never worked out a systematic approach to assist the 
dependent territories of Africa, the so-called Brown Man’s Burden is significant because it 
was a vital aspect of the conference’s appeal. Particularly, the accusation that the West had 
used aid as a pretext for exploitation struck a sensitive cord among the Western powers. In the 
Western imagination, Nehru and Sukarno had not become the standard bearers of a new 
anticolonial order, but competitors in the ideological scramble to provide cultural assistance. 
It was unacceptable that they would be outcompeted by these complete novices in foreign 
affairs. 
 
250 Note for direction general des affaires politiques, “A/S: Conférence afro-asiatique”, [January 1955], DAO, 
Généralités, 124QO/190bis, AMAE ; Also, the French ambassador in a conversation with Allen of the FO, see 
W.D. Allen to Alan Lennox-Boyd, “Afro-Asian Conference”, 6 January 1954, FO 371/116975, TNA. 
251 Letter, FO to Middleton, [February 1955], DO 35/6097, TNA; Confidential letter, Embassy of Katmandu to 
F.S. Tomlinson, South-East Asia Department Foreign Office, 14 April 1955, DO 35/6098, TNA. 
252 Quoted in Vitalis, “The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung (Ban-Doong)”, 
275. 
253 Vitalis argues that Nkrumah was only concerned with Nasser in his diplomacy surrounding Bandung and 
ignores Nkrumah’s concerns about Asian paternalism, see Ibid., 276; W. Scott Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign 
Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 46. 
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Illustration 6: The Indonesian government produced a Bulletin on the Bandung Conference, intended to bolster 
its prestige and in that way bury the myth that non-whites were not capable of self-government. Also note the 
inversion of the title, Asian-African Conference rather than the Afro-Asian Conference, reflecting the discomfort 
among Asian heads of state about the position of Africa in the Bandung coalition. Source:“World Press 
Opinion”, Asian-African Conference Bulletin 1, no. 1 (March 1955): 18. 
 
 
Drawing Lessons: Bandung as a Question of Aid  
 
As reports from Indonesia arrived, Western observers could breathe a sigh of relief. The 
inexperience of participants in Bandung had not led to undirected anticolonial anger or a 
propaganda disaster for the West. On 10 June 1955 the African section of French foreign 
affairs informed its personnel in Africa that its prediction had been correct: Africans were not 
sufficiently evolved to comprehend the abstract and imprecise issues that made up the world 
of international affairs. Likewise, the main report by Jacques Roux, the man who directed the 
section on Asia and Oceania at foreign affairs in Paris, saw the anticolonial discussions as a 
minor point. Instead he focused on the more realist aspects of the meeting: Nehru’s reputation 
82 | T h e  I d e o l o g i c a l  S c r a m b l e  f o r  A f r i c a  
 
had been overshadowed by Chou En-Lai’s popularity. His proposal to negotiate with the 
Americans on Formosa had been a positive development.254   
In contrast to France, the Anglo-American officials apprehended the propaganda 
damage. At the State Department there was some concern about the trust Afro-Asian 
delegates had placed in the United Nations (UN). The US officials predicted that the 
institution would become used increasingly to force the issue of decolonisation. In general, 
however, the free world had scored a substantive success, according to the member of the 
OCB who sat down to evaluate the Conference. Important free world principles had been 
endorsed and anti-western or pro-communist statements avoided.255  
The Foreign Office agreed: alarmist predictions had been unwarranted. Francis 
Cumming-Bruce, the adviser on external affairs to the governor in Ghana, further concluded 
that the Gold Coast delegation had behaved in an exemplary fashion after a conversation with 
Dei-Anang in which the latter kept his informal diplomatic contacts a secret. The Gold Coast 
party, organised jointly with the British Council in Djakarta, was further cited as evidence. A 
newsreel and a short film on the recent elections had been shown to prove there was a 
benevolent side to colonialism. The ambassador in Djakarta noted that the Gold Coast 
delegation was partially responsible for the generally satisfactory way in which Britain 
emerged from the Conference.256 With their ‘command of English,’ but also their ‘general 
intelligence and good sense’ they were living examples of the British civilising mission.257 
 
 
French and American Cultural Assistance Fortified 
 
When Western observers began to dissect the speeches in Indonesia they came to a 
remarkable conclusion: the Bandung delegates had not rejected colonial guidance, but had 
254 Information bulletin, “Bulletin d’information du mois de July 1955, émanant de la Direction d’Afrique-
Levant Sous-Direction d’Afrique”, 1955, DAL Généralités, 49QONT/32, f : 32/1, AMAE; Note, “A/s : 
Conférence de Bandung Affaire de Formose”, 6 May 1955, DAO Généralités, 124QO/274, f: Chine, Conférence 
de Bandung, Affaire de Formose, AMAE. 
255 Confidential telegram, Roger Makins to FO, 12 May 1955, FO 371/116985, TNA; Notes, Geoffrey Caston, 
24 May 1955, CO 936/350, TNA; Memorandum for the Operations Coordinating Board, “Subject: Bandung 
Conference of April, 1955”, 12 May 1955, WH Office, OCB central File Series, Box 86, f: OCB 092.3 (File# 2) 
(2) [April-November 1955], DDEL. 
256 Tarling, “‘Ah-Ah’: Britain and the Bandung Conference of 1955”, 109. 
257 Confidential letter, British Embassy Djakarta to FO, 5 May 1955, Memcon, F.E. Cumming-Bruce, “Record of 
Talk with Mr. Dei-Anang”, 2 May 1955, FCO 141/5051, TNA; quotes taken from confidential letter, British 
Embassy Djakarta to FO, 5 May 1955, FO 371/116984, TNA; Confidential letter, Djakarta to FO, 22 April 1955, 
FO 371/116981, TNA; The party was attended by Jawaharal Nehru, his daughter Indira Ghandi, Indian diplomat 
Krishna Menon, Sudanese Prime Minister Al Azhari, the Lebanese diplomat Charles Malik, the prime minister 
and the economic affairs minister of Indonesia, the Liberian and Ethiopian delegations and John Kotelawala’s 
delegation. 
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complaints and harboured doubts about the sincerity to fulfil the imperial duty and pursue the 
economic and educational development of their colonies. The focus on the diplomatic and 
racial implications of the Afro-Asian meeting has led historians to conclude that the meeting 
did not affect French, British or American policies towards the Third World. However, that 
assessment overlooks how Bandung was transformed in the Western imagination from a 
propaganda problem into a development challenge during the course of the conference.258 
American officials did capitalise on the opportunity to seek out Third World goodwill 
by offering preparatory tools. The British began drafting a statement to reaffirm their 
commitment to a policy of a guided and orderly transition. Even within the French diplomatic 
apparatus Bandung forced a change. Leopold Senghor, deputy of Senegal and minister 
responsible for international cultural matters in Edgar Faure’s government, devised a plan to 
improve French cultural assistance. He had welcomed the conference as an opportunity for 
Africans and Asians to affirm their so-called ‘personality’. In a speech at the Congress of 
Black Writers in 1956, he defined the meeting as a chance to revitalise the African culture that 
had been so important in the development of European and American cultures.259 
Négritude had been pioneered by Senghor and Césaire in the interwar period as a way to 
reaffirm ‘black’ values, art and culture which the French civilising mission had sought to 
repress. Through poetry and reflections on African art, written in French, Senghor deliberately 
attempted to counter the claimed universalism of French culture with his own claim to 
universalism for black culture.260 
At the same time, Senghor – in his role as minister in the French government – wanted 
to accelerate African progress by combining the French and African civilisations to foster 
African progress. On 30 April, only six days after the closing session, he informed his 
minister of foreign affairs, Antoine Pinay, about his plans to visit Nigeria, Sierra-Leone and 
the Gold Coast. He wanted to improve the French cultural assistance to Africa and devise a 
258 The French response to Bandung has not been thoroughly assessed but there is agreement that Bandung 
generated little response in terms of policy, see Parker, “Cold War II”, 891–892; Tarling, “‘Ah-Ah’: Britain and 
the Bandung Conference of 1955”, 108–111; Amady Aly Dieng, Les Grands Combats de la Fédération des 
étudiants d’Afrique noire de Bandung aux indépendances, 1955-1960 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009), 1–15. 
259 The conclusion rejects the arguments of Jason Parker, “Small Victory, Missed Chance: The Eisenhower 
Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the Turning of the Cold War”, in The Eisenhower Administration, 
the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, ed. Kathryn Statler, Andrew Johns, and Jason Parker 
(New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 155; Babacar M’Baye, “Richard Wright and African 
Francophone Intellectuals: A Reassessment of the 1956 Congress of Black Writers in Paris”, in African 
Diaspora and the Metropolis: Reading the African, African American and Caribbean Experience, ed. Fassil 
Demissie (New York: Routledge, 2013), 36–37. 
260 Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa, 93, 16; Richard Watts, “Negritude, Présence Africaine, 
Race”, in Postcolonial Thought in the French-Speaking World, ed. Charles Forsdick and David Murphy 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009), 227–37. 
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strategy to counter Nasser’s anti-French propaganda. Senghor feared that if France ignored 
the threat coming from Cairo, its colonies would be overtaken by pan-Islam propaganda, 
spread by Radio Damascus and Radio Cairo.261 
American officials were even faster in their response. Two days before the end of the 
conference on 22 April 1955, Andrew Berding, officer in the Bureau of Public Affairs of the 
State Department, sent around a paper entitled ‘Use of Nationalistic Aspirations in the U.S. 
Information Agency’s Operations’. Berding argued that particularly in Africa, communism 
had been successful in identifying itself with nationalism because of the presence of the 
European powers, a fact that the US had to take into account. The best hope for using 
nationalistic emotions was the enlargement of an educational programme for foreign youths 
and political reformers in ‘democratic techniques’. In that way the government structures of 
new nations could be improved.262 
 
 
Colonial Publicity and ‘Bandung in Reverse’ in the UK 
 
The speed with which the State Department turned towards educational assistance contrasted 
with the difficulties to assess the diplomatic ramifications of the Afro-Asian meeting and 
suggest officials had given little thought to the development aspect of conference. In May 
1956, the State Department could only recommend that their embassies refrain from taking a 
position until they had established how serious the Asian-African aspirations were.263  
The British, on their part, revived a plan from 1954 to propagate the idea of British 
colonial achievement. The Bandung Conference taught Foreign Affairs Minister Anthony 
Eden that the target audience would not simply accept that message. The imperial enterprise 
needed to be actively propagated, goodwill consciously created and discontent about the poor 
level of foreign aid reduced. The British wanted to promote the benefits of imperialism 
together with the French and added an ‘appreciative reference’ to the other powers in Africa 
in their planned statement.264 Furthermore, they decided that they could not only talk about 
261 ‘Nous ne pourrons éviter longtemps la confrontation.  Si nous la refusons, elle se fera – elle se fait déjà – sans 
nous et dans les pires conditions,’ see report, Leopold Senghor,  “Voyage officiel en Afrique occidentale 
britannique, du secrétaire d‘Etat à la Présidence du Conseil 22 Septembre – 7 October 1955”, October 1955, 21, 
DAL, Généralités 1953-1959, 49QONT/66, AMAE. 
262 Memorandum for Andrew Berding, 9 May 1955, RG. 59, A1 1587-M, Box 63, f: Nationalism, NARA. 
263 Circular, 22 May 1956, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, FRC 5, f: Afro-Asian Conference - 1956, NARA. 
264 Confidential, Anthony Eden, “Colonial Publicity”, 6 August 1954, CO 1027/72, TNA; Letter, H T Bourdillon 
to ITM Pink, “Proposed General Assembly speech defending colonialism”, 24 September 1956, Goldsworthy, 
David, ed. The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 1951-1957, BDEE 1994, Vol. 3, Pt 1, p.408-
411 (no.169); The tempering of American ideas was also in line with the way the UK responded to American 
ideas before the conference. 
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the forthcoming independence of the Gold Coast and the Federation of Malaya because the 
impression would be created that the UK wanted to cover up its problems in Kenya.265 The 
assertive Bandung Conference made the British information services – at least on the level of 
strategy – more political. 
The British and the Americans were in agreement: Bandung had signalled a call for 
better development. That shared understanding motivated Dulles to contact the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Harold Macmillan, at Geneva in November 1955. He knew Macmillan 
supported positive imperial propaganda as an alternative to the obscure statements the UK 
government had been issuing since the interwar period. Already in August 1941 the British 
ambassador to Washington, Lord Halifax, had told Dulles’s predecessor that the British 
government was considering a Colonial Charter on Britain’s colonial responsibilities.266 
Dulles now returned to that idea and proposed a ‘Bandung in reverse.’ 
The ‘Bandung Conference in reverse’ idea was a final attempt to entice the British into 
making the statement on self-government Eisenhower had wanted since 1953.267 Dulles 
proposed the organisation of a conference where the colonial powers would announce a plan 
that would lead to self-determination of their colonies and thus seize the initiative from the 
Soviet Union. Contrary to nonaligned leaders and historians who have cast Dulles as an 
inflexible Cold Warrior with little sympathy for the independence cause, the secretary of state 
saw himself as an adherent to the American tradition of anti-imperialism.268 
Once Western officials noticed that the positions taken at the conference were moderate, 
they renewed their commitment to high-quality foreign aid. Dissatisfaction with the 
substandard level of colonial assistance programs was considered to be the main complaint 
that arose from the deliberations in Bandung. 
 
 
 
 
265 Letter, HT Bourdillon to ITM Pink, 30 October 1956, in: Goldsworthy, David, ed. The Conservative 
Government and the End of Empire 1951-1957, BDEE 1994, Vol. 3, Pt 1, p.415 (no.171). 
266 Morris, British Techniques of Public Relations and Propaganda for Mobilizing East and Central Africa 
during World War II, 210. 
267 Plan described in Egya N. Sangmuah, “Eisenhower and Containment in North Africa, 1956-1960”, Middle 
East Journal 44, no. 1 (1990): 77; Mary Montgomery, “The Eyes of the World Were Watching: Ghana, Great 
Britain, and the United States, 1957-1966” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, 2004), 29. 
268 Memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President, 14 May 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 22: 
Southeast Asia, 267-268; For the beginning of a more nuanced interpretation of John Foster Dulles see Rakove, 
Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World, 3. However, Rakove does not explain how Dulles’s negative 
statements about nonalignment can be understood as a positive American project for self-government. 
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Conclusion: Bandung as the Call for a Better Colonial Project 
 
At least as important as the anticolonial aim to regain the morality within international 
relations and certainly more neglected in the history of the conference and the Western 
response was the influence of colonial developmental ideas. The notion that Asian nations had 
a responsibility to foster the development process in Africa to enable independence was 
pervasive among the delegates at Bandung. It even made Nkrumah hesitant about fully 
supporting the Afro-Asian project. Nonetheless, he had deceived the British in order that a 
Gold Coast delegation might attend the meeting. Nkrumah as the shrewd diplomat who 
wanted to establish diplomatic ties without getting caught up in the plans of Nehru, the British 
or Nasser, is something historians have missed. 
The accusation that the West had been insincere about preparing nations for self-
government was the first point Western analysts noticed in their post-conference reports. A 
plea to leave the territories in Africa and Asia, to Western ears sounded like a call for better 
assistance. Officials in the UK, the US and in France – where there had been little anxiety in 
the run up to April 1955, despite historian’s claims to the contrary – therefore decided to 
deepen their commitment and expanded their educational assistance schemes. That conclusion 
has faded into the background of historical understanding and has been buried by research on 
the diplomatic and racial aspirations of the conference. In the next chapter we explore the 
ideas and tools that sustained the renewed Western commitment to aid. 
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3. Hungry Minds 
  
The Question of Aid and the Challenge of African and Arab Nationalism 
(October 1955- March 1957) 
 
One third of all mankind has entered upon an historic struggle for a new freedom: freedom from grinding 
poverty. Across all continents, nearly a billion people seek, sometimes almost in desperation, for the skills 
and knowledge and assistance. 
 
– Dwight D. Eisenhower, second inaugural address, 21 January 1957.269 
 
We believe that the constitutional advance of the Gold Coast has significance far beyond the boundaries 
of our country. […] This official publication, produced in London and distributed overseas, will show 
something of our determination to catch up with the deficiencies of the past and to meet the challenge of 
the future. 
   
– Kwame Nkrumah about the Ghanaian periodical, The Gold Coast Today, 18 January 1956.270 
 
The expansion of the French language and culture, once again, was the main purpose of my mission. All 
that [observations] demonstrate the urgent need to define  – and implement – a French cultural policy. 
  
– Leopold Senghor, report on his travel to Africa, October 1955.271 
 
[W]hat has been described as a new communist offensive has begun, particularly in the Arab areas of the 
Middle East: and it seems clear that while there may, as yet, be no evidence of a direct Russian offensive 
in the African Colonies, it is likely that the common pattern of communist expansion will be followed, 
and that advantage will be taken of affinities of language, religion, and geography. 
   
– IRD analysis, 1956.272 
 
 
In 1956 Alfred Bannerman, a Ghanaian student from Koforidua, attended the New York 
Herald Tribune Forum with 32 other students. When the group visited the White House, the 
president’s car pulled out of the driveway. As Alfred and the others cheered and waved, 
Eisenhower ordered his car to stop and allowed the students to swarm around the vehicle. 
Afterwards, Alfred proudly reported how he shook hands with the president and that 
Eisenhower had wished him and Ghana good luck. In the spirit of intercultural understanding, 
Pan American World Airways had given each of the young delegates free round-trip 
transportation and Bannerman was offered the opportunity to speak at the Atlantic City 
convention of the Association of School Administrators about the struggle for independence 
269 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Second Inaugural Address”, 21 January 1957. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10856. 
270 “A Message by the Gold Coast Prime Minister, the Hon. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah”, The Gold Coast Today, 
January 18, 1956, Vol. 1, No.1, 1. 
271 ‘l’expansion de la langue et de la culture françaises, encore une fois, était le but principal de ma mission. Tout 
ce qui a précède démontre l’urgente nécessité de définier – et d’appliquer – une politique culturelle française’, 
see Report, Leopold Senghor, “Voyage officiel en Afrique occidentale britannique, du secrétaire d‘Etat à la 
Présidence du Conseil 22 Septembre – 7 October 1955”, October 1955, 2, DAL, Généralités 1953-1959, 
49QONT/66, AMAE. 
272 Draft telegram, [1956], CO 1035/7, TNA. 
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in the Gold Coast. Together with other delegates, he appeared on television shows that dealt 
with the literacy campaigns in the Gold Coast and Mexico.273 
Eisenhower’s encouragement of private educational programmes was not limited to 
welcoming African students. The Bandung Conference had made Western officials realise 
that the peoples in the colonial and postcolonial world were not only hungry for food or 
material progress, they also had a thirst for knowledge. This vocabulary reflected a wider 
trend within the school of psychological modernisation theory, which argued that the 
psychological makeup of men and women could be modernised through education and with 
the help of other techniques. David McClelland, for instance, a social psychologist at Yale, 
published The Achievement Motive in 1953, which argued that the need for achievement was 
like the need for food, one wanted it more the longer one went without it.274 
Responding to this alleged cry for aid required an expansion of cultural assistance 
schemes, something that Western public diplomats had already committed themselves to after 
Bandung. In the face of anticolonial nationalism, particularly Nasser’s propaganda campaign 
towards British East Africa and French West Africa, the promise of the civilising mission had 
to be reaffirmed. African peoples needed to be reassured that their developmental needs 
would be met, in spite of Radio Cairo’s proclaimations.275 Eisenhower publically committed 
to the creation of a systematic cultural assistance effort in an important speech at Baylor 
University in May 1956. Leopold Senghor wanted to improve French language teaching to 
advance African societies. While the different offices within the British government increased 
the funding for the British Council, an institution founded in 1934 to organise British 
education and cultural activities abroad. 
After 1955, cultural assistance became an integrated part of foreign aid doctrines 
towards Africa. It is argued here that the centrality of this type of assistance profoundly 
affected the foreign aid debate in the US. In 1956, direct aid to Africa amounted to less than 
two per cent of the total US economic aid abroad while aid-grants were only considered well 
into Eisenhower’s second term.276 But how can we explain why a fiscal conservative like 
Eisenhower pushed for aid to the Third World while at the same time economic aid in real 
273 Telegram, “World Youths Are One – Bannerman Says”, 1956, Telegram, “Our Young Ambassador”, 14 
March 1956, Telegram, “College Student Meets U.S. President: Eisenhower Wishes G.C. Govt ‘Good Luck’”, 9 
March 1956, RG. 84, Box 2, f: D1 NY Herald Tribune Youth Forum, NARA; “Herald Tribune High School 
Forum Delegates”, New York Herald Tribune, January 2, 1956, 10. 
274 Gilman, Mandarins of the Future, 97; David McClelland, The Achievement Motive (New York: Appleton 
Century Crofts, 1953), 110.  
275 Brennan, “Radio Cairo and the Decolonization of East Africa, 1953-64”, 174–176. 
276 Nwaubani, The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950-1960, 99. 
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numbers remained low? Eisenhower’s conviction that the Soviets attached more weight to 
political tactics, the free market ideology, and the fear that countries would remain 
permanently dependent as well as the bureaucratic infighting between traditionalists – who 
saw economic aid as a short term security measure, and progressives – who considered 
foreign aid as one part of a long-term development effort, have all been cited as possible 
explanations.277 
Likewise, the scholarship on the French and British activities in the developing world 
approaches public diplomacy as a separate area of foreign policy preoccupied with 
propaganda wars. Ignoring the developmental ambition of many of these programmes, makes 
it difficult to explain how French language teaching or British educational work was expected 
to influence the direction of colonial societies. In the highly politicised French historiography 
of the early 1960s diplomat and writer Louis Dollot sparked a debate when he argued that the 
spread of the French language could yield economic and political gains, a claim rejected by 
Suzanne Balous.278 She argued that French cultural diplomacy was political but only in the 
sense that it tried to secure the position of the French language in international relations. Any 
possible commercial interest was outweighed by French development aid.279 New social and 
cultural historians leave that debate behind and instead accept that the goals of French public 
277 An extended historiography on Eisenhower and foreign aid can be found in Michael R. Adamson, “‘The Most 
Important Single Aspect of Our Foreign Policy’?: The Eisenhower Administration, Foreign Aid, and the Third 
World”, in The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, ed. Kathryn 
C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 58, 56; Emphasis on bureaucratic 
infighting in Shenin, America’s Helping Hand, 77; For a revisionist view on Eisenhower’s aid see Burton 
Kaufman’s classic text on foreign economic policy of the Eisenhower administration, Burton I. Kaufman, Trade 
and Aid: Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982); 
Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1988); Thomas Zoumaris, “Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy in the 
1950s: The Case of Latin America”, in Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s, ed. 
Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 155–91; The 
lack of effectiveness of Eisenhower’s development aid is addressed in David Anderson, Trapped by Success: 
The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Nick 
Cullather, Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of the United States-Philippines Relations, 1942-1960 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); William Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in 
Indochina (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).  
278 Louis Dollot, Les relations culturelles internationales (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964); Carl 
Doka, Les relations culturelles sur le plan international (Neuchâtel: La Baconnière, 1959); Annie Angrémy, La 
diplomatie culturelle de la France (Strasbourg: Conseil de la coopération culturelle du Conseil de l’Europe, 
1970). 
279 Suzanne Balous, L’action culturelle de la France dans le monde: Préf. de Maurice Genevoix (Paris: Presses 
universitaires de France, 1970), 175–177; Albert Salon, L’action culturelle de la France dans le monde (Paris: 
Fernand Nathan, 1983). 
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diplomacy were ‘schizophrenic’ and contained deep-rooted contradictions. It has even been 
argued that the civilising mission was never part of French public diplomacy.280 
Like their French counterparts, British historians only mention the British cultural 
efforts in Africa in passing, assuming public diplomats could never establish a bold 
propaganda campaign aimed at rejecting colonial nationalism or communism.281 Even Tony 
Shaw, who sets out to reinstate Anthony Eden as a decisive leader in the psychological 
warfare campaign during the Suez crisis, is forced to admit that a sustained effort to mobilise 
public support was difficult because the UK cabinet lacked the confidence to establish a key 
propaganda theme.282 James Vaughan’s book on British propaganda in the Middle East argues 
further that officials on the ground turned to the British Council and cultural diplomacy, in 
light of their failure to win over opinion because of a Cold War emphasis.283 
In the aftermath of Bandung, cultural and educational assistance became the key 
instrument to heighten prestige because it was the only way in which the commitment to 
development, criticised at Bandung, could be reaffirmed. In the following the French, the 
British and the American doctrines are analysed and their implementation assessed. The 
commitment to feeding hungry minds makes it possible to explain Eisenhower’s ambiguous 
position on foreign aid. 
 
 
Satisfying the Hunger for Education (1955-1956) 
 
The question of whether officials were always able to distinguish nationalism from 
communism looms large in the background of a history about the Western engagement with 
the Third World.284 As already apparent in the early fifties, the Eisenhower administration was 
able to differentiate between the challenge of nationalism – a positive force if leaders were 
sufficiently prepared for the task ahead – and communist infiltration. In 1956 Eisenhower 
explicitly acknowledged that looking at the world through a Cold War lens was misguided. It 
was clear for Americans that ‘communism seeks to dominate or to destroy’ while ‘freedom 
280 Dubosclard, L’action artistique de la France aux États-Unis, 1915-1969, 350–351; Dueck, “International 
Rivalry and Culture in Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate”, 151–152; Dueck, The Claims of Culture 
at Empire’s End, 4. 
281 Osgood, “Words and Deeds: Race, Colonialism, and Eisenhower’s Propaganda War in the Third World”, 18. 
282 Tony Shaw, Eden, Suez and the Mass Media: Propaganda and Persuasion during the Suez Crisis (London: 
I.B.Tauris, 1996), 169, 189–192. 
283 Vaughan, The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-57, 248–249. 
284 This debate was stimulated in particular by Matthew Connelly who has convincingly rejected McMahon’s 
claim that the Eisenhower administration insisted on viewing the world through the distorting lens of a Cold 
War. McMahon’s view has remained influential however, see McMahon, “Eisenhower and Third World 
Nationalism”, 457; Connelly, “Taking Off the Cold War Lens”, 739–740. 
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seeks to cooperate and to help others build’, but Eisenhower cautioned that the people of the 
world were ‘not necessarily thinking in terms of opposing concepts of communistic 
dictatorship and of human rights and freedom.’285 For the president, these two problems were 
interrelated but ultimately separate, and thus required a different response. 
The only foreign policy operatives who credited the Soviet Union with some influence 
in Africa were to be found in the British Foreign Office. Encouraged by the Information 
Research Department (IRD), founded in 1948 to produce anti-Soviet material, the FO officials 
tried to convince officials at the Colonial Office that the ‘Bandung label’ was increasingly 
being used to camouflage communist inspiration. Based on a publication for the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences, they maintained that Egypt and North Africa were a ‘bridge’ for Soviet 
intrusion. For the British that image was especially potent because it played on an older image 
of Egypt as the entry port for Arab slave traders in the 1880s. Nonetheless, the assistant under 
secretary of the Colonial Office, Charles Carstairs, believed policy making suffered from the 
Foreign Office’s insistence on a ‘Russian drive’ in Black Africa. Particularly irritating was a 
meeting with the French who kept talking about the Soviet intrusion of the continent.286 
In April 1956, the British ambassador to Paris, Gladwyn Jebb had visited the Quai 
d’Orsay where they confirmed his suspicions about the communist threat in Africa. The 
French officials told him that – according to their information – the Soviets were planning to 
open an embassy in the Gold Coast after independence.287 However, the French threat analysis 
had revealed that the communist influence in Accra was non-existent. By feeding the anxiety 
of the British, the French believed they would be able to convince the UK of the need to 
contain Nkrumah’s emerging anticolonial discourse. Renner, the ambassador to Ghana, for 
instance had been furious about the anticolonial conference of Labour politician Fenner 
Brockway in Accra.288  
Officials at France d’outre-mer were concerned about Nasser’s pan-Arab influence in 
Chad and the Sahel. Young muslim religious leaders, so-called marabouts, were attracted to 
the Al-Azhar University in Cairo, which was not only a political centre but – more 
importantly – a place where the Arab language was being taught. Upon their return, the 
285  Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Address and Remarks at the Baylor University Commencement Ceremonies, Waco, 
Texas”, 25 May 1956. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10499. 
286 Confidential memorandum, IRD, 1 August 1956, CO 1035/17, TNA; “Soviet Penetration of Africa”, 
February 1956, FO 975/97, TNA; Minutes, Mr. Watson, Mr. Carstairs, 10 May 1956, CO 1035/126, TNA. 
287 Letter, Gladwyn Jebb to Selwyn Lloyd, 31 October 1956, CO 1035/120, TNA. 
288 Renner also refers to the negligible Soviet influence, see Letter, Renner to DAL, “Congrès anti-colonial”, 25 
March 1955, DAL, Ghana 1953-1965, 50QO/6, AMAE. 
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students would have a better grasp of the Arab language, which would lead them to a better 
position in the French estimation. This was a problem for a colonial power that considered its 
language as a primary source of influence.289 Nasser was threatening the French position as 
the primary suppliers of upward social mobility. 
For the Americans, the French, and the British, nationalism was not the only problem, 
but it was clearly the most urgent issue. The officers at the Foreign Office were the only ones 
who prioritised Soviet containment over the management of nationalism and economic 
development, but could not convince the other branches of the UK foreign policy apparatus. 
The expansion of the cultural assistance machine was considered to be the most appropriate 
response. 
 
 
British Colonial Publicity as a Dam against Hostile Ideas  
 
The three overseas departments – the Foreign Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office, 
and the Colonial Office – had decided by the summer of 1955 to expand their information 
work. Most important was the substantial expansion of the British Council work in the so-
called underdeveloped countries. In 1954, the British Council officials had complained that 
the expansion of the radio and press services to the colonies took financial resources away 
from their own operation. Only a year later, they received a significant increase in funds, 
£271,560. This was a substantial amount in comparison to £133,850 for the COI, £130,000 
for the BBC, £64,000 for the CRO, £27,500 for the FO Information Service and £23,000 for 
the CO Information Service.290  
The British Council was to promote and spread the British language overseas. Through 
direct teaching in institutes and with the help of recognised examinations, the Council tried to 
convince as many Africans as possible to learn English. In that way, British values were 
projected while at the same time societies were developed. The interdepartmental committee 
concluded that it was important to strike a balance between the needs of the information 
services and the long-term need for educational and cultural work by the British Council. 
Contrary to what James Vaughan has been argued, the anxiety that came with political crisis 
289 Report, “Note sommaire sur les influences pan-islamiques et pan-arabes en Afrique Noire Française”, [1956], 
8, 2261/2, Affaires Politiques, CAOM. 
290 Minutes, Watrous for Evans, 16 March 1954, CO 1027/74, TNA; Draft paper for OIS (Official) Committee, 
“The Overseas Information Services Prospects for Expansion in 1956/1957”, [1955], CO 1027/72, TNA;  
Report, CO, “Information activities undertaken by the Colonial Office in the African territories”, [1958], INF 
12/978, TNA;  
                                              
H u n g r y  M i n d s  | 93 
 
and nationalist activism did not cause the British officials to dismiss long-term educational 
programmes. In fact, those operations were expanded.291 
Nonetheless in Ghana a counter-subversion committee was established, officially to 
keep communist publications out. It was admitted, however, that only 22 Europeans and 33 
Africans in the Gold Coast had a known connection with communism. The British were 
driven to seal off its colony from outside ideas due to the unrest that had erupted in Ghana in 
1954. A dispute between Nkrumah and the Ashanti over the cocoa pricing scheme had led to 
violent protests and calls for secession. Francis Cumming-Bruce, the adviser on external 
affairs to the governor, had even told Anthony Eden that the Gold Coast could slide into chaos 
after independence if an insufficient number of British officers remained. This opinion 
enjoyed widespread support among academics like David E. Apter, the first political scientist 
who worked on Ghana. As the Africa division of the Colonial Office conceded, their efforts 
were not directed against communist activism but were actually aimed at discouraging 
Nasser’s attempts at subversion.292 
 
 
Négritude as the French Public Diplomacy Strategy 
 
Nasser’s pan-Arab propaganda and the Bandung moment also led Leopold Senghor, deputy of 
Senegal and minister responsible for international cultural matters, to travel to Lagos in 
Nigeria, where on 11 October, he stepped of his plane at the airport of Ikeja. His appearance 
alone was proof of the successful symbiosis between African and French civilisations. He 
declared brotherly greetings from France, a country where ‘Muslims were an integrated part 
of society.’ As he was whisked off to a waiting car to watch the rugby game between Abidjan 
and Lagos, journalists sent out press reports describing the man as cutting an impressive and 
cosmopolitan figure.293  
His immaculate suit and his eagerness to speak to the press were no coincidence. 
Senghor believed French prestige was in need of some repair due the pan-Arab propaganda 
and the international public relations campaign waged by the Algerian Front de Libération 
291 Vaughan makes that argument, see Vaughan, The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab 
Middle East, 1945-57, 247; Report, “The British Council: Annual Report 1955-1956”, 1956, 25, BW 151/17, 
TNA; Draft Paper for O.I.S. (Official Committee), “The Overseas Information Services Prospects for Expansion 
in 1956/1957”, [1956], CO 1027/72, TNA. 
292 Minutes, Prime Minister, 1 September 1955, PREM 11/1367, TNA; Secret, “Communism in the Gold Coast”, 
CO 1035/120, TNA; David E. Apter, Ghana in Transition (New York: Atheneum, 1955), 3; Note for C.Y. 
Carstairs, 2 July 1956, CO 1035/126, TNA. 
293 ‘où il ya aussi des Musulmans’, see Letter, Paul Raymond to DAL, “a.s requitte adressée à M. Senghor”, 12 
November 1955, 1, DAL, Généralités 1953-1959, 49QONT/66, AMAE. 
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National/National Liberation Front (FLN), but also because Soviet and American propaganda 
were on the rise. Antoine Pinay had been so surprised when the UN General Assembly 
condemned the French repression in September 1955 that he lashed out against Soviet Foreign 
Minister Vyachslav Molotov during a dinner party in New York. The French government 
therefore approved of Senghor’s visit to British West Africa, which had been organised under 
the pretence of French-British cultural cooperation. Officially he set out to study the British 
educational system and their Colonial Welfare and Development programme.294  
His real mission was to be kept secret. He wanted to export the French language and 
culture, while introducing and developing French language education to advance the 
development of African peoples and increase French prestige. When asked about the trip in 
the French-British talks in November 1955, the French officials acted as if Senghor’s 
identification of the problems – too little French language education and no connection 
between elites in French and British Africa – was the result of a close empirical study, even 
though these had been forgone conclusions.295 
What had been a literary movement pioneered by Senghor and Césaire to reaffirm 
‘black’ values, art and culture became a strategic framework for French cultural diplomacy in 
Africa. As outlined in his review, Présence Africaine, Senghor believed African civilisations 
had fostered many of the European and American cultural achievements. That link between 
French and African cultures had to be reinvigorated in support of African progress. The 
French language was essential to this project. French prestige was not only dependent upon 
French values, which found their expression first and foremost in its literary achievements. 
The teaching of the French language at the same time had to facilitate the study of science, 
because France was a country of imaginative solutions, a ‘terre d’imagination’. That nation 
was institutionalised by replacing the Direction générale des relations culturelles with the 
Direction générale des Affaires culturelles et techniques (DGACT). Lastly, the teaching of 
French served a wider societal purpose. In Senghor’s opinion, the practice of teaching 
indigenous languages, fairly common in British Africa, hindered the advancement of the 
294 Report, Leopold Senghor, “Voyage officiel en Afrique occidentale britannique, du secrétaire d‘Etat à la 
Présidence du Conseil 22 Septembre – 7 October 1955”, October 1955, 21, 2, DAL, Généralités 1953-1959, 
49QONT/66, AMAE; Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, 92–93. 
295 Memcon, “Point III Relations culturelles entre les territoires d’Afrique Occidentale Française et les 
Territoires Britanniques”, 30 November 1955, DAL, Généralités 1953-1959, 49QONT/52, AMAE. 
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African people as a whole, because the lower classes – unlike the elites – could not seize upon 
the opportunity to familiarise themselves with the French culture.296  
More important than the emphasis on the French language as a tool to advance French 
prestige, science, and the societal model, was Senghor’s interpretation of Négritude as a 
civilisational instrument since it allowed all members of the French bureaucracy to maintain 
their own view of what French cultural diplomacy was supposed to achieve.297 He saw the 
French language as a way to ‘advance’ Africans of all social layers, while Pinay emphasised 
the potential economic gains of cultural centres, and the DGRC was excited about the 
opportunity to distribute information about France in Africa. This diversity of views stemmed 
from the fact that France had a long tradition of public and cultural diplomacy in which 
multiple aims and definitions had already been formed. What everyone essentially agreed 
upon was that a better organisation would further their own goals.298 
The prominence of racial identity and pride offered the French a set of powerful ideas to 
work with. For Senghor, Négritude was a way to elevate African societies, not only 
economically but also culturally and spiritually, in cooperation with the metropole. We ‘mean 
to be Negro-African and French at the same time’ declared Senghor on Radio Accra.299 His 
emphasis on the French culture and language, as a modernising force uniquely suited to 
boosting African development rather than as a colonial tool aimed at cultivating African 
loyalty, would prove to be durable. It returned in the French plan for cultural expansion that 
de Gaulle approved in 1958 and even seeped into the bilateral cooperation agreements that 
were concluded between France and its former African territories after 1960. 
 
 
The Baylor Philosophy and the Export of American Values  
 
For American policy makers, aid was a problematic issue as they struggled with an old 
problem. Americans considered their policies of assistance to be rational and non-ideological. 
296 Report, Leopold Senghor, “Voyage officiel en Afrique occidentale britannique, du secrétaire d‘Etat à la 
Présidence du Conseil 22 Septembre – 7 October 1955”, October 1955, 14, DAL, Généralités 1953-1959, 
49QONT/66, AMAE. 
297 Scott Lucas had described a very similar process, arguing that covert and overt operations behind the Iron 
Curtain helped policy planners clarify what America’s aims and responses should be and what the threats 
consisted of, see Scott Lucas and Kaeten Mistry, “Illusions of Coherence: George F. Kennan, U.S. Strategy and 
Political Warfare in the Early Cold War, 1946–1950”, Diplomatic History 33, no. 1 (2009): 39–66. 
298 Alain Dubosclard, Histoire de la fédération des Alliances Françaises aux Etats-Unis (Paris: L’Harmattan, 
1998), 155; Letter, Pinay to Senghor, “Voyage officiel de M. Senghor en Afrique Occidentale Britannique”, 23 
December 1955, Letter, DGRC to DAL, “Récente mission de M. Senghor en Afrique Occidentale Britannique”, 
26 November 1955, 1, DAL, Généralités 1952-1959, 94QONT/66, AMAE.  
299 Letter, University College Ibadan director of extra-mural studies to M.P. Goumain French Consul in Lagos, 
“Interview with M. Senghor at the Accra Broadcasting Station”, 1955, 4, DAL, Généralités 1952-1959, 
49QO/66, AMAE;  Watts, “Negritude, Présence Africaine, Race”, 227–229. 
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Nobody could therefore guarantee that new nations would not choose the wrong form of 
modernity: communism. It was Harland A. Cleveland, a deputy administrator of the Marshall 
Plan, who in June 1950 captured this sentiment in a popular phrase: the ‘revolution of rising 
expectations’. He explained that the West had caused the Korean War by showing the 
potential of modern science and ideas.300  
‘Who was going to have title and ownership over these plants which had been built with 
U.S. funds?’ Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson asked in the NSC of 1954: ‘If the ultimate 
owner was the state, we would be helping these countries proceed down the road which led to 
[…] Communism.’301 In 1956, Eisenhower pointed out that the differences between the 
American model and communism were not as clear to the rest of the world as they were to 
him or to the rest of America.302 When Allen Dulles of the CIA discerned a pattern of 
coordinated long-term operations designed to advance communist influence in the 
underdeveloped world, the question of how the US could provide economic aid while 
ensuring that the new nations would not choose in favour of communism became even more 
pressing. 
How could the US avoid engineering its own downfall? Eisenhower’s National Security 
document, NSC 162/2, had already hinted at the solution in 1953:  
 
Outside economic assistance alone cannot be counted on either to solve their [the uncommitted areas], 
basic problems or to win their cooperation and support. Constructive political and other measures will 
be required to create a sense of mutuality of interest with the free world and to counter the communist 
appeal.303 
 
In Africa after 1955, these ‘other measures’ were found in the employment of information and 
education. In no part of the world was the thirst for knowledge considered to be greater than 
in Africa: ‘whoever brings the African education has the power to influence him in a basic 
fashion.’ The State Department summed up the ways in which people – who were portrayed 
as difficult children – could be educated. The memorandum included the USIA operation, 
which in Europe was geared towards winning the Cold War: 
300 David Ellwood, The Shock of America: Europe and the Challenge of the Century (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 274; The phrase was also used by the British, for instance by the senior information officer in 
British Guinea, Lloyd Searwar in his analysis of information services in the Third World, see Lloyd Searwar, 
“The Role and Problems of Information Services in the Underdeveloped Territories”, [1959], INF 12-867, TNA. 
301 Memorandum of Discussion at the 226th Meeting of the National Security Council, 1 December 1954, FRUS 
1952-1954, Vol. 14: China and Japan, 971-5. 
302  Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Address and Remarks at the Baylor University Commencement Ceremonies, Waco, 
Texas”, 25 May 1956. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10499. 
303 A Report by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on Basic National Security Policy NSC 
162/2, 30 October 1953, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. 2: National Security Affairs, 577-97. 
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(a) Increase our general information program, including libraries, press information, etc; 
(b) Expand our exchange of persons programs; 
(c) Move to assist local education, especially in the vocational and medical fields. In view of the 
inevitable maladjustment of the foreign trained student, this local effort may well be the major one 
on our part.304 
 
On 25 May 1956, Eisenhower laid out his doctrine of nationalism, trade, and various forms of 
international cooperation in a speech at the Baylor University in Texas, a crucial foreign 
policy speech on the Third World on which he had worked for days (illustration 7).305 He 
asked the college graduates to take individual initiative to promote a world society that 
respected the values in which the school from which they were graduating believed. 
Eisenhower pleaded for a comprehensive effort, rather than ‘makeshift arrangement to meet 
day-to-day crises.’ If a stable, prosperous, peaceful world was to be developed, other peoples 
had to be taught how to become more like the US. Specifically: 
 
the peoples of other nations must, through similar study and thought, recognize with us the need for this 
kind of cooperation. This is not easy. Many nations, though their cultures are ancient and rich in human 
values, do not possess the resources to spread the needed education throughout their populations. But 
they can wisely use help that respects their traditions and ways.306 
 
To make the free world stronger, adequate institutions of modern techniques and sciences had 
to be built in areas of the world where ‘the hunger for knowledge and the ability to use 
knowledge’ went unsatisfied.  
Eisenhower subscribed to a Wilsonian brand of internationalism that equated the spread 
of American values with security, a philosophy that had become much more applicable in an 
increasingly interconnected world.307 He wanted to further the aspirations of those who 
founded the republic and saw American security as linked ‘with the security and aspirations 
of liberty loving people in many other lands.’ Without a so-called community of interest 
supported by American-style social structures, military and economic action would be 
304 Memorandum Prepared in the Office of African Affairs, “The United States in Africa South of the Sahara”, 4 
August 1955, FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. 18: Africa, 21. 
305 Letter, Dwight D. To Barbara Bates Gunderson, 7 June 1956. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. 
L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1891. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial 
Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, 
http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/1891.cfm 
306  Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Address and Remarks at the Baylor University Commencement Ceremonies, Waco, 
Texas”, 25 May 1956.Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10499. 
307 On Eisenhower’s Wilsonian internationalism: Steven Metz, “Eisenhower and the Planning of American 
Grand Strategy”, Journal of Strategic Studies 14, no. 1 (1991): 49. 
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futile.308 Americans in private organisation had to teach Third World nations about democracy 
and equip peoples with the values needed to ascertain a stable transition, not only because this 
would address the demand for education, but also because it increased American security. 
Clarence Randall – Africa expert of the Eisenhower administration and chairman of the 
Commission on Foreign Economic Policy – shared these objectives. His Randall Report 
opposed the use of aid disbursements because they would have no control over the way in 
which funds were used.309 When the Council on Foreign Economic Policy was asked to focus 
on Sub-Saharan Africa in June 1958, Randall identified the increase of educational facilities 
and the elevation of educational standards as the most urgent needs. Teacher training and 
vocational training programmes had to be expanded, new training institutions had to be 
established and support given to the construction of a Central African University. Ghana was 
considered to be the best possible host country and funds were found in the mutual security 
programme. In its fourth recommendation, Randall wanted the administration to insist on the 
increase of private support for missionary schools in the area.310  
Eisenhower, the fiscal conservative who pushed for economic aid to the Third World 
but provided little hard cash, relied on cultural assistance. While Matthew Connelly has 
pointed to Eisenhower’s fears of a racial North-South conflict to explain his firm stance on 
aid, the documents indicate that the president subscribed to the optimism of development 
theorists in times of peace, and saw aid in combination with education as a viable and 
effective instrument to transform foreign societies. Eisenhower’s actions were thus not only 
motivated by the fear of a possible race war.311  
Public diplomats became obsessed with increasing the transformational power of 
cultural assistance. The Bandung Conference and the threat of Arab nationalism not only 
prompted Eisenhower to present his ideas in a more developed fashion, but also shifted 
education and culture from colonial management tools into instruments of development. 
Where the president sought to foster a stable transition, however, Senghor and his British 
colleagues hoped they could reaffirm their commitment to development and keep Arab 
nationalism at bay. 
308 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Address and Remarks at the Baylor University Commencement Ceremonies, Waco, 
Texas”, 25 May 1956. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10499. 
309 Adamson, “‘The Most Important Single Aspect of Our Foreign Policy’?: The Eisenhower Administration, 
Foreign Aid, and the Third World”, 63. 
310 Memorandum to Council on Foreign Economic Policy, “Subject: CFEP 568 – United States Foreign 
Economic Policy for Africa South of the Sahara”, 5 June 1958, 2, RG. 469, P206, Box 13, f: Aid for Africa 
South of the Sahara (Randall Report), NARA. 
311 For this claim, see Connelly, “Taking Off the Cold War Lens”, 765. 
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Illustration 7: Dwight D. Eisenhower delivers a major foreign policy address from the rostrum in the Heart of 
Texas Coliseum in Waco, Texas. The speech was part of the graduation ceremony at Baylor University, 25 May 
1956. Source: DDEL Digital copy, United Press International, copyright held by Corbis. 
 
 
Reaffirming the Commitment to Assistance on the Ground (1955- 1957) 
 
 In France and the US, committees were established to monitor the implementation of the new 
blueprints for cultural assistance, while the British Council started spending its new funds. 
Their principal task was to investigate how education and culture could be most effectively 
used to affect the development of Third World peoples. But how could success be 
guaranteed? Through deliberation officials wanted to identify the key element that made 
education and culture work. 
 
 
Improving French Language Education 
 
On his journey, Senghor had met teachers who were unqualified and taught French as a ‘dead 
language’ – a problem since the French language was seen as the basis of rational thought and 
prestige. The only powerful response against Cairo’s anti-French propaganda was therefore 
not vigorous counterpropaganda, but an enhancement of teaching methods. From Senghor’s 
viewpoint, the improvement of language education would offer a road to development and in 
doing so improve the French reputation. As Albert Charton, the inspector general of education 
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in French West Africa and an important theoretician, put it in 1936: French education was 
about forging a ‘moral alliance’, not about ‘moral conquest’.312  
The power to ignite development and increase prestige could only be found in an 
expression of French culture, not in a propaganda campaign. Despite Radio Cairo’s verbal 
attacks, Radio Brazzaville held on to its wartime task of producing news for a global 
audience. The information post that Senghor wanted to build in Accra was meant to 
disseminate books, rather than engage in a war of words.313 Unlike the Americans who were 
funding the Jazz tours of John Birks ‘Dizzy’ Gillespie in the Middle East, and the official and 
unofficial performances of Louis Armstrong in Ghana, the DGACT only financed initiatives 
like the PEN Club, an international literary club presided over in France by André Chamson 
of the Académie française.314  
In the closing lines of his report Senghor urged his colleagues not to let his 
recommendations become a dead letter. Nonetheless, at the inter-territorial conference in Fort-
Lamy where the impact of pan-Arab propaganda was debated, Senghor’s recommendations 
were ignored and it was decided that press publications and films in Arabic should be 
produced to counter the Egyptian, Russian, and American publications circulating in the cities 
of French Africa.315 The difference between Paris and the people at France d’outre-mer was 
illustrated by their behaviour at the conference of black writers and artists in September 1956, 
which had been organised by the founder of Préscene Africaine, Alioune Diop. While the 
DGRC entertained the attendees with a cocktail party, the officials of France d’outre-mer 
were pacing the floor, worrying about Diop’s alleged ties with so-called extremist groups.316 
Therefore, it was the actions of schoolteachers such as Thomas Boateng that determined 
what Senghor’s call for a better French cultural diplomacy looked like on the ground. In 
August 1956, this Ghanaian French teacher from a school in Tamale arranged an excursion to 
312 Report, Leopold Senghor, “Voyage officiel en Afrique occidentale britannique, du secrétaire d‘Etat à la 
Présidence du Conseil 22 Septembre – 7 October 1955”, October 1955, 21, DAL, Généralités 1953-1959, 
49QONT/66, AMAE; Mary Niles Maack, “Books and Libraries as Instruments of Cultural Diplomacy in 
Francophone Africa during the Cold War”, Libraries & Culture 36, no. 1 (2001): 61. 
313 Letter, Senghor to DAL, “exposé relative de la situation actuelle du poste national de Radio Brazzaville”, 7 
June 1950, 3, DAL, Généralités, 1944-1955, 49QO/94, AMAE, Letter, Victor Gares to DAL, “Voyage à Abidjan 
des élèves de l’Ecole Secondaire de Tamale, Gold Coast”, 6 August 1956, Note pour le Secrétaire General, 
“Création à Accra d’un poste d’information”, 5 April 1956, DAL, Ghana 1953-1959, 50QO/8, AMAE. 
314 Letter, Leopoldville to DAL, 27 October 1956, DAL, Congo Belge 1953-1959, 44QO/41, AMAE; Penny Von 
Eschen, Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War (Boston: Harvard University Press, 
2006), 12; Lisa Davenport, Jazz Diplomacy: Promoting America in the Cold War Era (Jackson: University Press 
of Mississippi, 2009), 3–26. 
315 Top secret memcon, “Proces Verbal de la Conférence Interterritoriale sur les principaux problèmes 
Musulmans”, 31 January, 2261/2, Affaires Politiques, CAOM. 
316 Note d’Information politique, Ministère de la France d’outre-mer, “La Propaganda Islamique dans les Milieux 
Africains, ” 11 June 1955, 2261/2, Affaires Politiques, CAOM. 
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Abidjan in cooperation with the educational services of Côte d’Ivoire. Victor Gares, consul in 
Accra, encouraged such activities because they were in line with Senghor’s vision of the 
French language as the route to French culture and modernity.317  
 
 
Mass Education, Private Initiatives, and Technical Assistance in the Service of American 
Ideas 
 
The Americans also tried to establish a set of working principles. Through deliberation in 
three separate committees, three important guidelines about the execution of the Baylor 
philosophy were agreed: mass education rather than attention for elites was important; private 
initiative had to be strengthened; and technical assistance was only important if it fostered 
education.  
On 7 December 1956 a conference at the Baylor University – organised to give 
substance to Eisenhower’s Baylor speech – turned its attention to Nigeria where the Foreign 
Mission Board of the Southern Baptists Convention had made the decision to establish a four-
year college. While mirroring the association between Ibadan and the University of London, 
they rejected the British educational system because it was considered to be elitist.318 A 
literacy programme was therefore established at Baylor that sought to shelter people from the 
woes of ignorance, superstition, and other fears with which illiterates supposedly struggled. 
The creation of the English Language Institute and the construction of an international house 
for the international students at Baylor would help export American values and create more 
advanced ‘emerging’ societies:  
 
A university can be a center for such [basic literacy] studies, drawing those from many nations who 
wish to study this body of principles and return to their own countries to teach it to others, and they to 
others, until it reaches out to the thousands of villages in Asia and Africa.319 
 
In June 1956, the OCB formed an inter-agency committee tasked with finding a formula 
that permitted the US government to have a voice in the organisation of private initiatives 
whilst remaining uninvolved in the specificities of the programme itself. Private initiatives 
remained key because too much American influence would make target audiences suspicious. 
317 Letter, Victor Gares to DAL, “Voyage à Abidjan des élèves de l’Ecole Secondaire de Tamale, Gold Coast”, 6 
August 1956, Note pour le Secrétaire General, “Création à Accra d’un poste d’information”, 5 April 1956, DAL, 
Ghana 1953-1959, 50QO/8, AMAE; Letter, P. Barbusse to Alioune Diop, 15 September 1956, DGRCST, 
Echanges Culturels, 1956-1959, 241QO/254, AMAE. 
318 Report, Paul Geren, “Conference on Implementation of the Baylor Proposal”, 1956, RG. 59, A1 5082, Box 3, 
f: Educational & Cultural Exchange, NARA. 
319 Charles E. Johnson, “Progress Report on Activities of the OCB Inter-Agency Committee on the President's 
Baylor Proposals”, 17 July 1957, RG. 59, A1 5082, Box 3, f: Educational & Cultural Exchange, NARA. 
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Nonetheless, government funds were required if any of these initiatives was to be successful. 
The Baylor University for instance had only raised $140,000 for the construction of a 
Nigerian-American House. A Committee on Arts and Sciences for Eisenhower sent out a 
questionnaire to 30,000 American educators requesting project suggestions as 25 workshops 
were organised to consider what Americans should know about overseas countries.320 
The US Office of Education stepped in and catalogued the initiatives of private 
foundations in its survey, American Cooperation with Higher Education.321 The report also 
illustrated how widely Eisenhower’s vision of technical assistance – as a means to project 
values – was shared by others. ICA, the central agency that provided technical assistance, had 
initiated a university contract programme in 1953, which brought the US government, an 
American and a foreign university together. The American university provided staff, books, 
and facilities on its own campus for a training faculty. Besides the ICA and USIA, the 
International Educational Exchange also became more involved.322 
Nonetheless, some USIS officers on the ground were unhappy with the emphasis on the 
modernising potential of American public diplomacy and demanded a better policy to guard 
against Soviet propaganda. From his post in Leopoldville, Robert G. McGregor wrote to 
George V. Allen that the Africans he met were interested in what the Soviets had to say 
because the USSR took a clear anticolonial position. He therefore applied the Baylor 
principles in a more flexible way and also used basic English classes to convey the benefits of 
Western society. In 1956, a group of American information officers even publicised Dag 
Hammarskjold’s visit to the Near East as they handed out pamphlets about the resolution 
320 Memorandum for the Operations Coordinating Board, “Subject: Progress Report on Activities of the OCB 
Inter-Agency Committee on the President’s Baylor Proposals”, 26 June 1957, 2, 7, RG. 59, A1 5082, Box 3, f: 
Educational & Cultural Exchange, NARA. 
321 The list of projects was still impressive: the Carnegie Corporation undertook library development in British 
East Africa, the Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College had an ICA contract with Harar Agricultural 
College and the Presbyterian Church of the USA supported the Cameroon Christian College. In Ghana, the 
Carnegie Corporation funded the library of the Gold Coast College of Technology, the Seventh-Day Adventist 
Church supported 519 students at the Bekwai Training School and the Hartford Seminary Foundation gave one 
research grant for the University College of the Gold Coast see memorandum for the Operations Coordinating 
Board, “Subject: Progress Report on Activities of the OCB Inter-Agency Committee on the President’s Baylor 
Proposals”, 26 June 1957, 143, 158, 154, 151, 188, 139, 192, 204. 
322 Paul S. Bodenman, American Cooperation with Higher Education Abroad: A Survey of Current Programs 
(Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1957); Memorandum for the Operations 
Coordinating Board, “Subject: Progress Report on Activities of the OCB Inter-Agency Committee on the 
President’s Baylor Proposals”, 26 June 1957, 2, 7, Report, Charles E. Johnson, “Progress Report on Activities of 
the OCB Inter-Agency Committee on the President's Baylor Proposals”, 17 July 1957, RG. 59, A1 5082, Box 3, 
f: Educational & Cultural Exchange, NARA. 
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against colonialism that had been proposed by a group of US Congressmen to boost their 
anticolonial credentials.323 
It was therefore the ICA rather than the USIA that stepped in to execute most of the 
educational programmes in Africa even though private initiatives remained essential. This not 
only led to a massive aid operation, particularly after Ghana’s independence in March 1957, 
but also created a persistent conflict between the USIA and ICA.324 The ICA had to produce 
technical ‘how-to-do-it’ types of material while the USIS had to advertise the ICA’s progress 
and make people ‘want to do it’ – a task the USIS officers avoided. However, by March 1960 
the USIA was forced to produce publications such as ICA-Ethiopia’s Point 4 News.325 
 
 
Increasing the British Presence 
 
To offset the costs of the expensive radio broadcasts and make the much needed cultural aid 
possible, the BBC proposed to cooperate with the Voice of America (VOA), which had 
initiated direct broadcasting to sub-Saharan Africa in 1956 with radio broadcasts that dealt 
with American history, women’s activities and education, and ways in which American ideas 
could help build viable societies.326 Richard Turnbull, who had dealt with the Mau Mau and 
needed all the help he could get to counteract the Swahili broadcasts of Radio Cairo and All 
India Radio contacted the American consul to Kenya, Edmund J. Dorsz.  
The US consul, who was still keen on countering the bad press the American civil rights 
issue had generated, agreed to draw up a list of themes on which he thought both the US and 
the UK agreed. The support of an orderly transition to self-government was listed above the 
desire to stimulate economic, social, and cultural development, resistance against interference 
from India, Egypt, the USSR, or the acceptance of communism and the removal of racial 
323 Foreign service despatch, Robert G. McGregor to USIA, “Country Objectives”, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, Box 
1, f: country objectives, NARA; Secret Letter, Robert G. McGregor to George V. Allen, 21 March 1956, RG. 59, 
A1 3112J, Box 1, f: Correspondence Reg, NARA; Draft, Peter L. Koffsky, “The United States Information 
Program in Africa, 1945-1970: A History & Interpretation”, p. 2-1, RG. 306, A1 1072, Box 9, f: African 
Program, Historical Background 1970, NARA. 
324 There was an enormous amount of ICA activities in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly those 
pertaining to education are part of a massive collection that spans 18 boxes, only a fraction of the material is 
presented here. 
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International Educational Exchange Service and of the International Cooperation Administration”, 1 May 1956, 
RG. 306, A1 1072, Box 8, NARA; Official Memorandum, Andrew Berding and William J. Handley, “USIS-ICA 
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barriers.327 Until the Suez crisis of October 1956, the British and Americans believed they had 
gained each other’s support. 
Mutual misperception even led to a new stereotype among the British diplomats, that of 
the clumsy USIS officer who was unfamiliar with African norms and British sensitivities. 
This label made the CO more forgiving. When Lagos acquired a new USIS officer in March 
1955, the British were not notified, making Harold Evans conclude that the clumsy efforts of 
the Americans to proclaim the American way of life made their own job more difficult.328 
Because of their ‘clumsiness or stupidity’, USIS officers could get away with promoting the 
American anticolonial ideas.329 At other times this stereotype hindered cooperation. The 
USIA’s suggestion to target African exchange students in London was dismissed by CO 
officer Peter Mennell as a foolish idea because he deemed the PAO of the American Embassy 
in London to be incompetent.330 
All the while, the British Council expanded its language education programmes in 
Africa in their attempt to establish English as a world language. Inspired by the support given 
to the French schools of the Alliance Française by the DGRC, they decided to expand their 
grants for schools overseas in 1956. Like the French they invested in quality, with better 
training programmes for secondary school teachers and headmasters.331 Unlike Senghor, 
however, the BC did not expand into French Africa.  
By 1956 there was a remarkable methodological convergence among the Western 
public diplomats. For cultural assistance to lead to results, quality was agreed to be 
paramount. For aid to lead to prestige, results were essential. That consensus crumbled when 
tanks appeared on the banks of the Nile. 
 
 
The Suez Crisis: the US goes it Alone 
 
On 26 July 1956, Nasser decided to nationalise the Suez Canal after France and the UK had 
withdrawn their offer to fund the construction of the Aswan Damn. The military intervention, 
staged by France and Great Britain on 31 October, ostensibly to eject Israel who had invaded 
a few days before, was condemned by Eisenhower and the USSR. This crisis had resulted 
327 Report, “Working party on Future Development Finance”, [1956], CO 1027/74, TNA; Memorandum, 
“Thematic Cooperation VOA and British Broadcasting Facilities”, 8 May 1956, RG. 59, CDF 1950-1954, 
511.45K/12-2656 – 511.45R5/8-1255, NARA. 
328 Secret Letter, S.H. Evans to Marett, 31 May 1955, CO 1027/83, TNA. 
329 Minute, W.T.A. Cox  to Mr. Barton Mr. M.C. Smith, Mr. Watson, Mr. Evans , 20 June 1956, CO 1027/83, 
TNA. 
330 Personal & confidential letter, Peter Mennell, 6 July 1956, CO 1027/83, TNA. 
331 Report, “The British Council Annual Report 1955-1956”, 1956, 8, BW 151/17, TNA. 
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from a confluence of political and economic motivations and had consequences that were 
even more complex. But the old fashioned imperial intervention made clear that Western 
cooperation in Africa had its limits. The American plan to equip Africans with the ideas 
required to build a stable and democratic society was incompatible with the British and 
French strategy to expand cultural assistance schemes which were meant to reaffirm their 
position.332 
Although the Bandung Conference had directly motivated the State Department to 
increase its efforts in the area of cultural assistance, the Suez crisis made clear that American 
efforts would only be effective if the US programmes were executed in an autonomous and 
more prominent fashion. On 5 January 1957, Eisenhower therefore reaffirmed his 
commitment to an orderly transition in the most theatrical way possible. In an address before 
a joint session of Congress, he asked to pass a resolution authorising him to pledge increased 
economic and military aid. 
Eisenhower wanted to prevent the Soviets from filling the power vacuum left behind by 
the British in the Middle East. At the same time the so-called Eisenhower doctrine also sought 
to contain Nasser’s radical Arab nationalism, as Salim Yaqub has convincingly argued. Even 
though Eisenhower felt ‘these Arabs’ were unable to understand the American ideas of 
freedom or human dignity, he still encouraged Arab unity.333 The administration’s belief in 
the power of American cultural assistance and its proactive policy in sub-Saharan Africa 
might explain Eisenhower’s openness towards the Middle East. 
In sub-Saharan Africa though, the Suez crisis made the USIA and the administration 
realise that effective American cultural assistance had to be clearly distinguishable from 
French and British activities. Dulles stowed away his proposal for a ‘Bandung in reverse’ and 
instead impressed upon other members of the National Security Council that they would need 
to decide if ‘the future lies with a policy of reasserting by force colonial control’ or if they, the 
US, would ‘oppose such a course of action.’334 The USIA also sent a paper to its posts 
explaining what local officials could do to ‘implement the Eisenhower doctrine 
psychologically’. To counteract the allegation that the doctrine was only a paper guarantee, 
every piece of information had to stress that the US resolutely opposed colonialism. Charles 
Lucet, the chargé d'affaires of the French embassy in Washington had understood the 
332 Ray Takeyh, The Origins of the Eisenhower: The US, Britain and Nasser’s Egypt, 1953-57 (Houndmills and 
London: Macmillan Press, 2000), ix–26. 
333 Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, 1–2. 
334 Memorandum of Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of the NSC, 1 November 1956, AWF, Papers as President 
1952-1961, NSC Series, Box 8, f: 302nd Meeting of the NSC, DDEL. 
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message. In his estimation, the doctrine carried the seed of a long-term American 
development effort in sub-Saharan Africa, that posed a serious challenge to the French 
presence.335 
Thus for American cultural assistance to be effective, it was to be distinct from what its 
competitors were doing. After Ghanaian independence the USIA only increased its 
involvement on the continent, much to the dismay of France and the UK. 
 
 
Increasing the Transformational Potential of American Foreign Aid (1957) 
 
The commitment to education exerted a profound influence on the overall direction of the 
foreign aid strategy of the Eisenhower administration. Where the French and British used 
public diplomacy to demonstrate the effectiveness of their aid programmes, the president 
turned cultural assistance into the cornerstone of his entire foreign aid strategy.   
The Baylor philosophy shaped Eisenhower’s position in the foreign aid debate, a 
discussion that centred on the transformative power of aid grants. Eisenhower’s insistence on 
the importance of foreign aid in his second inaugural address encouraged his advisor for 
psychological strategy Charles Douglas Jackson and Walt Rostow to urge the president to 
support foreign aid, ‘using your second inaugural as a springboard.’336 Eisenhower considered 
the foreign aid bill of 1956 an absolute necessity. He also lectured others on the merits of aid: 
‘I have talked endlessly it seems to me on the subject and you know the mediocre success I 
have had, even with some of the Republican members of the Congress.’337 
Nonetheless, an earlier attempt of Rostow and Jackson to sell Eisenhower on a ‘World 
Economic Plan’ had failed. The idea for such a plan had emerged at the Princeton Inn 
Conference of 1954, a gathering of likeminded academics who wanted to convince the 
Eisenhower administration of the need for a socio-economic approach to modernisation. For 
them, public diplomacy was important, but only to create sufficient dramatic appeal so people 
would want it and governments would be forced to adopt it.338 Rostow attributed the failure of 
his plan to the entrenched position of traditionalists within the Eisenhower administration who 
335 Guidance paper, Mr. Damon and William J. Handley, “Psychological Implementation of Eisenhower 
Doctrine”, 2 January 1957, Box 2, RG. 306, P 253, NARA; Letter, Charles Luce, to Christian Pineau, “a/s 
Doctrine Eisenhower et l’Afrique”, 5 April 1957, 10-11, DA, Etats-Unis 1952-1963, 91QO/433, AMAE. 
336 Shenin, America’s Helping Hand, 113–114. 
337 Eisenhower, Dwight D. to Barbara Bates Gunderson, 7 June 1956. In The Papers of Dwight David 
Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1891. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/1891.cfm. 
338 Kimber Charles Pearce, Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid (East Lansing: Michigan State 
University Press, 2001), 53. 
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saw foreign aid a short-term security measure. In 1957, Rostow and Jackson therefore began a 
new attempt and asked Paul Hoffman, the director of the Economic Cooperation 
Administration, to send Eisenhower his article ‘Blueprint for foreign aid’. 
A closer look at Walt Rostow and Max Milikan’s epoch making A Proposal: Key to an 
Effective Foreign Policy of 1957 reveals the grounds for their disagreement. Both men 
rejected education as an effective modernisation tool because it was fraught with difficulties 
and was inefficient. In their own words: ‘values […] can be much more quickly grasped and 
promoted through programs of common action than through debate or education.’339 Instead, 
poorer nations needed aid grants to accumulate capital and jump-start the modernisation of 
societies. Cultural resources were important only as a public relations tool.340  
For Eisenhower, however, cultural assistance had to be the cornerstone of any foreign 
aid strategy. Through his plea to integrate educational assistance into the foreign aid 
programme he developed a threefold critique on the progressive doctrine of foreign aid. In 
‘Blueprint for foreign Aid’ Hoffman argued, as Rostow and Max Millikan did, that the 
encroachment of Soviet aid could only be stopped if it was matched by a competing American 
offer. To be effective, this offer had to be ‘without strings attached’, while the purpose had to 
be ‘one which the countries themselves can wholeheartedly share.’ There was nothing wrong 
with gaining political and military friends by offering aid, Hoffman agreed, but it was 
ineffective. Friendships and alliances that could be bought with dollars were not to be trusted. 
Moreover, Moscow’s propaganda agents would use ‘angry cries about strings’ to cast the US 
in the image of ‘colonial master’. Therefore, Hoffman claimed, aid had to be used to create a 
favourable environment in the long run.341 
In his correspondence with US Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, 
Eisenhower suggested a third way between the security-focused use of aid and the long-term 
development strategy. The president agreed with Humphrey’s argument that ‘neither 
education or mutual aid is in itself sufficient. Only in their unity will we find the strength 
necessary to do what we need to do.’342 But economic aid could only create allegiance and 
serve as an engine of development if it had ‘strings’, Eisenhower argued. The US had to 
339 Millikan and Rostow, A Proposal, 83. 
340 David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World 
Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 173; Rostow, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Foreign Aid, 44; 
Pearce, Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid, 53. 
341 Paul Hoffman, “Blueprint for Foreign Aid”, New York Times Magazine, February 17, 1957, 38. 
342 Eisenhower, Dwight D. to George Magoffin Humphrey, 27 March 1957. In The Papers of Dwight David 
Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1891. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/1891.cfm. 
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actively instil in so-called underdeveloped people a ‘true desire for individual freedom’ and 
‘persuade them permanently to our way of life.’343 Thus Eisenhower did not believe, as 
Rostow would later argue, that American values could be grasped by the general public 
through offers of aid programmes or building factories.344  
A second important element of Eisenhower’s views on aid was his doubt about the 
transformative power of development aid. The US could not simply export the success of its 
own development: ‘This I believe because the circumstances and conditions that allowed a 
few men to put a steel plant in a corn field and another successful one in a marsh are as 
different from today's conditions in most of the Afro-Asian countries as day is from night.’ He 
was happy to find that Humphrey agreed with him on an issue so close to his heart: aid that 
flowed from the US to a developing country would not result in a transformation of values. 345 
Finally, Eisenhower questioned if economic assistance could affect political change. 
Eisenhower agreed with the progressives in part, there was value in promoting ‘economic 
development and political progress even if Communism did not appear.’ However, this did 
not mean that the president was a new convert to the progressive gospel of long-term foreign 
aid.346 He further clarified his view in January 1960. Eisenhower believed that the US had to 
educate peoples first, only then assist: ‘if the countries […] oriented themselves towards 
Moscow, we would not wish to undertake programmes for their orderly economic 
development and political progress.’347  
During Eisenhower’s visit to Morocco, King Mohammed V told the president that the 
US should help the countries of Africa to become independent and then assist in their 
development. Eisenhower unsurprisingly argued against ‘precipitate action’ in the granting of 
independence and he characterised the king’s reasoning as ‘putting the cart before the horse.’ 
For the president, the US needed to assist a country culturally before it became independent. 
343 Eisenhower, Dwight D. Personal to Frank Altschul, 25 October 1957. In The Papers of Dwight David 
Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1891. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/1891.cfm; Paul Hoffman, 
“Blueprint for Foreign Aid”, New York Times Magazine, February 17, 1957, 43. 
344 Millikan and Rostow, A Proposal, 38. 
345 It ‘strikes a very responsive chord in my soul,’ see Eisenhower, Dwight D. To George Magoffin Humphrey, 
27 March 1957. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1891. World 
Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-
term/documents/1891.cfm.  
346 Ambrose, Eisenhower. The President 1952-1959, 2:387. 
347 Memorandum of Discussion of the 432nd Meeting of the National Security Council, 14 January 1960, Papers 
as President, 1953-1961, NSC Series, Box 12, f: 432nd Meeting of NSC, DDEL. 
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Reversing that strategy would be ineffective because many governmental structures would 
already be in place.348 
Eisenhower and Humphrey’s views were not parochial but part of a globally shared 
modernisation outlook. A group of experts at the UN had already reached the conclusion in 
1951 that financial assistance would not be sufficient because, in many places, individual 
psychology and social organisation created obstacles to development.349 The educational 
challenge was further hampered with another fear of the modernisation theorists: 
overpopulation. A country that had reached the saturation point in population long before its 
people understand or, indeed, even hear of the terms ‘personal rights’ and ‘personal freedom’, 
Eisenhower argued, presented far different problems from those Americans faced in the first 
half of the 20th century. Overpopulation, the vision of a vast throng of underdeveloped people 
haunted Eisenhower, who feared constructive developments projects would collapse under the 
pressure of ‘one and a half billion hungry people.’350 
Eisenhower’s statements were not mere rhetoric. On 1 July 1955, the Foreign 
Operations Administration was replaced with the ICA run by John Hollister.351 In testimonies 
to Congress after 1957, ICA officials repeatedly mulled over the fact that Africa required a 
different type of assistance. In setting up the so-called ‘Fund for Africa’ it was emphasised 
that the existing aid categories did not meet the necessities of Africa South of the Sahara. 
What the continent needed was a special form of aid with an emphasis on the creation or 
expansion of educational and training institutions.352 
The ICA regional director for Africa, Marcus J. Gordon, wanted to create ‘productive 
citizens’. He linked education with socio-economic development and security when he stated 
that economic development depended as much upon a ‘state of mind’ as on the ‘possession of 
natural resources.’ The educational system had to produce skilled workers to support 
348 Memorandum of Discussion of the 432nd Meeting of the National Security Council, 14 January 1960, Papers 
as President, 1953-1961, NSC Series, Box 12, Folder: 432nd Meeting of NSC, DDEL; Draft, Peter L. Koffsky, 
“The United States Information Program in Africa, 1945-1970: A History & Interpretation”, 2-1, RG. 306, A1 
1072, Box 9, f: African Program, Historical Background; 1970, NARA. 
349 Ekbladh, The Great American Mission, 157–159, 163–168. 
350 Eisenhower, Dwight D. to George Magoffin Humphrey, 27 March 1957. In The Papers of Dwight David 
Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 90. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower 
Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, 
http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/documents/90.cfm; Quoted in: Matthew 
Connelly, Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population (Cambridge and London: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 187; Similar ideas can be found in Privileged Information for 
President’s Committee only, “The Population Explosion”, 15 June 1959, 2, RG. 469, P4, Box 1, f: Draper 
Committee Papers, NARA. 
351 Shenin, America’s Helping Hand, 201. 
352 See chapter 4; Arthur L. Richards and Jane M. Alden, “Relations of Mutual Security Act Amendment to the 
President’s Baylor Proposals”, S.d., RG. 469, P 36, Box 3, f: Africa Fund, NARA. 
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development as well as trained public administrators and leaders in Government because he 
believed that no country could achieve political stability and subsequently encourage 
economic development without a well-trained corps of public administrators.  
The financial means for training consequently rose from $ 93,000 in 1957 to $ 473,000 
in 1960. The ICA’s cultural activities resulting in the ‘enlightenment or improvement of the 
current status or development of a culture’ embraced virtually the entire range of the ICA’s 
technical cooperation activities in Africa. Education programmes were to focus on leadership 
training, not merely on the export of what was found useful in American education. The 
number of African students training in the US and countries outside of Africa, taking short 
courses, and enrolling at night schools increased rapidly. On-the-job training was being 
provided on a country-by-country basis and in 1960 Gordon’s top priority became teacher 
training and the increase of educational materials. Secondary school programmes had to turn 
out educated citizens, inform leadership styles, as well as prepare candidates for colleges, 
universities, as well as for the new scientific and technical courses and in the humanities. 353 
Conversely for the French and British, cultural diplomacy acted only as a lubricant for 
economic aid schemes such as the Colombo Plan, and the Foundation for Mutual Assistance 
in Africa South of the Sahara (FAMA), which was an organ of the Commission for Technical 
Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA). The French and the British met in these 
commissions to discuss their joint development projects and economic assistance programmes 
towards Africa. A brochure on the CCTA and FAMA for instance displayed the results of 
French led development: from scientific training, to education on soil erosion and the training 
at professional schools (illustration 8).354  
In France and the UK, pamphlets were printed to highlight the merits of economic aid 
while cultural assistance was seen as a form of aid that was distinct from financial and 
technical assistance. For the American president, however, cultural assistance was an essential 
element in his overall foreign aid strategy. 
 
 
 
353 Shenin, America’s Helping Hand, 62; Presentation transcript, Marcus J. Gordon, “Subject: Activities of the 
ICA in Africa in the Education and Cultural Fields”, 23 November 1959, 13, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, FRC 2, f: 
ICA, NARA; Other plans were the development of education in the areas of the English language, adult and 
community education, literacy and educational administration, see Presentation by Marcus J. Gordon, Regional 
Director for Africa and Europe, “Subject: Activities of the ICA in Africa in the Education and Cultural Fields”, 
23 November 1959, 13, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, FRC 2, f: ICA, NARA. 
354 Brochure, “Coopération Interafricaine : Dixième Anniversaire CCTA/CSA – FAMA”, 1960, Ministère de la 
Coopération, Direction de la coopération technique et culturelle, 19810443/57, CHAN. 
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Illustration 8: A pamphlet on the ten-year anniversary of the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa 
South of the Sahara contained this picture of a veterinarian being trained in Dakar. Source: Brochure, 
‘Coopération Interafricaine: Dixième Anniversaire CCTA/CSA – FAMA’, 1960, Ministère de la Coopération, 
Direction de la coopération technique et culturelle, 19810443/57, CHAN. 
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Conclusion: Culture and Information as Modernisation Tools 
 
After the Bandung Conference of 1955 and in the face of Nasser’s challenge, the ‘mind’ of 
African peoples became a development target rather than a security concern. Through more 
elaborate cultural assistance schemes, Western policymakers raced to be the first to offer 
Africans education. This move would create the conditions for American values to be 
internalised by the Third World peoples, to make it possible for the British to safeguard the 
transition to self-government of a country such as Ghana, or to allow them to take advantage 
of the opportunities offered by the French culture and language. 
The belief in cultural assistance exerted a profound influence on Eisenhower’s – often 
misunderstood – foreign aid doctrine. The positive outcome of modernisation projects, public 
health programmes or factory construction, would not automatically plant the right ideas in 
people’s mind. Eisenhower rejected what Rostow termed the ‘demonstration effect’; he 
believed values had to be actively taught.355 Meanwhile, the British and the French used 
informational resources as a way to sell their colonial development schemes to reaffirm their 
commitment to development.  
The African target audience remained conspicuously absent in these visions for 
psychological modernisation; success could be attained by improving the quality of the aid on 
offer. Even though the Americans became more interested in the people356 – everybody had to 
possess the right type of skills to become a participant in a democratic society – Africans 
never acquired agency.  
That disregard for local customs would sometimes make education hard to sell. 
Odweanomana, a 25 year old Ghanaian man, for instance, had written a letter to the advice 
column of the Sunday Mirror on a topic related to education. The six men in his house had 
told him he should not marry a certain girl because she was literate. Literate women were 
supposedly more inclined to leave their husbands if they went bankrupt, whereas the illiterate 
women would stay.357 Education could thus make women appear less suitable marriage 
partners and weaken their social position, a side effect the idealist Western planners did not 
even contemplate. 
355 Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1960), 27. 
356 This counteracts the claim that public diplomacy in the Third World focused only on elites. This critique is 
worked out further in chapter 5, see Osgood, Total Cold War, 114; Osgood, “Words and Deeds: Race, 
Colonialism, and Eisenhower’s Propaganda War in the Third World”, 16; Cull, The Cold War and the United 
States Information Agency, 145; Dueck, The Claims of Culture at Empire’s End, 16; Robert J. Young, Marketing 
Marianne: French Propaganda in America, 1900-1940 (Piscataway: Rutgers University Press, 2004), 174. 
357 “Dear Hilda: What do you Suggest – Literate or Illiterate Wife?”, Sunday Mirror, March 9, 1956, 10. 
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It is only when Nkrumah’s Bureau of African Affairs began producing pamphlets in 
which he promoted the so-called ‘African Personality’, the self-confident African, and giving 
activists political training, that the West began to pay attention. 
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4. Mental Decolonisation 
  
Nkrumah, Pan-African Propaganda and the African Revolutionary Network 
(March 1957 – June 1960) 
 
We are proud that we are able to make our independence the means by which the forces of nationalism 
are strengthened […] throughout the continent of Africa. We are prepared to move ahead, side by side, 
with African patriots everywhere, not with guns but with ideas. 
 
– Nkrumah in the Africa Freedom Day broadcast, 1959.358 
 
The tribute paid to the head of government by those who only yesterday were themselves considered and 
treated as a sort of monarch, seems to justify the recent statement of Mr. Kofie Baako that with the ‘rapid 
development of industrialization and education, there would be nobody, in twenty years’ time, to follow 
the parasol of the chief.’ 
   
– Louis de Guiringaud, French ambassador to Ghana tries to understand the political 
transformation in Ghana, 1958.359 
 
I do not think we need be unduly alarmed at the prospect of Dr. Nkrumah calling a Pan African 
Conference. 
 
  – J.S. Bennett, an officer at the Colonial Office, 26 March 1957.360 
 
 
As Mrs. C.G. Johnson, of the West African Cocoa Research Institute served her two sons 
pancakes for dinner, a British man knocked on her door. Standing in the drizzle of Accra’s 
evening rain was A.R. Philips of the BBC, who enquired if he was at the right address. Indeed 
he was. Mrs. Johnson had agreed to lodge Philips’ team, which was there to coordinate the 
activities of the Ghana Broadcasting Service and prepare a programme for the BBC Home 
Service. So great was the interest in the story of Ghana and its independence that, with 306 
accredited overseas and local correspondents on the scene, there was literally no room at any 
inn in the capital city and the BBC had been reduced to putting up correspondents in private 
homes.361 Nkrumah was keen to exploit this PR potential (illustration 9). 
Journalists received daily briefings between 2 March 1957 – the arrival of Princess 
Marina, the Duchess of Kent, and 7 March 1957 – Nkrumah’s closing press conference. The 
press hotel had a direct radio connection with London, was fitted with a bank, a post office 
358 “Ideas and Courage, Not Guns”, Ghana Today, April 29, 1959, Vol. 3, No. 5, 1. 
359 ‘L’hommage rendu au chef du gouvernement par celui qui, hier encore, était considéré et traité comme une 
sorte de monarque, paraît également justifier l’affirmation récente de M. Kofie Baako selon laquelle ‘avec le 
développement rapide de l’industrialisation et de l’éducation, il n’y aura plus personne, dans 20 ans, pour suivre 
l’ombrelle d’un chef’, see Outgoing telegram, Guiringaud to DAL, 15 July 1958, DAL, Ghana 1953-1965, 
50QONT/15, f: Politique interieure,  AMAE. 
360 Minutes, J.S. Bennett, 26 March 1957, CO 936/576, TNA. 
361 Letter, A.R. Phillips to C.G. Johnson, 28 February 1957, E1-1,433, BBC-Archives; Among others: E. Sawyer 
of USIA, H. Andrews of the Liberian Bureau of Information, L. Fleming of the BBC, Jack Allen from Reuters, 
Claude Wauthier of Agence-France-Presse, Vasily Kisselev of Pravda, Alex Riveria of the Pittsburgh Courier, 
Akim Emiola of Nigeria Tribune. 
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where the popular new Ghana stamps were sold, a book shop and a bar with free drinks, while 
a fleet of buses took reporters to official functions around the country. In the midst of all this 
excitement the BBC even forgot to play its recording of the independence celebrations of 6 
March.362 When The Birth of Ghana was finally aired, listeners heard a story in which the 
triumph of African nationalism and the representation of British imperial policy as an 
emancipatory endeavour were intertwined.363 The programmes that followed maintained that 
line, even when a group called the Ghana Union complained that the Ghanaian drumming 
performances that were featured were unrepresentative of Ghana’s ‘true culture’.364  
This concern for the true culture of Africa became the core of Ghana’s foreign policy 
and had been at the heart of the last legislative assembly on the eve of independence. When 
Nkrumah took over the portfolios of defence and external affairs, he declared Ghana would be 
converted into a ‘centre for the discussion of African problems.’ In his independence speech 
on the old polo grounds in Accra he declared that ‘just minutes ago’ he had laid out a 
programme to create an ‘African Personality and identity.’ In his view, this was the only way 
to show the world that the continent was ready to fight its own battles.365 In doing so, he 
rejected the insights of Carothers and other ethno-psychologists who had argued that the 
African was psychologically unfit to organise a society.  
Ironically, Nkrumah – a man who gazed at the world from beneath a pair of constantly 
frowning and expressive eyebrows – has been described in those terms because he had been 
unable to execute his grand non-violent strategy to unite Africa. Scholars in the 1960s and 
1970s questioned Nkrumah’s intellectual capacities. The first book that dealt with Ghana’s 
foreign policy presented him as ‘a marginal man, intellectually insecure.’366 When members 
of the Ghanaian bureaucracy began publishing their memoirs in the 1980s, Nkrumah came to 
362 Confidential letter, J.B. Millar to Bernard Moore, 25 March 1957, Ghana Information Services, “The World 
Press and Ghana Independence”, 23 March 1957, Transcript, R.J. Moxon, Director of Information Services, 
“Ghana Independence Celebrations: List of Fully Accredited Overseas and Local Correspondents”, 6 March 
1957, E1/1, 433/1 Ghana Independence Celebrations, 1957, BBC-Archives. 
363 Draft, “Opening Announcement for ‘The Birth of Ghana’”, E1/1, 433/1 Ghana Independence Celebrations, 
1957, BBC-Archives. 
364 Note, director general BBC London, 5 November 1958, E1/1,435/1 Africa Ghana Union, BBC-Archives. 
365 That same night he also opened the Ghana Museum; “Ghana is free forever”, BBC-World Service, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/focusonafrica/news/story/2007/02/070129_ghana50_independence_speech.s
html; “Ghana’s Foreign Policy will not be dictated by the Need for Aid”, Ghana Today, March 20, 1957, Vol. 1, 
No. 2, 2; George P Hagan, “Nkrumah’s Cultural Policy”, in The Life and Work of Kwame Nkrumah: Papers of a 
Symposium Organized by the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Legon, ed. Kwame Arhin 
(Trenton: Africa World Press, 1993), 1. 
366 Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 418; Nwaubani, The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 
1950-1960. 
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be seen as an inpatient idealist whose plans were thwarted by his corrupt aides.367 In recent 
years, Nkrumah has acquired the reputation of a charismatic leader whose radical pan-African 
experiment was damaged by the pressures of the Cold War.368 This has led some to return to a 
neocolonial interpretation, arguing that the West plotted against African unity.369 Others have 
shown that pan-African activism was sustained by transnational networks.370 
The focus on Nkrumah’s failure, alleged hypocrisy or inability to resist the 
machinations of the Cold War, has eclipsed the actual goals and methods of Ghanaian 
diplomats and leaders. Foreign policy was shaped by the psychological and cultural impact of 
colonialism, a crucial concern of Third World intellectuals. In Black Skin White Mask and The 
Wretched of the Earth, Fanon uses psychoanalytical terms to describe the inferiority complex 
that colonialism imposed upon the black man. Albert Memmi, a Tunisian essayist, published 
Portait du colonisé/Portrait du colonisateur in which he explores the psychological effects of 
colonialism on colonised and colonisers alike.371  
In 1964, Afari-Gyan coined the term ‘mental decolonisation’. As a lecturer at the 
Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, he had come to the conclusion that the transition from 
colonialism to independence, and ultimately to socialism, required not only political, but also 
economic, social and cultural action. A new view of the dignity of man was needed, ‘a view 
367 Kofi Batsa, The Spark: From Kwame Nkrumah to Hilla Limann (London: Rex Collings, 1985); Michael Dei-
Anang, The Administration of Ghana’s Foreign Relations, 1957-1965: A Personal Memoir (London: Athlone 
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Agyeman, Nkrumah’s Ghana and East Africa; Kofi Buenor Hadjor, Nkrumah and Ghana: The Dilemma of Post-
Colonial Power (London: Kegan Paul international, 1988), 99–105; Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah. Vision and 
Tragedy; Basil Davidson, Black Star: A View of the Life and Times of Kwame Nkrumah (London: Allen Lane, 
1973), 1–15. 
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Empire”, in Postcolonial Thought in the French-Speaking World, ed. Charles Forsdick and David Murphy, 
Postcolonialism across the Disciplines 4 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009), 213. 
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which demands a change of mental attitude, of personality’, something Ghana had been 
committed to since independence.372  
The Ghanaian aspiration to mentally decolonise Africans raises three important issues 
that will be addressed. First, the main goals of Ghana’s foreign policy and its relationship to 
the ideology of pan-Africanism will be reassessed in light of Nkrumah’s worldview – which 
was made up of imperialists and anticolonialists. Second, the pan-African conferences that 
were staged in Accra are studied. Not only do these meetings illuminate how much Ghanaian 
officials wanted to create a network of political activists, the debates also shed light on 
Nkrumah’s ambiguous stance on the use of violence in decolonisation. He wanted to convince 
African leaders and audiences of the need for African unity, making public diplomacy the 
core of his non-violent approach abroad. However he did not reject violence as a matter of 
principle. Nkrumah was hesitant because he felt the root of the problem – the psychological 
and cultural impact of colonialism – would remain intact. Lastly, the ways in which Ghanaian 
officials tried to attract people to Accra to acquire what the Bandung delegates had defined as 
‘moral strength’ are analysed. 
 
 
 
Illustration 9: Kwame Nkrumah addresses the crowd on the old polo grounds on the eve of independence, a few 
minutes after midnight, 6 March 1957. Source: “Ghana’s Foreign Policy Will not be Dictated by the Need for 
Aid”, Ghana Today, March 20, 1957, Vol. 1, No.2, 2. 
372 Research paper, K. Afari-Gyan, “The Problems of Mental Decolonisation”, [1964], Nkrumah Papers, Box 
154-38, f: Afari-Gyan, MSRC. 
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African Unity and the ‘African Personality’ as Nonalignment 
 
Nkrumah developed his belief in a united Africa during the interwar period, when 
intellectuals of African descent in the US and the Caribbean became more active and pan-
Africanism gradually evolved from a utopian to a political project. The first Pan-African 
Conference in London, in 1900, was followed by successive Pan-African Congresses in 1919, 
1921, and 1927, in which W.E.B Dubois played an important role and where the ties with 
Africa were discussed. In 1937, C.L.R. James, Jomo Kenyatta and George Padmore 
established an International African Service Bureau in London to increase the impact of their 
activism by bringing together political activists, trade unionists, and intellectuals.373  
Around the same time, in the spring of 1935, Kwame Nkrumah arrived in New York to 
study at Lincoln University where he started writing Towards Colonial Freedom, an 
intellectual critique on colonialism that presented economics as the basis of imperialism. At 
this point, Nkrumah’s declared aim was the establishment of a West African union, which 
was re-imagined as a continental union under George Padmore’s impulse.374  
That meeting with Padmore occurred in Manchester, where Nkrumah helped organise 
the Pan-African Congress of 1945, a gathering that gave more substance to pan-Africanism as 
a political project. Padmore presented a vision of anti-imperialism and pan-Africanism in 
which non-violence rather than violent resistance was chosen, and priority was given to 
political rather than economic revolution. The meeting concluded that pan-Africanism should 
be seen as an independent ideological system, a counterweight to capitalism and 
communism.375 In 1956, Padmore expanded on this idea when he wrote Pan-Africanism or 
Communism? In his preface Richard Wright writes about the importance of race and 
colonialism in the African worldview:   
Black people primarily regard Russian Communists as white men. Black people primarily regard 
American, British and French anti-Communists as white people… Is that surprising? It ought not to be.376  
 
373 Eschen, Race against Empire, 7–11; Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah. Vision and Tragedy, 33; Jonathan Derrick, 
Africa’s “Agitators”: Militant Anti-Colonialism in Africa and the West, 1918-1939 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2008), 45–47; Top secret report, 18 October 1952, KV2/1850, TNA.  
374 Kwame Nkrumah, Towards Colonial Freedom: Africa in the Struggle Against World Imperialism (London: 
Heinemann, 1947), 1; Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah (Edinburgh: T. 
Nelson, 1957), 24–26; Toyin Falola, Nationalism and African Intellectuals (Rochester: University of Rochester 
Press, 2001), 156–158. 
375  James, “‘What We Put in Black and White’: George Padmore and the Practice of Anti-Imperial Politics”, 
156; K. Afari-Gyan, “Nkrumah’s Ideology”, in The Life and Work of Kwame Nkrumah: Papers of a Symposium 
Organized by the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Legon, ed. Kwame Arhin (Trenton: Africa 
World Press, 1993), 166. 
376 Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism? The Coming Struggle for Africa, 12. 
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In Manchester, Nkrumah’s star rose to unseen heights. After being invited by Joseph 
Danquah to become the secretary-general of the United Gold Coast Convention in December 
1947, he founded the Convention’s People’s Party (CCP) in 1950. With their plea for 
‘independence now’ he won the elections and became the ‘leader of government business’ in 
1951 and Prime Minister at independence on 6 March 1957. 
Ghanaian independence was the pivotal moment when the political pan-African project 
increased its interventionist aspirations. ‘Our independence is meaningless’, Nkrumah 
claimed, ‘unless it is linked up totally with that of the African continent.’377 If Ghana’s 
anticolonialism stopped at its borders, the country would be unable to maintain its 
independence. The fact that Ghana was founded on the idea of liberation and African unity, 
rather than on an exclusive concept of nationalism was thus the outcome of half a century in 
which pan-Africanism evolved into a mature political ideology. 
 
  
Pan-Africanism as an Interventionist Ideology 
 
Whether pan-Africanism was a separate ideology or if more weight has to be given to the fact 
that its substance relied on Wilsonianism and Leninism is debatable. Admittedly, the 
hegemonic messages of Soviet-Chinese communism and American liberal capitalism helped 
postcolonial regimes define their domestic policy and gave rise to different types of African 
socialism.378 George Padmore’s biography, for instance, exemplifies the complexity of pan-
Africanism: he was born in Trinidad in 1903, worked in the US, joined the Communist Party 
which he left in 1933, moved to London in 1935 and ended up in Ghana where, as Nkrumah’s 
Advisor to the Prime Minister on African Affairs, he became the key planner of Ghana’s 
public diplomacy strategy.  
Nevertheless, Ghanaian foreign policy was guided by a set of systematically expressed 
concepts.379 Ghanaian pan-Africanism consisted of a political philosophy (anticolonialism and 
‘African Personality’), a theory of history with slavery as a key moment as well as a vision for 
the future (African unity), a national and international explanation of the legitimacy of the 
regime (positive neutrality and disarmament). All components were promoted on a 
377 “Ghana is free forever”. BBC-World Service, http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/focusonafrica 
/news/story/2007/02/070129_ghana50_independence_speech.shtml. 
378 Byrne, “Africa’s Cold War”, 101–102; Much of the literature has not recognised pan-Africanism as a separate 
ideology and has instead devoted most of its energy to determining if and when Nkrumah turned towards the 
Soviet Union, see Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 1–15. 
379 James, “‘What We Put in Black and White’: George Padmore and the Practice of Anti-Imperial Politics”, 33; 
Definition of ideology taken from: Odd Arne Westad, “Bernath Lecture: The New International History of the 
Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms”, Diplomatic History 24, no. 4 (2000): 552. 
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continental scale, but the ‘African Personality’ and ‘positive neutrality’, in particular, shaped 
foreign policy. 
First among the pan-African principles was anticolonialism. As a student, Nkrumah had 
defined colonialism in a Leninist way, as a system rooted in the hunger for raw materials. Yet 
he also stressed the fact that education only served the spread of European ideas and denied 
Africans the skills needed for nation building.380 By the time Nkrumah watched the fireworks 
on the eve of independence, colonialism had become a system that oppressed the sense of 
African self-worth. ‘We must change or attitudes, our minds’, he claimed, ‘we shall show the 
world that the African man is capable of managing his own affairs.’381 
For Nkrumah, who had been born in Nkroful in Nzima, close to the slave fort of 
Elmina, the slave trade marked the start of a long history of continental exploitation. At the 
Conference of Independent African States (CIAS) in 1958, he offered his linear view of 
history in which the ‘slave trade and the rape of Africa’ by the European powers were the 
decisive factors shaping the history of Africa. The abolition of the slave trade was followed 
by colonialism, which had enslaved Africans in their own territories and had transformed into 
a more subtle form of exploitation, neocolonialism. Nkrumah’s book Neo-Colonialism, The 
Last Stage of Imperialism referred to Lenin, but presented colonialism as something that 
touched every aspect of life. Neocolonialists worked in subtle and varied ways, Nkrumah 
claimed, and they were active in the economic field, but also in the political, religious, 
ideological, and cultural spheres.382     
The ‘African Personality’, the revival of a ‘common fundamental sentiment’ among 
Africans, was considered to be vital in the battle against neocolonialism. Colonialism had not 
only oppressed local cultures, but had also duped generations into believing that the solution 
for Africa’s problems lay outside the continent. Nkrumah adopted the ‘African Personality’ – 
a term coined by Edward Wilmot Blyden, an American-Liberian educator, in 1893 – to stress 
380 Afari-Gyan, “Nkrumah’s Ideology”, 168; Obed Asamoah, “Nkrumah’s Foreign Policy 1951-1966”, in The 
Life and Work of Kwame Nkrumah: Papers of a Symposium Organized by the Institute of African Studies, 
University of Ghana, Legon, ed. Kwame Arhin (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1993), 242. 
381 That same night he also opened the Ghana Museum; “Ghana is free forever”. BBC-World Service, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/focusonafrica/news/story/2007/02/070129_ghana50_independence_speech.s
html.  
382 Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism (London: Panaf Books, 1965), 239; D. E. 
K. Amenumey, Ghana: A Concise History from Pre-Colonial Times to the 20th Century (Accra: Woeli Pub. 
Services, 2008), 103; Birmingham, Kwame Nkrumah, 3; Speech transcript, “Conference of Independent African 
States”, 15 April 1958, 5-6, SC/BAA/136 Conference of Independent States, PRAAD-Accra. 
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the autonomous role of the African on the international stage where for ‘too long in our 
history, Africa has spoken through the voices of others.’383 
Like Senghor’s Négritude, Nyerere’s Ujamaa, Mobutu’s Áuthenticité and Kaunda’s 
‘African Humanism’, the ‘African Personality’ – or genius – was an idealised ‘authentic’ 
image of the past that provided a framework to visualise the future of African unity. The 
‘African Personality’ was close to Aimé Césaire’s definition of Négritude which combined 
the ‘fraternity of olden days’ with the ‘the productive power of modern times’ in an attempt to 
go beyond the past, not repeat it. Nkrumah, for his part, stressed the differences with 
Négritude, casting it as an idea that presented Africans as possessing merely ‘sensitivity’ not 
rational capacities.384 
After 1960, the ‘African Personality’ increasingly came to be seen as the product of his 
environment. In the words of Ghana’s principal newspaper The Spark: ‘in an imported 
environment that does not reflect his language, his customs, his dress, his food, his music, 
song and dance’ the African could not be truly at home.385  
To create that distinct form of modernity, African unity was required. Neocolonialism 
had only been able to succeed because the continent had been divided into small units that 
were unable to develop on their own. Instead, the different parts had to rely on the former 
imperial power for defence and economic development. Disagreement about the optimal form 
of unity and the relation to the former coloniser created three blocs after 1960. Ghana was part 
of the Casablanca group, which also comprised Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Algeria, and Libya. 
As ‘radical’ socialist states they called for the immediate formation of a pan-African 
government, and strongly criticised the former imperial powers. The Brazzaville Group 
consisted of the other French colonies aimed at the integration of French Africa with a strong 
connection to France. The Monrovia group united the more pro-capitalist and pro-American 
countries that advocated a gradualist approach towards unity. In July 1959, Ghana, Guinea 
and Liberia formulated a declaration of ten principles in Sanniquellie. Nkrumah was willing 
to negotiate because he feared that union would be seen merely as a propaganda stunt.386  
383 “Africa had Scholars before Europe”, Evening News, September 4, 1963; Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom: A 
Statement of African Ideology, 125; Biney, The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah, 120. 
384 Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, 10–11; Samuel Obeng, ed., “44. Opening of the Institute of African 
Studies, Legon October 25, 1963”, in Selected Speeches of Kwame Nkrumah, vol. 2, 4 vols. (Accra: Afram Publ. 
(Ghana) Ltd, 2009), 272–84; Biney, The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah, 120. 
385 Klang Nabi, “Cultural Imperialism: Ideas we Must Fight”, The Spark, February 15, 1963, 5; Ndabaningi 
Sithole, “African Personality”, The Spark, March 15, 1963, 4; D.B. Sam, “The concept of African Personality”, 
February 21, 1962, RG. 17/2/800 Miscellaneous1955-1964, PRAAD-Accra. 
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‘Positive Neutrality’, used interchangeably with nonalignment, was the fourth 
component of pan-Africanism. The guiding principle of Ghanaian diplomacy amounted to a 
Monroe Doctrine for Africa. Nkrumah connected ‘Africa for the Africans’, a plea by the 
founder of the Universal Negro Improvement Association, Marcus Garvey, with the American 
foreign policy doctrine of 1823 in his speech before Congress on 24 July 1958: ‘Our attitude 
[…] is very much that of America looking at the disputes of Europe in the 19th century. We do 
not wish to be involved.’ Just as the US wanted to keep the Europeans out of the American 
continent, Ghana believed that ‘the peace of the world in general is served, not harmed by 
keeping one great continent free from the strife.’387 Nkrumah shied away from exploiting the 
Cold War rivalry because he believed interference would only draw Africa into the conflict, 
‘When the bull elephants fight, the grass is trampled down.’388 Playing the USSR and the US 
against each other would not yield benefits. It would only result in the destruction of less 
powerful nations.  
Peace and disarmament, the opposition to thermo-nuclear weapons, were therefore part 
and parcel of Nkrumah’s pan-African and anticolonial worldview. Nkrumah opposed the use 
of thermo-nuclear weapons and presented himself as a mediator in Vietnam in 1965, in the 
Palestine-Israeli conflict and the Sino-Indian War of 1962. 389  
 
 
Pan-Africanism as a Foreign Policy: Shrugging the Colonial Past 
 
This set of five ideas compelled Ghana to engage in public diplomacy targeted at political 
activists in other African territories. In July 1956, Padmore had already urged Nkrumah to 
personally manage the Gold Coast’s image abroad. If Nkrumah wanted his ideas to 
materialise they had to be vigorously propagated, integrated in concrete projects and 
cemented in institutions. One year after independence, Nkrumah went to the national 
assembly to set down his foreign policy.390 Officials of the American embassy, who had been 
able to get their hands on the corrected draft of Nkrumah’s speech, noticed that favourable 
1966”, 244; Confidential, “African Unity”, [1955-1964], RG. 17/2/800 Miscellaneous1955-1964, PRAAD-
Accra.  
387 Quoted in Asamoah, “Nkrumah’s Foreign Policy 1951-1966”, 248; Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 110, 
177–83,279–90; Ibrahim Sundiata, “The Garvey Aftermath: The Fall, Rise, and Fall”, in The United States and 
West Africa: Interactions and Relations, ed. Alusine Jalloh and Toyin Falola (Rochester: University of Rochester 
Press, 2008), 75–76. 
388 Quoted in Asamoah, “Nkrumah’s Foreign Policy 1951-1966”, 248. 
389 Allman, “Nuclear Imperialism and the Pan-African Struggle for Peace and Freedom”, 86; Levey, “The Rise 
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390 Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 24 July 1956, Kwame Nkrumah Papers, Box 154-41, f: Correspondence 1952-
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references to the Commonwealth had been exchanged for an increased role for Ghana in 
Africa.391 
Early Ghanaian diplomacy had been sensitive to PR and concerned with African 
liberation but, by its very nature, was pragmatic in outlook. Nkrumah enjoyed cordial 
relations with the French ambassador, Marc Renner, and at CCTA meetings the Ghanaian 
delegation had made friendly and informal approaches to the delegates of Apartheid South 
Africa. They even urged South Africa to set up some form of permanent representation in the 
Gold Coast. London had invested in the creation of a diplomatic service. A total of 30 officers 
attended the part-time course on international relations at the London School of Economics 
(LSE) while the Ghana government negotiated with Whitehall in 1954 over the establishment 
of a High Commissioner in London, the US and Canada.392  
Pushed by Padmore, Nkrumah fashioned an image of himself as a revolutionary. His 
educational background had been far from radical however. After attending Achimota school 
in Accra, a missionary school where British and African customs and cultures were combined, 
he left for the US and Britain. The fact that Ghanaian public diplomacy targeted potential 
leaders, rather than the people, was a reflection of that background. Furthermore, echoing 
civilisational discourses about premature independence, Nkrumah considered all dependent 
territories to be ‘backward in education, in agriculture and in industry’ and in need of 
assistance.393  
Ghana’s UN representative, Daniel A. Chapman, also believed that education needed to 
produce men and women for the public service to facilitate the institutional development of 
the modern self-governing state.394 At the same time, he forcefully rejected the notion that 
self-government had to be postponed until the educational standards were high enough, an 
excuse often used to postpone independence. Ghana would step in and train political activists 
and provide political information to strengthen the structures of the future state and build a 
revolutionary network.  
391 Foreign service despatch, Amembassy Accra to StateDept, “Changes Made by the Prime Minister in the 
Delivery of his Policy Speech in the legislative Assembly”, 19 March 1957, Foreign service despatch, 
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392 Statement by the secretary of state for the colonies, 11 May 1956, 3, PREM 11/1367, TNA; Memorandum, 
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September 1956, Memorandum, “Formation des Candidats a la Carriere Diplomatique de la Gold Coast”, 23 
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Nonetheless, Nkrumah was acutely aware that the age of mass communication had 
changed foreign policy. Mobilising public opinion was the most effective way to expose 
colonialism as immoral. In the Afro-Asian group at the UN, for instance, he spoke about how 
international public opinion was forcing nations to act in increasingly more ethical ways.395 
Similarly, during a television recording at the UN TV studio, he declared that the founding 
members of the UN had hoped that ‘world public opinion would develop on the basis of 
international morality.’396 Once in exile, in 1966, Nkrumah would grow to regret his reliance 
on persuasion and propaganda. Nonetheless, until the early sixties, the belief in propaganda 
was widely held. Alphonse Ebassa, a freedom fighter in Sierra Leone wrote to Ghana’s 
principal propaganda institution, the Bureau of African Affairs (BAA), to request more copies 
of the monthly periodical they produced, Voice of Africa, because propaganda had proven to 
be more ‘powerful’ than guns.397  
 
 
African Unity as a Foreign Policy Goal 
 
What then was political education and propaganda supposed to achieve? What were the aims 
of public diplomacy within Ghana’s overall Africa strategy? Chiefly, as an ambassador of 
Ghana, S.E. Quarm, stated, Nkrumah did not have a credible military option nor the capacity 
to declare effective economic sanctions. He therefore had to rely on ‘informal diplomacy’ 
with Radio Ghana, the Ghana Trade Union Congress and the Bureau of African Affairs 
(BAA) as the primary tools to coordinate the struggle against colonialism.398 
What is more, the BAA had to spread the ‘African Personality’. Ghanaian propaganda 
projected a narrative of a shared African past that was distinct from Europe. In 1960, for 
instance, a series of postcards was disseminated that depicted Africans at the bedrock of every 
major intellectual achievement, such as mathematics and philosophy (illustration 10). In 
December 1962, the first international congress of Africanists was organised to explore a 
395 Speech script, “Address Delivered by the Prime Minister of Ghana to the Afro-Asian Group at United Nations 
Headquarters, New York on Tuesday, July 29th, 1958 at 4.15 p.m. in Ghana and the United Nations, published by 
Ghana Information Services”, October 1958, Dabu Gizenga Papers, Box 128-5, f: Kwame Nkrumah Speeches – 
Addresses to The United Nations, 1953-1957, 1958, 1960, MSRC.  
396 Transcript, “Television Recording made by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of Ghana at the United 
Nations”, July 29,1958, Dabu Gizenga Papers, Box 128-5, f: Kwame Nkrumah Speeches – Addresses to The 
United Nations, 1953-1957, 1958, 1960, MSRC. 
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‘common fundamental sentiment’ and give the ‘African Personality’ a semi-scientific 
underpinning.399 In an interview with K.B. Asante – conducted in 2012 – the ways in which 
he and Nkrumah had propagated the African past to heighten the self-confidence of his fellow 
Africans was a recurring theme: 
 
Whether in Africa or in Ghana, we found out, Nkrumah found out, that most people at the time wanted to 
do things the European way. […] So Nkrumah tried, what you call, the ‘African Personality’, self-
confidence. We even sometimes exaggerated what the African had done over the years, as you can see. It 
was intentional. 400 
 
Lastly, the numerous trips of BAA officials were a cover for intelligence gathering. In 
November 1959, the 5th meeting of the African Affairs Committee – which coordinated 
Ghana’s Africa policy – decided to send out intelligence officers to obtain vital information in 
dependent territories under the guise of cultural, football, or athletic associations. Until late 
1959, decision makers had to rely on newspaper reports and correspondence from friends 
outside of Ghana. To ensure they had Nkrumah’s backing, the committee members stated that 
‘Comrade Padmore’ had approved of the idea to create an intelligence service.401  
Ghanaian public diplomacy had many faces – as a product of necessity due to the lack 
of ‘real’ power, an instrument to instil Africans with the right values, even as a front for an 
intelligence operation – but it was principally aimed at accelerating the march to African 
unity. To achieve African unity, territories would have to pass through four stages of 
development: the attainment of freedom and independence, the consolidation of that freedom 
and independence, the creation of unity and community among the African states and the 
economic and social reconstruction of Africa. In practice, these phases were overtaken by 
day-to-day events, something Nkrumah admitted at the freedom fighters conference of June 
1962.402 
More importantly, Nkrumah’s strategy for Africa was only one of many in a veritable 
glut of blueprints for the new Africa. The rivalry between Nkrumah and Nasser, for instance, 
came into the open when the Egyptian delegation was not invited to attend Ghana’s 
independence celebration. Most outspoken was the competition with President William 
399 Hagan, “Nkrumah’s Cultural Policy”, 18; Letter, Louis de Guiringaud to DAL, “Information politique”, 14 
May 1960, 2, DAL, Ghana 1960-1965, 50QO/34, AMAE and “Histoire de l’Afrique racontée aux Ghanéens”, 22 
February 1960, DAL, Ghana 1960-1965, 50QO/72, AMAE; “Africa had Scholars before Europe”, Evening 
News, September 4, 1963. 
400 Author’s interview with K.B. Asante, conducted on March 13, 2012, in Labadi, Accra, Ghana. 
401 Minutes of meeting, “Minutes of the 5th Meeting of the African Affairs Committee held on November 19th 
1959 at Flagstaff House at 8 P.M.”, 19 November 1959, SC/BAA/251 African Affairs Committee, PRAAD-
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Tubman of Liberia, who propagated his own so-called 15-Year Unification Programme, a 
plan that wanted to expand the national development programme of 1944 to the rest of the 
continent.403  
To become a worthy alternative to Nkrumah’s pan-Africanism, Tubman decided to 
place the PR savvy Joseph S. Colemen in Lagos. His propaganda campaign, interviews, 
newspaper articles and the brief contemporary history of Liberia he had written for a 
newspaper, the West African Pilot, earned him the nickname ‘Mister Liberia’. To increase his 
credibility, he explicitly referred to Nkrumah who had called the country a ‘pioneer in the 
freedom movement’ during his visit in 1953.404  
It was the NSC that accurately captured the confusing situation that Nkrumah and his 
competitors faced:   
 
The African’s mind is not made up and he is being subjected to a number of contradictory forces. This 
pressure will increase in the future. The African is a target for the advocacy of Communism, old-
fashioned colonialism, xenophobic nationalism, and Egyptian “Islamic” propaganda, as well as for the 
proponents of an orderly development of the various political entities in the area in question, closely tied 
to the West. The eventual political orientation of the emerging African states will probably be determined 
by what the leaders and peoples conceive best serves their own interests, measured primarily in terms of 
“independence” and of “equality” with the white man.405 
 
 
To rise to prominence, Ghanaian policy makers – who had been moulded by the 
colonial education system – began projecting an image of Ghana as a revolutionary centre. 
Driven by a sense that the Ghanaian nation and its ideas about African unity would perish if it 
did not intervene in other African territories, Ghana began to spread propaganda and train 
political activists of other territories. Those activities were aimed at strengthening a network 
of freedom fighters, which had been established at two conferences in Accra. 
403 Foreign service despatch, Peter Rutter to Amembassy Accra, “Ghana’s Relations with Egypt”, 16 May 1957, 
CDF 1955-59, 645.5694/2-1756 – 645U.86B322/1-2959, NARA; Elwood D. Dunn, Liberia and the United 
States during the Cold War: Limits of Reciprocity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 81–85. 
404 Foreign service despatch, “Ghanaian-Liberian relations in the First year of Ghana’s Independence”, 19 May 
1958, Foreign service despatch, Richard L. Jones, “Prospects for Guinean-Liberian Relations on the Eve of 
Touré’s Visit to Monrovia”, 17 November 1958, RG. 59, CDF 1955-59, 6519.00/9-2958 – 65/W.61/1-2159, 
NARA; Foreign service despatch, Amcon Lagos to StateDept, “Newly Assigned Liberian ConGen Making 
Determined Public Relations Campaign”, 14 July 1959, Transcript, “Broadcasts made by the Liberian Consul 
General to Nigeria over NBC”, 3 July 1959, RG. 59, CDF 1955-59, 645.5694/2-1756 – 645U.86B322/1-2959, 
NARA; Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, 180. 
405 Letter, S. Everett Gleason Acting Executive Secretary to government agencies, “U.S. policy toward Africa 
South of the Sahara Prior to Calendar Year 1960”, 26 august 1958, 4, WH Office, NSC Series, Policy Papers 
Subseries, Box 25, f: NSC 5818 Africa South of the Sahara,  DDEL; Robert Murphy, makes the same point in 
the tripartite talks with the UK and France on 16 April 1959: “The Africans were on the whole immature and 
unsophisticated and were subject to many pressures – Communist, Pan-African, Islamic – all of which made it 
difficult for those African leaders who were Western minded to keep their followers on the right path”, see secret 
record, “Summary Record of the first meeting at Ambassadorial level held on April 16”, 16 April 1959, 2, FO 
371/137966, TNA. 
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Illustration 10: ‘The science of chemistry was originated by Africans in the ancient empire of Ghana.’ A postcard 
from a series on pan-African history. This type of propaganda was a source of inspiration for the French who 
were looking for ways to improve the effectiveness of their own cultural activities. Source: Ghana 1960-1965, 
50QO/34, Ghana 1960-1965, AMAE. 
 
 
Converting Accra into a Revolutionary Mecca 
 
To attain their goals, Nkrumah and his aides relied on a fundamental mechanism. They 
wanted to convert the symbolic strength of Ghana into real power by building a network of 
freedom fighters throughout Africa. These political activists would in turn convince the 
people and, once in power, fix their gaze on Ghana, ultimately leading to African unity. Thus 
Accra had to be converted into a revolutionary Mecca that could rival other anticolonial 
centres like Cairo and, by 1960, Dar es Salaam.406 Ghana’s position as a pan-African nation 
was directly dependent upon its ability to attract and influence African leaders. Its propaganda 
therefore had to be easily identifiable. Hence, in December 1959, Nkrumah asked the 
broadcast department to begin every news broadcast of the Voice of Africa with a signature 
call: ‘This is the Voice of Africa coming to you from Radio Ghana, Accra.’407  
The first and most direct initiatives to establish the revolutionary network were the 
Conference of Independent African States (CIAS) between 15 and 23 April 1958 and the All-
African People’s Conference (AAPC) from 8 to 13 December 1958. The AAPC sought to 
form a network that included Kenneth Kaunda of Northern Rhodesia, Julius Nyerere of 
406 Ahlman, “Road to Ghana: Nkrumah, Southern Africa and the Eclipse of a Decolonizing Africa”, 27. 
407 Minutes of meeting, “Sixth Meeting of the African Affairs committee held at the Flagstaff House at 1 P.M. on 
Friday, 4th December, 1959”, 4 December, 1959, RG. 17/2/501 African Affairs Committee 1959-1960, 
PRAAD-Accra 
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Tanganyika, Joshua Nkomo of Southern Rhodesia, Patrice Lumumba of the Belgian Congo, 
Tom Mboya of Kenya and Kanya Chiume of Nyasaland.408 The fact that leaders from 
independent African countries were able to meet in Accra was in itself a rejection of the 
claims of ethno-psychology. In Nkrumah’s words, it was proof that they had become ‘the 
masters of their own fate.’409 
 
 
The Conference of Independent African States and the Establishment of the Network 
 
Unlike the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, which marked the beginning of Africa’s colonial 
tragedy, and distinct from the Brazzaville Conference of 1944 – understood by Nkrumah as a 
ploy to thwart the progress of ‘Positive Action’ – the CIAS aimed at strengthening the ties 
between the different territories of Africa. Initially, American and British officials were 
nervous. Sir Charles Arden-Clarke wanted to persuade Nkrumah not to proceed with the 
conference, while the American ambassador to Ghana, Wilson C. Flake doubted if Nkrumah 
would be able to organise the meeting at all. However, by February 1958, both the Colonial 
Office and the CIA had reached the conclusion that the CIAS would be a good opportunity to 
contain Nasser’s pan-Arab ambitions.410 
Mohammed Ahmed Omaar, a friend of Nkrumah and Padmore, played on these 
ambitions when he assured Chapman Andrews at the CO that the conference was indeed 
intended to seize the political lead in Sub-Saharan Africa before the communists and the 
Egyptians had the chance. The CO therefore encouraged Ako Adjei, the Ghanaian minister of 
the interior, to take a more assertive stance against Nasser’s Egypt, communism, and the 
Soviet Union. But Adjei formally denied that those goals had been pursued to attract a 
sufficient number of participants to the conference. Nkrumah knew that he had to plan 
carefully. In order not to monopolise the initiative and upset Egypt and Liberia, he allowed 
408 Confidential Report, “Ghana’s Role in the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories”, 
12 May 1959, SC/BAA/122 UNO, UNESCO, ILO, PRAAD-Accra; Ahlman, “The Algerian Question in 
Nkrumah’s Ghana, 1958–1960”, 73; Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah. Vision and Tragedy, 209; E.A. Haizel, 
“Education in Ghana, 1951-1966”, in The Life and Work of Kwame Nkrumah: Papers of a Symposium 
Organized by the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Legon, ed. Kwame Arhin (Trenton: Africa 
World Press, 1993), 242; Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 31–39. 
409 Speech transcript, “Conference of Independent African States”, 15 April 1958, SC/BAA/136 Conference of 
Independent African States, PRAAD-Accra. 
410 Kwame Nkrumah, Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for de-Colonization (London: Heinemann, 1964), 
6; Top secret minutes, “Meeting held at 12, Carlton House Terrace, to discuss the projected Pan-African 
Conference in Ghana”, 20 February 1958, CO 936/578, TNA; Incoming Telegram, Flake to StateDept, 23 
August 1958, RG. 59, CDF 1955-1959, 645.5694/2-1756 – 645U.86332/1-2959, NARA; Secret and personal 
letter, W.L. Gorell Barnes to Charles Arden-Clarke, 6 November 1954, FO 371/108193, TNA. 
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the African ambassadors in London – who had gathered there for the Commonwealth 
conference of 1957 – to do some of the preparatory work.411  
By April the organising committee had agreed on a list of five goals, which could be 
read as an instruction manual for African Unity: the exchange of views on foreign policy and 
other common interests, the consolidation of independence, help for dependent territories, the 
strengthening of economic and cultural ties, and securing peace. Two of the three points that 
were added to this agenda, foreign subversive activities in Africa and the creation of a 
permanent machinery after the Conference, point to the more activist attitude on the part of 
Ghana that wanted to break away from British influence. Moreover, Nkrumah wanted to see 
African cooperation in a broad set of fields, because he believed neocolonialism – a 
geopolitical practice whereby a country could be indirectly controlled – relied on a varied set 
of tools that were not merely violent in nature. Economic penetration, cultural assimilation, 
ideological domination, psychological infiltration, and subversive activities were all 
important.412 
Once the CIAS started, with speeches, discussions, and receptions where Nkrumah and 
Tubman danced together to Ghanaian Highlife music, France stayed away from the meeting 
altogether while the State Department sent a personal message from Dulles to Nkrumah with 
well wishes. Only the UK Information Office set up shop alongside the other independent 
nations in Accra’s Community Centre, which had been converted in an area where all states 
attending the conference could create publicity displays. The United Kingdom Information 
Office (UKIO) distributed issue No. 57 of Commonwealth Today, which was picked up by the 
Soviet Press Service representative, but also by Ghanaians who also left with a large 
complimentary portrait of Nasser. It strengthened the British in their belief that they could 
provide a counterbalance to Nasser’s growing influence in West Africa.413 
Overall, however, the CIAS was a rude awakening for the Western powers. Influencing 
Nkrumah had been more difficult than expected, leading to intense debate about the upcoming 
AAPC of December 1958. The colonial governments had a big stake in preventing as many as 
411 Confidential letter, Khartoum to FO, 26 March 1957, CO 936/576, TNA; Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign 
Policy, 32. 
412 Annex agenda, “Conference of Independent African States, April 15 to April 23”, [1958], 3, Speech 
transcript, “Conference of Independent African States”, 15 April 1958, Draft provisional agenda, “Conference of 
African States”, [1958], SC/BAA/136 Conference of Independent African States, PRAAD-Accra; Nkrumah, 
Towards Colonial Freedom, 1–3. 
413 Confidential letter, Washington to FO, 10 April 1958, Extract from letter, N.A. Leadbitter UKIO to R.I. Hall 
CRO, 23 April 1958, INF 12/863, TNA; Letter, Henri-Francis Mazoyer consul Congo to DAL, “s.e.: L’opinion 
et la conférence d’Accra”, 25 April 1958, 5, DAL Généralités, 49QONT/43, f: Première Conference d’Accra 
documents (mars 1957- avril 1958), AMAE.  
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possible from participating in this meeting where political activists from still dependent 
territories were set to meet. Even the Belgians in the Congo, who normally ignored 
anticolonial activism, took action. The Voix du Congolais, a Belgian publication aimed at the 
evoluées, presented the CIAS as a propaganda event that through ‘l’infiltration 
psychologique’ (psychological infiltration) wanted to drive a wedge between Europe and 
Africa. The criticism of European slavery was presented as hypocritical because the Arab 
slave trade was not condemned.414  
The CO fell back into old paternalistic habits. Perhaps a stern talk with Nkrumah would 
persuade him to cancel the conference?415 In the ensuing discussion, William D. Allen of the 
Foreign Office rejected the idea of talking to Nkrumah. He believed that the call for African 
unity was aimed at the white settlers as well. In his paternalistic analysis this was exactly what 
the UK had been trying to do in multi-racial territories, such as Kenya. The proposal to talk 
with Nkrumah was also opposed by the Commonwealth Relations Office, because they 
understood that a memorandum that contained the British position might become a dangerous 
propaganda weapon in the hands of Padmore.416 In short, the British bureaucracy 
acknowledged the power of Nkrumah’s propaganda, but did not see him as an immediate 
threat to British colonial claims.   
Conversely, the French had been surprised by Nkrumah’s organisational aptitude and 
for the first time began to see him as a contender in French Africa. However, they did not see 
the propagandist dimension of the CIAS. What were intended as symbolic resolutions at the 
closing of the conference, were judged to be absurd and seen as a sure sign that the meeting 
had failed.417 
In July 1958 Nkrumah visited the US where the conferences were only mentioned in 
passing. But in light of the AAPC, USIS-Ghana now became more active. Exclusive 
interviews with Tom Mboya, the conference chairman, and with Michael Olatunji, President 
of the All African Students Union of the Americas were published. The Afro-American 
Congressman Charles C. Diggs Jr., further asked USIS to assist in organising a press 
414 Letter, Henri-Francis Mazoyer consul Congo to DAL, “Objet : commentaires de presse sur la conférence 
d’Accra”, 30 July 1958, DAL Généralités, 49QONT/43, f: Première Conference d’Accra documents (mars 1957- 
avril 1958), AMAE. 
415 Minutes, R.N Posnett to Mr. Watson and Mr. Jerrom, 13 August 1958, Minutes for secretary of state, 25 July 
1958, CO 936/579, TNA. 
416 Secret letter, W.D. Allen to N.D. Watson, 30 September 1958, Secret draft, A.W. Snelling for Mr. Eastwood, 
[July 1958], CO 936/579, TNA. 
417 Confidential letter, F.R. MacGennis to R.S. Faber, 11 August 1958, Secret, “extract from the record of the 
Quadripartite Discussion on Africa Lisbon 1958”, [1958], CO 936/579, TNA; Letter, Herve Alphand to 
Christian Pinau, “Conférence d’Accra, A.S. Entretien avec M. Julius Holmes”, [1958], DA, Etats-Unis, 
91QO/433, AMAE. 
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conference from his room, which was attended by the Ghana New Agency, Radio Ghana and 
Guinea Press who were able to hear answers that were drafted by USIS.418 It is clear that the 
success of this first conference, and particularly Nkrumah’s ability to act as an independent 
actor, took the West by surprise. 
 
 
The All-African Peoples Conference: Debating the Role of Non-Violence and Propaganda 
 
Nonetheless, the AAPC of December turned out to be a disappointment for Nkrumah, who 
wanted to gather party leaders, trade unionists and other freedom fighters to ‘work out a 
blueprint for the future’ of dependent Africa. However, Nkrumah’s plan for non-violent 
‘Positive Action’ was met with opposition. The conference became a platform for one of the 
most heated debates surrounding the use of violence as opposed to the reliance on public 
diplomacy and propaganda in decolonisation. In his address, Fanon highlighted the aggressive 
nature of the French colonial system. The Algerians had tried non-violence, but in the face of 
French aggression they had been forced to take up arms.419  
In this context, Padmore had been looking for the appropriate term to name the 
resistance fighters, leaders of women organisations, trade unionists, students, and musicians 
who would be gathering in Accra. Eventually, the term ‘freedom fighter’ was settled upon 
because it refuted the claim that ‘Positive Action’ was a passive concept, and it also replaced 
the word ‘terrorist’ – which the British had used to tarnish the cause of the Mau Mau.420 
Nkrumah’s opening speech emphasised non-violence. ‘We have pride’, he said, ‘in our 
determination to support every form of non-violent action.’421 In a commemoratory address 
one year later he maintained that it was not guns but ideas and moral force that offered the 
only sure road to victory.422 
Despite Nkrumah’s zealous entreaty for non-violence and his reliance on propaganda, 
he supported violent resistance, for instance by opening a Chinese-led training camp in 
Mankrong in 1961. Historians explain this contradiction by pointing to Nkrumah’s 
disillusionment with the decolonisation process. Jeffrey Ahlman writes that Nkrumah’s faith 
418 Memcon, 23 July 1958, Memcon, 24 July 1958, FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. 14: Africa, 647-652; Foreign service 
despatch, USIS-Accra to USIA-Washington D.C., “USIS Coverage of the All African Peoples Conference”, 16 
December 1958, RG. 306, P 74, Box 17, f: Ghana 1959 Info. Gen, NARA. 
419 Telegram, Accra to secretary of state, 25 July 1958, RG. 59, CDF 1955-1959, 645.5694/2-1756 – 
645U.86332/1-2959n, NARA; Ahlman, “The Algerian Question in Nkrumah’s Ghana, 1958–1960”, 74. 
420 Author’s interview with K.B. Asante, conducted on March 13, 2012, in Labadi, Accra, Ghana; Carruthers, 
Winning Hearts and Minds, 34, . 
421 All-African People’s Conference: Speeches by the Prime Minister of Ghana at the Opening and Closing 
Sessions on December 8th and 13th, 1958 (Accra: Community Centre, 1958), 2. 
422 “Ideas and Courage, Not Guns”, Ghana Today, April 29, 1959, Vol. 3, No. 5, 1. 
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in the Ghanaian model of non-violence began to sour in the face of the Congo crisis, the 
Algerian War and the Sharpville Massacre in South Africa. Nonetheless, how do we explain 
why Nkrumah – who had built his entire reputation on ‘Positive Action’ – supported 
violence? Why did he not formulate a response to Fanon’s portrayal of the Algerian situation? 
Why did he not provide some nuance to Fanon’s argument that violence was inevitable in the 
face of French atrocities? Ahlman hints at an answer when he argues that Nkrumah, at least in 
principle, sympathised with many of the arguments advanced by Fanon.423 By 1966, Nkrumah 
seemed to have come around to Fanon’s assertion when he voiced regret about the fact that 
his policy of African liberation has been leaning so heavily on propaganda:  
 
As I wrote to you some time ago, the situation in Africa and the stage which the African revolutionary 
struggle has reached, demands a new approach as to political action. Persuasion and propaganda must 
be backed by revolutionary armed struggle [...] This is now my conviction after 18 years struggle by 
other means.424 
 
However, this statement did not reflect a change of heart. While Fanon and Nkrumah 
are often presented as opposites, they had a shared understanding of colonialism as a 
psychological problem. Fanon was convinced that the psychological chains of colonialism 
could only be broken by violent means: ‘colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body 
endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when 
confronted with greater violence.’425 At the same time, he acknowledged that radio had been a 
potent weapon for the French colonisers, which made the Radio Alger an important 
instrument of resistance. When Fanon became the FLN’s ambassador to Ghana, he also noted 
how the Louis Armstrong’s jazz performances, ‘American Negro diplomats’, scholarships, the 
Voice of America, and the German and Israeli cultural activities, made African unity 
difficult.426 
In short, Fanon and Nkrumah diagnosed colonialism in the same way, but in Nkrumah’s 
opinion Fanon’s remedy fell short. Fanon did not explain the transformational mechanism 
behind violence. As Nkrumah was rewriting his own guerrilla warfare handbook in 1966, he 
noted that The Wretched of the Earth was ‘a powerful book’ but without a ‘practical 
423 Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa: Documentary Evidence of Nkrumah’s Interference in the Affairs of Other 
African States (Accra: Ministry of Information, 1966), 6; Ahlman, “Road to Ghana: Nkrumah, Southern Africa 
and the Eclipse of a Decolonizing Africa”, 1, 36; Ahlman, “The Algerian Question in Nkrumah’s Ghana, 1958–
1960”, 76. 
424 Letter Nkrumah to Milne, 18 May 1966, quoted in Milne, Kwame Nkrumah: The Conakry Years, His Life and 
Letters, 43–44. 
425 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 36. 
426 Frantz Fanon, Toward the African Revolution: Political Essays, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove 
Press, 1988), 178. 
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revolutionary philosophy.’427 What distinguished Nkrumah from Fanon was not his principal 
rejection of violence, but rather the conviction that violence in itself was not ‘a cleansing 
force’. According to Nkrumah, violence did not free ‘the native from his inferiority complex 
and from his despair and inaction’, as Fanon had written, nor make him ‘fearless’ or restore 
‘his self-respect’.428 Violent resistance had to be backed by an effort to strengthen the self-
confidence of the African and spread the ‘African Personality’ and culture. 
Nkrumah had initially found Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violence ineffective. In 
Nkrumah’s analysis, non-violence could only work when backed by a ‘strong political 
organisation.’429 Already in 1952, Nkrumah emphasised that ‘Positive Action’ was not only 
about ‘strikes, boycotts and non-cooperation’; they were ‘a last resort’.430 More important 
were the ‘Positive Action’ techniques, which became an essential part of the curriculum at the 
Ideological Institute in Winneba, where freedom fighters were trained from 1961 onwards. A 
specific topic of attention was the organisational policies and procedures of political parties 
who were campaigning for independence, including the organisation of elections, party 
branches and propaganda vans.431   
In his opening speech to the AAPC, Nkrumah stressed that the ethical and humanistic 
side of the African people could not be ignored. The conference resolutions gave some 
support to those who were ‘compelled to retaliate against violence’, but also valued the 
mobilisation of world opinion and the education of the African people. At the ‘Positive 
Action’ conference in April 1960, he reiterated that ‘the passive sympathy of the African 
masses’ had to be converted into ‘active participation in the struggle for the total 
emancipation of Africa.’432 To attain these goals, the AAPC had to create a network of leaders 
to guide the African public. 
Both conferences had an impact on Nkrumah’s image. The Eisenhower administration 
and the Macmillan government still viewed Nkrumah as an ally in their attempt to bring about 
427 Milne, Kwame Nkrumah: The Conakry Years, his Life and Letters, 174; The sociologists Peter Worsley, made 
a similar observation ‘Fanon's writing […] is ruthlessly honest and highly intellectual, if not always worked 
through’, see Worsley, ‘Frantz Fanon and the ‘Lumpenproletariat’, 193. 
428 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 94. 
429 Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, vii–viii. 
430 Kwame Nkrumah, What I Mean by ‘Positive Action’ (Accra: Convention People’s Party, 1950), 3. 
431 Draft memorandum, “Development of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute, Winneba, as the Institute of political 
science”, [1961], BAA/RLAA/423 Kwame Nkrumah Institute Winneba, 1961-63: Memos, Reports (Kwame 
Nkrumah Ideological Institute), PL. 
432 All-African People’s Conference: Speeches by the Prime Minister of Ghana at the Opening and Closing 
Sessions on December 8th and 13th, 1958, 4; Resolutions of the All African People’s Conference Held at Accra, 
Ghana December 5-13, 1958 (Accra: Community Centre, 1959), 6; Samuel Obeng, ed., “10. Positive Action 
Conference For Peace and Security in Africa, Accra April 7, 1960”, in Selected Speeches of Kwame Nkrumah, 
vol. 1 (Accra: Afram Publishing, 1979), 54. 
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an orderly transition to self-government, while the French still considered Nkrumah to be a 
small problem. In January 1958 Renner even believed Nkrumah suffered from a mental 
illness.433 Nkrumah’s plea for non-violence had made a particular impression in London, but 
also in Washington – where the first assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Joseph 
Charles Satterthwaite, and Robert Murphy of the State Department, praised the attendees of 
the AAPC for their moderate position.434 Officials at the CO had even picked up gossip in the 
corridors, where Nkrumah’s warnings about the different forms of colonialism were 
interpreted as a condemnation of Nasser.435  
In Africa the conferences lowered Nkrumah’s standing because they had widened the 
gap between the violent and non-violent approach, between radical adherents of African unity 
and gradualists, and between French Africa and Ghana. Diop told the American ambassador 
to Paris that the conferences had been a political event of ‘immense importance’ but he felt 
that the French Africans had been ‘crushed’ by British Africans. With no translators on site it 
had been difficult to participate.436  
Nonetheless, with the CIAS and the AAPC Nkrumah had laid the groundwork for a 
network of political activists. The AAPC resolutions called upon independent African 
countries to offer aid and support African unity, more specifically ‘through propaganda and 
education to discourage tribalism.’437 By contrast to what historians have argued, Nkrumah 
did not grow to accept violence as decolonisation became more brutal, but believed violent 
resistance was ineffective if it was not combined with an effort to promote the ‘African 
Personality’. The Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs, who worked to strengthen the network, 
picked up that challenge. 
 
 
 
433 Letter, M.C. Renner to minister of foreign affairs, “Marriage de M. Nkrumah”, 2 January 1958, DAL, 
50QO/15, f: Politique Intérieure, AMAE; The British wanted to exploit the goodwill that had been created by 
Ghanaian independence, see Report, R.H.K Marett, “Report on visit to East Africa by R.H.K”, March/November 
1960, 12, INF 12/863, TNA; The International Cooperation Administration described Nkrumah’s Pan-African 
conference as a first step towards African economic cooperation and development: Official memcon, 
“International Cooperation Administration: Advisory Conference on Africa May 17 – 27, 1960: Pan-
Africanism”, 27 May 1960, 2, RG. 469, P36, Box 11, f: Africa Advisory Conference, NARA. 
434 Press release, “Address by the Honorable Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs before the Southern Assembly (Tulane University): The United States and the New Africa”, 17 January 
1959, CDF 1955-59, 611.70/10-158 – 611.7194/12-457, NARA; Confidential letter to Mark E. Allen, E.G. Le 
Tocq, 12 December 1958, CO 822/1349, TNA; Secret record, “Summary Record of the first meeting at 
Ambassadorial level held on April 16”, 16 April 1959, 2, FO 371/137966, TNA. 
435 Confidential letter to Mark E. Allen, E.G. Le Tocq, 12 December 1958, CO 822/1349, TNA. 
436 Letter, Amembassy Paris to StateDep, 6 January 1959, CDF 1955-59, 611.70/10-158 – 611.7194/12-457, 
NARA. 
437 Resolutions of the All African People’s Conference Held at Accra, Ghana December 5-13, 1958, 7. 
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Bureau of African Affairs: Improving the Network  
 
In the resolutions of the AAPC, freedom fighters were encouraged to use ‘propaganda and 
education’ to attain unity, while the leaders of independent countries were asked to assist the 
fighters.438 After George Padmore died, on 23 September 1959, these resolutions were given 
substance when Nkrumah replaced the office of advisor to the prime minister on African 
affairs with the Bureau of African Affairs. In doing so, he wanted to put Padmore’s work on a 
permanent basis and in that way he realised Padmore’s dream: a bureau, officially a non-
governmental organisation, to support independence movements. Nkrumah named himself as 
the acting director, and A.K Barden became the secretary, after Kofi Baako had temporarily 
filled that position.439  
Already in the 1950s, the BAA became the topic of espionage stories because they 
provided financial and moral aid to African freedom fighters. It also led to a tense relationship 
with the African Affairs Secretariat and the ministry of foreign affairs, two branches of the 
Ghanaian bureaucracy that managed the official diplomatic relations. A.K Barden wrote to 
Nkrumah that the idea of sending out activists had not been very well understood.440 The 
secretive way in which BAA officers were forced to work did not help matters. For instance, 
in 1960 Kofi Baako had fled into the office of the bank manager to evade the suspicious stares 
of clerks and customers, which he received when he collected a bag filled with dollar bills 
intended for the freedom fighters outside of Ghana.441 
 
 
The Bureau of African Affairs as a Public Diplomacy Institution 
 
However, the BAA and its predecessor, the Offices of the Advisor to the Prime Minister on 
African Affairs, defined themselves in public diplomacy terms – as actors in the ideological 
scramble.442 They ran literacy classes and educational campaigns for expatriates and devoted 
438 Ibid. 
439 Nkrumah quoted in Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 107; Minutes of meeting, “Minutes of the 3rd 
Meeting of the African Affairs Committee held on Thursday”, 22 October 1959, SC/BAA/251 African Affairs 
Committee, PRAAD-Accra; Eschen, Race against Empire, 11; James, “‘What We Put in Black and White’: 
George Padmore and the Practice of Anti-Imperial Politics”, 235; Resolutions of the All African People’s 
Conference Held at Accra, Ghana December 5-13, 1958, 7. 
440 Letter, Barden to Nkrumah, 20 May 1964, SC/BAA/357 Bureau of African Affairs 16/10/53 – 30/7/65, 
PRAAD-Accra; Author’s Interview with K.B. Asante, conducted on March 13, 2012, in Labadi, Accra, Ghana 
by Frank Gerits. 
441 Letter, Kofi Baakoo to Nkrumah, “Operation Independence Transfer of Financial aid to Freedom Fighters”, 
[1960], BAA/RLAA/370 Correspondence with the President, 1960: BAA Reports, Correspondence (Nkrumah, 
Nationalist Organizations), PL.  
442 This rejects Thompson’s claim that the BAA’s financial mismanagement led to failure. Even though Ahlman 
makes important steps in redefining the BAA, he does not see Nkrumah as a player in the ideological scramble, 
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most of their time to the production of information material. Despite rumours of espionage 
and financial mismanagement, the BAA described itself as an information office and 
maintained a research department, protocol division, printing press, library, linguistic 
secretariat, conference hall and publications section. Some of the political organisations in 
dependent Africa were represented by their own personnel in the bureau. Other movements, 
such as the Mouvement de Liberation Nationale in the Belgian Congo had their own material 
printed while AAPC pamphlets rolled off the BAA presses and were sent out to the rest of the 
continent.443  
Admittedly, Ghana’s government had declared that it would give financial assistance to 
all freedom fighters in their attempt to free themselves from the imperial yoke. However, 
Nkrumah understood that handing out dollar bills would not suffice. At the end of 1959, when 
£20,000 had been funnelled to others on the continent, Nkrumah reiterated that assistance 
would only be given to organisations that fully subscribed to the idea of African independence 
and unity. 444 
Education, journalism and, increasingly, radio were more important than dollar bills 
particularly because these so-called ‘Positive Action’ techniques were appropriate in an 
international system where decolonisation had acquired a symbolic dimension. Kofi Baako, 
the first director of the BAA, described the 1950s and 1960s as a time of ‘national rivalries, 
ideological competitions and racial antagonisms.’445 The importance of ideas led to a foreign 
policy that relied heavily on propaganda and aspired to build a network of political activists. 
In the vernacular of Ghanaian diplomacy, this approach relied on non-violence and ‘Positive 
Action’. In Padmore’s words: ‘That is why Nkrumah has made it a principal plank of his 
see Ahlman, “Road to Ghana: Nkrumah, Southern Africa and the Eclipse of a Decolonizing Africa”, 26; 
Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 222–226. 
443 File, “Bureau of African Affairs”, [1964], BAA/RLAA/430 Memorandum—Bureau of African Affairs, 1964: 
Memos, Speeches, Newspaper Clippings (BAA, Portuguese Territories), PL; Letter, Barden to the Acting 
Secretary to the Prime Minister, 30 January 1959, Letter, Padmore to the Acting Secretary to the Prime Minister, 
Government House Accra, 9 April 1959, Letter, A.K Barden to the Acting Secretary to the Prime Minister, 
Government House Accra, 18 March 1959, Bill for MLN, 11 April 1959, BAA/RLAA/247 1962 Receipts: Bills, 
Correspondence (BAA), PL. 
444 Letter, Kofi Baako to Nkrumah, “Operation Independence Transfer of Financial aid to Freedom Fighters”, 
[1960], BAA/RLAA/370 Correspondence with the President, 1960: BAA Reports, Correspondence (Nkrumah, 
Nationalist Organizations), PL; Minutes of meeting, “Sixth Meeting of the African Affairs committee held at 
Flagstaff House at 1 P.M. on Friday, 4th December, 1959”, 4 December, 1959, RG. 17/2/501 African Affairs 
Committee 1959-1960, PRAAD-Accra.  
445 Letter, chairman of BAA to Nkrumah, “Operation Independence Transfer of Financial aid to Freedom 
Fighters”, [1960], BAA/RLAA/370 Correspondence with the President, 1960: BAA Reports, Correspondence 
(Nkrumah, Nationalist Organizations), PL.  
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government’s foreign policy to render every kind of support, short of violence, to the struggle 
for national independence in Africa and wherever else it is being carried on.’446 
Essential in all this was the network strategy, a public diplomacy technique that 
betrayed the elitist bias of Ghanaian government officials. Rather than targeting the general 
population directly, the BAA invested in political education for potential leaders who could in 
their turn convince their people to look towards Ghana for guidance. The resolutions of the 
AAPC had explicitly subscribed to this approach: ‘Be it resolved that steps be taken by 
political, trade union, cultural and other organisations to educate the masses about the dangers 
of these evil practices and thereby mobilise the masses to fight these evils.’447 
In Ghana, the BAA turned to political education, revolutionary journalism, and radio as 
means to establish and strengthen a revolutionary network on the continent that would be 
loyal to Ghana. 
 
 
Education and Political Training 
 
Ideological training was one of the most direct ways in which the ties with Accra could be 
strengthened. In September 1958, Padmore had been advised by W.W.K. Vanderpuye of the 
ministry of education to offer scholarships that were different from the academic grants 
already offered to Liberians. Vanderpuye wanted to emulate the Indian and Egyptian cultural 
exchange scholarships, which had an explicit political goal. As early as 12 November 1959 
Nkrumah announced his plans in a meeting of the African Affairs Committee to convert the 
Winneba Party College into an institute where selected members of all nationalist movements 
could receive training in how to achieve African unity. The institute would, in Nkrumah’s 
words, ‘propagate firmly the essence of African unity in Ghana and throughout the continent 
of Africa.’448  
Until the opening of the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute in 1961, other buildings 
and organisations within Ghana were used. On 11 November 1960, the Kwame Nkrumah 
Youth Training School, an extension of the training base of the Ghana Young Pioneers in 
Teshie, was opened. This youth movement aimed at cultivating a revolutionary form of 
citizenship and patriotism while the Builder Brigade, a state-led group of young men 
446 Telegram, Padmore to Jian, Times of India and Nkrumah, 6 September 1959, BAA/RLAA/413 Cablegrams, 
1959: Telegrams (Travel Plans, Miscellaneous), PL 
447 Resolutions, “Resolutions of the All African People’s Conference held at Accra, Ghana December 5-13, 
1958”, 19 January 1959, 6, BAA/RLAA/455 All African People’s Conference, 1959: Letters, Bills, Memos, PL. 
448 Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa: Documentary Evidence of Nkrumah’s Interference in the Affairs of Other 
African States, 44. 
                                              
M e n t a l  D e c o l o n i s a t i o n  | 139 
 
undertaking public construction work, was also visited by freedom fighters to learn those 
values, even though it was far from revolutionary. New documents reveal that the ICA that 
had covertly funded the establishment of this organisation. 449 
The school trained youths from Nyasaland and 108 Gambians, of which 50 returned to 
their country after completing a general course in youth leadership. According to the report 
they had an important part to play in the reconstruction of Gambia.450 A lecture on the one-
party system, given at a school in Cape Coast, provides a glimpse of this education. Pacing up 
and down in front of the blackboard, the lecturer asserted:  
 
These people may try to make comparisons between their countries and ours, between other countries 
and ours, between some world leaders and our leaders and point fingers here and there at some failings 
in some of our people in an attempt to bring our country into ridicule or to reduce it into some inferior 
position.  
 
The response was simple: ‘I am proud of Ghana. I must do my duty to my country.’451 
Ghana’s use of education as a means to plant ideas, as well as a way to prepare future leaders, 
not only reveals Padmore’s enduring influence but also betrays how much officials had been 
influenced by the European ideas they chose to reject.  
 
 
Revolutionary Journalism 
 
The many newspapers that the BAA spread throughout Africa exposed a similar logic. The 
focus on press material to create a language for African activism was Padmore’s second 
legacy. As a former journalist of The Chicago Defender and The Pittsburgh Courier, he 
ordered the dispatch of 300 daily copies of Evening News and Ghanaian Times to ‘selected 
people, news agencies of European countries as well as those of independent and dependent 
African States’ in January 1959.452 These periodicals were government-owned products of 
biased, but serious, journalism – which, despite the professed revolutionary role of the press, 
remained elitist and aimed at strengthening the ties with Accra.  
449 Letter, Permanent Secretary Ministry of Education W.W.K. Vanderpuye to Padmore, “Suggested 
Scholarships Awards to Liberian Citizens by the Government of Ghana”, 29 September 1958, 
BAA/RLAA/1038A Circulars, PL; Ahlman, “Living with Nkrumahism: Nation, State, and Pan-Africanism in 
Ghana”, 81; Ahlman, “A New Type of Citizen”, 87; Letter, Hemmerich to ICA, “Builders Brigade: Further ICA 
Technical Assistance”, 10 March 1958, Memorandum, Bernstein, “US Assistance for Builders Brigade in 
Africa”, [1957-1958], RG. 469, P65, Box 1, f: Ghana Reports (Builders Brigade), NARA. 
450 “The Ghana Young Pioneers”, S.d., BAA/RLAA/437 Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute (Lectures), PL. 
451 Lecture transcript, A.K. Gaituah, “Lecture To Mfantsipim School, Cape Coast: Why One-Party State”, 24 
January 1964, BAA/RLAA/437 Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute (Lectures), PL. 
452 Letter, Colfecumer Clerical Officer to Nkrumah, 8 January 1959, BAA/RLAA/247 1962 Receipts: Bills, 
Correspondence (BAA), PL. 
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Although read out in public, newspapers were first and foremost meant for an educated 
audience that was able to digest academic essays on the ‘African Personality’. One of those 
articles, allegedly written by Dorothy Padmore and published in the Ghanaian Times, posited 
that the Africans in British Africa had been more successful in safeguarding their Africanism 
compared to their counterparts in French Africa.453 The illiterate reader was aided by cartoons 
that tried to illustrate what it meant to be African while postcards and all sorts of other visual 
material was produced to demonstrate the rich African past.  
Padmore worked to expand his readership to include more influential people. In July 
1958 he asked the Americans to help him improve his mailing list, filled with individual 
organisations that might be interested in the publications or bulletins his office distrubuted. 
The importance of newspapers even convinced the USIA to distribute Padmore’s old 
newspaper The Pittsburgh Courier throughout the continent (illustration 11).454 
The power of the so called ‘revolutionary press’ therefore lay more in creating a 
common understanding among elites in Africa about what it meant to be African. Nkrumah’s 
invitation to W.E.B. Dubois to take charge of the Encyclopedia Africana project and his 
commitment to fostering African Studies, both project that were aimed at collecting 
information from the entire continent written by Africans for Africans, has to be understood in 
the same light.455    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
453 Letter, Louis de Guiringaud to DAL, “a/s : Nationalisme et négritude”, 4 July 1958, DAL Ghana, 50QO/19, f: 
Relations du Pays avec la France, AMAE. 
454 Foreign service despatch, USIS-Accra to USIA, “Requests of Prime Minister’s Advisor on African Affairs”, 9 
July 1958, RG. 306, P 74, Box 17, f: Ghana 1959 Info. Gen, NARA; Presentation, Olcott H. Deming, public 
affairs adviser for African affairs, 15 December 1959, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, f: IPS, NARA. 
455 Meriwether, Proudly We Can Be Africans, 150–153; Amy Bass, Those About Him Remained Silent: The 
Battle Over W.E.B. Du Bois (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), viii; Birmingham, Kwame 
Nkrumah, 129; Jonathan Fenderson, “Evolving Conceptions of Pan-African Scholarship: W.E.B. Du Bois, Carter 
G. Woodson, and the ‘Encyclopedia Africana,’ 1909-1963”, Journal of African American History 95, no. 1 
(2010): 71–91; Allman, “Kwame Nkrumah, African Studies and the Politics of Knowledge Production in the 
Black Star of Africa”, 181–183. 
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Illustration 11: A slide taken from a presentation given by The Pittsburgh Courier to the USIA as part of an 
attempt to convince the USIA to distribute the newspaper throughout Africa. It argued that, as an Afro-American 
newspaper, it had a unique position in which it could convince an African readership of the good American 
intentions. Source: Presentation, Olcott H. Deming, Public Affairs Adviser for African Affairs, 15 December 
1959, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, f: IPS, NARA. 
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Radio and the Network Strategy 
 
In 1957, the Ghana External Broadcasting Service and The Voice of Ghana were founded. 
These services compiled news bulletins and were intended to project Ghana’s image abroad, 
but until transmitters became strong enough in 1961, radio remained an instrument of national 
education. However, Nkrumah was keen on strengthening his external broadcasting 
capacities, an ambition he inserted into the second Five Year Development Plan (1959-64). 
By March 1958, two advisors from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation had arrived in 
Ghana with a plan for a radio network at an estimated cost of £1,077,950 and an annual 
operation cost of £169,410. In its first stages the new service was to be broadcast in English 
and French. 456 
Until 1961, however, radio remained part of the network strategy. With its capacity for 
radio broadcasting, Ghana was able to become a member of the Union of African 
Radiobroadcasting, which was founded on 23 May 1960 with its permanent seat in Rabat, its 
administrative component in Tunis, its technical commission in Cairo, and the committee 
responsible for the exchange of programmes based in Accra.457 Even though Nkrumah was 
not yet able to project his ideas abroad, radio allowed him to cement the idea of African unity 
in yet another institution. 
 
 
People in the Network 
 
The weak link in Ghana’s network strategy concerned the selection of suitable candidates. 
Day-to-day life at the African Affairs Centre – which provided accommodation and meals to 
the freedom fighters in Accra – illustrated the problem. There were various reports of rowdy 
behaviour among the student population. One student, Evelyn Molabatsi, for instance had 
become so drunk that she had almost been run over by a van and had verbally abused the 
security guard at the gate of the centre. Other women turned to prostitution. Fights among 
men were also reported, and a Kenyan student had tried to force his way into another 
student’s bedroom at four in the morning.458   
456 Report, “Proposed Scheme for the International Service of The Ghana Broadcasting System by A.L. Pidgeon 
and J.L. Marshall of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation”, 14 March 1958, Government Statement, 
“Government Statement on the Report on External Broadcasting by Messrs. A.L. Pidgeion and J.L. Marshall”, 
14 March 1958, E1/1,3791,1 Africa Broadcasting in Ghana, BBC-Archives; “Radio Ghana Increases Local 
Programming”, Ghana Today, July 10, 1957, Vol. 1, No. 10, 2. 
457 Memcon, “Proces – Verbaux de la Première Conférence: Des directeurs de Radiodiffusion Africaine : Tenue 
a Rabat du 23 au 26 Mai 1960”, 26 May 1960, 1, 8, DAL Généralités, 49QONT/69, AMAE. 
458 Letter, Nkrumah to T. Makonnen, “African Affairs Centre”, Accra, 17 June 1960, Letter, Makonnen to 
Nkrumah, 22 June 1960, SC/BAA/357 Bureau of African Affairs 16/10/53 – 30/7/65, PRAAD-Accra; Minutes 
                                              
M e n t a l  D e c o l o n i s a t i o n  | 143 
 
These reports not only elucidate how difficult it was for Ghanaian men to come to terms 
with changes in female gender patterns, but also had political consequences. On 11 November 
1960, a special mission left Accra, comprised of A.K Barden, the director of the Bureau of 
African Affairs, John Tettegah, a board member of the Bureau, and W. Wilson, security 
officer of the ministry of foreign affairs. They wanted to examine what the network strategy 
had accomplished thus far and study how their contacts with trade unionists, the youth groups 
and women’s associations could be improved. Delays and organisational difficulties limited 
their visit to Sudan, Kenya, and Tanganyika. 
They confirmed that no financial assistance should ever be given to any political 
organisation without first having conducted an on-the-spot analysis. More importantly, their 
report wanted to impress upon readers that each target group had a particular political 
potential that needed careful and tactical exploitation. They were interested in the youth 
groups and students because ‘the fire kindled by the youth in sincerity can never be 
quenched.’ Barden’s team therefore offered scholarships to Sudanese students to enable them 
to study in Ghanaian labour institutions. What made the women politically useful was their 
perceived urge to ‘exercise their political rights’. The pan-African project could thus offer an 
opportune avenue for women who were ambitious in this respect. 
In short, Barden’s team wanted to better understand how the ‘political consciousness’ of 
different groups within different African societies could be exploited and they analysed 
political organisations as part of this endeavour. The writers of the report paid no attention to 
the preferences of mass target audiences or communication strategies. Ghanaian influence in 
Africa had to be increased through a network of political activists in a non-violent way if the 
‘African Personality’ and African unity were ever to be realised.459 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of meeting, “7th Meeting of the African Affairs committee on Thursday 17th December 1959”, 4 December, 
1959,  RG. 17/2/501 African Affairs Committee 1959-1960, PRAAD-Accra; Report, “Miss Evelyn Molabatsi – 
Drunkeness”, [7 February 1966], RG. 17/2/796 Miscellaneous 1963-1965, PRAAD-Accra; Anonymous letter to 
Nkrumah, S.d., BAA/RLAA/393 Ghana Government—Bureau of African Affairs, 1961: Memos, PL. 
459 Report, A.K. Barden to Nkrumah, “Special Mission to East and Central Africa”, 28 November 1960, 
BAA/RLAA/370 Correspondence with the President, 1960: BAA Reports, Correspondence (Nkrumah, 
Nationalist Organizations), PL. 
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Conclusion: an Anticolonial and Pan-African Worldview  
 
The pan-African ideology influenced Ghanaian diplomatic activity on several levels. On the 
level of interpretation, Africa’s problems were perceived as the consequence of a colonial 
system and the outcome of neocolonial machinations, rather than the by-product of a 
superpower competition. On the level of foreign policy formulation, Ghana’s diplomacy 
became geared towards exploiting the only advantage it had over its imperial opponents: its 
African credentials and what the Bandung Conference had labelled its ‘moral strength’.  
On the level of policy execution, violence was considered to be ineffective because it 
did not address the underlying problem of colonialism: the blow to African self-confidence 
and the balkanization of the continent. The Bureau of African Affairs therefore sought ways 
to draw politically active Africans into a network. Even though Accra presented itself as a 
revolutionary centre, the effectiveness of its public diplomacy operation relied heavily on 
African leaders, not on a mass audience. Political training, newspapers and even radio were 
all used to establish and strengthen an elitist political network. Their belief that pan-African 
activism would not only work to the advantage of Accra, but also strengthen the leadership of 
future independent states betrayed how far Nkrumah and his aides remained the victims of the 
very thing they wanted to fight: mental colonisation.460 Nkrumah and his aides were prisoners 
of the European ideas they claimed to reject as they distrusted the population abroad and 
instead chose to rely on a network of leaders. The BAA wanted to construct a revolutionary 
Mecca to rival other centres such as Cairo and Dar Es Salaam.  
The first test for the strength of Ghanaian diplomacy was the independence of the 
French colony of Guinea in 1958. The UK, the US and particularly France were forced to 
alter their approach to public diplomacy in the face of Ghana’s ideological challenge. It is 
their response to the rise of Ghana as a new competitor that is explored in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
460 Research paper, K. Afari-Gyan, “The Problems of Mental Decolonisation”, [1964], Nkrumah Papers, Box 
154-38, f: Afari-Gyan, MSRC. 
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5. Showcasing Development 
 
Competing for African Attention in Guinea in the Shadow of Nkrumah’s Pan-
Africanism and the Move towards Authoritarianism (1957 – 1960) 
  
We prefer poverty in liberty to riches in slavery. 
 
– Ahmed Sekou Touré, the leader of Guinea, in his speech in front of the General Assembly in 
Conakry during de Gaulle’s arrival, 25 August 1958.461 
 
We have tried to have our cake and eat it, to avoid offense to our friends in Europe and to give only a 
cautious encouragement to the legitimate aspirations of self-government. [...] the result has been to please 
neither and to lose the psychological and ideological initiative. This has indirectly benefited communism. 
 
– American Interagency Working Group on Educational and Cultural Programs in Africa 
South of the Sahara, 18 March 1960. 462 
 
 
Nkrumah’s independence speech, in which he envisioned an Africa that was ‘ready to fight its 
own battles’, presented Paris, Washington and London with a new challenge: nationalist 
leaders who promoted their own plans for Africa and relied on authoritarian development 
models.463 How Nkrumah’s pan-African blueprint shaped the decision making of those 
outside of the continent is a heavily debated question.  
Some have argued that French and British plans for imperial reform foresaw the 
creation of independent states. Guia Migani, for instance, argues that Guinean independence 
accelerated the decolonisation of French Africa, until plans were implemented after 1960 that 
allowed France to restore its influence. Ronald Hyam has most prominently developed a 
parallel argument for the British Empire.464 Others question the extent of British and French 
planning and claim that African independence reshaped the decolonisation process and 
461 ‘Nous préférons la pauvreté dans la liberté à la richesse dans l’esclavage’, quoted in : Claude Wauthier, 
Quatre présidents et l’Afrique: De Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard d’Estaing, Mitterrand : quarante ans de politique 
africaine (Paris: Seuil, 1995), 82. 
462 Memorandum, “Interagency Working Group on Educational and Cultural Programs in Africa South of the 
Sahara”, 18 March 1960, RG. 306, P 249, Box 10, f: English teaching, NARA. 
463 “Ghana is free forever: BBC-World Service”. http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/focusonafrica/news/story/ 
2007/02/070129_ghana50_independence_speech.shtml.  
464 For France the Loi Cadre of 1956 and the establishment of the French Community ‘enabled Paris to reaffirm 
its authority, while preparing the African territories to run their own territory in the future’ The French 
administration had enough foresight to realise ‘that the African leaders still wanted independence, despite their 
adhesion to the Community’, see Guia Migani, “De Gaulle and Sub-Saharan Africa: From Decolonization to 
French Development Policy, 1958 - 1963”, in Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French 
Foreign Policies, 1958-1969, ed. Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Martin Garret (Lanham: Lexington 
Books, 2010), 254; Guia Migani, “Sékou Touré et la contestation de l’ordre colonial en Afrique sub-saharienne, 
1958-1963”, Monde(s) 2, no. 2 (2012): 272–273; In a similar vein Macmillan ‘presided over a voluntary 
decolonization, not wholly unorchestrated’, Hyam argues, see  Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire, 242; David 
Birmingham, The Decolonization of Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1995), 13; Alistair Horne, 
Macmillan: The Official Biography, vol. 2 (Basingstoke and Oxford: Pan Macmillan, 2012), 260–290. 
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limited what the imperial powers and the US were able to achieve.465 Further, the degree to 
which Eisenhower in particular was truly committed to creating a set of liberal democracies in 
Africa is subject to debate. It has been argued that Cold War concerns forced the president to 
support authoritarian regimes from 1958 onwards. But why did Eisenhower sacrifice 
democracy for development by supporting the so-called ‘strong men’ – particularly when he 
believed American values were essential for long-term stability, as has been argued in the 
previous chapters? 
These dynamics converged on 28 September 1958, when Guinea, a West African 
country led by Ahmed Sékou Touré, rejected the new French constitution in a referendum. 
After his return as prime minister of the fourth French Republic, de Gaulle had given the 
French territories two options: accept a subordinate position in a newly created French 
Community, or choose immediate independence and the loss of French aid. Touré’s Parti 
Démocratique de Guinée-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (PD-RDA) had advocated 
the no vote under the impulse of students, trade unionists, and the party’s youth wing.466 
Subsequently, French civil servants packed their suitcases and destroyed much of the 
infrastructure while the construction of the Konkouré dam was terminated. However, Ghana 
and the USSR, but also the British and the Americans, almost instantly rushed to Touré’s aid 
as part of a miniature scramble that is ignored in the existing scholarship in favour of the 
narrative of  East and West competition. 
Studying the race to Guinea within the wider context of the ideological scramble 
between the years 1958 and 1960 rejects the notion that the Americans were complacent in 
the face of Soviet intrusion467 and questions the degree to which the French withdrew from 
Guinea. Historians such as Fred Marte and Laciné Kaba for instance, have emphasised that 
the French retreat from Guinea was radical because of the conflicting personalities of de 
Gaulle and Touré. Nonetheless, they pay less attention to the international competition for 
Guinea and the efforts of others within the French bureaucracy that worked to limit the impact 
465 Mairi Stewart MacDonald, “The Challenge of Guinean Independence, 1958-1971” (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Toronto, 2009), 262–266; Irwin, Gordian Knot, 2–5; Darwin, The Empire Project, 614; Joanna E. 
Lewis, “White Man in a Wood Pile: Race and the Limits of Macmillan’s Great ‘Wind of Change’ in Africa”, in 
The Wind of Change: Harold Macmillan and British Decolonization, Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial 
Studies Series 18 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillen, 2013), 89. 
466 Note, “a/s Entretien du Général de Gaule avec Monsieur Black”, 21 October 1958, Fonds de la présidence de 
la République de Charles de Gaulle, 5AG1/765, CHAN; Elizabeth Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa: 
From the Cold War to the War on Terror (Cambridge and London: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 174; 
Georges Chaffard, Les carnets secrets de la décolonisation II (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1967), 189. 
467 Nwaubani, The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950-1960, 226; Mazov, A Distant Front in 
the Cold War, 59; James P. Hubbard, The United States and the End of British Colonial Rule in Africa, 1941-
1968 (Jefferson: McFarland, 2010), 288–289. 
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of de Gaulle’s disdain for Touré.468 The perspective of the ideological scramble further reveals 
that officials on the ground adjusted their public diplomacy techniques in response to Ghana’s 
propaganda campaign and the pressure of Guinea’s independence, while the belief in a guided 
transition was not affected. Thus the historians that claim decolonisation was a planned 
undertaking and the historians that reject that narrative by studying the influence of African 
nationalism are both right: because both tell a story that is only partial. 
Specifically, then, the following pages analyse how the idea of a planned route to self-
government remained surprisingly influential among anxious planners who were forced to 
improvise. First, the way in which British and American determination to assist Guinea 
influenced French decision making in Africa is assessed. Second, how Nkrumah’s pan-
African propaganda campaign impacted upon the tactics of public diplomats on the ground 
will be explored. For instance the French ambassador in Accra, Louis de Guiringaud, began to 
emulate the successful tactics of his colleagues in an attempt to make aid attractive, rather 
than qualitatively superior – as had been advocated by Senghor in the years before. The final 
part discusses how Eisenhower managed to uphold his commitment to American democratic 
values and an orderly transition while supporting authoritarian regimes. Taken together, the 
events of the late 1950s offer insight into the complexities of the gospel of stability. The race 
to Guinea reveals that the showcasing of development was a skill that public diplomats only 
acquired over time as the competition intensified.469   
 
 
Expanding Cultural Assistance and the Race to Guinea 
 
Eleven days before the referendum, the French ambassador Jean Mauberna asked teachers 
who were holidaying outside of Guinea not to return, a punitive measure that reflected the 
French views on development in which teachers and language were essential.470 The fact that 
Touré had ordered all his ministers and senior officials to learn English within a year not only 
illustrates his aspiration to speed up the integration of British and French Africa, but also that 
Touré subscribed to the French ideas about development and language. In Touré’s view, 
468 Kaba Lanciné, “From Colonialism to Autocracy: Guinea under Sékou Touré, 1957-1984”, in Decolonization 
and African Independence: The Transfers of Power, 1960-1980, ed. Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 228; Fred Marte, Political Cycles in International Relations: The 
Cold War and Africa 1945-1990 (Amsterdam: VU Press, 1994), 148. 
469 The showcase was thus not part and parcel of modernisation theory, see Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: 
America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2010), 179. 
470 Elizabeth Schmidt, Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea, 1946-1958, West African Studies 17 (Athens: 
Ohio University Press, 2007), 166; Confidential letter, H. Carr CRD to A.C. Cameron BC, 27 October 1959, FO 
371/138838, TNA. 
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Africa needed ‘moral and spiritual’ as well as material aid. Moreover, the figure of the teacher 
held an almost mythical status in postcolonial societies where pedagogical leadership styles 
were adopted to teach populations how to become full citizens of a modern nation state that 
needed to catch up with the West.471 
 
 
Analysing Guinea through the Lens of an Orderly Transition 
 
A few weeks after Ghana’s independence, Eisenhower wrote a letter to his Secretary of the 
Treasury, George M. Humphrey, in which he recommended ‘a combination of the broadest 
and most persistent kind of education’ to address the critical condition brought about by the 
‘spirit of nationalism’ and the ‘deep hunger for some betterment in physical conditions and 
living standards.’ ‘Like men’ the administration would have to wipe out the conditions of 
instability that could make the communist ideology flourish and damage the independence of 
new countries such as Ghana.472 As the US Bureau of African Affairs was created within the 
State Department in 1958, a strategic paper maintained that the most pressing issue was the 
long-term attitude of the 120 million people living South of the Sahara.473 The Baylor 
Program was executed by working out a standard procedure for educational exchanges and 
the Harrar Report by George Harrar was published at the National Academy of Sciences, 
which recommended an expansion of the teaching in science and technology.474 
Even Macmillan, who faced a crisis in the settler colony of Nyasaland, remained 
wedded to the old formula of the British information services. The state of emergency 
declared by Governor Robert Armitage on 3 March 1959 resulted in the death of 51 Africans. 
When the British High Court investigated Armitage’s justification – an alleged plot of 
Hastings Banda’s National African Congress (NAC) to indiscriminately kill Europeans and 
471 Memorandum of Discussion of the 432nd meeting of the National Security Council, 14 January 1960, Papers 
as President, 1953-1961, NSC Series, Box 12, f: 432nd Meeting of NSC, DDEL; Chakrabarty, “The Legacies of 
Bandung: Decolonization and the Politics of Culture”, 53. 
472 Eisenhower, Dwight D. to George Magoffin Humphrey, 27 March 1957. In The Papers of Dwight David 
Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 90. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower 
Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 
473 The Bureau was established under the impulse of Republican Congresswomen Francis P. Bolton, see 
Nwaubani, The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950-1960, xviii; Memorandum Prepared in 
the Office of African Affairs “The United States in Africa South of the Sahara”, 4 August 1955, FRUS 1955-
1957, Vol. 18: Africa, 13-22. 
474 Letter from White to Eisenhower, 30 April 1957, Letter from Eisenhower to White, 9 May 1957, 
Memorandum For Mr. Staats, “Subject: Nigerian College – Baylor University”, 7 May 1957, OCB Series, 
Administrative Subseries, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, WH Office, Box 1, f: 
Chronological - F.M. Dearborn, April-July 1957 (2), DDEL; Draft pamphlet, “The College and University 
Affiliation Program”, September 1959, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, FRC 3, f: IOC, NARA; Memorandum to James 
W. Riddleberger, ‘Subject: National Academy of Sciences Study on Africa South of the Sahara’, 30 July 1959, 
RG. 469, P36, Box 10, f: Harrar Report on Africa, NARA. 
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Asians – Judge Devlin unexpectedly dismissed the ‘murder plot’ as a fabrication. 
Nonetheless, when turning to the cause of the conflict Devlin maintained that an insufficiently 
developed information services had been at the root of the unrest. John C. Hyde of the UKIO 
in Uganda therefore proposed the production of a series of films about the federation in which 
Europeans and Africans cooperated.475 Historians are in agreement that the crisis signalled the 
‘moral end of the British empire’, but the UK ideological strategy suggests a different 
chronology.476 In April 1959 the official British goal remained an orderly and gradual 
evolution to independence, implemented through the development of ‘institutions of central 
government.’477 
Consequently ‘orderly transition’ – not direct Soviet containment – became the lodestar 
of the Western response to Guinea. Although Soviet intrusion would be particularly 
challenging, Secretary of State for the Colonies Lennox-Boyd believed that any kind of 
‘power vacuum’ was potentially risky and required early intervention. He wanted to provide 
Nigeria with a radio transmitter as a counterweight to the hostile broadcasts of Radio 
Conakry, even though he did not know if Touré supported Ghana’s brand of pan-African 
nationalism or if he had been seduced by communist ideas. The first assistant secretary of 
state for African affairs, Joseph Satterthwaite, also felt that the US had to support 
independence – provided a country was ‘able to undertake its responsibilities’ – by 
strengthening the resolve of the new nations ‘in their own capacities’.478  
In 1958, the French had yet to play the Soviet card. In the belief that the UK could still 
be a valuable ally, the French representative in the Anglo-French talks warned that it would 
be ‘a serious psychological mistake’ if Africans were led to feel that the West was only 
interested in them for ‘Cold War reasons’.479 Blinded by what might happen to a territory that 
475 Darwin, The Empire Project, 620; A.D.C. Peterson, “Nyasaland in the London Times”, 3 August 1959, 
Letter, John C. Hyde to E.C.R. Hadfield, 5 August 1959, INF 12-867, TNA. 
476 The paradigm shifting content of the report is emphasized by British historians, but in the area of information 
the report worked in a more indirect way, see Darwin, The Empire Project, 621; Alistair Horne, Macmillan: The 
Official Biography (Basingstoke and Oxford: Pan Macmillan, 2012), 179–182; Sarah Stockwell and Larry J. 
Butler, “Introduction”, in The Wind of Change: Harold Macmillan and British Decolonization, ed. Sarah 
Stockwell and Larry J. Butler, Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series 18 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), 6. 
477 Secret record, “Summary Record of the third meeting at Ambassadorial level held on April 20”, 28 April 
1959, FO 371/137966, TNA. 
478 Draft memorandum, Ralph Murray, “For Mr. Carstairs’s signature”, 26 May 1959, CO 1027/252, TNA; 
Minute, Alan Lennox-Boyd, 16 October 1958, CO 967/337, TNA; Press release, “Address by the Honorable 
Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs before the Southern Assembly (Tulane 
University): The United States and the New Africa”,17 January 1959, 8, RG. 59, CDF 1955-59, 611.70/10-158 – 
611.7194/12-457, NARA. 
479 Draft record, Anglo-French talks, 1 December 1958, FO 371/137940, TNA; Confidential letter, C. Steel to 
FO, 31 March 1955, FO 371/116979, TNA. 
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was insufficiently prepared for independence, the British and Americans felt forced to 
intervene. Nkrumah’s vocal rejection of imperial guidance did not affect the belief in 
psychological modernisation. It only made Whitehall and the White House rethink the way in 
which that right was exercised, particularly after Nixon’s Africa trip of 1957. 
 
 
 
Illustration 12: Joseph C. Satterthwaite lights a cigarette for Julius Nyerere, leader of the Tanganyika African 
National Union and later president of Tanzania. It was these types of meetings that irritated the settlers and the 
British, because they believed it gave Africans an inflated sense of self-worth. Source: Undated photo, 
Satterthwaite Papers, Box 3, Bentley Historical Library. 
 
 
Africa as a Battleground for Hearts and Minds 
 
After attending the independence celebrations in Ghana, Nixon visited Morocco, Liberia, 
Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, Libya, Italy, and Tunisia. Considering his tour, the vice president 
reflected on the ‘wider significance of the emergence of the new nation of Ghana’ and 
concluded that its success was crucial. Specifically, the eyes of the world would be on Ghana 
to determine whether the formula for an ‘orderly transition’ was durable and applicable 
elsewhere. In Nixon’s estimation, the advance of technology made the influence of ‘ideas and 
principles’ even more pervasive. He therefore made a plea to increase the number of 
information posts, understanding that American influence did not only depend on assistance 
in matters of education and public health but also rested on whether the people in Africa 
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continued to understand the American principles of ‘independence, equality and economic 
progress’. 480  
Eisenhower agreed with Nixon, particularly after Nkrumah’s visit to the US in July 
1958. During the NSC meeting of August 1958, that discussed Thomas White’s plan for 
military bases in Africa, the president frequently returned to the issue of public diplomacy: 
‘We must win Africa, but we can’t win it by military activity […] we couldn’t win wars 
unless we won the people.’ Nixon added that cultural relations would also enable the US to 
support a brand of ‘neutralism, which the national independence movements favor’ without 
being accused of importing the Cold War, a recurring concern since the Bandung Conference 
of 1955.481  
In 1959, Alec Douglas-Home, the secretary of state for commonwealth relations, also 
adjusted the course of the British information services which had relied primarily on the 
development of radio and press services. However, ‘Afro-Asian propaganda’ developments in 
the Arab world and the manifestations of African nationalism – in Accra but particularly in 
Nyasaland – forced the Colonial Office to become more involved in information activities, as 
well as becoming more committed to presenting international news in the ‘correct’ 
way. Interestingly enough, Alec Douglas-Home reached that conclusion after a conversation 
with Nkrumah in which the Ghanaian leader had told him that British decisions in Africa were 
under the close scrutiny of African public opinion. Nkrumah advocated that Britain should 
produce a ‘declaration of principles’ on colonial policy to stress its commitment to fostering 
‘self-government’. 482 
Rather than promoting the benefits of imperialism and improving assistance schemes, as 
happened after Bandung, UK Information Offices needed to prevent the liberal story of a 
guided transition from crumbling under the pressure of Nkrumah’s propaganda campaign 
which had brought ‘racial problems in the Central African Federation and Kenya’ to the fore. 
Robert Marett of the IPD labelled this ‘the goodwill’ strategy in which a tactical offering of 
aid had to be combined with ‘a more or less orthodox type of information job’ inside and 
480 Report, Nixon, “The Emergence of Africa: Report to the President by Vice President Nixon on his trip to 
Africa: February 28 – March 21, 1957”, [March 1957], 1-2, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, FRC 1, f: Briefing Paper, 
NARA. 
481 Memorandum of Discussion at 375th NSC meeting, 7 August 1958, FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. 14: Africa, 21. 
482 Secret record of conversation, Alec Douglas-Home, “Conversation with Dr. Nkrumah on Colonialism in 
Africa”, 1 June 1959, PREM 11/2588, TNA. 
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outside of British Africa.483 The Next Ten Years in Africa, a government report, reflected an 
acute awareness of the power of African public opinion:  
 
If Western governments appear to be reluctant to concede independence to their dependent territories, 
they may alienate African opinion and turn it towards the Soviet Union; if on the other hand they move 
too fast they run the risk of leaving large areas of Africa ripe for Communist exploitation.484 
 
From 1958 onwards the UK information officers were asked to inform their African target 
audiences about the advances in British as well as French decolonisation. Imperial reform was 
promoted as a single enterprise. 
Contrary to Eisenhower and Douglas-Home, de Gaulle ignored African nationalism in 
the French plan for cultural expansion of 1959. Admittedly, there was more attention for the 
concrete political ‘advantages’ that came with cultural diplomacy. However, French cultural 
assistance to Africa was not solely a cloak to hide cynical agendas of weapon shipments and 
business deals, nor were French operatives naïve enough to think that cultural, technical, 
commercial and linguistic aid would simply entice the former African colonies to develop 
according to a French model, as many have argued.485 For France, assistance was not about 
creating and selling an image of French grandeur. 
Instead, the projection into Africa was about striking a deal. The French believed they 
had something to offer and they expected support in return. Therefore, institutions such as the 
universities, cultural centres and language schools had to be renovated, French books had to 
create an appetite for the French language by focusing on scientific, technical and medical 
knowledge and, where possible, educational cooperation had to be improved by making the 
services more useful. This service mentality – ‘véritable politique d’offre de services’ – 
avoided hurting African nationalistic pride and made French culture more attractive. The plan 
did increase the visibility of the French cultural operation. The Americans had calculated that 
the plan increased spending from $40,270,000 to $49,680,000 by 1963.486  
483 Report, R.H.K. Marett, “Report on visit to East Africa by R.H.K.”, March/November 1960, 12, INF 12/863, 
TNA; Robert Marett, Through the Back Door: An Inside View of Britain’s Overseas Information Services 
(Oxford and London: Pergamon Press, 1968), 198–199; Confidential memorandum, CO, “The Objectives of 
United Kingdom Information policy on Colonial Territories (With special reference to the East African 
Territories)”, February 1959, INF 12/1339, TNA. 
484 Quoted in Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire, 256. 
485 Note pour le premier ministre, “a/s. Conception et organisation d’ensemble de l’action culturelle et technique 
française à l’étranger”, 8 October 1959, 1-3, 2DE61, f: Juin 1958-février 1962, FNS; Martin Garret, 
“Conclusion: A Gaullist Grand Strategy?”, in Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French 
Foreign Policies, 1958-1969, ed. Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Martin Garret (Lanham: Lexington 
Books, 2010), 302–303; Robert Frank, “La machine diplomatique culturelle française après 1945”, Relations 
Internationales, no. 115 (2003): 332; Rice, “Cowboys and Communists.”. 
486 ‘veritable politique d’offre de services’, Note pour le premier ministre, “a/s. Conception et organisation 
d’ensemble de l’action culturelle et technique française à l’étranger”, 8 October 1959, 1-3, 2 DE 61, f: Juin 
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In short, Nkrumah succeeded in giving Africans a place in the blueprints of Whitehall 
and the White House, albeit not as political actors but as propaganda targets. Specifically, 
public diplomacy had to pave the way for psychological modernisation to be effective. The 
officials at the Quai d’Orsay, on the other hand, saw the French language and culture as a 
modernising force that needed little introduction. That subtle difference led to conflict when 
Nkrumah succeeded in forming the Ghana-Guinea union on 22 November 1958, which was 
accompanied by a Ghanaian loan for Tour of £10,000,000.487 
In French government quarters there was outrage because they believed the British had 
helped Ghana. Nkrumah was not considered to be an independent actor in international affairs 
and French newspapers accused the UK of destabilising the French Community. The 
conspiracy allegation angered the Colonial Office where African public opinion was taken 
seriously. The stories published by French newspapers fed anti-British sentiment as far as the 
bazars of Morocco where the French periodicals were also read.488 
To minimise the PR damage, the British informed the French in December 1958 that 
they were already helping Touré by recruiting English teachers, while radio recordings of the 
first 50 lessons of the BBC’s ‘English By Radio Course’ were offered to the minister of 
education and broadcast a day later on Radio Conakry. In response, the French representative 
suggested that Touré was under communist control, but the British officials were adamant 
about the need for action – ‘whatever the situation.’ De Gaulle realised he was rapidly losing 
influence when the French counterespionage service listed the assistance missions that had 
already visited Guinea by December 1958. Besides the delegations coming from the US, West 
and East Germany and the Afro-Asian solidarity secretariat, Guinea sent its envoys to Ghana, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togo, Houphouet’s Ivory Coast and even the UK.489 
The American assistance mission is particularly remarkable since Eisenhower withheld 
the official recognition of Guinea until 1 November 1958, which historians have interpreted 
as a form of support for France.490 More important, however, was Eisenhower’s view on 
1958-février 1962, FNSP; Confidential, “US Paper Other Western Efforts French Informational and Cultural 
Activities in Africa”, [1961], FO 953/2029, TNA. 
487 Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 68–69. 
488 Memorandum, “Le Colonial Office contre le Communauté”, FO 371/138170, TNA; Aide memoire, 5 
December 1958, Fonds de la présidence de la république de Charles de Gaulle 5AG1/765, f:  Notes et Entretiens 
1958-1959, CHAN. 
489 Confidential, “Record of Anglo French Official Talks on Africa held in London on December 7 and 8”, 8 
December 1958, CO 936/564, TNA; Notice d’information secret, SDECE, “La Situation Interieure et les 
Relations Extérieures de la Republique de Guinee (Oct.-Nov. 1958)”, 2 December 1958, 27, DAL, Guinee (sous 
dérogation), 51QO/35, AMAE. 
490 Nwaubani, The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950-1960, 206; Mazov, A Distant Front in 
the Cold War, 60. 
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decolonisation, which led him to be less proactive. As Dulles explained, it was not in the 
American interest to reward ‘premature independence’. The rumours about Guinea’s possible 
turn towards the USSR made a foreign aid scheme problematic. As Eisenhower had already 
argued in his correspondence with Humphrey and Hoffman, aid would only strengthen 
Moscow if it was not part of an integrated cultural assistance strategy. He was therefore 
pleased that Touré had invested so much time in education, a priority for new nations.491 
Eisenhower, the fiscal conservative who pushed for economic aid to the Third World without 
providing a lot of hard cash once again relied on cultural assistance. 
In August 1959, the ICA survey team arrived in Guinea to investigate the possibilities to 
provide assistance. Touré, who had also hired an Afro-American PR adviser, understood that 
he could use the oversupply of aid offers against the French. That same month, Ismaël Touré 
– Sékou Touré’s half-brother – publically suggested recognising the Provisional Government 
of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) as the legitimate government of Algeria, to see how far he 
could go in his negotiations with the French. When Touré visited the US in October 1959 he 
was promised 150 scholarships and the placement of 50 Guinean students per year for three 
years. Moreover, a seminar for Guinean teachers was organised (illustration 13).492  
Touré also tried to use the arms shipments from Czechoslovakia and the rumours of 
Soviet intrusion to put pressure on the British and Eisenhower. In a conversation with 
Satterthwaite in October 1959, he asked for funds for the construction of the Konkouré dam, 
hinting that the Soviets had already made an offer.493 In September 1959, he invited the 
British chargé d'affaires, Wynn Hugh-Jones, to meet him and denied Guinea’s relations with 
the Soviet bloc. He claimed to have only accepted an invitation to visit Moscow under great 
pressure, asserting that Khrushchev had even sent an aircraft to Conakry. While waving the 
Soviet-Guinea agreement on cultural cooperation under Hugh-Jones’ nose and claiming it also 
granted financial aid, he stated he would not sign it unless he was sure there were no strings to 
491 Memorandum of Discussion of the 432nd Meeting of the National Security Council, 14 January 1960, Papers 
as President, 1953-1961, NSC Series, Box 12, f: 432nd Meeting of NSC, DDEL; Memorandum of Conversation, 
27 October 1959, FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. 14: Africa, 698-701. 
492 Foreign service despatch, Amembassy London to StateDept, “Reported Interest of Sekou Touré, President of 
Guinea in Hiring an American as Public Relations Advisor”, 18 November 1959, RG. 59, CDF 1955-1958, 
870.461/8-1258 – 871.00/12-2657, NARA; Memorandum for the files, Eugene B. Abrams, “Subject: FY 60 
Contracts for Guinea”, 29 June 1960, RG. 469, P206, Box 3, f: Guinea 1959-1960, NARA. 
493 The entire conversation can be found in Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War, 133. 
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the aid the Soviets had offered.494 It is therefore not surprising that de Gaulle’s memoires 
describe Touré as a demagogic dictator, who skilfully forged public opinion.495   
 
 
 
Illustration 13: ‘Foundations of an enduring friendship’, a USIA pamphlet in French on Touré’s visit to the US 
in October 1959. Source: RG. 306, A1 53, Box 7, f: Eisenhower and Touré, NARA. 
 
 
Debré’s Early Return 
 
Already by January 1959, the French wanted to slow down the race to Guinea and started 
negotiating a cultural protocol with Touré. They also sent an unofficial diplomat, Pasteur 
Mabille, to investigate what motivated others to go to Guinea. At the Africa Department of 
the Foreign Office, Mabille was assured that the UK had nothing to do with the Ghana-
Guinea union. In his meeting with Dulles, he was asked why de Gaulle had granted Guinea 
independence if the general still wanted to intervene. Because the French could not see 
African leaders as independent actors on the international stage, contrary to the British and 
Americans, Mabille’s mission only generated more international tension.496  
494 Confidential letter, Wynn Hugh-Jones to FO, 2 September 1959, FO 111/138838, TNA. 
495 Elizabeth Schmidt’s research explores Touré’s pragmatic leadership style in great detail, see Schmidt, Cold 
War and Decolonization in Guinea, 1946-1958, 171, 174, 277; Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires d’Espoire: Le 
Renouveau 1958-1962 (Plon: Librairie, 1970), 60. 
496 Confidential memorandum, A.T. Oldham, 14 January 1959, FO 371/138170, TNA. 
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At the Quai D’Orsay, they remained convinced that the Americans and the British were 
silently undermining the French Community. Robert Murphy of the State Department told the 
French ambassador to Washington, Louis Joxe, that he could not understand why the Quai 
d’Orsay would not allow him to appoint ambassadors if the threat from the Soviet Union was 
imminent, we ‘are ready now!’ he claimed.497 Assistant Secretary of State for Africa James 
Penfield was also eager to know where the ICA was permitted to intervene.498 The USIA and 
ICA were keen to put programmes in place because the creation of ‘civil servants capable of 
assuming responsibility’ required time.499 
On 16 June 1959, the psychological warfare committee of France was instructed by 
Prime Minister Michel Debré to take action because he wanted to maintain Guinea in the 
French Franc zone and preserve some level of intellectual influence by providing the 
necessary educational infrastructure.500 In mid-May, after other NATO members could not be 
convinced of the seriousness of the Soviet threat, a negotiation team led by the DGACT 
director Roger Seydoux was sent to Guinea to resume negotiations about an economic and 
cultural agreement.501 That decision was driven less by the 4,000 remaining French 
inhabitants and their economic interests, than it was by competitors with their feet in the door 
to Guinea, possibly unlocking the rest of French Africa in the process.502 
 
 
‘Avoiding another Guinea’: How to Make Aid Attractive 
 
In the face of intense competition, public diplomats behind their desks in Africa were forced 
to think about ways in which they could make their aid attractive. As James Saccio, the 
deputy director of the ICA, asked in 1960: how could another Guinea be avoided?503 The 
issue of attractiveness preoccupied one man in particular, Louis de Guiringaud, the French 
ambassador to Accra, who was confronted with a Ghanaian propaganda campaign in which 
497 Secret record, “Summary Record of the third meeting at Ambassadorial level held on April 20’, 28 April 
1959, 2 , FO 371/137966, TNA. 
498 Penfield to Ferguson, “Suggestions for Airgram to Paris and Conakry”, 1 May 1959, RG. 59, A1 3112B, Box 
1, NARA. 
499 Foreign service despatch to StateDept, “Educational Exchange: Proposed Fiscal Year1960 Country Program”, 
13 May 1958, RG. 84, Ghana Post Files General Records 1952-58, Box 2, f: D. Exchange of Persons, NARA. 
500 Note d’information Secret, premier ministere,  Comité d’action Psychologique”, 16 June 1959, DAL Guinee 
1958-1959 (sous dérogation), 51QO/35, AMAE. 
501 Confidential letter, J.S.H. Shattock to J.H.A. Watson, 21 May 1959, FO 371/138837, TNA. 
502 MacDonald, “The Challenge of Guinean Independence, 1958-1971”, 101. 
503 Memorandum for the Honorable Joseph C. Satterthwaite assistant secretary for African affairs, L.J. Saccio, 
“ICA Paper on US Assistance to Tropical Africa for Mr. Dillon”, 25 March 1960, 8, RG. 306, P 249, Box 10, f: 
English teaching, NARA. 
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France was depicted as Africa’s enemy alongside a growing group of students who chose the 
US or Germany over a visit to France.504 
Marett of the IPD also registered the complaints of UK information officers who were 
dragged into a ‘ludicrous scramble to give away money.’ With aid so easily available, it had 
become difficult to impress African leaders.505 In August 1959, for instance, books, water 
pumps, two child incubators, and twelve portable spraying machines were quickly offered.506 
At the same time, the UK officers were unhappy about the Americans who heightened the 
impact of their aid by driving around ‘American experts, jeeps and blonde typists.’507 
Conversely, in East African territories settlers worried about Ghana’s propaganda.508 
In spite of the British observations, the USIS posts in West Africa also felt cornered by 
their competitors, particularly the Soviets. Unlike Eisenhower, who prioritised long-term 
development, the USSR focused on ‘impact-type projects’ which turned ‘Guinea into a 
showpiece of apparent development.’509 The American promise of an increased gross national 
product was ‘no substitute for a “showcase”’ Saccio complained. Like the Soviets, the ICA 
would need to start appealing to the ‘vanity, the hearts or stomachs’ of Africans.510 
In response, public diplomats started building their showcases in order to reach a target 
audience beyond the elite, an effort that historians have overlooked. Richard McMillan, the 
newly appointed UKIO director in Ghana, had already decided after Ghana’s independence 
that his team would need to go ‘into the bush’ and beyond the ‘influential few’ with film 
viewings in every village where he believed at least four million ‘illiterates’ would be 
affected.511 In October 1957, Argus Tresidder made a similar plea in his Study of the Cultural 
Program in Africa.512 In February 1960, the ambassador to Guinea, John Morrow, proposed 
504 Letter, Louis de Guiringaud ambassadeur de France au Ghana to ministre des affaires etrangeres, 
“Enseignement du français au Ghana”, 21 April 1960, 7, DAL, Ghana 1960-1965, 50QO/72, AMAE. 
505 Report, R.H.K. Marett, “Report on visit to East Africa by R.H.K.”, March/November 1960, 12, INF 12/863, 
TNA. 
506 Confidential letter, FO to Conakry, 28 August 1959, FO 111/138838, TNA. 
507 Report, R.H.K. Marett, “Report on visit to East Africa by R.H.K.”, March/November 1960, 12, INF 12/863, 
TNA; In his book Marett almost literally repeats what he wrote in his report: Marett, Through the Back Door: An 
Inside View of Britain’s Overseas Information Services, 196–199. 
508 Report, R.H.K. Marett, “Report on visit to East Africa by R.H.K.”, March/November 1960, 8, INF 12/863, 
TNA. 
509 Emphasis in the original, see Confidential, Department of State, “Communist Influence in Guinea”, 9 March 
1960, RG. 59, CDF 1960-63, 751.56311/1-760 – 751F.00/7-261, NARA. 
510 Memorandum for the Honorable Joseph C. Satterthwaite Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Department 
of State, L.J. Saccio, “ICA Paper on US Assistance to Tropical Africa for Mr. Dillon”, 25 March 1960, 9, RG. 
306, P 249, Box 10, f: English teaching, NARA. 
511 Notes, B.A Cockram, 10 May 1957, DO 35/9716, TNA. 
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Program Development and Coordination Staff Information Center Service United States Information Agency”, 
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the creation of a mobile medical team to increase the impact of American aid, a gesture that 
was ‘at once dramatic and easy to implement.’513 
However, no one was more motivated than Guiringaud. He explained the lack of 
interest in French culture by pointing to Africans who were supposedly insufficiently 
prepared for a culture that came from a ‘highly civilised’ country. The terrain had to be 
‘psychologically prepared’ by making the audience familiar with certain aspects of French 
life.514 Every cultural manifestation was bound to fail if it was not accompanied by an effort to 
disseminate news about France in an attractive way..515 In defiance of the official policy in 
Paris, Guiringaud attended the signing ceremony of the Ghana-Guinea union, because he felt 
Guinea was not yet lost. Moreover, he wanted to convince Nkrumah of his plan to let French 
technicians back into Guinea through Ghana.516 Touré told the French ambassador that he 
would not sign the Ghana-Guinea agreement if France could offer an alternative.  
Guiringaud tried to make the civil servants in Paris see that a hostile attitude towards 
Guinea only gave Ghana propaganda ammunition.517 The minister of foreign affairs, Maurice 
Couve de Murville, Debré and de Gaulle, however, did not understand the PR dimension of 
the race to Guinea and had ‘been unpleasantly’ surprised by the ambassador’s move. ‘Being 
cordial was one thing’, Debré remarked sarcastically, ‘staying at a reception for two hours’ 
was a different matter.518 De Gaulle believed the Guineans needed France and would 
eventually return. The obstinacy of civil servants at France d’outre-mer – who cast the 
Guineans as ‘nègres communists’ – further marginalised Guiringaud’s position. Instead, the 
October 1957, 28, Memorandum of conversation, Department of State, “Subject: Meeting of Representatives of 
Government Agencies on Africa”, 16 October 1959, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, FRC 2, f: Regional, NARA 
513 Foreign service despatch, John H. Morrow to StateDept, “Recommendation for Impact Project in Guinea”, 15 
February 1960, RG. 469, P206, Box 3, f: Guinea 1959-1960, NARA. 
514 ‘pour preparer psychologiquement le terrain et faire connaitre par ce moyen certains aspects de la vie 
française’, see : Letter, Louis de Guiringaud to DAL, “Information politique”, 14 May 1960, 2, DAL, Ghana 
1960-1965, 50QO/72, AMAE. 
515 ‘effort culturel de notre part’, Telegram, Louis de Guiringaud Ambassade Leopoldville to DGRC, “Copie de 
ma lettre de ce jour RC/ 86, adressée au Département (Direction des Relations Culturelles) A.S Passage de la 
troupe de l’Union française”, 17 February 1954, DAL, Congo belge 1953-1959, 44QO/41, AMAE ; Letter, Louis 
de Guiringaud Ambassadeur de France au Ghana to Monsieur le ministre des Affaires Etrangères, 
“Enseignement du français au Ghana”, 21 April 1960, 1, DAL, Ghana 1960-1965, 50QO/72, AMAE. 
516 NOTE pour le Ministre, de Guiringaud, “A/S Présence culturelle et technique française en Guinée”, 28 
Novembre 1958, f : Education Relations cultrelle, 51QO/28, AMAE. 
517 ‘Je comprends bien que n’ont pas ici le même éclairage qu’à Paris. […] ‘des Africaines français, et je’en vois 
presque tous les jours qui ne sont pas not ennemies’, see : Letter, Louis de Guiringaud to Couve de Murville, 11 
décembre 1958, CM 7 1958, FNSP 
518 ‘Ne pas se dérober à un entretien est une chose. Répondre à une convocation et rester pendant deux heures est 
une autre.’, see : Letter, Debré to Louis de Guiringaud, 28 Novembre 1958, CM 7 1958, FNSP. 
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ambassador began looking for new ways to genuinely promote France, leading him to observe 
his competitors.519 
 
 
Conflict in Print 
 
Guiringaud became an eager student of print material. He read Les Nouvelles de Moscou, 
American Outlook, London Press Service, Indian News, News of the Week, News from Israel, 
London Illustrated, and Commonwealth Today. The latter had particularly impressed him. He 
asked Paris for a brochure on the French Community that could serve as a starting point for 
his own publication which would also have large photographs and articles on de Gaulle’s 
travels abroad. Guiringaud had been particularly inspired by the richly illustrated issue 73 of 
Commonwealth Today, which reported Princess Margaret’s visit to the Commonwealth 
Exhibition and had been stapled to the diplomatic dispatch (illustration 14).520 Within the 
British logic, however, Commonwealth Today was not seen as a means to project UK ideas, 
but as a guide containing ‘practical help’. In 1953, there had even been a brief discussion 
about selling the publication, with a circulation of 106,000, rather than handing it out for 
free.521 
Guiringaud was also impressed by the high quality of the publications produced by the 
Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs. The French were interested in booklets such as New 
Ghana and Ghana Today, but particularly in the postcards that were disseminated depicting 
Africans as being at the bedrock of every major intellectual achievement, such as mathematics 
and philosophy. ‘Africans’ had taught the Greeks the alphabet, and architecture had originated 
with ‘African mothers’ laying foundations for their houses. The Ghanaian propagandists 
themselves had borrowed, because the scenes had been painted by an American artist, Earl 
Sweeting.522 The layout was qualitatively superior and had therefore attracted the 
ambassador’s attention because he was seeking a way to improve the appeal of his own 
operation and produce better quality publications.  
519 Monsieur Daridan, ambassade de France au Ghana, 21 Novembre 1958, DAL, Guinee, 50QO/36, f: Relations 
Guinnée – Ghana, AMAE. 
520 Letter, Louis de Guiringaud to ministre des affaires etrangeres, “Information politique”, 14 May 1960, 4, 
“Commonwealth Today”, 2, DAL, Ghana 1960-1965, 50QO/72, AMAE. 
521 Letter, J.T. Hughes to Arnold Harrison, 27 January 1953, INF 12/597, TNA; Colonial Office, “Information 
activities undertaken by the Colonial Office in the African territories”, [1958], INF 12/978, TNA. 
522 Letter, Louis de Guiringaud to Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, “Information politique”, 14 May 1960, 2, 
DAL, Ghana 1960-1965, 50QO/34, AMAE, “Histoire de l’Afrique racontée aux Ghanéens”, 22 February 1960, 
DAL, Ghana 1960-1965, 50QO/72, AMAE. 
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Guiringaud’s attention had not only been drawn by British and Ghanaian publications, 
but also by the USIA that came out in support of civil rights. John A. Calhoun of the State 
Department had been anxious about Nkrumah’s ‘pan-African’ propaganda, in which he 
‘spoke of his country as a haven for persecuted Negroes.’523 This change in the USIA’s 
communication led to conflict with the settlers when Gordon P. Hagberg of USIS-Nairobi 
distributed the Pittsburgh Courier that told the story of Ghanaian independence.524 Conflict 
centred on the supposed effects of USIS’s propaganda publications. The settlers saw the 
American habit of having personal conversations, as well as the production of positive stories 
about civil rights advancements, as detrimental to their cause because it gave Africans an 
inflated sense of self-worth (illustration 12).525 The USIS-officers went to ‘embarrassing’ 
lengths in the ‘business of currying favour with potential trouble-makers’ such as Tom 
Mboya.526  
It was this kind of attraction, this type of emotion the French ambassador admired. 
Where his predecessor Marc Renner had seen the manipulative skills of USIS officers as a 
form of weakness, Guiringaud understood that French educational aid would have to be 
promoted in a spectacular way. 
 
523 Memorandum for Mr. Gerald D. Morgan, John A Calhoun, “Request from the Civil Rights Commission: 
Treatment of Minorities in the United States – impact on our foreign relations Part B – Area Review”, 4 
December 1958, RG. 306, P 283, f: Minorities in the US [Folder ½], NARA; State department report, 
“Treatment of Minorities in the United States – Impact on our Foreign Relations”, RG. 306, P 283, Box 11, f: 
Minorities in the US [Folder ½], NARA. 
524 C.Y. Carstairs, 17 March 1958, CO 1027/332, TNA; Secret letter, Douglas W. Williams, “Note on alleged 
Anti-Americanism among British Officials in East Africa”, 23 April 1958 and Memorandum of conversation, 
Mr. Vaughan Ferguson and Mr. Roberts, Douglas Williams Colonial attaché, 4 March 1958, and secret letter, 
Chief Secretary Nairobi to W.A.C. Mathieson, 13 July 1957, 2-3, CO 1027/332, TNA. 
525 Secret letter, E Barring to Carstairs, 19 April 1958, FCO 141/6731, TNA. 
526 Secret letter, Douglas W. Williams, “Note on alleged Anti-Americanism among British Officials in East 
Africa”, 23 April 1958, Memorandum of conversation, Mr. Vaughan Ferguson and Mr. Roberts, Douglas 
Williams Colonial attaché, 4 March 1958, Secret letter, chief secretary Nairobi to W.A.C. Mathieson, 13 July 
1957, 2-3, CO 1027/332, TNA. 
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Illustration 14: Louis de Guiringaud, the French ambassador to Ghana was inspired by this issue of 
Commonwealth Today. Source: Pamphlet “Commonwealth Today”, 2, DAL, Ghana 1960-1965, 50QO/72, 
AMAE. 
 
 
Teachers and the Political Dimension of Education  
 
In the new plan for French cultural expansion, however, there was still no attention for its 
appeal. By offering teachers, societies could be modernised and French prestige increased. By 
recalling the French teachers from Guinea, that progress would be stalled.527 De Gaulle’s 
spectacular and radical retreat has received most of the attention, obscuring the fact that 
French DGCT officials – working behind de Gaulle’s back or with his tacit permission – 
maintained a presence in Guinea. The decision of 78 French teachers to stay in Guinea in 
1958 delighted the DGCT, because it meant that in 1960 – when France officially recognised 
527 Note pour le Ministre, Guiringaud, “A/S Présence culturelle et technique française en Guinée”, 28 Novembre 
1958, f : Education Relations cultrelle, 51QO/28, AMAE. 
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Guinea – only 25 new teachers needed to be hired while the inflow of teachers from the 
Soviet bloc had remained limited. 528 
By 1960 an increasing number of teachers wanted to leave, which was detrimental for 
the French who believed that the future Guinean leaders could not be oriented towards France 
without proper schooling. Teachers in Guinea left for a variety of financial and emotional 
reasons, but above all because they felt threatened by the anti-French broadcasts which was 
produced by Radio Conakry with the help of Ghana.529 Pierre Siraud, the chargé d’affaires in 
Guinea therefore wanted to encourage the teachers to stay:  
 
The problem of maintaining our cultural presence in Guinea is pressing. If the teachers who are here 
refuse to remain at their posts […] change their minds. They are needed however to ensure a sustained 
influence of French culture in this African country which politically and economically is moving closer 
to the countries of the East each day. 530 
 
When France accorded Guinea diplomatic recognition on 2 January 1960, Roger Sedoux sent 
M. Mauffrai – the former inspector of primary school education in Morocco – to Guinea to re-
establish a cultural service within the embassy.531  
However, Guiringaud again came into conflict with Paris because he believed French 
language education could not be separated from the political climate of a particular country. 
In Ghana for instance, French language classes would not increase French prestige but 
undermine the French Community by facilitating the exchanges between French and British 
Africa. Guiringaud signalled to Seydoux that the Ghanaians who had signed up had admitted 
that they wanted to learn French so they could visit the countries of the French Community 
and spread the ‘Ghanaian gospel’.532 The ambassador to Tunis had similar complaints while 
the French intelligence service agreed with Guiringaud that the introduction of compulsory 
French language education in Ghanaian schools was not necessarily a victory for French 
528 Note pour le ministre, DGCT, Enseignement et Oeuvres, 10 May 1960, DAL Guinée, 51QO/61, f: Guinée: 
Education et relations culturelles, AMAE. 
529 Letter, Siraud to Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, “a/s: Situation des professeurs en Guinée”, 21 May 1960, 
2, DAL Guinee, 51QO/67, f: Guinée: Education et relations culturelles,  AMAE. 
530 ‘Le problème du maintien de notre présence culturelle en Guinée se trouve donc posé. Si les professeurs qui 
sont ici refusent de demeurer dans leurs poste […] revenir sur leur décidé […] d’assurer la pérennité de la culture 
française dans ce pays d’Afrique qui, sur le plan politique et économique, s’oriente chaque jour davantage vers 
les pays de l’Est’, see : Letter, Siraud to Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, “a/s: Situation des professeurs en 
Guinée”, 21 May 1960, 3, DAL Guinee, 51QO/67, f: Guinée: Education et relations culturelles,  AMAE. 
531 Schmidt, Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea, 1946-1958, 176; Telegram, Seydoux to Chargé d'Affaires 
Conakry, “a/s: Mission de M. Mauffrais”, 11 January 1960, DAL Guinee, 51QO/67, f: Guinée: Education et 
relations culturelles,  AMAE. 
532 Roger Seydoux, 22 May 1959, DAL Généralités, 49QONT/65, AMAE. 
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cultural diplomacy. These language programmes were intended to reduce the language 
barriers and foster African unity, something that would not benefit the French interests.533 
Nonetheless, foreign affairs in Paris held on to the conventional logic behind language 
education: the spread of the French language and culture would – irrespective of political 
views – instil the African with an admiration for the French culture and should thus be 
encouraged where possible.534 French lack of attention for the political aspects of education 
opened the path to competitors who all wanted to be the first to get their foot in the door.  
In July 1959, the ICA had already sent out Marie Gadsden, an Afro-American teacher 
who was setting up an operation on her own, which by October 1960 resulted in two classes 
of 10 advanced students and a beginner class of 28.535 Christopher Ewart-Biggs, a senior 
officer at the FO and MI6, believed that this initiative had to be countered. The opportunity 
had to be seized to make British rather than American books the standard for English teaching 
in Guinea. This was a battle for hearts and minds. If the Americans convinced a Guinean 
minister that American books better suited his needs, the British had to dissuade him and if 
possible offer more money.536 
To not be outdone by the Americans, J.D.B Fowells of the British Council travelled to 
Guinea in January 1960 and made some grand promises even though he admitted in his 
correspondence that there were only 4 teachers available (illustration 15). Like the French, the 
British Council began sending their textbooks to the ministry of education. An unknown 
teacher, C.H. Judd, was placed in the lycée classique for boys in Conakry to make a start with 
English language education. The good relations between Guinea and the UK and the 
aspiration to make ‘friends not rivals’ out of the French teachers of English, had to convey a 
joint commitment to fostering African self-government.537 
The USIA for its part wanted to be first. The agency’s English consultant, James Echols 
bluntly admitted in 1958, as would Wilbert Petty the PAO in Conakry two years later, that 
they were not interested in increasing the use of the English language. Teaching provided a 
way to ‘reach key groups’ and if those people were already sitting in classes organised by the 
533 S.D.E.C.E bulletin, Présidence du conseil, “Ghana : Activités Pan-Africaines”, 26 June 1958, DAL, Ghana 
1953-1959 (sous dérogation), 50QO/28, f: Education – Question culturelles Bulletings S.D.E.C.E: Juin-Juillet 
1958, AMAE ; Amembassy Tunis, “The Alliance Française in Tunisia”, 24 November 1958, RG. 59, CDF 1955-
59, 550.60/6-958-556D.973/9-957, NARA. 
534 Note, DAL, 13 August 1959, DAL Généralités, 49QONT/65, AMAE. 
535 Foreign service despatch, Wilbert C. Petty to USIA, “English Teaching Potential”, 27 October 1960, 2, RG. 
469, P206, Box 3, f: Guinea 1959-1960, NARA. 
536 Memorandum, Christopher Ewart-Biggs, 29 September 1959, FO 1110/138838, TNA. 
537 Report, J.D.B. Fowells, “Report on Visit to Guinea, January 14th-26th 1960”, BW 132/1, TNA; Confidential 
memorandum, “British Council Work in Non-British West and Equatorial Africa”, [1960], BW 1/280, TNA. 
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British Council, the USIA would not be able to teach and influence them.538 In 1960, the 
USIA partnered with the English Language Service to establish the first English language 
programme in Guinea at a cost of $21,000.539 At USIS-Conakry resources were allocated on 
the basis of impact: because some students had already become fluent, intensive language 
courses received more funds.540 
While the teaching of English emerged as one of the USIA’s top priorities in the Third 
World, the inexperience of the US information officers is often overlooked.541 By 1960, the 
American ICA and USIA personnel had undertaken so many study trips that the British 
expats, particularly in Ghana, were tired of answering the same questions. The British 
officials, impressed upon their American visitors that it was necessary to study the basic facts 
of the educational system before departure, rather than taxing their staff who were already 
overburdened with their own educational expansion.542 More importantly, the cooperation that 
had existed in the early 1950s was replaced by an intense competition among allies who were 
looking for ways to make their aid more attractive. 
 
538 Quotation taken from: “Memorandum, N.E. Policy”, [1961], RG. 306, A1 1072, Box 194, Box 194, f: English 
Language Teaching 1962, NARA; For Guinea see Foreign service despatch, Wilbert C. Petty to USIA, “English 
Teaching Potential”, 27 October 1960, 1, RG. 469, P206, Box 3, f: Guinea 1959-1960, NARA. 
539 Bell, “Developing a ‘Sense of Community’: U.S. Cultural Diplomacy and the Place of Africa during the Early 
Cold War Period 1953-54”, 136; Memorandum, Eugene J. Skora to Carlston, “English Teaching Program”, 12 
June 1962, RG. 306, A1 1072, Box 194, Box 194, f: English Language Teaching 1962, NARA. 
540 Foreign service despatch, Embassy Conakry to Dept of State, “USIA Program for Guinea, Particularly 
English-Teaching Program”, 21 July 1959 , RG. 469, P206, Box 3, f: Africa-Guinea 1959-1960, NARA; Foreign 
service despatch, Wilbert C. Petty to USIA, “English Teaching Potential”, 27 October 1960, 2, RG. 469, P206, 
Box 3, f: Guinea 1959-1960, NARA. 
541 Osgood, Total Cold War, 309. 
542 Working Paper, Verna A. Carley, “A Working Paper on Observations made of the Needs of Education in 
Africa, South of the Sahara”, June 1960, 1, RG. 469, P 206, Box 1, f: Africa-General 1/60-6/60, NARA. 
                                              
S h o w c a s i n g  D e v e l o p m e n t  | 165 
 
 
 
Illustration 15: The British had found recruiting teachers a challenge and therefore started campaigns to 
stimulate British teachers to teach overseas. This pamphlet was introduced by Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, who 
was the Chairman of the National Council for the Supply of Teachers Overseas. Source: Pamphlet, “Why not 
teach for a time Overseas?”, [1961], CAB/5534, TNA. 
 
 
Understanding the Power of the Radio 
 
With the invention of the transistor radio in the 1950s, radio became a cheap and popular 
medium with a profound impact. In April 1959, for instance, Chad Chipunza, a member of the 
federal government of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, was dragged from his car and assaulted by 
demonstrators because he had refused to admit in an interview broadcast on Radio Ghana that 
‘Africans were treated worse than dogs.’543 
The ability of radio to rouse people to action attracted Guiringaud. In the run up to the 
referendum, he gave an exposition on Radio Ghana about the new constitution. It was a story 
of progress that had its origin in the aftermath of the French revolution, when the 
representatives of Sénégal and Réunion had been invited to take a seat in the National 
Constituent Assembly. At the Brazzaville conference in 1944, de Gaulle took the next step by 
543 Foreign service despatch, Stephen Gurney Gebelt to StateDept, Ghana Government Statement Concerning 
Visit of Mr. Chipunza, Member of the Federal Government of Rhodesia and Nyassaland, 29 May 1959, RG. 59, 
CDF 1955-59, 645.5694/2-1756-645U.863322/1-2959, NARA. 
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creating the French Union. In this linear narrative, the proposed French Community was the 
next stage in an ongoing process of increasing people’s happiness.544 
Paris followed a different logic however. In 1960, the Foreign Office even had to 
convince the French not to cease their radio transmissions. Because British strategy hinged on 
a joint defence of a guided decolonisation process, the UK decided to cooperate with Radio 
Brazzaville, which now focused on countries in Africa. However, by late 1960 the French 
were happy that the British had kept them in the game, because the information department of 
Guinea had created a popular anti-French radio station under the leadership of Bangoura 
Karim.545 
Instead of instigating a radio wave offensive, as Guiringaud had wanted, the secretariat 
of the French Community increased the number of African pupils in the so-called courses on 
French radio techniques at what used to be the radio school of France d’outre-mer. It was not 
a French ideological offensive, but training that would increase prestige. The funding for the 
radio stations in the territories that made national programmes and educational radio was 
increased in 1960 to 83,739,885 French francs, an increase of 10% compared to 1959. To 
limit adverse propaganda, radio-jamming stations were placed in the Ivory Coast.546  
The French cooperation with the British had been the outcome of a struggle between the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, which reasoned about radio in terms of PR and the Colonial 
Office, which wanted to create goodwill through training and the setup of a radio 
infrastructure. When an envoy was sent out to study how the French had been able to maintain 
their grip on French Africa, he came back with a list of the radios, libraries and information 
services that were operating in Dakar, rather than a close study of the French techniques. In 
May 1959, in the face of hostile broadcasts from Conakry and Accra, the CRO realised its 
mistake and began to limit the broadcast capability of African countries by decreasing the aid 
grants it offered. Moreover, the CRO opposed the plan of the CO to give Nigeria a more 
544 Louis de Guiringaud to Ministre des affaires étrangers, “Célébration de la Fête nationale”, 19 juillet 1958, 2, 
DAL, Ghana 1953 -1959, 50QO/10, AMAE.. 
545 Memorandum, FO to MAE, “Anglo-French Talks on Information: Outline Record and Conclusions The 
Foreign Office – July 4/5, 1960”, 1960, 2, DAL Généralités 1960-1965, 49QONT/94, AMAE; Confidential, 
“Brief for Anglo-US talks on Colonial Items at the 14th Session of the General Assembly: Washington, 14th and 
15th September 1959”, 14 September 1959, CO 936/545, TNA; Incoming telegram, ambassade de France en 
Guinee to DAL,  “a/s: Poste de radiodiffusion en Guinée”, 26 January 1960, Letter Amassade de France près la 
République fédérale d’Allemagne to Couv de Murville, “A/S : Projet de création d’un centre de radiodiffusion en 
Guinée”, 27 July 1960, DAL Guinee 1960-1965, 51QO/41, AMAE. 
546 Brochure, “Le studio-école de la radiodiffusion Outre-Mer”, [1957], Report, “Compte-Rendu d’activités de la 
SORAFOM au cours de l’exercise 1960”, [1960],  Report, G. Lavergne, “Rapport d’Activite de la SORAFOM 
Exercice 1958”, [1958], 15, 18, Letter, Haute Commissaire auprès de la République de Côte d’Ivoire to 
Secrétaire Général de la Communauté, 22 December 1959, Ministère de la coopération, Direction de la 
coopération technique et culturelle, 19780282/14, CHAN. 
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powerful transmitter to counter the possible Soviet bloc broadcasting station in Conakry. 
Unlike the Colonial Office, the CRO realised that the transmitters they had help build could 
one day be used against them.547 
In February 1959 Henry Loomis of the USIA Information Broadcasting Service (IBS) 
was concerned with the low number of listeners. To get the educational ‘forum lectures’ 
placed on local radio stations, mass popular entertainment like Jazz had to be offered as well. 
Unlike the BBC, who believed radio could effectively reach a massa audience, Loomis’ 
preferred target audience was the recently educated members of society who were supposedly 
interested in everything, unlike the general public that only listened to ‘indigenous music’ and 
the university educated listener who would be too critical. The USIA and the State 
Department emphasised that there had to be more attention to music with a broad appeal, Jazz 
had to be danceable not progressive. The experience that USIA officers possessed in the field 
of radio allowed it to conquer a mass audience in a more tactical way than the British and the 
French, who only gradually understood that their African audiences had to be enticed to turn 
their radios on.548 
 
 
Inspiring Examples, Changing Methodologies, a Wide Target Audience 
 
By untangling the multi-centric knot of the miniature scramble for Guinea, French public 
diplomacy is considered in a new light. Historians argue that the Second World War created a 
creeping sense of self-doubt while French culture was still celebrated, resulting in a French 
cultural diplomacy enterprise that could be described as ‘schizophrenic’.549 However in Africa 
there were constant doubts about the ways in which French culture was offered, while the 
belief in French superiority remained unshaken. Constant tactical modification by local 
officers only appear as inconsistencies with hindsight.  
547 Memorandum, CO, “Information activities undertaken by the Colonial Office in the African territories”, 
[1958], Confidential report, A. P. Cullen, “Information Work in Africa South of the Sahara: Report of a Tour by 
Mr. A.P. Cullen from February 4 to June 25, 1958”, [1958], INF 12/978, TNA; Letter, Ralph Murray to FO, 26 
May 1959, CO 1027/252, TNA; Letter, M.E. Allen to N.D. Watson, 24 April 1959, CO 1027/252, TNA. 
548 Memorandum, James H. Logan, “Programing Objectives: African Service – IBS/RN”, 12 February 1959, 1-2, 
RG. 306, UD-WW 285, FRC 2, f: IBS, NARA; Pamphlet, Leon Festinger, “The Voice of America: Forum 
Lectures, The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance”, [1961], MC 440 Ithiel de Sola Pool Papers, 1941-1984, Box 
134, f: Voice of America – Speech December 1961, MIT-Archives; Report, Handley (IAN), Henry Loomis 
(IBS), “Special African Project”, 17 November 1959, Confidential report, Henry Loomis, “Report on Trip to 
Africa July-September 1959”, [undated, 1959], RG. 306, UD-WW 258, FRC 2, f: IBS, NARA; “Extracts from a 
letter from Henry Loomis”, 22 August 1959, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, FRC 3, f: Letters General, NARA; Report, 
“African Conference on Department of State and US Information Agency Cultural Programs April 5-9, 1960”, 9 
April 1960, 1, RG. 306, P 249, Box 10, f: Policy-Kampala Conference [folder ½], NARA. 
549 Dubosclard, L’action artistique de la France aux États-Unis, 1915-1969, 350–351; Dueck, The Claims of 
Culture at Empire’s End, 138. 
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Moreover, public diplomats were not only interested in the elites of the Third World as 
historians have argued, and nor was that tactical choice typically British or French.550 Interest 
in the influential elite was combined with an attempt to better inform African mass audiences. 
From 1958 onwards, pamphlets, film and radio were used to promote British aid as widely as 
possible, to ‘prepare’ unsophisticated minds for French culture and ‘open the door’ to the elite 
target audience in the American case.  
Lastly, in the competitive climate of the late 1950s public diplomats constantly looked 
towards competitors to improve their efficacy. Public diplomacy did not therefore merely 
reflect national ideas or identities. American officials did not always agree with their own 
propaganda nor did other messages reflect deeply held beliefs as has been argued. Public 
diplomats also saw themselves as professionals who searched for ways in which they could 
influence their target audiences.551 Furthermore, this cross-national process of adoption and 
adaption refutes a narrative on hegemonic Americanisation in which the USIA with its 
superior public relations methods would have been the most important source of influence. 
The French borrowed techniques from the USIA, but also turned to the British and the 
Ghanaians for inspiration. Public diplomacy in Africa was not solely preoccupied with the 
projection of strongly held ideological beliefs, but was the product of a multitude of 
influences. 
 
 
Strong Men as Caretakers 
 
The Guinea crisis unfolded as a number of so-called ‘emerging’ nations were confronted with 
military takeovers and a trend towards authoritarian leadership styles, including Ghana where 
Nkrumah approved the Preventive Detention Act in 1958. When Nixon returned from the 
independence celebrations in Accra he wondered whether African leaders could maintain 
democracy as they took on the challenges of development.552 Employing the imagery of a 
snake shedding its skin, the British journalist Elspeth Huxley became widely quoted among 
French and British ambassadors who referred to her analysis in their correspondence while 
550 A transnational perspective adds some nuance to the argument that the French and British preferred to target 
elites, see Osgood, Total Cold War, 114; Osgood, “Words and Deeds: Race, Colonialism, and Eisenhower’s 
Propaganda War in the Third World”; Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 145; 
Dueck, The Claims of Culture at Empire’s End, 16; Young, Marketing Marianne, 174; Richard J. Aldrich, The 
Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London: John Murray, 2001), 603.  
551 Arguments can be found in Laura A. Belmonte, Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold 
War (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 158; Osgood, Total Cold War, 255. 
552 Report, Nixon, “The Emergence of Africa: Report to the President by Vice President Nixon on his trip to 
Africa: February 28 – March 21, 1957”, [March 1957], 1-2, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, FRC 1, f: Briefing Paper, 
NARA. 
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Noon used her article as the basis of the USIA’s 1957 ‘Study of the Cultural Program in 
Africa’. Huxley called to mind a continent that was undergoing two revolutions: the transition 
from colonialism to independence and the leap from tribalism to modern civilisation. 
Somewhere in that process the mythical tribal leader could return.553   
In a way, the agenda had already been set before the problem emerged. During the first 
tripartite talks on Africa on 29 April 1957, Joxe tried to convince Murphy that Africans had a 
‘natural element of susceptibility to authoritarian regimes’. He claimed democracies in Africa 
could not ‘be created overnight’. However, his attempt to undercut Murphy’s optimism failed. 
It was US policy to help the ‘native African races’ to attain their goals without being dragged 
into the struggle between east and west.554 One of de Gaulle’s closest advisers, Jaques Foccart, 
by contrast build a network that connected authoritarian African leaders to France as a way to 
maintain influence.555 
Only in May 1959 Ramsey and the State Department presented a policy to turn the trend 
towards authoritarianism to the advantage of the US. In Latin America, military regimes were 
leading societies through their socio-economic revolutions. At the same time, Ramsey 
admitted that identifying with an authoritarian regime made the US a target for anti-regime 
propaganda, but little prestige would be lost if the leaders were making progress.556 Historians 
consider the meeting to be the birth of a Cold War policy in which right-wing dictators were 
supported because it was seen as practical and inevitable.557 Nonetheless, the members of the 
administration, as well as Eisenhower himself, maintained their belief in the value of civic 
education and resisted the French and British encouragement to utilise the authoritarian trend 
to their advantage. 
553 Elspeth Huxley, “Two Revolutions That Are Changing Africa”, New York Times Magazine, May 19, 1957, 9; 
Huxley voiced an old British concern and was quoted in French and American sources, see Report, Argus 
Tresridder, “A Study of the Cultural Program in Africa with Especial Reference to Education: Program 
Development and Coordination Staff Information Center Service United States Information Agency”, October 
1957, 2, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, FRC 2, f: Regional, NARA; Letter, Service de Presse et d’Information, 19 May 
1957, 50QO/15, f: Politique Intérieure, AMAE. 
554 Secret record, “Summary Record of the first meeting at Ambassadorial level held on April 16”, 27 April 
1959, 2, FO 371/137966, TNA; Marry Montgomery’s narrative uses this quotation to claim that Murphy agreed 
with Joxe even though the record implies disagreement, see Montgomery, “The Eyes of the World Were 
Watching: Ghana, Great Britain, and the United States, 1957-1966”, 113. 
555 Jean-Pierre Bat, Le syndrome Foccart: La politique française en Afrique, de 1959 à nos jours (Paris: Éditions 
Gallimard, 2012), 11–55. 
556 “Political Implications of Afro-Asian Military takeovers (State Department Presentation)”, 27 May 1959, 
Papers as President 1953-1961, NSC Series, Box 11, f: 410th Meeting of NSC June 18, 1959, DDEL. 
557  David F. Schmitz, The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1965-1989 (Chapel Hill and London: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 17; David F. Schmitz, Thank God They’re on Our Side: The United States 
and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921-1965 (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1999), 178–235; Bradley Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian 
Relations, 1960-1968 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 35; Reid, A History of Modern Africa, 299; 
MacDonald, “The Challenge of Guinean Independence, 1958-1971”, 113; Westad, The Global Cold War, 122. 
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While Eisenhower was pondering how he was going to phrase his criticisms of the 
report, he limited his initial comments to complimenting Ramsey for ‘a fine paper’ that was 
‘beautifully organised’; ‘the validity of [Ramsey’s] conclusions’, was a totally different 
matter. Eisenhower accepted the need to support military leaders, but only as a short-term 
emergency solution. He identified two major problems. First, this policy clashed with the 
fundamental democratic values of the US. He referred to a conversation he had had with late 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who had just passed away, about the biggest threat to 
the American model: ‘Can our system of free government stand the strains which it must 
endure because of our tolerance of pressure groups and other kinds of uniformed thinking?’558  
Guided by older fears that saw the US transform into a garrison state because of the 
Cold War, and already pointing to his speech about the military-industrial complex, 
Eisenhower attached a lot of value to the export of the American democratic model and 
therefore remarked that the rising young military leaders, on which the US was forced to rely, 
had to be influenced by the American military assistance personnel. Without training, people 
who had lived ‘so long under dictatorships’ could not be expected to ‘understand our ideas of 
freedom’ or ‘run a successful government.’559 In his report to the president after his visit to 
Ghana, Nixon agreed: ‘the Free World has a vital interest’ in helping them to develop 
‘governmental institutions which are based on principles of freedom and democracy.’560 
Secondly, Eisenhower did not agree with the way Ramsay minimised the trade-off 
between stability and propaganda. Ellsworth F. Bunker, ambassador to India, had told 
Eisenhower about the ‘terrific propaganda campaign that the Soviet Union was waging 
against us in India.’ Other NSC members agreed with the President’s opinion about the 
importance of the educational and cultural solution. Eisenhower called on Clarence Randall to 
give his opinion. Randall, the Republican businessman and part-time Africa expert of the 
Eisenhower administration who had toured the continent in 1958, detected too much readiness 
to ‘give up pushing for democratic ideals’ and instead ‘wanted to see more and better 
558 Memorandum of Discussion of the 410th Meeting of the National Security Council, 18 June 1959, 2, Papers as 
President 1953-1961, NSC Series, Box 11, f: 410th Meeting of NSC June 18, 1959, DDEL; The authors in the 
previous footnote have used the ‘fine paper’ quotation to show that Eisenhower agreed with Ramsey’s report, 
even though the president was very critical of the State Department. Macdonald attributes one of Joxe’s 
quotations to Murphy while both historical actors actually disagreed. Schmitz states that the report was approved 
by the NSC, however the text actually approves the production of follow-up studies, see MacDonald, “The 
Challenge of Guinean Independence, 1958-1971”, 113; Schmitz, Thank God They’re on Our Side, 17. 
559 Memorandum of Discussion of the 410th Meeting of the National Security Council, 18 June 1959, 3, Papers as 
President 1953-1961, NSC Series, Box 11, f: 410th Meeting of NSC June 18, 1959, DDEL. 
560 Report, Nixon, “The Emergence of Africa: Report to the President by Vice President Nixon on his trip to 
Africa: February 28 – March 21, 1957”, [March 1957], 1-2, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, FRC 1, f: Briefing Paper, 
NARA. 
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education for civilians’, he also saw ‘a real chance for free government in the region of Africa 
south of the Sahara.’ The man most historians consider to have been cynical when it came to 
Africa thus proved himself to be optimistic about Africa’s chances of attaining an American 
style of democracy.561 
The report Randall had authored in 1954 also offered a method for reaching 
authoritarian leaders because it gave an expansive interpretation of what military assistance 
could do if it was coupled with the spread of American values. While waiting for the 
conclusion from the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, Eisenhower looked to General 
William Draper for other ideas as he established a presidential commission on US military 
assistance. The Sprague Committee, established in 1959 to evaluate American public 
diplomacy, picked up a lot of ideas from the Randall and Draper Committee Report. In its 
broader recommendations it identified the need for a plan to guide the development of the 
military and the internal security forces as a way to contribute to the political, economic and 
social development of the area.’562 
A coherent approach to reaching authoritarian leaders was worked out in a plan entitled 
‘The Collateral Effects of Training Foreign Military Personnel’ on 16 May 1960. Its reading 
of history established that newly created nations consider military forces essential to their 
independence and they exert a far greater influence on political and economic developments 
than is the case in older nations. This could lead to dictatorship and economic stagnation, as in 
Latin America, or to an enlightened role, as in Burma. The informational objectives in every 
country were aimed at guiding the state towards political stability and economic viability and 
eventually towards democratic institutions. It was therefore important to create a situation in 
which the military could contribute to those goals.563 
The mutual defence agreements were a ‘unique psychological opportunity’ to encourage 
the armed forces to make ‘an enlightened and positive contribution’ to long-term 
development. It offered the opportunity to ‘create a sympathetic attitude’ towards the 
American efforts to help them along that road. The training programmes, which were 
primarily designed to teach armed forces how to use modern equipment efficiently, had 
561 Memorandum of Discussion of the 410th Meeting of the National Security Council, 18 June 1959, 4, Papers as 
President 1953-1961, NSC Series, Box 11, f: 410th Meeting of NSC June 18, 1959, DDEL 
562 Connelly, Fatal Misconception, 186; Report, “Africa South of the Sahara”, 1960, US President’s Committee 
on Information Activities Abroad: Records 1960-61, Box 9, f: Africa # 31 (1), DDEL. 
563 Privileged Information for Use of President’s Committee only, “The President’s Committee on Information 
Activities Abroad: The Collateral Effects of Training Foreign Military Personnel”, 16 May 1960, 2, US 
President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee), Box 20, f: PCIAA #10(1), 
DDEL. 
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important ‘collateral effects’ on attitudes. Namely, they could offer military trainees 
leadership qualities and a better understanding of American values. Through the Military 
Assistance Advisory Group local armed forces could be encouraged to work on the 
development of the local economy and social development. Posts on the ground agreed.564 
To sum up, while NATO members agreed that Africans were attracted to 
‘authoritarianism’ their concrete response differed markedly.565 The British and, particularly, 
the French sought to exploit the move to authoritarianism in a straightforward way, as 
Eisenhower was looking for ways to maintain democracy. When Andrew Goodpaster, 
Eisenhower’s staff secretary, was asked in 1982 what Eisenhower believed to be the best 
course of action when an authoritarian leader could come to power, he did not hesitate: ‘self-
government!’566 
 
 
Conclusion: Showcasing Aid  
 
Accounts on the Guinea crisis identify American and French misperceptions about the Cold 
War and African nationalism at the root of the conflict. French Prime Minister Debré, 
however, reversed de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw French aid, a decision that was motivated 
by the competition coming from British and American officials who were not hesitant, as 
historians have argued, but eager to offer cultural assistance.567  
Orderly transition – rather than direct Soviet containment – was the compass that the 
West followed in Guinea. Eisenhower’s commitment to cultural assistance even influenced 
his stance on authoritarian leadership. Contrary to claims made most prominently by David 
Schmitz, Eisenhower supported authoritarian leaders only reluctantly. In his vision, the 
sustenance of so-called ‘strong men’ always had to be complemented with a civic education 
programme that could transfer American democratic leadership skills. Officers on the ground 
noticed that their target audience was not interested or preferred the services of competitors. 
564 Report, “The President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad: The Collateral Effects of Training 
Foreign Military Personnel”, 16 May 1960, 2, US President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad 
(Sprague Committee), Box 20, f: PCIAA #10(1), DDEL; Foreign service despatch, Amembassy Addis Ababa to 
StateDept, “Role of Military in Less Developed Countries”, 30 September 1959, Foreign service despatch, 
Amembassy Tripoli to StateDept, “Role of Military in Less Developed Countries”, 1 October 1959, RG. 59, 
CDF 1955-59, 611.70/10-158 – 611.7194/12-457, NARA. 
565 Note by the Political Division, “Communist Penetration in Africa”, 23 April 1960, 2, CM(61)43-e, NATO-
Archives. 
566 “Interview with Andrew J. Goodpaster, Jr. on April 10, 1982 for Dwight D. Eisenhower Library”, on p. 33-
35, in the Columbia University Oral History Research Office Collection.  
567 Nwaubani, The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950-1960, 226; Mazov, A Distant Front in 
the Cold War, 59; Hubbard, The United States and the End of British Colonial Rule in Africa, 1941-1968, 2010, 
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In defiance of de Gaulle, the French ambassador to Ghana courted Touré and adopted the 
public diplomacy techniques that made Ghana, the US and the UK successful. 
As noted by Cooper, modernisation theorists were not only driven by the simplifying 
logic of ‘high modernism’ – the hubristic endeavour at making every problem technically 
legible; the modern apparatus of rule was itself wracked by doubts and particularisms.568 In 
Africa those doubts were acutely felt at the cultural centres but hardly understood by de 
Gaulle, Eisenhower and Lennox-Boyd who held on to their ideas about cultural assistance. 
The rift between higher and lower levels led public diplomats on the ground to adopt the 
successful methods others used to showcase their cultural aid, in effect producing hybrid 
forms of public diplomacy. 
In sum, a multi-centric analysis of the Guinea crisis not only rejects a nationalist 
narrative that claimed decolonisation was the outcome of an imperial plan, but also refutes a 
counter narrative that presents African nationalists as people able to spin decolonisation to 
their advantage. The historical claim of planned decolonisation merely reflects the beliefs of 
policymakers who ignored the improvisation of local officers. At the same time, Nkrumah’s 
swift creation of the Ghana-Guinea Union actually made it harder to sell his pan-African plan 
for Africa, because it motivated public diplomats to showcase their own aid plans and actually 
invited more Western involvement.  
Ultimately, Guinea brings into focus how much the West held on to the idea of an 
orderly transition, a notion that did not disappear even when countries declared their 
independence. Only the violence of Algerian independence, as Todd Shepard has argued, 
would lead French officials to adopt the term ‘decolonisation’ and reassess their relationship 
with colonial subjects.569 Cultural aid was never questioned. If target audiences rejected 
cultural products and public diplomacy, there had to be something wrong with the way in 
which it was showcased. The gospel of stability only fell apart when Africa became the 
theatre of two international crises, one in the Congo and one in the Sahara.  
 
 
 
 
 
568 Cooper responds to James Scott’s argument on “high modernism”, in Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 141; 
James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 343. 
569 Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, 3–10. 
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6. Things Fall Apart 
 
The French Atomic Bomb, the Congo Crisis and the Collapse of Stability 
(1960 – 1961) 
   
The explosion of the A-bomb on African soil already drenched in blood by the monstrous Algerian war 
and by the fierce repressive measures taken in Kamerun – to mention only territories under French 
domination – constitutes an intolerable threat to the African peoples in their struggle for independence.  
 
– Protest letter from the president of the Republic of Guinea, Sekou Touré to Secretary-
General of the United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld, 4 March 1960.570 
 
Nearly a year has passed since the infant Congolese nation was born prematurely into the reality of 
‘independence’ […] The prognosis for the struggling child is not optimistic in the short run. There is 
every indication that it must rest for years in the UN incubator, with no real strength of its own – except 
a precious capacity for talking like an adult 
   
– Fitzhugh Green, PAO of USIS-Leopoldville after independence, 30 May 1961.571 
 
 
1960 was a turning point. Not only did 17 new countries gain their independence but, and 
more importantly, old strategies based on ideas and psychology fell apart in the face of the 
Congo crisis and the decision to detonate a French atomic weapon in the Sahara. On 13 
February 1960, in the vicinity of Reggane in Algeria the first French bomb was tested, in 
defiance of Ghana’s campaign against the detonation. Despite – or because of – the loosening 
French grip on Algeria, de Gaulle still laid claim to the Sahara because of its mineral 
wealth.572  
A few weeks earlier, on 20 January 1960, 60 Belgian officials and 95 Congolese 
politicians gathered in Brussels for a month of talks that resulted in a date for independence, 
30 June 1960. As elections were held in May 1960 the Comité Spécial du Katanga, which 
allowed the central government in Leopoldville to control the mining industry in the province 
of Katanga, was dissolved. On independence day, the first Congolese prime minister, Patrice 
Lumumba, gave a speech in which he harshly condemned Belgian colonial exploitation, to the 
dismay of the young Belgian King Baudouin. A day later, a Belgian army general, Émile 
Janssens, conveyed to his Congolese troops, the Force Publique, that independence had 
changed nothing by writing ‘before Independence = after Independence’ on a chalkboard. 
570 Foreign service despatch, Zachary P. Geaneas USUN to StateDept, “(IO-UNP) – Letter From President of 
Guinea Concerning French Atomic Bomb Test in the Sahara”, 8 March 1960, RG. 306, P 249, Box 10, f: Policy 
– French Atomic Tests [Folder1/2], NARA.  
571 Foreign service despatch, Fitzhugh Green to USIA, “Country Plan”, 30 May 1961, RG. 306, UD-WW 273, 
FRC 51, f: IAA Country Plan FY 1962, NARA. 
572 Memorandum, “Sahara: Expériences nucléaires et spatiales”,  18 October 1961, 2 DE 87, FNSP. 
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Consequently, riots broke out in Thysville, setting in motion the chain of events that 
eventually led to Lumumba’s assassination.573 
What are scholars to make of the French nuclear test in the Sahara and the crisis in the 
Congo? International historians and Africanists insist on reading both episodes as moments 
where the Cold War realities of the international system intruded on Nkrumah’s ambition to 
keep Africa out of the bipolar conflict. Both incidents initially offered Ghana and the Afro-
Asian community in the UN the opportunity to play an autonomous role on the international 
stage, so the story goes, but the Cold War constraints, and Lumumba’s request for Soviet 
intervention, limited Nkrumah’s space to speak from a position of nonalignment. Moreover, 
Nkrumah himself became disappointed and realised that ‘the space to imagine new worlds’ 
had become a luxury ‘no one could […] afford.’ The Cold War, the competition between the 
Soviet and the American social system, forced anticolonial leaders to take the real balance of 
power into account.574  
Yet when the Sahara atomic bomb is assessed from multiple vantage points, the Cold 
War appears as an opportunity. By framing the explosion as an element of Cold War politics 
the French and British avoided the real issue at stake – the right to interfere in African affairs 
– which in turn allowed Nkrumah to promote his anticolonial ideology. By referring to the 
health risks and the Geneva test ban negotiations, which lasted from 1958 until 1962, the UK 
could support Ghana and criticise France without risking its remaining colonial claims. By 
making generic statements about nuclear disarmament, the USIA could avoid the issue 
altogether. At the same time, this myopic focus on the nuclear factor blinded the French to the 
strength of African nationalism. 
Likewise, the Congo crisis was not a moment where the United States betrayed its 
‘democratic values and rights to self-determination’ in a ‘relentless search for dominance over 
the Soviet Union’, as has been argued, nor was the emergency in the heart of Africa 
unquestionably a Cold War crisis.575 It is argued here that Eisenhower approved of 
573 David Van Reybrouck, Congo. Een Geschiedenis (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 2010), 276; Lise Namikas, 
Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960–1965 (Washington DC and Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2013), 62–71. 
574 Allman, “Nuclear Imperialism and the Pan-African Struggle for Peace and Freedom”, 97; Plummer, In Search 
of Power, 74; Biney, The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah, 112,152; As Thompson writes, 
Nkrumah ‘had designed his Congo policy to keep the Cold War out of Africa; the crisis had introduced it despite 
its efforts’, see Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 160; Rooney sees Nkrumah as skilful, but in the end claims 
that he was humiliated by the forces of the Cold War, which frustrated his genuine attempt to solve the crisis, see 
Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah. Vision and Tragedy, 284. 
575 Quotes taken from Namikas’s book that represents the dominant trend in the literature, see Namikas, 
Battleground Africa, 223–225; Ebere Nwaubani, “Eisenhower, Nkrumah and the Congo Crisis”, Journal of 
Contemporary History 36, no. 4 (2001): 608; Madeleine G. Kalb, The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa, 
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Lumumba’s murder because it would help preserve American values by eliminating a 
demagogue. American officials and their NATO allies agreed that the Congo crisis was the 
result of under-preparation for self-government, an analysis that profoundly shaped the 
Western response, and something that historians have ignored.  
Their failure to adequately deal with these crises therefore did not stem from a Cold 
War habit. Western officials acted out of a sense of desperation. The confrontation with 
Africans who demanded their political rights in an international propaganda campaign, and 
others who seemed out of control, signalled that psychological modernisation had not worked. 
In their search for a new way to acquire influence in Africa, leaders created complex modes of 
conflict that walked and talked like the Cold War, but were not about a bipolar competition to 
promote the American or Soviet forms of modernity. Historical research on the Congo crisis 
in particular does not reflect that complexity, but instead analyses these events from a Cold 
War centred view, while postcolonial criticism relegates that bipolar history to an analytical 
margin, making nineteenth century colonial Europe the object of its criticism.576 
Specifically, then, it is argued here that African attitudes often influenced Western 
decision-making in unexpected ways, while the Cold War did not damage Ghana’s Pan 
African project in 1960. A reading of American, Ghanaian, British and French documents 
reveals four contradictions that are not accounted for in the literature. For one, why did public 
diplomacy planners not decide on an all-out battle for hearts and minds with the Soviet Union 
in Africa? Further, it is assumed that Nkrumah could not realise his pan-African vision 
because the Cold War forced him to take the real balance of power into account. However, it 
is difficult to reconcile that claim with the British, American, and French response to Ghana’s 
campaign against the bomb. Third, historians argue that Lumumba came to be seen as an 
instrument of Soviet influence or even as a communist. Yet they do not explain why 
Lumumba needed to die while other leaders with communist sympathies were allowed to stay 
in power. Lastly, the Congo crisis is seen as a moment that pushed Nkrumah towards the East, 
an argument that is not supported by the sources.577 It is these four problems that are explored 
here. 
from Eisenhower to Kennedy (New York: Macmillan, 1982), xiii; Stephen R. Weissman, American Foreign 
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576 Here I expand on the insight of Heonik Kwon who writes: ‘postcolonial criticism […] results in a 
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Public Diplomacy after Independence: From Psychological to Socio-Economic 
Modernisation 
 
In the beginning of 1960, it was unclear if the strategies of the 1950s that were informed by 
the insights of psychological modernisation would also work on a continent with self-
governing states. When public diplomats gathered to rethink their operation, they had to 
determine what Africa’s new relationship with the world was and how the Cold War and the 
string of independence declarations affected their decisions. 
Ghanaian diplomats realised that after 1960 they would not only have to fend off 
neocolonial influence, but also convince the leaders of other African countries that African 
unity could yield significant benefits. The special mission that had set out from Accra in 
November 1960 to investigate the possibilities for pan-African activism had concluded that 
this would be particularly difficult in territories with ethnic tensions. Ibrahim Abboud, for 
instance, had welcomed Barden in Sudan where the non-Arab south was subjugated to a 
policy of ‘Islamisation.’ Abboud welcomed Ghanaian officials to make him acceptable in the 
south. Barden, the BAA director, was keen on exploiting that agenda. By offering 
scholarships, establishing pan-African trade unions and creating women’s organisations in 
Sudan he could limit Nasser’s pan-Arab influence. Not only the superpowers, but also 
Ghanaian diplomats were willing to increase the tension in countries like Sudan if it served 
their own goals.578 
Decolonisation also placed a heavy strain on the American public diplomacy machine, 
which had been designed to fight the battle for hearts and minds with the Soviet Union. In 
1960, Eisenhower therefore asked Mansfield Sprague, former Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for International Affairs, to evaluate US informational strategy. The resulting Sprague report 
was a stock taking exercise of how the lofty ambitions of the Jackson Committee had fared, in 
light of the emergence of ‘under developed nations.’579 
The changing world was an important topic of discussion in the committee meetings. 
The deputy director of the USIA, Washburn, for instance talked about ‘the trend to a 
multipolar world.’ Unlike Henry Kissinger, who saw political multi-polarity as a problem, 
578 Report, A.K. Barden to Nkrumah, “Special Mission to East and Central Africa”, 28 November 1960, 
BAA/RLAA/370 Correspondence with the President, 1960: BAA Reports, Correspondence (Nkrumah, 
Nationalist Organizations), PL; Westad, The Global Cold War, 398; Paul Nugent, Africa Since Independence: A 
Comparative History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 83. 
579 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 180; Report, “Conclusions and 
Recommendations of the President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad”, December 1960, 2, 13, U.S. 
President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee) Records, 1959-61, Box 26, f: 
Printed Committee Report, DDEL. 
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Washburn welcomed the countries that were ‘not aligned with either side.’ In his analysis this 
development was in line with the American spirit of self-determination and incompatible with 
Soviet coercion. Livingston T. Merchant from the State Department disagreed: Washburn 
might be right in the case of the UN, but ‘in terms of power the world is in fact bi-polar and is 
likely to become more so.’580 
Their debate reflected an ongoing discussion beneath the surface of American foreign 
policy. The world was changing; but were these changes relevant in diplomatic terms? The 
answer to that question depended on the type of diplomacy one was engaged in, something 
the Sprague Committee acknowledged by pointing out that modern diplomacy came in many 
guises, ranging from the formalised government-to-government communications to 
‘electronic diplomacy’.581 Because Washburn operated in the world of day-to-day symbolic 
combat, a place where real power relations were less important, he paid more attention to a 
small country such as Ghana that could use its prestige as a substitute for real power. 
Merchant, a seasoned diplomat, saw the world in starker and more realist tones.  
Nonetheless, when it came to Africa even the State Department acknowledged that this 
was not primarily a Cold War problem. Satterthwaite denied that the US was running a race 
with the USSR.582 The Sprague Committee did not see an immediate threat, but wanted to 
‘pre-empt’ Africa ‘for the Bloc’, something Dulles had stressed in his conversations with 
Eisenhower.583 In Africa, the PRC and the USSR did not constitute a direct threat. 
Communism was seen as a disease that could thrive in the development process, a problem 
that the Americans – in a cynical twist – could even create for themselves if they did not 
consciously imprint their values through cultural assistance. The Sprague Report saw 
communist activities as ancillary, at best, to the real problem, which was the so-called 
580 Minutes, “Abbott: U.S. Information Agency: Notes for Sprague Committee Presentation – Monday 
Afternoon”, 14 March 1960, U.S. President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague 
Committee) Records, 1959-61, Box 27, f: Minutes (2), DDEL; Kissinger quoted in Irwin, Gordian Knot, 172. 
581 Report, “Report of the President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad”, 1960, 8, US President’s 
Committee on Information Activities Abroad: Records 1960-61, Box 26, f: Report of the PCIAA, DDEL. 
582 He stated this in public and behind closed doors, see Draft, Satterthwaite, “U.S. Objectives in Africa: 
Statement by Mr. Satterthwaite at Tangier Conference”, 1960, 4, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, FRC 2, f: Conferences, 
NARA; Confidential Report, “Views expressed by the African Advisory Group regarding the Report of the 
Study group on U.S. Aid to Africa”, 17 May 1960, RG. 469, P36, Box 11, f: Africa Advisory Conference, 
NARA. 
583 Report, “Africa South of the Sahara”, 1960, 16, U.S President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad 
(Sprague Committee), Box 23, f: PCIAA #31 (1), DDEL; Stephen G. Rabe, “Eisenhower Revisionism: The 
Scholarly Debate”, in America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941, ed. 
Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 306; “Diary Memorandum for Records – 
December 26, 1960”, AWF, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box 11, f: [ACW] Diary December 1960 , DDEL. 
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revolution of rising expectations, the idea that unfulfilled, increased expectations create 
unstable political situations.584  
Because of independence, it became more important not only to prepare but also to 
favourably dispose leaders towards the US. The Sprague report recommended a presidential 
speech to glamorise the new $20,000,000 ICA Special Assistance Program for Tropical 
Africa while the efforts to educate and expand leadership cadres had to be strengthened. 
Ultimately, however, Americans saw leadership training and the promotion of a favourable 
American image as intertwined. Inexperienced Africans did not understand how international 
diplomacy worked, it was reasoned, which allowed for a distortion of the American image if 
decisions were implemented slowly. The cumbersome administrative procedures seemed to be 
particularly unsuited to Africa, and could result in so-called ‘negative psychological 
impressions’ on African leaders who were deemed to be unfamiliar with bureaucratic 
restrictions.585 This was Wilsonianism at its most paternalistic: a world run by American 
standards benefited Africans and Americans alike. 
The French tried to plant the seed of doubt by distributing two maps of Africa among 
their colleagues. One depicted bloc penetration through Egypt and Ethiopia, another displayed 
communism together with a pan-African and pan-Arab arrow coming from Egypt and Ghana. 
The second map was handed to the British with the urgent plea to undertake joint action if the 
colonial powers wanted to maintain their position in the face of African nationalism. The 
British were unimpressed, even though Macmillan had been concerned about the future of 
parliamentary democracy in Africa. A few days later, Herter was given the bipolar map of 
Africa by Debré, which Herter found exaggerated (illustration 16). James Frederick Green, the 
former US consul in Leopoldville, also saw the map and understood that the French wanted to 
mislead them.586 
What France failed to understand was that neither the US nor the UK was guided by a 
straightforward logic of Cold War containment. Paradoxically enough it was in the NATO 
committee on communist penetration in Africa that the most pressing problem surfaced: 
584 Report, “Report of the President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad”, 1960, 10, US President’s 
Committee on Information Activities Abroad: Records 1960-61, Box 26, f: Report of the PCIAA, DDEL.  
585 Report, “Africa South of the Sahara”, 1960, US President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad: 
Records 1960-61, Box 9, f: Africa # 31 (1), DDEL. 
586 Plans & Operations Militaires, “Reprise des Conversations Tripartites sur L’Afrique: Menaces et Zones 
Sensibles”, 6 April 1960, DAL, Généralités 1960-1965, f: entretiens franco-americains juin 1959-aout 1962, 
AMAE; Secret letter, Chancery to African Department FO, 23 April 1959, FO 371/137966, TNA; Secret cabinet 
note, “Colonial Policy Committee”, 10 April 1959, CAB 134/1558, TNA; Confidential, “President de Gaulle’s 
Visit Position Papers: Soviet Penetration in Africa April 22-26, 1960”, [April  1960], Memorandum, James 
Frederick Green to Satterthwaite, “Your Appointment with the French Minister”, 8 December 1959, RG. 59, A1-
3107, Box 1, f: Communism in Africa, NARA 
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nationalism. The members concluded that nationalism had led to unrealistic expectations, 
which made the so-called ‘white man’ less confident about his ability to address the challenge 
of African development. Whereas in the past, education could have addressed these issues, 
profound economic and social changes had rendered this tool useless. The leaders who had 
been educated in the West were still unstable, discontent, and resentful.587  
In the sands of the Sahara and the bush of the Congo, it became clear that psychological 
schemes of modernisation to draw Africans into the modern mindset had failed. Instead, 
leaders turned towards socio-economic modernisation, in which the socio-economic 
conditions not the African attitudes were targeted. All the while Nkrumah was forced to look 
for a new way to compete with other African leaders who resisted his pan-African aspirations. 
Nkrumah therefore took the lead in a propaganda campaign against the bomb. 
 
587 Report, “Communist Penetration in Africa”, 20 March 1959, 1-5, CM(59)32-e, “Communist Penetration in 
Africa”, 23 November 1961, CM (61)112, Note by the Political Division, Evelyn Shuckburgh, “Communist 
Penetration in Africa”, 23 April 1960, 6, CM(61)43-e, NATO-Archives. 
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Illustration 16: This map was produced by the French military staff and depicts the different threats to the 
French presence on the continent, namely communism, pan-Arabism, and pan-Africanism (Fermentation 
africaine). Where Ghana, Guinea, the Belgian Congo and Nigeria are seen as strongholds of pan-Africanism, 
Nasser’s Egypt is seen as a mixture of pan-Arab and communist influences. It was these types of maps that 
French officials gave to the British to convince them to form a joint front. Source: Plans and Operations 
Militaires, “Reprise des Conversations Tripartites sur L’Afrique: Menaces et Zones Sensibles”, 6 April 1960, 
DAL, Généralités 1960-1965, f: entretiens franco-americains juin 1959-aout 1962, AMAE 
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No Longer at Ease: The Sahara Atomic Bomb and the Assertive African 
 
In 1959, France made clear that it wanted to test an atomic bomb in the Algerian Sahara 
desert, a moment that provided Ghana with the first real opportunity to confront de Gaulle’s 
conception of Africa. At the same time, Ghana, together with the West, discovered the 
mobilising potential of African nationalism. When the Afro-Asian Peoples Secretariat in 
Cairo organised an anti-Atomic Bomb Test Day in October 1959, Ghana could not stay 
behind because protest on the streets of Cairo strengthened Nasser’s anticolonial reputation.588 
Nkrumah therefore utilised his network and requested the help of other African leaders, such 
as Keita in Mali, to mobilise African opinion.589  
In November 1959, 22 Afro-Asian countries succeeded in having a UN resolution 
approved that expressed concern about the health risks of the atomic fallout. In the lead up to 
the vote, the British had considered drafting a watered down version of the resolution, a plan 
that was eventually dropped after personal intervention by Macmillan who felt they could not 
offend Ghana and Nigeria, the two leading nations behind the campaign against the bomb.590 
Wilson Flake, the US ambassador in Accra, was surprised when the Minister of External 
Affairs, Michael Dei-Anang, reassured him that the Anglo-American vote against the 
resolution would soon be forgotten. Nkrumah had accomplished the desired PR effect. Couve 
de Murville, for his part, was afraid that the Afro-Asian bloc would only further destabilise 
the UN with its unreasonable demands.591 
The British interpretation of African disgruntlement, Americans on the side-line, 
Ghana’s discovery of propaganda, France’s inability to see Africans as international actors 
and the UN vote already reflected the positions of the participants in a public debate about the 
future of colonialism that was shrouded in Cold War language. 
 
 
Ghana Discovers the African Public: the Campaign against the Bomb 
 
For its campaign against the bomb, Ghana relied heavily on its newspapers. To reach a mass 
audience, more attention was being devoted to the production of gripping and richly 
illustrated stories. The accusatory discourse focused on the health risks that attended the 
588 Confidential U.K. Eyes Only, Arnold Smith, “Afro Asian Solidarity Secretariat, Cairo: Anti Sahara Atomic 
Test Day”, October 1959, FO 371/138609, TNA. 
589 Letter, Modibo Keita to Nkrumah, 7 July 1959, RG. 17/2/802 Miscellaneous 1959-1966, PRAAD-Accra. 
590 “Big UN Vote Calls on France to Drop Bomb Plan”, The Times Saturday, November 21, 1959; Telegram, 
New York to FO, 18 November 1959 and Secret Minute, Macmillan, 30 October 1959, PREM 11/2694, TNA. 
591 Telegram, Wilson Flake to secretary of state, 8 December 1959, RG. 306, P 249, Box 10, f: Policy – French 
Atomic Tests [Folder1/2], NARA; Letter, Couve de Murville to de Gaulle, 12 March 1960, CM 7 1959, FNSP. 
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bomb, rather than the legitimacy of French colonial claims. The Evening News described the 
French decision to explode the bomb in apocalyptic terms that were appealing to a religious 
society. A cartoon depicted the devil guiding de Gaulle to a ballistic missile with the caption 
‘Instrument of imperialists to crush down African Personality (illustration 17).’592 Feelings of 
indignation were also stirred in a directly religious way, through a prayer for instance: 
 
O God of Mother Ghana and All Africa. Thou knowest the peaceful stand, which Ghana is taking 
against the French A-bomb test. Not in France but the Sahara. Thy sons and daughters truly implore 
thee. For peace and concord of all nations. Change thou the heart of France. To desist testing an A-
bomb in the Sahara. Our God-given Sahara thou mayst preserve and incline France to our pleas and 
protests. And from the claws of all warmongers. Save Mother Ghana and all Africa. Prove to the world 
as thou did in the days when Daniel was cast into the den of lions. That through Thee France’s Atom 
bomb test must surely fail and put to shame. From Mother Ghana and all Africa in particular. Wipe 
away the perils of French imperialism. And save us and the future generations. Through thy Son, Jesus 
Christ our Lord, Amen.593 
 
A discourse on health, pacifism, and religion had to unite a fragile coalition of Africans and 
pacifists from beyond of the continent. The reverend Michael Scott, a renowned anticolonial 
activist, A.J. Must, who founded the American Committee on Africa, and Michael Randle, 
chair of the Direct Action Committee against Nuclear War, were just some of the people who 
descended on Accra, a city where peace activists, anticolonial freedom fighters and Afro-
Americans found a public forum and a common cause.  
Besides the press, the Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs tried to rouse the public with 
stories of spontaneous protest, such as the journey of the Sahara Protest Team to the bombing 
site in January 1960. On Radio Ghana the trip was presented as a holy war and had been 
financed by a fundraising campaign during a rally at the West End Arena in November 1959, 
meant to increase exposure. Even though both teams became stranded in Upper Volta, the 
mission was still successful because it created awareness about the bomb as pamphlets were 
distributed in French, English, Arabic and Hawza and spectacular stories were printed in 
newspapers. Gbedemah even sent the team back after they had been dropped back into Ghana 
by French soldiers because their confrontations had aroused so much international interest.594 
Ghana’s provocative language was effective. Guiringaud complained about the women 
protesting under his window. When he asked them to leave, they shouted back that a bomb 
would lead to an embargo of French goods. The Ghanaian government even provided the 
592 Cartoon, Evening News, January 7, 1960 
593 “Prayer Protesting against French A-Test in the Sahara”, The Ghana Times, February 1, 1960. 
594 Allman, “Nuclear Imperialism and the Pan-African Struggle for Peace and Freedom”, 90; Bill Sutherland and 
Matt Meyer, Guns and Gandhi in Africa: Pan-African Insights on Nonviolence, Armed Struggle and Liberation 
(Trenton: Africa World Press, 2000), 36–39. 
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ambassador with a retired policeman for his personal protection.595 These women also created 
organisations such as Ghana’s Women’s League, Ghana Women’s Atom-Test Committee and 
the Accra Market Women’s Association, all of which were covertly supported by the state. 
Their open letter rejected the ‘sugar-coated propaganda’ of France and played on maternal 
instincts: ‘For us who breast-feed children and know the sacrifices involved in our birth-pangs 
in order to bring forth a single human being to life, the Sahara Atom test is most wicked and 
inhuman.’596  
In short, the imperative of shaping and manipulating public opinion had become central 
for Ghana. This is even more evident when contrasted with the Nigerian diplomats who were 
aware of the PR dimension of the bomb, but more concerned about its immediate health risks. 
Prime Minister Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewe visited London in September 1959 to 
demand British nuclear experts, which he then posted in Nigerian monitoring stations even 
though Macmillan reassured Balewe that the Harmattan, a dry dusty Sahara wind, could not 
carry the fallout in the direction of Nigeria. Nigeria’s unilateral move as well as the British 
guarantees for assistance to Sierra Leone angered Nkrumah, because he felt they weakened 
the international position of the African bloc.597  
 
 
 
595 Incoming telegram, Guiringaud to DAL, 8 February 1960, f: Mesures de blocages des avions français a 
Ghana, DAL Généralités, 49QONT/72, AMAE. 
596 Letter, “The Ghana Women’s Anti-Atom Test Committee”, 13 February 1960, DAL Généralités, 
49QONT/72, AMAE. 
597 Report, “Nigerian Ministers Visit to London: Talks with Macmillan and Mr. Lennox Boyd”, 19 September 
1959, Confidential, “Note on Visit to Nigeria (February 13th – February 20th, 1960)”, 21 March 1960, EG1/685, 
TNA; Secret Minute, Macmillan, 30 October 1959 and Secret, “Note on Ghana Reactions”, [October 1959], 
PREM 11/2694, TNA. 
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Illustration 17: Cartoon aimed at inciting African public opinion against the atomic bomb. Source: Evening 
News, 7 January 1960. 
 
 
Debating Decolonisation in Cold War Terms: The Western Response to Ghanaian 
Activism 
 
It was Ghana’s propaganda campaign that forced the CRO, the USIA and even Guiringaud to 
publically take a position. Guiringaud’s response was complicated. Not for a moment did he 
pause to consider the legitimacy of French testing in the Sahara, but he understood that a 
public response was required in the face of Ghanaian propaganda, which had led the 
unintelligent mass audience – ‘gens simples’ – to panic, and the educated parts of the public to 
harbour doubts about the French intentions. 
The ambassador wrote a rather factual sounding six-page pamphlet based on the speech 
that Jules Moch, the French representative in the UN disarmament commission, had given 
during the debate on the Afro-Asian resolution against the bomb. It included three diagrams 
that compared the blast site in the Sahara to those of Nevada and Balkhash to further 
substantiate the claims about safety. The pamphlet played on the perceived need for prestige 
of the elite, which Guiringaud called the ‘les cercles évolués.’ Someone with a certain level of 
education, the pamphlet stated, would not want to be guided by the same emotions of the 
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common people. ‘As an educated and responsible person’, the pamphlet went on, ‘you would 
not like to be guided by such arguments only by your judgement on a matter of this 
importance’.598 
According to the French embassy, the pamphlet was a success. It had been well received 
among diplomats and at universities and resented by government offices in Accra. Ghana’s 
finance minister, K.A. Gbedemah had described the pamphlet’s content as a blatant lie and the 
Ghanaian Times of 9 February 1960 had printed a reply which according to Guiringaud was 
unsubstantiated and merely contained insults. A protest letter from the Belgian professor and 
former health minister, Arthur Wauters, and a transcript of Gbedemah’s speech were handed 
over to the embassy.599  
Guiringaud, like de Gaulle, felt that African leaders had no right to interfere with what 
they perceived to be French affairs. The fact that France, through the Secretariat of the French 
Community, began offering internships in its energy commission and its atomic facilities – 
believing this was good public relations – further underscores the French inability to think 
outside of the colonial framework.600 French officials did not question their right to be in 
Africa. 
The British, by contrast, attempted to depoliticise the campaign against the bomb and 
avoided decolonisation because they realised that traditional colonialism was on the way out. 
They placed the bomb in the context of the Geneva test ban negotiations and the Cold War. 
The conversation between Macmillan and Balewe, for instance, bordered on the absurd. 
Although they agreed on a joint Nigeria-UK commission to measure the nuclear fallout, both 
men seemed to be living on different planets. As the Nigerian delegation complained about 
French neocolonialism, Macmillan stoically maintained that the real challenge was nuclear 
proliferation. 601  
In the House of Commons debate, Macmillan avoided the symbolic impact of the bomb. 
When a Labour member of parliament (MP), Fenner Brockway, claimed that the Sahara was 
not only a matter of the danger of the fallout, but also a matter of the resentment of African 
598 Letter, Guiringaud to DAL, “Note sur notre expérience nucléaire”, 29 January 1960, Letter, Guringaud to 
DAL, “Note sur notre expérience nucléaire”, 25 January 1960, DAL, Généralités, 49QONT/72, f: Mesures de 
blocages des avions français a Ghana, AMAE. 
599 Letter, Guiringaud to DAL, “a/s: Polémique sur notre experience nucléaire”, 11 février 1960, DAL, 
Généralités, 49QONT/72, AMAE; “French Embassy Note Proved False”, Ghana Times, February 11, 1960. 
600 Letter, Secrétaire d’etat aux relations avec les etats de la Communauté to l’envoyé exceptionnel et 
plénipotentiaire de la république française et de la Communauté à Abidjan, 11 October 1960, Ministère de la 
Coopération, Direction de la coopération technique et culturelle, 19810443/47, f : Historique de la DCT : 
Organization, CHAN. 
601 Brief for the Prime Minister, “The Visit of the Nigerian Prime Minister”, 17 September 1959, PREM 
11/2892, TNA. 
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countries, Macmillan stated that the technical issues had been studied and further expressed 
his hope that the Geneva negotiations would be successful. When another MP rose to disagree 
with Macmillan, stating that the main problem was the affront to African feelings, Macmillan 
stuck to his position: the Nigerian ministers that had visited London had been anxious about 
the health risks.602 
Nonetheless, this was a tactical move. Macmillan and UK foreign officers knew they 
needed to find a public relations strategy that balanced the French viewpoint with the need to 
support Nigeria and Ghana. The FO believed that the British ‘public reaction’ would become 
an important element in the future relations with France. Ignoring the hostile reactions in 
Africa – as France was doing – was not an option, since Ghana’s propaganda campaign had 
fed rumours about a French-British conspiracy to wipe out the African population on the 
continent. Therefore the UK officers were ordered to deny any involvement, declare that the 
UK would not resume testing as long as negotiations were ongoing in Geneva and state that 
their own research had found that fallout did not pose any significant risk to health.603 In a 
private conversation with de Gaulle, Macmillan voiced his discontent about the French 
behaviour, explaining that it made the British position in Africa almost impossible.604 
Conspicuously absent in this war of words was the USIA, a consequence of the OCB’s 
decision to remain silent. Nevertheless, when Nigerian newspapers began to blame the US for 
the situation, because the Americans had denied the French access to the ‘atomic club’, 
George Allen decided that some damage control was needed. The USIA’s response was 
Making It Safe to Stop Nuclear Testing, a story produced for USIS-Accra, but sent out to all 
the posts. By describing how the US had made every effort to share its nuclear technology and 
by emphasising the deception of the public by the USSR, it was suggested that the US had 
been forced into the business of atomic weaponry. The second part of the pamphlet explained 
that nuclear energy had peaceful uses and that the American testing procedure was safe, with 
only three lives lost since the beginning of the tests in 1945. Still, a few days before the 
explosion, the USIA’s guidelines to its posts worldwide maintained that the less said by US 
officials the better.605 
602 Debate transcript, “Oral Answers”, 10 November 1959, Secret telegram, secretary of state for colonies to Sir 
J. Robertson, 31 March 1960 PREM 11/2892, TNA. 
603 Letter, A.W. Snelling to J. Chadwick, 12 February 1960, DO35/9341, TNA; Confidential telegram, FO to 
posts, 11 February 1960, PREM 11/4242, TNA. 
604 Très Secret, “Conference Occidentale a Quatre : Tete-a-tete du General de Gaule avec M. Macmillan, au 
Palais de l’Elysee le 21 Decembre 1959 de17h.40 à 18.15”, 21 December 1959, 7-8, Fonds de la présidence de la 
République de Charles de Gaulle, 5AG(1)/661, f: Janvier du 21 Decembre 1959, CHAN. 
605 Foreign service despatch, “Nigerians Protest French Atomic Tests in the Sahara”, 21 July 1959, Outgoing 
Message, Allen to posts, “Infoguide: French Nuclear Test”, 19 August 1959, Letter, Tom Graves to Glen Smith, 
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Ghana’s propaganda campaign thus forced the USIA and British to respond in ways that 
subtly acknowledged African grievances but did not upset de Gaulle who considered the 
bomb to be a French affair and African opposition an expression of mass hysteria induced by 
Ghana. By referring to the Cold War in broad terms, the Anglo-Saxons wanted to remain 
middle-of-the-road, a course of action that became untenable once the bomb was activated. 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 18: Map of the area affected by radioactive fallout taken from the UK-Nigerian report of 1960. 
Source: Nuclear Tests in the Sahara: Report by the Joint United Kingdom-Nigerian Scientific Committee on the 
Monitoring of Radioactivity. Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1960. 
 
 
Testing Bombs, Testing Alliances: Britain takes Nkrumah’s Side and the Disintegration of 
the Anti-Bomb Coalition 
  
On the afternoon of 13 February 1960, Dr. J.A.T. Dawson of the Atomic Weapons Research 
Establishment – which manufactured the UK warheads – left for Nigeria to join the UK-
Nigerian Scientific Committee. During the flight to Lagos, he was called into the cockpit at 
“Making it Safe to Stop Nuclear Testing Part I II III”, 14 October 1959, US Information Agency Outgoing 
message, “Infoguide: French Nuclear Testing”, 11 February 1960, RG. 306, P 249, Box 10, f: Policy – French 
Atomic Tests [Folder1/2], NARA. 
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4:30 PM because the radiation monitor on board had recorded 3 milliroentgen while flying 
over Kano in Nigeria, an indication that the weapon debris had travelled in a different 
direction than predicted. After careful study in Lagos, the team concluded that the amount of 
fallout had been below harmful limits. Dawson then travelled to Ghana to study the data of 
the Canadians who had quietly set up radiation monitoring equipment at Nkrumah’s 
request.606  
Once the bomb exploded, the UK was quick to investigate if its reassurances about the 
potential fallout matched the actual measurements. Even though the UK-Nigerian Scientific 
Committee concluded that the dust particles, which had travelled to Ghana and Nigeria, were 
harmless, the Nigerian prime minister was still angry (illustration 18).607 Furthermore, when 
Sierra Leone and Gambia also asked for help in measuring the fallout, Macmillan and CRO 
officers began to worry about the opportunities this offered Ghana in terms of propaganda.608  
In light of that threat to their public image, the British grew increasingly disaffected 
with the French. When, at the end of 1960, a new Afro-Asian resolution requested countries 
to refrain from further testing, the UK delegation in New York was instructed to vote in 
favour. The bomb and the already erupted Congo crisis made the British choose for its 
territories in Africa rather than France, something the British representatives at the UN kept 
secret from their French colleagues until just before the vote. The new public diplomacy 
strategy that the Foreign Office drew up in 1961 stressed that the British record of 
decolonisation had to be clearly distinguished from the French actions.609 
Guiringaud was unaware of any wrongdoing and despite his efforts to promote French 
culture in Ghana he was unable to see the symbolic dimension of the Sahara tests. When he 
bumped into the British ambassador at a cocktail party, Guiringaud told him that he found the 
campaign against France unnecessary and exaggerated. ‘But your bomb is a political affair is 
it not?’ the British ambassador replied. Guiringaud interpreted this snide remark as evidence 
of envy about France’s entry into the small group of atomic powers. Even when Nkrumah in a 
private conversation with the ambassador hinted that his propaganda on nuclear safety was a 
way to reject French colonialism, Guiringaud still replied that the Sahara was French and that 
606 Confidential, “Note on Visit to Nigeria (February 13th – February 20th, 1960)”, 21 March 1960, EG1/685, 
TNA; Confidential inward telegram, Ottawa to CRO, 31 March 1960, EG1/685, TNA. 
607 The committee consisted of J.R. Clackson, Director of Meteorological Services, Nigeria, O.D. Macnamara, 
senior radiology specialist, Nigeria, B.E.C. Agu, physicist at the University College Ibadan and J.A.T. Watson, 
see Confidential letter, N. Levin to Roger Makins, 23 March 1960, 1, Confidential, “Note on Visit to Nigeria 
(February 13th – February 20th, 1960)”, 21 March 1960, 1, EG1/685, TNA. 
608 Letter, A.W. Snelling to Hunt, “Fake Independence”, 2 March 1960, DO35/9424, TNA. 
609 Minute, N. Pritchard, 13 December 1960, DO 177/19, TNA; Memorandum, FO, “Information Policy for 
Africa”, 30 June 1961, FO 953/2031, TNA. 
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the French access to the nuclear club was not up for discussion, after which he rose from his 
seat and left.610  
Additionally, the Executive Council of the French Community supported the bomb as a 
measure to protect French Africa.611 Senghor, for instance, had expressed his amazement that 
the 208th explosion provoked such emotion, while the 207 non-French tests had gone 
unnoticed. The press release of the French embassy on the day of the explosion played down 
the health risks, listed the results of the tests, and stated that the French decision had been 
made because nuclear weapons had become a fact of international life.612 
When a second device was detonated on the first of April, even Eisenhower felt forced 
to react. At the Washington meeting on 22 April 1960, he passed on warnings from nine 
African nations to de Gaulle that the French nuclear tests in the Sahara were driving them to 
the Soviet camp.613 In Ghana, propaganda became less involved with the peace movement and 
more aimed at furthering Ghana’s pan-African ambitions. 
Ghanaian officials lost sight of the possible consequences of their propaganda. 
Gbedemah for instance had been forced to cancel the freeze of all the assets of French firms, 
when other African countries did not follow the Ghanaian example. Ghana’s claim within 
GATT for equal treatment and its application for loans with the IMF were weakened by the 
trade restrictions put in place against France. Nonetheless, the second secretary of the 
American embassy, Howard W. Potter, understood that the economic sanctions were mainly 
designed to have a political effect.614 
More importantly, in April 1960, international peace activists like Bill Sutherland 
became disillusioned with Nkrumah at the Positive Action Conference for Peace and Security 
in Africa. Jean Allman argues that peace activists were unhappy because Nkrumah was 
unable to resist the pressures of the Cold War and as a consequence gave them less freedom to 
experiment. However, Sutherland hardly mentions the Cold War in his memoirs. What he 
610 Confidential report, Guiringaud to DAL, “a/s : M. Nkrumah, la bombe et nos amis”, 23 février 1960, f: 
Mesures de blocages des avions français a Ghana, DAL, Généralités, 49QONT/72, AMAE ; Letter, Guiringaud 
to Couve de Murville, 14 February 1960, DDF, 1960, Tome 1, 175. 
611 “A French bomb-not only for France?”, The Manchester Guardian, July 10, 1959. 
612 Foreign service despatch, Donald Dumont to StateDept, “Position of UPS on French Atomic Explosion”, 24 
February 1960, Foreign service despatch, “Reaction in Guinea to French Atomic Test”, 20 February 1960, RG. 
306, P 249, Box 10, f: Policy – French Atomic Tests [Folder1/2], NARA; Press Release, Ambassade de France 
Service de Presse et d’Information, “France’s First Atomic Explosion”, 13 February 1960, RG. 306, P 249, Box 
10, f: Policy – French Atomic Tests [Folder1/2], NARA. 
613 Irwin M. Wall, France, the United States, and the Algerian War (Berkeley and London: University of 
California Press, 2001), 212. 
614 Foreign service despatch, Howard W. Potter to StateDept, “Factors Causing Withdrawal of Sanctions 
Imposed in Protest Against French Saharan Bomb Tests”, 28 April 1960, Foreign service despatch, Howard W. 
Potter to StateDept, “Ghana Reinforces Economic Sanctions Against France in Protest Against Saharan Bomb 
Tests”, 14 April 1960, RG. 306, P 249, Box 10, f: Policy – French Atomic Tests [Folder1/2], NARA.  
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criticises is Nkrumah’s use of the peace movement to advance Ghana’s position in Africa and 
the rest of the world.615 
Unlike the propaganda campaign before the explosion, Nkrumah’s speech at the 
Positive Action conference presented the nuclear bomb as an attempt to ‘balkanise’ the 
continent and destroy the ‘African Personality’.  Peace activists like Sutherland were 
disappointed because original disarmament proposals were submerged in the pan-African 
agenda. Nkrumah had discovered that the emotions that the bomb raised could be used to 
mobilise the so-called ‘masses’ in the service of African Unity. International peace activists 
and Nkrumah went their own way, not because of the Cold War but because Nkrumah wanted 
to pursue his own agenda.616 The USIA therefore described Nkrumah’s call for an emergency 
conference as an attempt to retain his leadership position in Africa where other newly 
independent nations rejected Ghana’s ideas. Nigeria, for instance, passed an emotional motion 
in its House of Commons that condemned France’s ‘disregard of African sensibilities.’617 The 
USIS officers in Accra, however, expected Nkrumah to be isolated in his pleas for African 
unity, a perceptive observation.618 
In summation, all actors in this story avoided the real stakes of the debate, namely the 
future of African self-government. Ghana’s campaign focused on health risks to sustain the 
coalition between peace movements outside of Ghana and the uneducated African public. The 
UK had to balance its relationship with France, safeguard its own atomic energy interests, and 
maintain the goodwill of its former colonies, and therefore treated the bomb as an issue of 
nuclear proliferation. France did not consider the African sensitivities and simply stated that 
their test posed no health threats, while the USIA presented the US as a responsible nuclear 
nation. The Americans had been forced to detonate a bomb because its Cold War adversary 
could not be trusted. Thus a debate that was at its core about the future of colonialism was 
discussed in Cold War terms. 
615 Sutherland and Meyer, Guns and Gandhi in Africa, 41–42; Allman, “Nuclear Imperialism and the Pan-
African Struggle for Peace and Freedom”, 97. 
616 Speech transcript, Kwame Nkrumah, “Conference on Positive Action and Security in Africa, Accra, 7th to 10th 
April, 1960: Opening Session”, 7 April 1960, Dabu Gizenga Papers, Box 128-6, f: 108 Conference, MSRC; 
Allman, “Nuclear Imperialism and the Pan-African Struggle for Peace and Freedom”, 93–96; Sutherland and 
Meyer, Guns and Gandhi in Africa, 41. 
617 Incoming airgram, Dorros to secretary of state, “House of Representatives Passes Strong Motion Regarding 
Future Sahara Bomb Tests”, 7 April 1960, RG. 306, P 249, Box 10, f: Policy – French Atomic Tests [Folder1/2], 
NARA.  
618 Foreign service despatch, Howard W. Potter Second Secretary of Amembassy Accra to StateDept, “Factors 
Causing Withdrawal of Sanctions Imposed in Protest Against French Saharan Bomb Tests”, 28 April 1960, 
Memorandum, “Conference on Positive Action for Peace and Security in Africa to be held in Accra April 7th – 
9th”, [April 1960], FCO 141/6735, TNA; Confidential outgoing message, Washburn to African posts, “Infoguide: 
Emergency Conference For Peace and Security in Africa”, 1 April 1960, RG. 306, P 249, Box 10, f: Policy – 
French Atomic Tests [Folder1/2], NARA. 
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With the second test, these coalitions fell apart under the pressure of African public 
opinion: Ghana cut its ties with the international peace movement to emphasize the message 
of African unity, while even the USIA and Eisenhower felt forced to react in light of French 
intransigence. The British choice to support Ghana instead of France is remarkable in light of 
what has been written about British decolonisation. Ronald Hyam and Frank Heinlein for 
instance, emphasise that the UK was forced to give up its empire because of international 
pressure, but they do not include African countries and cite the French referendum in 1958 as 
an event that prompted British officials to rethink their approach.619 What the Sahara bomb 
shows is how important Ghana was in UK decision making and how France – rather than an 
example – was a disruptive force in British declonisation policy. 
By the time the UK gave up its support for France, it was not the assertive claims of 
African nationalism but the perceived ‘primitive’ behaviour in the streets of Leopoldville that 
preoccupied the imaginations of policy makers. That interpretation profoundly influenced 
decision making in the Congo. 
 
 
Things Fall Apart: The Congo Crisis and the Unhinged African 
 
On 30 June 1960, King Baudouin arrived in Leopoldville to witness the transfer of power 
from the Belgians to the newly formed Congolese government in which Lumumba took the 
position of prime minister and Joseph Kasavubu became the president. After King Baudouin 
sung the praise of Leopold II as a civiliser and Kasavubu promised to honour the longstanding 
ties between both nations, Lumumba approached the podium and made an impromptu speech 
in which he reminded his audience of Belgian exploitation and racism. Baudouin had to be 
persuaded by Gaston Eyskens, the Belgian Prime Minister, to not walk out of the ceremony. 
Only 48 hours later, workers went on strike to demand better working conditions and riots 
broke out among the soldiers of the Force Public, while the mineral rich province of Katanga, 
which was led by Moise Tshombe, declared its independence with Belgian support.620 
But what determined international decision making about the Congo and eventually 
created a climate in which Lumumba’s assassination became acceptable? While historians 
have condemned the state-led murder, they do not explain why it was that the Congolese 
619 Frank Heinlein, British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945-63: Scrutinising the Official Mind 
(New York: Routledge, 2002), 299; Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire, 265; Darwin, The Empire Project, 649–
652; Martin Shipway and Larry J. Butler, “The Wind of Change and the Tides of History: De Gaulle, Macmillan 
and the Beginning of French Decolonization Endgame”, in The Wind of Change: Harold Macmillan and British 
Decolonization, ed. Sarah Stockwell and Larry J. Butler (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 180–94. 
620 Namikas, Battleground Africa, 62–69. 
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prime minister had to be eliminated and other left-leaning leaders were allowed to stay in 
power. Lumumba came to be seen as an instrument of Soviet influence, most historians claim, 
a perception encapsulated by Dulles’s utterance that Lumumba was ‘a Castro or worse’.621  In 
this narrative Eisenhower is a man solely motivated by the Cold War competition, a 
characterisation that is widely accepted even by those who analyse the influence of racist 
tropes on policy.622 However, Lumumba’s reputation as a demagogue was more important for 
the British, the Belgians, and particularly Eisenhower because demagoguery was what he 
wanted to avoid. Accordingly, it was officials in these three countries that devised a plan to 
murder Lumumba.  
 
 
The Congo as an Educational Wasteland 
 
In response to the riots and the Katanga secession, the US quickly approved the United 
Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), while Britain and France abstained. Afraid it would 
set a precedent for Rhodesia, Macmillan supported ONUC but not the use of force in Katanga 
while de Gaulle opposed the entire operation. Through the anticolonial lens of Lumumba and 
Nkrumah the position of the two colonial powers was seen as a form of support for Katanga. 
However, the Quai d’Orsay, like Macmillan was not willing to support the secession. Both 
men feared that open support would lead to disgruntlement in the remaining African colonies, 
open the door to more UN intervention, and lead to secessionist claims in the Bas-Kongo, 
which could threaten the territorial integrity of Congo-Brazzaville.623  
The widespread unrest had come as a surprise because many believed that Belgian 
colonial rule had given the ‘heart of darkness’ a more modern heartbeat (illustration 19).624 
When King Baudouin travelled to Leopoldville, for the independence celebrations, he found a 
621 Memorandum of Discussion at 452nd Meeting of the NSC, 21 July 1960, FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. 14: Africa, 
338-41; The interpretation of the Congo crisis as an episode of the Cold War and Eisenhower’s approval of 
Lumumba’s death were two claims that were established for the first time by Madeline G. Kalb, see Kalb, The 
Congo Cables, 27–28. 
622 Only Kevin Dunn has departed from the Cold War explanation by studying how the American media scripted 
a narrative of ‘cold war competition and Congolese barbarity and chaos.’ Eisenhower, however, is still cast as 
the voice of a ‘Cold War competition’, Kevin Dunn, Imagining the Congo: The International Relations of 
Identity (New York and Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 65, 99–101; Borstelmann, The Cold War and 
the Color Line, 129–131. 
623 Letter, M. Thibaut to DAL, 10 October 1960, DAL, Congo Belge 1960-65, 44QONT/49, f: CB-V-1-17 
Assistance technique et culturel jan-déc 1960, AMAE; Lise Namikas, “Battleground Africa: The Cold War and 
the Congo Crisis, 1960-1965” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 2002), 73; Vincent Genin, 
“La politique étrangère de la France face à la crise congolaise (1960-1961)”, Journal of Belgian History 43, no. 1 
(2013): 95. 
624 The Belgian government was surprised, as the official investigation revealed: De Vos et al., Lumumba: De 
Complotten? De Moord., 31. 
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clean and modern city, that had undergone a dusting with the pesticide DDT to kill the 
mosquitos. J.D.B Fowells of the British Council was impressed to find skyscrapers, wide 
boulevards, air conditioned hotels, night clubs, and even a British Congo club where 
inhabitants of the Commonwealth gathered. What was maddening for the American and 
British public diplomats who had been hiding under their desks, was that the Congolese 
seemed to refuse the order and prosperity that colonialism had brought.625 Couve de Murville 
for his part had already in April 1960 predicted that the prosperous Congo would descend into 
chaos once the ‘white man’ left.626  
In determining why there was so much atrocious violence, de Murville and his 
colleagues settled upon a familiar explanation: the Belgians had insufficiently prepared the 
Congolese for self-government. The educational programmes of Radio Congo Belge, initiated 
in 1959 and set to expand in 1960, were soon forgotten, despite initial success. By the end of 
November the Leopoldville station had already received 25,000 letters from listeners each 
month, making it almost impossible to correct and return every essay.627 Newspaper 
commentators, however, criticised the Belgian colonial government for creating an 
uneducated mass with only a few educated leaders.628 In December 1959, the American 
embassy expressed its concern after reading an old Belgian plan, authored by Jef Van Bilsen 
in 1955. This Belgian lawyer had estimated that 30 years and 50,000 secondary school 
graduates were needed to establish essential government services. What had been a report to 
justify a continuous Belgian presence, was read by the Americans as a cry for help.629 In his 
625 Confidential letter, Information Office Leopoldville to FO, 16 August 1960, BW 154/1, TNA; Telegram, 
USIS Leopoldville to Sec of State, 10 April 1961, RG. 306, P 86, Box 2, NARA; Report, USIS-Leopoldville to 
Washington, “Country Assessment Report”, 13 February 1961, RG. 306, UD-WW 273, FRC 51, f: IAA 
Assessment Reports, NARA; Letter, Elizabeth Wyndham to F.R.H. Hugh Murray, 31 October 1960 and Letter 
F.R.H. Murray to E. Wynhamd British Embassy Leopoldville,  11 November 1960, FO 1110/1299, TNA 
626 Genin, “La politique étrangère de la France face à la crise congolaise (1960-1961)”, 89; Memcon,  “Exchange 
of Views on Africa”, 15 April 1960, 5, RG. 59, CDF 1960-63, 611.70/2-860 – 611.70/2-1362, NARA. 
627 The director had thought about handing out radio sets that could only receive the local wave length, to protect 
the public from ‘mischievous material from outside’, but in the end he decided that the time for such ‘illiberal’ 
measures had passed, see Restricted, consulate general to information executive department, 25 November 1959, 
CO 1027/252, TNA. 
628 Note, “C.W. de Kiewiet President Universy of Rochester: Education in the Congo, in the New York Herald 
Tribune”, 8 January 1961, BW 90/59, TNA; American headlines emphasising the chaos in the Congo, see Dunn 
who focuses on the way in which Lumumba’s image was constructed: Dunn, Imagining the Congo, 87–91. 
629 ‘[I]rrational forces at work among the Congolese, similar to many other backward people’ meant that they 
would have to receive training in self-government before they were ready, see Foreign service despatch, 
Amembassy Brussels, “United States Policy Toward the Belgian Congo”, 10 December 1959,  3, RG. 59, CDF 
1955-59, 611.55921/9-1257 – 611.565/11-2957, NARA; Jef Van Bilsen, Un plan de trente ans pour 
l’émancipation politique de l’Afrique Belge (Kortrijk: Vooruitgang, 1956); General Andrew Goodpaster wrote to 
Herter: ‘The Congo crisis points up one of the world’s most urgent needs: The absence of trained and educated 
people to take over leadership and administration of the new African nations’, quoted in Tom Shachtman, Airlift 
to America: How Barack Obama, Sr., John F. Kennedy, Tom Mboya, and 800 East African Students Changed 
Their World and Ours (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009), 151. 
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memoirs, Macmillan blamed the Belgians for leaving a ‘gap that the native Congolese could 
not fill.’630 
On independence day, delegates therefore brought educational assistance plans with 
them to Leopoldville in an attempt to manage the transition to independence.631 Belgium 
belatedly initiated a crash scholarship and trainee programme for students, which by 1962 had 
produced 200 university graduates and had allowed 1,000 Congolese to complete training 
courses of three to six months.632 Robert Murphy, who headed the American delegation, 
announced that he had 300 scholarships on offer at the same time as the USIA flew in staff 
and equipment to meet the challenge by simultaneously strengthening 33 posts in 21 African 
countries. The French consul in Congo, Henry-Francis Mazoyer, had been overwhelmed by 
the stacks of application forms on his desk, but in line with the guidelines from Paris had 
refused to help a delegation of the Katanga government.633 For contemporaries, the Congo 
was not a site of bipolar struggle but an educational wasteland. 
 
630 Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 1959-1961 (London: Macmillan, 1972), 430. 
631 As Dunn has shown the Congo crisis was rooted in the conflicts over Congolese identity and who had the 
authority to author that identity. However, it was not only the Belgian colonial narrative that relied on needs of 
the Congo, this was a transnationally shared discourse employed to explain the chaos. Dunn makes this argument 
in Dunn, Imagining the Congo, 71, 64. 
632 The document lists earlier initiatives, see Airgram, Amembassy Brussels to StateDept, “The Training of 
Africans in Belgium”, 11 January 1963, RG. 59 1960-1963, CDF 561.913/8-560 to 570C.003/10-661, NARA. 
633 IPS Document, Fitzhugh Green to USIA, 30 June 1960, The Fitzhugh Green Papers, Box 6, f: 23, Special 
Collections Georgetown; The OCB also offered 200 scholarships for technical and governmental administrators, 
see Report, Dorothy Rigdon, “Draft of 15th Report to congress”, [1961], RG. 306, P 249, Box 6, NARA; 
Operation Committee Minutes, 23 March 1960, Memorandum, “Subject: Notes on OCB Meeting June 22 1960”, 
23 June 1960, RG. 306, P 249, Box 8, f: Policy – OCB, NARA; Letter, Pierre Charpentier to Couve de Murville, 
“Object : Assistance Technique”, 6 July 1960, Letter, Henry-Francis Mazoyer to DAL, “Object: Coopération 
technique aide culturelle au Congo belge”, 7 April 1960, DAL, Congo Belge 1960-65, 44QONT/49, f: CB-V-1-
17 Assistance technique et culturelle Janv.-déc. 1960, AMAE. 
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Illustration 19: Picture taken from a pamphlet that was produced by the Belgian government in the Congo 
entitled, Université Lovanium/Lovanium-Universiteit, 1956-1957. By showing white and black students together 
in one classroom, the idea of a harmonious colonial society was projected abroad. Source: Pamphlet, 
“Université Lovanium/Lovanium-Universiteit, 1956-1957”, [1957], BW 90/59, TNA. 
 
 
The African and the International Side to Congolese Education in the General Assembly 
 
To fulfil the perceived demand for education, Western leaders realised they had to cooperate. 
After Raymond Hare of the State Department admitted that he had no clue what to do, Roger 
Seydoux confessed that France needed help with a request to train 100 to 200 Congolese in 
French technical schools. The British information officers received an enormous number of 
requests to study in the UK, for instance by a group called ‘Les Amitiés Congolais’ – a 
motley crew of Congolese journalists and Bulgarian refugees.634  
Contrary to this anxiety, Ghanaian diplomats and other African freedom fighters were 
excited. Congolese independence was seen as the opportunity they had been waiting for. 
When the AAPC in Tunis received news from the Belgian roundtable conference, they 
concluded that the Congo would be a ‘springboard for effective propaganda.’635 In line with 
the network strategy of the BAA, experts of the Bank of Ghana, Ghanaian doctors, engineers, 
and civil servants poured into the Congo alongside Ghanaian soldiers. Not only was an 
agreement signed with Lumumba, secretly establishing the Ghana-Congo-Guinea union, the 
634 Memcon, StateDept, 11 July 1960, RG. 469, P 206, Box 1, f: Africa-General 7/60 – 12/60, NARA; 
Confidential, Letter Information Office Leopoldville to FO, 16 August 1960, BW 154/1, TNA. 
635 Strictly confidential, “Report on the 2nd all African People’s Conference held in Tunis on 25th January, 1960”, 
25 January 1960, SC/BAA/251 African Affairs Committee, PRAAD-Accra; The centrality of the Congo was 
also deemed important by the French cultural diplomats after 1945, see Letter, Monod to Direction du Personnel, 
“Représentation française en Afrique Noire”, 20 April 1945, 2, DAL Généralités 1944-1952, 49QO/96, AMAE. 
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Ghanaian chief of staff, General Alexander, also took command of the ONUC troops and 
disarmed the mutinous Congolese Army.636  
At the 15th session of the UN General Assembly, which started on 20 September 1960, 
the problem of African development and education was internationalised. The General 
Assembly is remembered mainly for the emergence of the Afro-Asian group, Khrushchev’s 
Troika proposal, and the debate on the UNOC intervention in the Congo. Nonetheless, what is 
striking is how many speeches dealt with the need to offer the Congolese people education 
and training. 
Macmillan, for instance, declared that administration, health, education and other 
services essential in a modern state could be provided more efficiently if larger administrative 
units were formed. This message was part of the new information strategy that had emerged 
during the Sahara bomb crisis, which presented British colonialism as an undertaking that 
fostered stable self-government. Unlike the discussion about colonialism at the UN, 
Macmillan stated in his speech that the UK had already proven to be willing to relinquish 
responsibility once colonies were prepared for self-government: ‘where are the 
representatives of these former British territories? Here they are, sitting in this hall […] who 
dares to say that this is anything but a story of steady and liberal progress?’637 
The French wanted to internationalise the educational problem in a different way. In de 
Gaulle’s estimation, the chaos in the Congo had been the result of insufficient Western 
cooperation, and this had left room for the UN to intervene. Debré and de Gaulle continued to 
see the US as bent on replacing France in the area of culture, economic aid and the training of 
African administrative personnel. Western cooperation had to put a check on American 
ambitions and discourage opposition groups in French Africa to call on the UN to intervene. 
In his letter to Eisenhower, de Gaulle argued that it made little sense to give the UN more 
responsibility, an organisation where the West, ‘the birthplace of common sense and freedom’ 
would be outcompeted by the Afro-Asian bloc and the USSR.638 Ultimately, de Gaulle wanted 
to avoid an international precedent whereby the UN would become the principal manager of 
decolonisation. 
636 Quoted in Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 124; Note, “Half of the Armed Force of Ghana are serving in 
the Congo”, [1960], Dabu Gizenga Papers, Box 128-9, f: 209 The Congo, MSRC. 
637 Quoted in Horne, Macmillan, 2012, 2:278. 
638 Letter, Eisenhower to de Gaulle, 17 November 1959, Letter, de Gaulle to Eisenhower, 9 August 1960, Letter 
Eisenhower to de Gaulle, 30 August 1960, Fonds de la présidence de la République de Charles de Gaulle, 
5AG1/722, CHAN; Letter, Debré to de Gaulle, “Note sur les relations franco-américaines”, 18 April 1960, f: 
Letters et notes de Michel Debré au general de Gaulle Dossier III (janvier-juillet 1960), 2 DE 29, f: Lettres et 
notes de Michel Debré au général de Gaulle Dossier III (janvier-juillet 1960), FNSP. 
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In his speech, Eisenhower hinted at such a scenario. He unfolded a concrete programme 
for Africa, ‘an all-out United Nations effort’ meant to help African countries with their 
educational activities. Thus the image of a president who only reluctantly participated in the 
UN General Assembly hardly does justice to the zeal with which Eisenhower called upon his 
fellow delegates to provide Africans, and the Congolese in particular, with ‘the mental tools 
to preserve and develop their freedom.’ Without an international effort at psychological 
modernisation ‘loud speakers in the public square’ would be able to ‘exhort people to 
freedom’ lacking any constructive plan for society. Besides a UN educational programme, he 
pledged to assist the UN in matters of African security, proposed the establishment of a UN 
fund for the Congo and wanted to involve the UN in long-term modernisation efforts.639 
The ICA created a UN programme for Africa and worked out the details in the course of 
October 1960. Before the General Assembly, ICA secretary Alice May had already sent out a 
transcript of Eisenhower’s speech because aid to Africa had been such a central theme. 
Immediately after the president’s speech, the ICA distributed an illustrative draft resolution 
among different UN delegates, which covered all the African proposals of the President.640 
When the UN secretariat objected because they felt they had not been given enough 
responsibility, adjustments were made to give UNESCO more influence. At a meeting in 
Paris, the US pushed UNESCO to add an additional million dollars to their budget for aid to 
education in Africa, and Herter instructed the US delegation to make a voluntary contribution 
of two million dollars. To ensure ‘maximum strategic and psychological impact’, he also 
asked the US delegates to ensure the announcement was dramatic and well timed.641 
The American public image in the Third World was important. The Sprague Committee 
had underscored that African leaders needed more than education, they also needed to be 
instilled with a more favourable attitude towards the US. As a firm believer in the power of 
psychological war and propaganda, in February 1960 Eisenhower had asked the president of 
the Motion Picture Association, Eric A. Johnston, to explore the possibility of distributing 
639 Namikas for instance characterises Eisenhower’s speech as lifeless, see Namikas, “Battleground Africa”, 109; 
Transcript, “President Eisenhower Addresses U.N. General Assembly”, RG: 469, P 206, Box 1, f: Africa – 
General 7/60 – 12/60, NARA. 
640 Letter, Riddleberger to MSP, “FY 1962 Proposals for the United Nations Program in Africa”, 11 October 
1960, RG. 469, Box 11, f: FY 1962 Africa Guidelines, NARA; Secretariat note ICA, “President Eisenhower’s 
Address to the UN General Assembly: Program for Africa Stressed”, 20 October 1960, RG. 469, P206, Box 1, f: 
Africa – General 7/60 – 12/60, NARA; Memorandum, James Simsarian, 30 September 1960, P36, Box 11, f: FY 
1962 Africa Guidelines, NARA. 
641 Airgram, Herter to Posts, “Subject: Aid to Education in Africa trough the UN System of Organizations”, 22 
November 1960, RG. 469, P 206, Box 1, NARA. 
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films in Africa that presented an accurate picture of the US.642 In November 1960, he 
welcomed African UN delegates to the White House, sent them on a tour across the US, 
established USIA representation at the UN while the USIA covered African activity at the 
General Assembly.643  
Ultimately, Eisenhower was willing to sacrifice the American public image at the UN if 
it served the orderly transition to independence. In the long run, the president argued that 
offering assistance to educational development was the soundest course of action. The US 
therefore joined France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Australia, the Dominican Republic, 
Portugal, Spain and South Africa in abstaining from General Assembly Resolution 1514. The 
anticolonial resolution had been put forward by the 22 Afro-Asian countries in December 
1960 and constituted a ‘Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial peoples and 
territories’ which was voted 89 to 0 in the UN General Assembly.644  
Nkrumah entered the General Assembly as a vindicated man. The crisis in the heart of 
Africa justified what he described in his speech as ‘his continuous outcry’ against ‘the threat 
of balkanisation in Africa’, as well as his ‘daily condemnation of neo-colonialism’. The 
Belgian support of the Katanga secession and the international tension about the Congo 
validated Nkrumah’s pan-African worldview and did not collapse the international politics of 
the Cold War into Africa, but only strengthened Nkrumah’s conviction that Africa’s problems 
could be solved by a joint African front. In August 1960, Nkrumah had already taken action 
by turning a Conference of Independent African States in Leopoldville, into a meeting to 
discuss the distribution of aid to the Congo. It was a way to keep the problems in the heart of 
the continent under African control.645  
The 15th General Assembly of the UN was not only a historic meeting where the Cold 
War stakes of the Congo crisis were raised with each thud of Khrushchev’s shoe on his desk. 
642 Eisenhower, Dwight D. to Eric A. Johnston, 16 February 1960. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 
ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1444. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial 
Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, 
http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/documents/1444.cfm. 
643 Memorandum, StateDept, “Tour of the United States November 1960”, RG. 306, P 249, Box 14, f: Policy US 
Tour For Africans – November and December 1960, NARA; Memorandum, USUN Edward Stansbury to IOP 
James J. Halsema, “Budget Proposal for USIA/UN”, 23 November 1960, RG. 306, P 249, Box 4, f: Policy-UN 
[Folder 3/3], NARA. 
644 Report, “Conclusion and Recommendations of the President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad”, 
December 1960,US President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad: Records 1960-61, Box 26, f: 
Printed Committee Report, DDEL; Nwaubani, The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950-1960, 
44. 
645 Speech transcript, “Address by Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah President of the Republic of Ghana to the 
fifteenth Session of The General Assembly of the United Nations”, 23 September 1960, 3, Kwame Nkrumah 
Papers, Box 128-6, f: Kwame Nkrumah Speeches – Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, MRC; Restricted report, Ian Scott, 3 September 1960, FO 371/146697, TNA. 
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More importantly, different aid philosophies for the Congo were put forward. Eisenhower 
wanted to get as many delegates as possible to initiate educational programmes in the Congo, 
to make sure the Congolese were developed into the so-called modern mindset. His plan 
contrasted sharply with Nkrumah’s call to keep foreign powers out. At the same time the 
British were mainly interested in peddling their liberal understanding of colonialism, while 
the French wanted Western cooperation to prevent new demands for self-government from 
arising. Those differences only intensified new problems on the ground, where cooperation 
had broken down since the landing of 19,825 UN troops on 15 July. 
 
 
The Scramble for Congolese ‘Minds’ Intensifies  
 
The main Western priority was the protection of white lives, while the Congolese government 
with Ghanaian support wanted to expel the Belgian troops and reunite the country. If an 
ambiguous UN mandate had made cooperation difficult, it was the disagreement about the 
final aims of a Congolese development programme that perpetuated suspicion and divisions. 
USIS officers argued that the Congo had been isolated from the outside world for so long that 
the first country to arrive in the Congo would have a great impact.646 The French, the British 
and the Americans were able to nonetheless continue cooperating because they all believed 
the operations of their competitors eventually served their own goals. 
The British Foreign Office believed the Congo crisis offered a new opportunity to 
present a liberal image of British imperialism, separate from that of the French, particularly 
after the second French atomic bomb of April 1960.647 Initially, the CRO had only encouraged 
the Ghanaian deployment in the Congo, believing Ghanaian success could stop dissatisfaction 
in Kenya and prevent what was called a second Congo.648 Only a day after this decision was 
made, however, they realised that an aid operation would be even more beneficial for the UK 
image, particularly when it was contrasted with the French intransigence in Algeria. The 
Congo turned into an ‘IRD paradise’, in which anti-communist material was in high demand: 
it was published by the two main papers of Leopoldville, the Courrier d’Afrique, and 
Actualités Africaines, radio broadcasts used information bulletins as news, priests and even 
646 Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa, 61; Report, “Tour of the Congo”, 14 June 1960, RG. 306, P 43, Box 
1, f: Belgian Congo Leopoldville, NARA. 
647 The FO was eager to exploit the opportunities in the area of education and information still open to them, see 
Confidential, Letter Information Office Leopoldville to FO, 16 August 1960, BW 154/1, TNA. 
648 Telegram, Embassy Leopoldville to Accra, “Congo/Ghana and Technical Assistance”, 15 August 1960, DO 
198/2, TNA; Secret, “Government Propaganda”, 4 August 1960, FCO 141-6227,TNA; Preventing a spill over 
into British territories was essential to the UK Alan James, Britain and the Congo Crisis, 1960-1963 (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 10. 
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two lecturers at Lovanium University used IRD pamphlets, such as the Interpreter, as 
teaching tools.649 By improving its public image the UK would also benefit financially thanks 
to the presence of companies such as Unilever, Shell, B.P., Barclays, and the large number of 
British missionaries. Business interests were thus always part of a wider set of concerns.650 
France, by contrast, was interested in winning over Congolese government officials to 
avoid a situation in which the UN would be the sole interlocutor for educational and technical 
assistance programmes. The DGCT had become convinced that cooperation with other 
Western countries, separate from the UN, was still possible. Particularly in October 1960, 
when the first Congolese students who had been funded through the ICA Third Country 
Scheme arrived in Paris. ICA funded the training of Africans in countries outside of the US, 
in an attempt to get as many trainees as possible ready for government positions. Couve de 
Murville was convinced that they would be able to get French experts into a key position in 
the new Congolese government led by Antoine Gizenga.651 
What the French saw as a step to Western cooperation was in fact an American effort to 
put in place stable state structures. Eisenhower wanted to ensure the supply of teachers and 
educational material through cooperation. To foster collaboration with the British, the State 
Department pointed out that a ‘Sovietized Congo’, so close to the East African colonies, 
would be disastrous, particularly with the already considerable influence of Cairo. The British 
Council only agreed to cooperate because it felt that competition would give the entire 
operation a political complexion in the eyes of the Congolese, a dent in the image of the 
649 Telegram, embassy Leopoldville to Accra, “Congo/Ghana and Technical Assistance”, 15 August 1960, DO 
198/2, TNA; Letter, Elizabeth Wyndham to Ralph Murray, 25 November 1960, FO 1110/1299, TNA. 
650 Appendix B, J.D.B. Fowells, “Notes on the Congo – particularly Leopoldville”, 6 September 1960, Report, 
J.D.B. Fowells, “Report on Visit to the Congo by Mr. J.D.B. Fowells: September 1st to 6th, 1960”, 6 September 
1960, BW 154/1, TNA; Some have elevated the business and financial interests of the European powers as 
essential in understanding the Congo crisis, see David N. Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World 
Intervention: Mines, Money,and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); 
Alanna O’Malley, “A Time for Pride and Prejudice, Anglo American Relations at the United Nations during the 
Congo Crisis from 1960-1964” (Ph.D. dissertation, European University Institute, 2012); John Kent, “The US 
and Decolonization in Central Africa, 1957-64”, in The Wind of Change: Harold Macmillan and British 
Decolonization, Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series 18 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillen, 
2013), 195–214. 
651 Memorandum, DGCT, “Assistance Technqiue de la France au Congo Ex-Belge”, 21 October 1960, Notes, 
“Questions culturelles et techniques”, 27 June 1960, Le Directeur General des Affaires Culturelles et 
Techniques, Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangère to Monsieur l’ambassadeur de France à Leopoldville, “A/S 
Mission de M. Gros”, 16 December 1960, DAL, Congo Belge 1960-65, 44QONT/49, f : CB-V-1-17 Assistance 
technique et culturelle Janv.-déc. 1960, AMAE. 
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liberal imperialist.652 Western cooperation was thus based on a fragile confluence of subtle 
misunderstandings. 
Nkrumah stood alone in his support for Lumumba. Kasavubu tried to seize the 
Ghanaian and Guinean pamphlets, hidden in large packing cases filled with medical supplies 
destined for the UN Indian Hospital. Together with the troops, a mobile cinema van of the 
Ghana Information Services had been unloaded. The van was officially meant to entertain the 
troops, but was secretly used to promote African unity. With little support for the African 
leaders who were unwilling to let him acquire more influence in the Congo, Nkrumah turned 
to the people. William Tubman, the president of Liberia, even publically expressed his 
irritation about the Ghanaian assistance mission to the Congo. Subsequently, Nkrumah could 
not secure enough support for the creation of an African High Command. He had already 
proposed such a joint structure at the AAPC in 1958, but now launched the proposal again to 
reconcile Lumumba, who wanted the UN troops to leave, and the Western powers, that 
wanted to maintain their presence.653 
Furthermore, even his relationship with Lumumba was tumultuous. The idea that 
Nkrumah and Lumumba had a warm relationship is the product of Ghana’s propaganda 
machine; it is hardly supported by the facts. Under the stress of the crisis, their relationship 
quickly soured. Nkrumah was informed by Andrew Djin, Ghana’s ambassador to Congo, that 
the high regard Lumumba once had for the Ghanaian leader, was quickly fading away.654 
 
 
Lumumba, the African Demagogue 
 
The chaos of the Congo became a self-fulfilling prophecy spurred by imperial decline. 
Nonetheless, the narrative of the demagogue leading an uneducated population had real 
consequences when it began to centre on one man: Patrice Lumumba. During the Congolese 
election campaign, Lumumba had been branded as a slick politician by most observers. In 
May 1959, the adviser to the Belgian minister of Congo, Maurice Van Hemelrijck, described 
him as ‘a political chameleon’ with a strong tendency to tell each audience what it wanted to 
652 Memcon, “US-UK Talks on Africa”, November 17-18, 1960, RG. 306, P 249, Box 11, NARA; Appendix, 
J.D.B. Fowells, “Notes on the Congo – particularly Leopoldville”, Report, J.D.B. Fowells, “Report on Visit to 
the Congo by Mr. J.D.B. Fowells: September 1st to 6th, 1960”, 6 September 1960, BW 154/1, TNA. 
653 Letter, Elizabeth Wyndham to Ralph Murray, 25 November 1960, FO 1110/1299, TNA; Note, “Half of the 
Armed Force of Ghana are serving in the Congo”, [1960], Dabu Gizenga Papers, Box 128-9, f: 209 The Congo, 
MSRC; Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 133. 
654 Ama Biney for instance speaks of an ‘ideological comrade’, see Biney, The Political and Social Thought of 
Kwame Nkrumah, 82; Letter, Andrew Djin to Nkruamh, 13 September 1960, Kwame Nkrumah Papers, Box 154-
20, f:10, MSRC. 
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hear.655 King Baudouin told Stanley M. Cleveland only three days before independence that 
he was ‘fully aware of Lumumba’s weaknesses and particularly of the fact that he was not 
very honest.’ Nonetheless, the king still considered him to be ‘the logical man to form the 
Government.’656 
When Lumumba gave his inflammatory indictment of Belgian colonialism on 
independence day, he unknowingly confirmed the Western cliché of the African strong man. 
This leader could attain stability if he adhered to Western norms, but turned to demagoguery 
when he was insufficiently educated. Nonetheless, even when Lumumba travelled to New 
York to make his case for the withdrawal of the Belgian troops at the UN, the references in 
the American press about an emotional Lumumba were relatively mild, because he had had 
the looks of a jazz musician.657 He became a liability only when he was placed under house 
arrest on 14 September 1960, after general Joseph-Desiré Mobutu’s first coup. Ian Scott, the 
UK ambassador in Leopoldville, wanted the UN to stop protecting Lumumba, which in his 
view would lead to Lumumba’s departure, his imprisonment by Mobutu, or a new constitution 
that would prevent Lumumba from exercising dictatorial powers. H.F.T. Smith of the Foreign 
office made it clear that ‘killing him’ would be preferable.658 
Eisenhower and the officials at the State Department were fed numerous reports that 
played into their long-standing preconception of the Congolese as ‘a restless and militant 
population in a state of gross ignorance – even by African standards.’659 In May 1960, for 
instance, the US president had been surprised by the flurry of political activity in the run-up to 
the Congolese elections, which he found remarkable since he was unaware that many people 
in the Congo could read. The French were an exception. They never publically accused 
Lumumba of being a communist, because they did not want to become involved in Congolese 
655 Van Hemelrijck’s adviser was named Georges Dumont, see Foreign service despatch, Stanley M. Cleveland 
to StateDept, “Congo Minister’s Chief Adviser Comments on Belgian Congo Policy”, 29 May 1959, RG. 59 
CDF 1955-59, 655.563/6-1256 – 655A.00/5-2959, NARA. 
656 Foreign service despatch, Amembassy Brussels to StateDept, “Conversation with King Baudouin on African 
and other Questions”, 27 June 1960, RG. 59, CDF 1960-63, 611.70/2-860 – 611.70/2-1362, NARA; Baudouin’s 
private remarks only three days before independence give more weight to the thesis that the Belgian government 
did not believe Lumuba was a Communist, even though publically officials created doubts about this, see Anne-
Sophie Gijs, “Une ascension politique teintée de rouge. Autorités, sûreté de l’état et grandes sociétés face au 
‘danger Lumumba’ avant l’indépendance du Congo (1956-1960)”, Journal of Belgian History 42, no. 1 (2012): 
57. 
657 Letter, Herve Alphand to Maurice Couve de Murville, “a.s. Le Congo et l’opinion américaine”, 29 July 1960, 
DAL, Généralités, 49QONT/65, f: CB-V-7 Nationalisme, panafricanisme, AMAE. 
658 Secret letter, Ian Scott to FO, 10 October 1960, FO 371/146646, TNA; H.F.T. Smith, “The Congo”, 28 
September 1960, FO 371/146650, TNA. 
659 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 573. 
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internal affairs – leading the French embassy personnel to hide every time they saw a Belgian 
official in the street.660  
The French restraint contrasted sharply with the report of W. Averell Harriman, the 
president’s self-appointed emissary to Kinshasa, who predicted that Lumumba would 
continue to cause difficulties because he was a ‘rabble-rousing speaker’ who had shrewdly 
manoeuvred himself through Congolese politics.661 At the offices of USIS-Leopoldville, 
Fitzhugh Green felt that Lumumba was a ‘magnetic demagogue’ who had not only used his 
personality, but had also turned to bribery and threats and what he called ‘gangsterism’ to 
claw his way into the driver seat of government.662 Clare Timberlake, US ambassador in the 
Congo, felt Lumumba had only created chaos for the two months he was in power.663 In 
September 1960, even the Sudanese prime minister urged Herter to ‘get rid of Lumumba.’664 
With their own agendas in mind, local officers and other officials pushed the Eisenhower 
administration – committed to fostering American model democracies, free from 
demagoguery – to act. When Allen Dulles heard Eisenhower’s wish that Lumumba would 
‘fall into a river full of crocodiles’, he could only interpret this as a green light for his 
assassination.665 
 
 
Ghanaian Nonalignment and New Plans for Africa 
 
Lumumba’s reputation as a demagogue materialised amidst an atmosphere of riots that – far 
more than the allegation that he had communist sympathies – eventually sealed his fate. While 
a Soviet takeover was the worst case scenario, Larry Devlin, the CIA station chief in 
Leopoldville, could imagine an immediate and far more pressing danger: Lumumba in power 
with chaos as the inevitable result. The perceived African inability to govern remained the key 
problem.666 The CIA would never execute its plan.  
On the night of 17 January 1961 Patrice Lumumba was executed on the orders of the 
leaders of the secessionist province Katanga. The persistence of the chaos after Lumumba’s 
660 Editorial note, FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. 14: Africa, 274 ; Genin, “La politique étrangère de la France face à la 
crise congolaise (1960-1961)”, 102–103. 
661 Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, 13 September 1960, FRUS 
1958-1960, Vol. 14: Africa, 486. 
662 Circular, USIS-Leopoldville to USIS, “Country Plan”, 30 May 1961, RG. 306, P 242, Box 1, f: Africa 1961, 
NARA. 
663 Timberlake on 26 September 1960 quoted in Nwaubani, “Eisenhower, Nkrumah and the Congo Crisis”, 619. 
664 Confidential letter, Z.R. Hoyer to secretary of state, 29 September 1960, FO 371/146646, TNA. 
665 Editorial Note, FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. 14: Africa, 495. 
666 Memorandum of Discussion at the 452d Meeting of the National Security Council, 21 July 1960, FRUS 1958-
1960, Vol. 14, 338-339; Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo, 62–63. 
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death was yet another confirmation that the diagnoses of Africa’s disease – immaturity – had 
been accurate. While 1960 – the year of Africa – had prompted much discussion, it was 
Lumumba’s murder that brought home the point that independence required a new strategy 
towards Africa if longstanding goals were to be achieved. This new strategy was particularly 
obvious in Ghana, where Lumumba was turned into a pan-African hero.  
 
 
Lumumba, the Pan-African Hero 
 
On 23 February 1961 – after news of Lumumba’s assassination hit the press stands – A.K. 
Barden of the Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs and Captain Hassan left for Leopoldville to 
discuss the new situation with the deputy prime minister of Lumumba’s government, Antoine 
Gizenga, who lost no time in summoning a cabinet meeting to devise a joint strategy. A direct 
communication line between Nkrumah and Gizenga was established while the troops were 
given underground support and vital public services were funded by Ghana. More 
importantly, continuous radio propaganda by independent African states was made 
possible.667 
Neither Nkrumah nor Barden had been surprised by Lumumba’s assassination. Not only 
had rumours about Lumumba’s arrest been circulating daily, more importantly pan-African 
ideas compelled Ghanaian diplomats to believe that his assassination had resulted from a lack 
of inter-African cooperation, which had made neocolonial intrusion possible.668 The public 
diplomacy strategy was adjusted accordingly: publics rather than potential African leaders, 
trade unionists or freedom fighters were now the target of Ghana’s public diplomacy efforts. 
The people had to convince their leaders to support African Unity. Nkrumah had come to 
realise that unifying the African continent required a clear and coherent ideological message 
presented in an emotional and appealing way. The chosen style can be characterised as a 
published form of radio trottoir, where newspapers such as The Spark and Voice of Africa 
were filled with fake telegrams, cartoons and rumours to mobilise the population.669 
The use of Lumumba’s murder provided the best example of this new strategy 
(illustration 20). Lumumba had written a letter to his wife which was also ‘meant for the 
Congolese and African peoples as well as for the peoples of the world’ and contained an 
667 Letter, Alexander to Nkrumah, “The Congo Mission of Mr. Barden and Capt. Hassan to Stanleyville”, 11 
April 1961, Kwame Nkrumah Papers, Box 154-4, f: 10 Congo, MSRC. 
668 For those rumours, see Letter, Djin to Nkrumah, 15 September 1960, Kwame Nkrumah Papers, Box 154-4, 
f:10, MSRC; Thompson concludes that Nkrumah ignored the realities in Leopoldville while Nkrumah actually 
looked at reality through the Cold War lens, see Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 140. 
669 Ellis launched the term, see Ellis, “Writing Histories of Contemporary Africa”, 19. 
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anticolonial discourse. The BAA spread the letter as a pamphlet and republished it in Voice of 
Africa, a newspaper read by freedom fighters, but also in newspapers such as Workers World, 
for a more general audience. Lumumba wrote: ‘what we wish for our country, namely its right 
to an honourable life, to a stainless dignity and an unlimited independence is not what is 
desired by Belgian Colonialists and their Western allies […] They have corrupted some of our 
compatriots, they have bought off our independence.’ Lumumba ended his political testament 
with words that were music to Nkrumah’s ears, because they embedded the Congolese 
struggle within the fight against colonialism on the entire continent: ‘Long live the Congo, 
Long live Africa.’670 
When Ghanaian officials found out that the son of Maurice Mpolo – a party militant of 
Lumumba who had been executed with the Congolese Prime Minister – had fled to Somalia, 
they were eager to fly him over to Accra, not to train him but to use him as a propaganda 
weapon.671 In July 1961, Voice of Africa published an interview with Denis Prosper Okito, the 
son of the late president of the Congolese senate, who was the third man murdered alongside 
Lumumba. In his interview Okito praised Ghana’s support in the Congo crisis, with a focus on 
its massive technical capabilities. He had ‘been greatly touched by the way a small country 
like Ghana, with very limited resources so selflessly devoted itself to the welfare of the 
Congo. […] Ghana was among the first to offer us troops […] technicians, health personnel 
and administrative officers.’  
After 1961, Ghana’s technical assistance was not only meant to create a network of 
revolutionaries, but was used more explicitly to project an image of Ghana as the leading 
modern nation of the African Revolution. Okito’s interview focused on Ghana’s leadership 
and vision: ‘We know that if Ghana’s numerous suggestions to the United Nations Secretary-
General had been followed’ and the Force Publique had not been strengthened by ‘the foreign 
imperialists, the possibility of a military dictatorship terrorizing the country would never have 
arisen and the legal government of the Congo would be in power today.’672 
The BAA also published a letter directed at Pauline Lumumba, the wife of the murdered 
Congolese leader. The letter was not a typical enumeration of imperialist crimes concluded 
with a call to fight and liberate Africa. Instead it played on readers’ emotions and attempted to 
convey Lumumba’s death on a very personal and individual level: 
670 Letter, “The Last Message of Patrice Lumumba”, 29 March 1961, Draft, “Workers World: A Fighter to the 
End: Lumumba’s Last Letter”, 14 April 1961, BAA/RLAA/964 Correspondence with Foreign Ministry, 
PRAAD-Accra. 
671 Letter, official secretary ministry of foreign affairs to embassy Ghana in Somalia, “Mr. Alfred Mauric 
M’polo”, 31 August 1961, BAA/RLAA/964 Correspondence with Foreign Ministry, PRAAD-Accra. 
672 “Why my Father was Killed”, Voice of Africa, July 1961, Vol. 1, No. 7, 4-5. 
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‘Mummy, Lumumba has been killed’, grieved my little boy and his eyes moistened with tears as he 
brandished his clenched little fist. His grief was profound, Pauline, and he will take this grief into his 
years of manhood, and he will be the hero I expect him to be one day. Pauline, none of us wants to 
become a coward, but, none of us wants an empty death, for life is so precious, life is not senseless but 
will erect a radiant new world. But Pauline, were death demanded from us, we would comply voluntarily, 
as Lumumba did, with the certitude of heroes that refuse to bow.673 
 
In the pan-African propaganda, Lumumba had become a hero for the African cause. Even the 
man responsible for Lumumba’s assassination, Moïse Tshombe, understood he had to 
convince African public opinion of his innocence. He wrote a letter to Nkrumah in 1964 in 
which he urged him to tone down the Ghanaian rhetoric. The hostility of public opinion made 
his political career impossible.674  
Internationally, Nkrumah’s choice for an emotional anticolonial discourse was 
interpreted as a move towards the Eastern bloc. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter for 
instance had already interpreted Nkrumah’s UN speech as a signal that the Ghanaian leader 
was ‘leaning towards the Soviet bloc.’675 Historians, by relying on the sources from 
Washington, Paris and London, have argued that Lumumba’s murder finally made Nkrumah 
realise he had to play a Cold War game, leading him to seek rapprochement with the USSR. 
Documents from the Ghanaian archives show how nonalignment remained Ghana’s foreign 
policy. 
 
673 Sugiarti Siswadi, “Remember the Lesson of Lumumba’s Life and Death”, February 1962, BAA/RLAA/425 
Death of Patrice Lumumba, 1962: Newspaper Clippings (Patrice Lumumba’s Assassination), PL. 
674 ‘J’estime que le moment est venu de faire toute la lumière et je ne peux rester plus longtemps sous le coup de 
cette accusation devant l’opinion africaine et l’opinion mondiale’, see Letter, Tshombe to Nkrumah, 31 January 
1964, SC/BAA/307 Tshombe, PRAAD-Accra; Raoul Peck’s film has been particularly influential in maintaining 
the image of Lumumba as a hero, see Raoul Peck, Lumumba (Zeitgeist Video, 2000). 
675 Nwaubani, “Eisenhower, Nkrumah and the Congo Crisis”, 614. 
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Illustration 20: This photo, taken from Ghana Today, shows how Ghanaian diplomats were keen on projecting 
an image of Lumumba as an anticolonial hero. The caption that accompanied the photograph reads: ‘The 
murder, not merely of an individual but of a principle.’ The periodical, Ghana Today, was an official publication 
that was disseminated abroad. Source: Ghana Today, March 15, 1961, Vol. 5, No. 2, 3. 
 
 
The Preservation of Nonalignment 
 
On 3 March 1961, an unknown aid tried to convince Nkrumah to take a more realist approach 
to Ghana’s nonaligned position because he believed international politics were ‘tough’. 
Ghana’s ‘tactical move to the Left’ had to be adjusted if a maximum of capital was to be 
obtained from ‘all sources abroad’. He questioned the wisdom of rigorously adhering to 
nonalignment, particularly because Ghana’s domestic economic structure resembled that of 
the Soviet Union.676 
Furthermore, he felt Ghana’s image abroad had to be promoted in a better way, because 
Nkrumah’s leftist statements had frightened overseas investors. Therefore, he urged Nkrumah 
to play off the Cold War powers against each other. Most outside observers already 
understood Ghana’s foreign policy in that way, and in its efforts to obtain funding for the 
Volta River Project Ghana had already followed this course without major consequences. In 
his own words:  
676 These documents offer us a glimpse of the inner workings of Ghanaian diplomatic decision-making. They 
suggest that Nkrumah did not only talk with people who praised him. Instead advisors had become skilled in 
providing carefully phrased and indirect criticism, contrary to what has been argued: Thompson, Ghana’s 
Foreign Policy, 418; Peter T. Omari, Kwame Nkrumah: The Anatomy of an African Dictatorship (Accra: 
Sankofa Educational Publishers, 2000), 8. 
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Most people assume that there has been a definite move on Ghana’s part to play the East off against the 
West (as has been done by the U.A.R.), and it can be argued that some of the progress with the Volta 
River project has been made possible by these methods.  There is no quarrel with Ghana overseas in the 
use of these tactics.677 
 
When the All-African Peoples Steering Committee, which had been established after the 
1958 conference, met in Dar es Salaam from 26 to 30 January 1961 they viewed the 
calamities on the continent through a pan-African lens. The crises in Algeria, the Congo and 
South Africa, and the French atomic bomb test, were not an indication that the Cold War had 
arrived on African soil. On the contrary, these crises were the dying breath of colonial 
regimes. The real problem was the failure of the Congolese people and other African peoples 
to unite. Political parties, the trade union organisations, youth movements, and women’s 
groups therefore had to win the people to achieve African unity.678 Through the pan-African 
lens, the Congo crisis was seen not as the emergence of the Cold War but as a wakeup call 
that signalled more pan-African activism was required. 
 
 
The End of Cultural Assistance 
 
2 
The change of Nkrumah’s strategic focus from leaders to the people was matched by the 
changes made by Western public diplomats, who had lost faith in their ability to develop men 
into the modern mindset. The details of a new socio-economic approach were worked out in 
the course of 1961, but the atrocities in the Congo offered the final proof that education could 
not change attitudes. 
For Britain, the Congo was the place where the ‘goodwill’ strategy came to die. In 1961 
the Foreign Office explicitly acknowledged that the promotion of its own achievements would 
never work if they could not criticise the other colonial powers. They had only hesitantly 
compared the ‘chaos left by the Belgians’ with the state in which former British dependencies 
had reached independence, because doing so would damage the entire Western presence on 
the continent.679 After the Congo-crisis, the British would no longer let their PR campaign be 
influenced by what the Belgian and French colonial powers were doing.  
677 Secret and personal notes, 25 March 1961, 2, SC/BAA/484 Notes on Government Policy, PRAAD-Accra. 
678 Report, “Meeting of the Steering Committee at Dar es Salam (Tanganyika) From 26 to 30th January 1961”, 
1961, Kwame Nkrumah Papers, Box 154-45, f: Printed Material – Meeting of the Steering Committee at Dar es 
Salaam Jan. 26-30, 1961, MSRC. 
679 Memcon, “United States – United Kingdom Information working Group Meeting: the Congo as an 
Information Problem”, April 1961, Memcon, “United States – United Kingdom Information working Group 
Meeting: United Kingdom Cultural and Education Effort in Africa”, April 1961, FO 953/2029, TNA. 
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The competition with the US and France intensified. When Wyndham travelled to 
Elizabethville, Usumbura and Bukavu in 1961, the Foreign Office told the Americans in the 
Information Working Group that their effort was limited to Leopoldville, a blatant lie.  
Despite Macmillan’s attempts to plan decolonisation, de Gaulle’s insistence in 1958 to jointly 
decide whether to stay or go, and claims that de Gaulle’s African policy profoundly 
influenced British decisions, it was the Congo crisis in combination with Nkrumah’s pan-
Africanism that drove the UK to emphasise the uniquely liberal character of their enterprise 
and drag France and Belgium down if necessary.680  
In January 1961 Kennedy became president which signalled the end of educational 
assistance to Africa. Unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy strongly believed in aid grants as an engine 
of socio-economic modernisation, while he felt more concerned about the adverse effects of 
rumours and misinformation. In February 1961, the Congo Steering Committee was created 
with the new assistant secretary of state for African affairs, G. Mennen Williams, as its 
chairman. Their focus was on the absence of decent journalism, which had created a so-called 
information vacuum.681 This ‘psychological vacuum’ or ‘void’ was being filled by rumours 
and free news services from the Eastern Bloc, which fed regional loyalties, emotionalism and 
bred political instability.682 
Cyrille Adoula’s survival as prime minister, however, required political stability. 
Adoula, an anticommunist trade unionist with CIA connections, enjoyed Kennedy’s support 
despite the fact that Lumumba’s ally, Gizenga, emerged as the clear favourite in parliament. 
Many historical accounts present Kennedy’s support for Mobutu as the next step.683 The 
efforts of the committee were ignored even though they recommended an alternative strategy 
aimed at moulding public opinion, since they believed the influence of a military man would 
be lost in the vastness of the Congo. The contingency plan for the Congo stressed that 
Adoula’s legitimacy and the American image rested on the re-establishment of the public 
administration and a promotion of the modernisation efforts.684 
680 Memcon, “US-UK Information Working Group Meeting”, April 1961, FO 953/2027, TNA; Hyam, Britain’s 
Declining Empire, 263–265. 
681 Memorandum, “Working Committee on the Congo”, 8 February 1961, Box 51, A1 1587-M, f: Congo 
Working Committee 1961-2, NARA; Confidential letter, Roger Tubby to the Under Secretary for Economic 
Affairs, “Information Needs in Africa”, 30 March 1961, RG. 59, A1 1587-M, Box 51, NARA. 
682 Memorandum, “Subject: Information System in the Congo”, 2 March 1961, 1, Memorandum, Edwin M.J. 
Kretzmann to C. Vaughan Ferguson, “The Psychological Void in Africa”, 15 February 1961, Box 51, A1 1587-
M, f: Congo Working Committee 1961-2, NARA. 
683 See for instance: Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa, 68–69; Westad, The Global Cold War, 140–141. 
684 Confidential, Vaughan Ferguson and Edwin M.J. Kretzmann, “Information Program for the Congo”, 15 
February 1961, 2, Box 51, A1 1587-M, f: Congo Working Committee 1961-2, NARA; Secret Draft, 
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Since modernisation theorists believed that armed resistance could thrive in so-called 
primitive societies where governments were weak, the communication between the 
government and the public had to be strengthened.685 This was primarily achieved by offering 
a $10,000 grant to improve infrastructure, providing radioteletype equipment with a one-year 
subscription to a news agency wire service and by sending in an operator to maintain 
equipment and train personnel. The final goal was the creation of a Congo-wide information 
network that could provide newspapers, newsreels, and wall posters.686 In the long term, an 
international news agency for Africa was to be founded and staffed with Africans because the 
local population mistrusted Western news sources. VOA had already begun broadcasting to 
the Congo to support Adoula and the modernisation process.687 
The public image of the UN was also to be improved by installing a ticker service to 
keep a check on the international news that local newspapers and international press agencies 
received. A new information service costing $850,000 was to be built. Edwin M.J. 
Kretzmann, chairman of the information sub-committee, even proposed the creation of a 
small inter-African mutual assistance service, which would distribute Red Cross relief 
supplies, food, and provide a communications training mission to run an information network. 
Within the Kennedy administration, public diplomacy had become a tool to fight insurgency, 
a means to strengthen the structures of weak states.688 
The Congo also changed the mindset of French officials such as Jean Sauvagnargues, 
the ambassador to Ethiopia, who called an emergency meeting on 20 January 1961 at the Quai 
d’Orsay to coordinate a coherent information campaign designed to convince the ‘less 
informed’ Africans about the French nuclear tests, something that had never crossed the 
minds of the French policymakers. Much like Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace Program, which 
highlighted the positive aspects of nuclear energy, French ambassadors proposed a massive 
“Contingency Planning for the Congo”, [1961], Box 51, A1 1587-M, f: Congo Working Committee 1961-2, 
NARA. 
685 Conference paper, “A Review of Behavioral Sciences Research in Support of Air Force Programs in Counter-
Insurgency and Limited Warfare by James L. Monroe”, 18 April 1963, MC 440, Ithiel de Sola Pool Papers, f: 
Westpoint meeting 4/18/63, MIT-Archives; Confidential memorandum, “Subject: Information System in the 
Congo”, 2 March 1961, 1, RG. 59, A1 1587-M, Box 51, f: Congo Working Committee 1961-2, NARA. 
686 Confidential meFmorandum, Roger Tubby to the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, “Information Needs 
in Africa”, 30 March 1961, Confidential Note, [1961], RG. 59, A1 1587-M, Box 51, f: Congo Information Sub-
Committee 1961-2, NARA. 
687 Confidential memorandum, “Subject: Information System in the Congo”, 2 March 1961, 1, Draft memo, 13 
September 1960, RG. 59, A1 1587-M, Box 51, f: Congo Working Committee 1961-2, NARA. 
688 Confidential paper, Donald M. Davies, “Congo Information Program”, 6 March 1961, RG. 59, A1 1587-M, 
Box 51, f: Congo Information Sub-Committee 1961, NARA. 
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propaganda campaign in English including a proposal for an African Atomic Energy Agency 
to survey the peaceful uses of atomic energy and a heavily publicised seminar in Paris.689 
The officials at the French Ministry of Cooperation felt they had to catch up with the 
British who had invested massively in the previous years. The British white paper they had 
access to struck them as highly relevant to their own situation, which demanded the marketing 
of the French socio-economic solutions and cultural achievements in a new and competitive 
environment. ‘As a nation, Great Britain has a great deal to offer’, the UK paper stated, yet 
‘we delude ourselves if we think that in a fiercely competitive world these things are self-
evident.’ Every effort had to be made to ensure the peoples of other countries understood UK 
ideas and policies. Word for word, that was what the French felt they needed in a world where 
everyone courted the favour of an African target audience.690 While the Congo had prompted 
the Americans to transform cultural assistance into a counterinsurgency tool, the French and 
British went into the sixties obsessed with promoting their colonial enterprise. 
In short, the Congo emergency brought inter-African conflict to the surface while the 
Americans and British came to see Nkrumah as a formidable opponent in the realm of ideas. 
A direct consequence of the Congo debacle was the creation of the Casablanca group made up 
of Nasser, Nkrumah, Touré, and Modibo Keita of Mali. In May 1961 the Monrovia group was 
established as a response: a political grouping of 20 to 22 states with the Brazzaville group at 
its core that defended the interests of French Africa. Nkrumah’s interference with the affairs 
of other African countries also irritated USIS officers in Leopoldville who now made plans to 
compete with Ghana’s pan-African propaganda.691 When Mark Mwithiga, the chairman of the 
Kenya African National Union (KANU), was arrested by the authorities in Kenya carrying a 
letter in his pocket from Ghana’s BAA that promised support, Nkrumah lost his credibility as 
an interlocutor. The subversive Ghanaian activities in Kenya were not helping the British case 
689 Memcon, “Compte-rendu de la reunion tenue au Quai d’Orsay le mardi 17 janvier 1961 de 17 h 30 à 19 h 15”, 
20 January 1961, Ministère de la Coopération, Direction de la coopération technique et culturelle, 19810443/47 
Histoire de la DCT, f: Historique de la DCT Organisation, CHAN. 
690 The French estimated, 6.6 million francs for the BBC, 5.1 million  for the British Council and the same 
amount again for the FO, CRO and the CO, see Memorandum, “Note sur les moyens d’information demandés 
par le Secrétariat d’Etat aux Relations avec les Etats de la Communauté”, [1960], Ministère de la Coopération, 
Direction de la coopération technique et culturelle, 19810443/47 Histoire de la DCT, f: Historique de la 
DCT Organisation, CHAN. 
691 Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 222, 305–306; Confidential Memorandum, “Subject: Information 
System in the Congo”, 2 March 1961, 3, RG. 59, A1 1587-M, Box 51, f: Congo Information Sub-Committee 
1961, NARA. 
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of a smooth transition. After 1960, Nkrumah and the Ghanaian form of pan-Africanism had 
very few allies left.692 
While the Congo crisis was influenced in important ways by the Cold War, the conflict 
was not determined by it. Rather, the dramatic failure to educate African target audiences into 
the modern mindset shaped the Western approach to the Congo. American public diplomats 
concluded that it was not African attitudes, but socio-economic structures that had to change 
if they wanted to maintain their influence. Conversely, the British and the French began to 
promote their approach to decolonisation. Meanwhile, Nkrumah decided that African 
audiences rather than nationalist leaders had to be targeted through emotional anticolonial 
propaganda. This divide between the American use of public diplomacy as a 
counterinsurgency tool and the European and Ghanaian public relations campaigns would 
characterise the 1960s. 
 
 
Conclusion: the Transition from Psychological to Socio-Economic Modernisation 
Schemes 
 
Lumumba’s assassination was the highpoint as well as the endpoint of an internationally 
shared view on African development. Even though historians consider the Congo as ‘the first 
hot spot of the Cold War’,693 for contemporaries the Congo emergency corresponded with 
another nightmare, namely that of an unstable postcolonial state led by a demagogue. The 
brutality – real and constructed – that filtered through diplomatic cables and news reports, 
with television as a new medium, awakened dormant fears that preceded the Cold War. The 
African response to the Sahara atomic bomb as well as the new public diplomacy plans had 
already shown the assertive side of African nationalism, requiring a more imaginative 
approach to maintain influence. At the same time, Nkrumah recognised that he would have to 
devise a new strategy to promote African unity, since other African leaders refused to support 
him. 
These new doubts strengthened old concerns about ‘premature independence’ because 
the so-called development of Africans into a modern mindset had not resulted in a 
reorientation towards Western norms and practices. Ghanaian training had also failed: the 
leaders of newly independent countries did not follow Accra, but opposed Nkrumah’s 
692 Secret and personal letter, T. Neil Permanent Secretary Office of the Chief Secretary, 18 April 1961, FCO 
141/6735, TNA; Milton Obote in Uganda remained a staunch supporter of Nkrumah’s regime, see Agyeman, 
Nkrumah’s Ghana and East Africa, 96. 
693 Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War, 2. 
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proactive stance. Those anxieties became entangled with what might happen if the Soviet 
competitor would succeed where the West had failed and – in the Ghanaian case – what might 
happen if the entirety of Africa suffered the same fate as the Congo.  
Jointly, the Sahara and the Congo offer insights into the relationship between 
decolonisation and the Cold War. Actors were remarkably flexible about the lens they applied 
to understand events on the ground. Macmillan for instance knew that African leaders were 
disgruntled about the arrogant French behaviour but chose to talk about the French atomic 
bomb as a Cold War problem. De Gaulle and his ambassador to Ghana were unable to see 
Africans as independent actors, which led them to conclude that the British and the Americans 
were jealous of the ‘force de frappe’.  
At the same time the colonial powers were concerned about the precedent set by UN 
intervention in the Congo. Eisenhower for his part knew the Congo could become a Cold War 
battleground, but wanted to address the more immediate problem of inadequate leadership. 
Nkrumah remained staunchly nonaligned. Africa had not acted as one during the Congo crisis, 
which had made neocolonial intrusion possible. His new emotional propaganda campaign, 
which denounced all forces outside of Africa, targeted the African peoples rather than the 
leadership, which had opposed his plan for a united African front. 
However, this does not mean that the Soviet threat, mineral riches, and strategic 
considerations were not important in deciding to intervene in the Congo. Rather it is argued 
that understanding why Lumumba was murdered and why the Congo came to be defined as an 
international crisis requires a look beyond the Cold War. Business interests,694 Cold War 
political concerns,695 Belgian involvement696 and the inexperience of the Congolese politicians 
were all constructed and expressed an underlying desire for orderly development.697  
694 British business were part of a more complex ideological decision process, unlike what some historians argue, 
see Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money,and U.S. Policy in the Congo 
Crisis; O’Malley, “A Time for Pride and Prejudice, Anglo American Relations at the United Nations during the 
Congo Crisis from 1960-1964”; Kent, “The US and Decolonization in Central Africa, 1957-64”; John Kent, 
America, the UN and Decolonisation: Cold War Conflict in the Congo (New  York: Routledge, 2009), 1–5. 
695 Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960-1964, 77; Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War, 
98; Kalb, The Congo Cables, 374; Michael G. Schatzberg, Mobutu or Chaos? The United States and Zaire, 
1960-1990 (Lanham: University Press Of America, 1991), 14; Hoskyns Catherine, The Congo since 
Independence, January 1960 - December 1961 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965); Namikas, 
“Battleground Africa”, 1–25. 
696 Bambi Ceuppens, Congo made in Flanders?: koloniale Vlaamse visies op “blank” en “zwart” in Belgisch 
Congo (Gent: Academia Press, 2003); Jonathan E. Helmreich, United States Relations with Belgium and the 
Congo, 1940-1960 (Cranbury: University of Delaware Press, 1998), 1–10. 
697 Goddeeris and Kiangu, “Congomania in Academia: Recent Historical Research on the Belgian Colonial 
Past”, 71; Guy Vantemsche, “The Historiography of Belgian Colonialism in the Congo”, in Europe and the 
World in European Historiography, ed. Csaba Lévai (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2006), 89–119. 
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Describing the Congo as ‘a likely trouble spot’, as a territory that was unprepared for 
independence, as a playground for the great powers, or as a place inextricably linked with 
violence and human suffering – from Leopold II to Kabila – explains very little.698 Moreover 
such explanations run the risk of perpetuating a colonial and postcolonial myth that the 
peoples on the African continent were somehow in need of more preparation to participate in 
politics. Mamdani’s contention that colonial rule in the countryside was characterized by a 
form of ‘decentralised despotism’ exercised by chiefs who depended on a colonial master and 
after independence on the new national leaders, is interesting in this respect. It implies that the 
chieftanity was hardly affected by decolonisation, while as Paul Nugent explains, the chiefs 
were among the principal casualties of decolonisation. Moise Tshombe, for instance, was not 
a disgruntled chief, but a national politician who opportunistically exploited tribal interests.699  
The focus on the brutal aspects of Congolese history finds its origin in the British 
campaign against forced labour in the Congo Free State. Edmund Dene Morel and British 
missionaries used the mass media in the beginning of the twentieth century, such as photos 
and newspapers, to expose the exploitation in the Congolese colonial economy including the 
cutting off of hands, a campaign that vilified Leopold II. While the horrifying ‘red rubber’ 
industry affected the daily lives of the Congolese, it is unclear why King Leopold’s ghost is 
still summoned to explain the atrocities of the 1950s or Mobutu’s rule.700 The emphasis on 
Congolse atrocities becomes even more remarkable when the narrative of Congolese 
decolonisation is compared to that of India. Even though violence, secession, and UN 
intervention in 1949 were all part of the British departure from India, these events are not 
relied upon to explain other chapters in Indian history.701  
Congo and the propaganda or the Sahara bomb taught the diplomatic corps from 
Flagstaff House to the White House, that their interpretation of Africa’s position in the 
international system – in dire need of guidance – had been correct, but the road towards it – 
698 The ‘Trouble spot’ quotation is taken from Mazov, see Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War, 78; 
Bechtolsheimer, “Breakfast with Mobutu: Congo, the United States and the Cold War, 1964-1981”, 228; Also in 
their upcoming book, Bruce Kuklick and Emmanuel Gerard present historical actors as figures that sprang up 
from Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness: Emmanuel Gerard and Bruce Kuklick, Death in the Congo: Murdering 
Patrice Lumumba (Boston: forthcomming at Harvard University Press, 2015). 
699 Colonialism transformed the chieftaincy and gave kings and princes a more explicit political function, see 
Richard Rathbone, Nkrumah & the Chiefs: The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana, 1951-1960 (Columbus: Ohio 
State University Press, 2000), 9–11; Nugent, Africa Since Independence, 108; Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: 
Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, 285–301. 
700 For the contradictions that sustained Morell’s campaign, see Kevin Grant, “Christian Critics of Empire: 
Missionaries, Lantern Lectures, and the Congo Reform Campaign in Britain”, The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 29, no. 2 (2001): 27–58; Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, 
Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa (New York: First Mariner Books, 1999), 1–7. 
701 Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 2007), 733–760. 
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the American reliance on civic education, the exclusive spread of French culture in French 
Africa, the creation of goodwill and the ideological training of leading freedom fighters by 
Ghana – had been misguided. The riots in Kinshasa were the beginning of the end for an 
internationally shared discourse of stability and a group of public diplomats who had believed 
in it and adopted each other’s methods.  
African hearts and minds – assertive and uncontrollable after 1960 – had become a 
threat rather than an opportunity in the modernisation and development of Africa. New 
approaches to maintain some form of influence had to be found. One man in particular, John 
F. Kennedy, would come to symbolise this new socio-economic way to win Africa and 
profoundly shaped the British, French and Ghanaian relations with Africa after 1960. 
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7. Managing Modernisation 
 
The Competition for the Anticolonial Project and Socio-Economic 
Modernisation as Foreign Policy (1961-1963) 
  
We must if necessary be prepared to draw a distinction between those good records and those of some 
other powers, […] otherwise all these situations can be lumped together by our enemies and made to 
serve as a mass condemnation of colonialist-imperialist policies. 
 
– Foreign Office, Information Policy for Africa, 30 June 1961.702 
 
Does a developing country have to repeat for its development the various steps or ‘stages’ that had been 
the historical pattern in countries now industrialized? 
 
– Nkrumah in a conversation with Seymour Melman of Columbia University, 24 June 1962.703 
 
Through language, culture, technology, trade, where sentiment is involved, links between states are 
intensified, making these states in their own way part of a French world that grows through everything 
that is French [while] the attachment to France and de Gaulle is not forgotten. 
 
– Charles de Gaulle, draft note for the council of ministers, March 1963.704 
 
 
With a purposeful tread, Nkrumah approached the podium of the first Non-Aligned 
Conference in Belgrade in September 1961.705 When reflecting on the conference agenda, he 
stated that the meeting should not create ‘a third bloc’, instead, time had to be devoted to the 
mobilisation of ‘moral force’ as a way to balance the influence of East and West. Nonetheless, 
on a continent with seventeen newly independent states, even Nkrumah could not ignore the 
international environment. He referred to the Cold War not as a neocolonial ploy, but as a real 
problem with pressing issues like Berlin and the space race. Even though Nkrumah saw 
nonalignment as an opportunity to bring morality into international affairs, his speech stressed 
the need to improve living standards. Disarmament had to be pursued not only because war 
would devastate the continent, but also because arms expenditures channelled financial 
resources away from this more important goal.706 
Nkrumah touched upon the paramount issue of international relations after 1961: 
foreign aid and its moral, social, economic, and political implications. The Belgrade 
702 Memorandum, FO, “Information Policy for Africa”, 30 June 1961, FO 953/2031, TNA.  
703 Limited official use, “Notes on Conversation with President Nkrumah on Sunday, June 24, 10-11:30 a.m.”, 28 
June 1962, CDF 1950-54, 511.45K3/10-1254 – 511.45R3/7-2850, NARA. 
704 Qu’il s’agisse de la langue, de la culture, de la technique, des échanges commerciaux ou qu’il s’agisse de 
sentiment, multiplier les contacts avec les États pour qu’ils fassent partie à leur manière d’une sorte de monde 
française et qu’ils se développent à travers ce qui est français […] N’oubliez pas leur attachement à la France et 
de Gaulle, see Charles de Gaulle, Lettres Notes et Carnets: Tome IX (Paris: Plon, 1986), 318. 
705 Where ‘Non-Alignment’ refers to the meeting of 1961 and the movement that sprang from it, the term 
‘nonalignment’ defines a certain diplomatic position between the two Cold War blocs. 
706 Speech transcript, Nkrumah, 2 September 1961, 1-11, FO 371/161222, TNA. 
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Conference forced policy makers in Paris, London and Washington to take a long hard look at 
‘anticolonialism’, ‘nonalignment’, ‘neutralism’ and ‘Afro-Asian solidarity’. It was their 
fascination with the socio-economic modernisation process that determined what they saw. 
Anticolonialism and its derivatives were seen as an emotional response, a consequence of the 
stress that came with the development of ‘emerging’ societies. The bold attitude that 
characterised nonalignment was evaluated within the metric system of modernity. Deemed the 
product of frustration by the US, the result of too little development by the French and an 
expression of the cultural differences between Europe and Africa in the British estimation, 
nonalignment was listed together with the reliance on agriculture and runaway fertility as an 
additional symptom of underdevelopment. 
Nevertheless, those who have studied Non-Alignment set out to uncover what the 
political project was about in geopolitical terms, what distinguished it from traditional 
neutralism and how it transformed from Bandung to Belgrade and Cairo.707 Political scientists 
in the 1960s, most notably G.H. Jansen, scrutinised the different statements, speeches and 
organisational decisions in an attempt to deconstruct the myths of Third World unity and 
racial solidarity that emerged shortly after the conference. Nehru’s realpolitik became a topic 
of particular interest. By employing the term ‘nonalignment’ for the first time in May 1950, 
the Indian prime minister was able to pursue relations with communist countries, most 
prominently China, without risking the support of domestic and international players.708 In the 
1980s, Robert A. Mortimer tried to assess how the influence of non-alignment impacted upon 
international politics.709 
Conversely, social and cultural historians have chosen to shift their attention back to the 
racial aspects and the symbolism of Non-Alignment through discourse-centred work that 
presents Belgrade as a key moment when international relations became overlaid with racial 
meaning.710 Others, who draw on postcolonial archives or reassess the evidence in American 
or British archives, have settled on a different conclusion. For one, the pragmatism and 
realism of foreign policy makers in the postcolonial world is stressed. Rinna Kullaa, for 
instance, shows how Yugoslavia and Finland developed very particular brands of 
707 Mark Atwood Lawrence, “The Rise and Fall of Nonalignment”, in The Cold War in the Third World, ed. 
Robert J. McMahon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 139–55. 
708 G. H Jansen, Nonalignment and the Afro-Asian States (New York: Praeger, 1966), 18; Abraham, “From 
Bandung to NAM: Non-Alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947-65”, 195–219. 
709 Robert A. Mortimer, The Third World Coalition in International Politics (New York: Westview Press, 1980); 
A. W. Singham and Shirley Hune, Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments (London: Lawrence Hill, 1986). 
710 Parker, “Ideology, Race and Nonalignment in US Cold War Foreign Relations”, 77; Prashad, The Darker 
Nations: A People’s History of the Third World, 95–104. 
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nonalignment to steer clear of absorption into the Soviet bloc.711 Moreover, it is clear that 
Western policy makers were unable to understand what Non-Alignment as a project was 
about.712 While the field is thus becoming more varied, the fundamental opposition between a 
realist understanding of the Non-Alignment Movement and a racial interpretation has 
persisted. 
This ambiguous reading of the international environment is in part due to Kennedy’s 
record on the Third World, which is partial, contradictory, and complicated by the president’s 
preference to rely on informal advisors.713 Nonetheless, the president’s reputation as someone 
who sympathised with African nationalism remains714, and is hardly tarnished by the 
revisionist narrative of the 1970s that portrayed Kennedy as a Cold Warrior.715 Post-
revisionists discern a sincere personal commitment to ending colonialism with few concrete 
results.716 In the most recent books, Kennedy and his aides emerge as people who were 
perceptive enough to distinguish communism from nationalism, but lacked the sensitivity to 
acknowledge the adverse effects of the modernisation they promoted. What was misguided 
was how planners and experts conceptualised social distress as a technical problem solvable 
by governmental planning, not their views of African nationalism.717 Yet Kennedy’s 
commitment to modernisation theory also comprised the fear of a modernisation process 
turned sour.  
711 Rinna Kullaa, Non-Alignment and Its Origins in Cold War Europe Yugoslavia, Finland and the Soviet 
Challenge (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 2–15; Vitalis, “The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables 
of Bandung (Ban-Doong)”, 261–262. 
712 Robert B. Rakove, “Two Roads to Belgrade: The United States, Great Britain, and the First Nonaligned 
Conference”, Cold War History 14, no. 3 (2014): 337–57. 
713 ‘He has not wished to give clear authority to any one of these men over another, preferring to retain the right 
of direct communication and command’, see Memorandum for the president, “Current Organization of the White 
House and NSC for dealing with International Matters”, 22 June 1961, 2, Papers of President Kennedy, NSF, 
Box 405, f: Memos to the President: 6/6, JFKL; The view that the scandals surrounding Kennedy’s personal life 
impacted on his foreign policy have never received much attention: Mark J. White, ed., “The Private Life of a 
Public Man”, in Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), 272. 
714 Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans; Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the 
White House (New York: Mariner Books, 2002); Ted Sorensen, Kennedy (New York and London: William S. 
Konecky Association, 1999); White, “The Private Life of a Public Man”, 272. 
715 Kolko, Confronting the Third World, 111–116, 191–205; Thomas G. Paterson, Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: 
American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Stephen G. Rabe, John F. 
Kennedy: World Leader (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2010); Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area 
in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1999); John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American 
National Security Policy During the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 198–273. 
716 Thomas J. Noer, “The New Frontier and African Neutralism: Kennedy, Nkrumah, and the Volta River 
Project”, Diplomatic History 8, no. 1 (1984): 61–80; Ibezim Chukwumerije, “The New Frontier and Africa, 
1961-1963” (Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York, 1976). 
717 Westad, The Global Cold War; Ryan Irwin, “The Gordian Knot: Apartheid & the Unmaking of the Liberal 
World Order, 1960-70” (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 2010); Robert Dallek, An Unfinished Life: 
John F. Kennedy, 1917 - 1963 (New York: Little Brown, 2003); Grubbs, Secular Missionaries, 1–18. 
                                              
222 | T h e  I d e o l o g i c a l  S c r a m b l e  f o r  A f r i c a  
 
The Cold War was not the only international reality that was harnessed to maximise 
potential benefits. The global Cold War perspective was also reversed. Diplomats from the 
global north worked to exploit that other international reality of their age: decolonisation. 
Specifically, diplomats sought to transform anticolonial nationalism and nonaligned 
internationalism into something that was considered to be more ‘constructive’. Kennedy’s 
ambition to make the anticolonial project more compatible with Western, so-called modern 
standards was shared by Macmillan and de Gaulle who believed their assistance projects 
could turn pan-Africanism in particular into a force for economic development and, 
consequently, prestige. 
Arguing that the French and the British tried to reap the benefits from anticolonialism 
confronts a historiography on decolonisation that has never found a firm footing. Unlike the 
new imperial history writing, which grapples with cultural, racial and gender tropes, the study 
of decolonisation has remained preoccupied with high politics and economics. Even fifty 
years after Macmillan’s Wind of Change speech, the British narrative on decolonisation still 
alternates between economic and geopolitical explanations for the liquidation of empire.718 
 Likewise, the French scepticism towards postcolonial theory and the trauma of the 
Algerian War has led to highly politicised narratives that drift between a positive assessment 
of Coopération and the Francophonie719 and accusatory accounts with Foccart, de Gaulle’s 
point man, in a leading role.720 Even in those histories that occupy a middle ground, de Gaulle 
still appears as the driving force behind policy, leaving little room for African initiatives to 
impact upon French policy making.721 In that way, it becomes difficult to explain how and 
why the UK branded itself as an expert of African development, de Gaulle began to present 
himself as a Third World champion, and the US became eager to manage anticolonial 
sentiment.  
718 Heinlein, British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945-63, 106; Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire, 
301–303; Horne, Macmillan, 2012, 1:174–211; Darwin, The Empire Project; Stockwell and Butler, 
“Introduction”; Robin Winks, Wm. Roger Louis, and Alaine Low, eds., The Oxford History of the British 
Empire, Volume V: Historiography (Oxford University Press, 1999). 
719 Marine Lefèvre, Le soutien Américain à la Francophonie: enjeux Africains 1960-1970 (Paris: Presses de la 
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 2010). 
720 François-Xavier Verschave, La Françafrique: le plus long scandale de la République (Paris: Stock, 1998); 
François-Xavier Verschave, De La Françarique À La Mafiarique (Brussel: Éditions Tribord, 2004). 
721 Maurice Vaïsse, La Grandeur: Politique Étrangère Du Général de Gaulle, 1958-1969 (Fayard, 1998), 284; 
Frédéric Turpin, De Gaulle, Pompidou et l’Afrique (1958-1974): Décoloniser et coopérer (Paris: Les Indes 
savantes, 2010); Pierre-Michel Durand, L’Afrique et les relations Franco-Américaines des années soixante: aux 
origines de L’obsession Américaine (Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 2007); Migani, “De Gaulle and Sub-Saharan 
Africa: From Decolonization to French Development Policy, 1958 - 1963,” 251–252; Bat, Le syndrome Foccart; 
Yves Gounin and Jean-Christophe Rufin, La France en Afrique le combat des anciens et des modernes 
(Bruxelles: De Boeck, 2009). 
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In this light two questions become relevant: what function was public diplomacy 
supposed to perform, now that the road to modernity was socio-economic rather than 
educational? Further, what was left of old colonial management tools like education and 
foreign aid, which had proven to be ineffective in the face of postcolonial crisis? Before 
turning to educational and economic assistance, however, we must examine how the global 
north understood the Non-Aligned Movement. 
 
 
Belgrade and Nonalignment as an Obstacle to Modernity 
 
With the Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade of January 1961, the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) became an international reality. In July 1956, Nasser, Nehru and Tito had decided on 
a conference during their meeting in Brijuni. Yet when delegates gathered to determine how 
they could politically harness a shared anticolonial sentiment and use the momentum of 1960, 
a tension within the Third World project surfaced. Realists like Ahmed Ben Bellah of the 
Algerian GPRA, who saw the NAM as a lever to acquire financial resources, faced leaders 
such as Ibrahim Abboud and Nkrumah who wanted to construct an ‘ideal international 
society’ geared towards world peace. For them, the NAM was a means to prevent Cold War 
intrusion and a way to give substance to anticolonial internationalism.722  
Ideologically, Belgrade therefore signalled the institutionalisation, but also the end of 
anticolonial internationalism as a separate project of international relations. The majority of 
the Non-Aligned leaders were no longer interested in making the international system more 
equal, but wanted to get more out of the existing international structure in terms of political 
influence and economic aid. That paradox is lost on most historians. Mark Atwood Lawrence 
for instance simply claims that ‘Non-Alignment became the centrepiece of Third World 
organizing in 1961.’723 
 
 
Non-Alignment and Anticolonialism as Roadblocks to Modernisation 
 
With such an ambiguous agenda, it took a long time before Western unease about Belgrade 
was translated into concrete diplomatic action. The NATO Council meeting concluded that 
‘nothing particularly new’ had emerged. Couve de Murville reported to posts in Africa and 
Asia that anticolonialism had been the principal issue at Belgrade, but a third bloc had not 
722 Byrne, “Our Own Special Brand of Socialism”, 103–104; Speech transcript, “Address by H.E. El Ferik 
Ibrahim Abboud”, [January 1961], 2, FO 371/161222, TNA. 
723 Lawrence, “The Rise and Fall of Nonalignment”, 144. 
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been formed. He agreed with the French officials in Yugoslavia, who expected that a UN 
caucus would be formed to demand more aid. The Americans and the British, by contrast, 
were worried the USSR might succeed in gaining nonaligned support for Khrushchev’s peace 
proposal for Berlin. A unilateral treaty with East Germany would effectively block American, 
French, and British access to the city.724 
As the pros and cons of a message from Kennedy to the delegates were debated at the 
White House, the British IRD sent a diverse set of booklets to Belgrade, such as The 
Communist Viewpoint, Communist Infiltration in the Congo, but also a more positive 
pamphlet on the power of economic assistance, Rostow on Growth. This uncertainty about the 
best communication strategy was triggered by a concern that too much attention would give 
the delegates an unjustified sense of importance. The British diplomats were ordered to 
discuss their plans with French, German, and American colleagues, which led the State 
Department to adopt the British guidance. ‘I particularly like scaring them with the loss of 
economic aid’, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Foy Kohler admitted. It was 
decided to impress upon Belgrade delegates that their survival was intertwined with the 
outcome of the Berlin crisis.725 
Once the Belgrade meeting had ended, most Western observers concluded that the 
NAM conferences were potential roadblocks to the modernisation of emerging societies. 
Where Bandung had strengthened cultural assistance programmes in 1955, Belgrade signalled 
a need to address the remaining resentment towards colonialism. As Rostow told Kennedy, 
nonalignment was a matter of national tactics not of moral commitment. In the NSC, Kennedy 
stated that an American policy in favour of free and independent countries could create 
problems, for instance in the case of Yugoslavia and Ghana. New conferences – Bandung II in 
Algiers (1964) and Belgrade II in Cairo (1965) – became an obsession for the administration 
and the Foreign Office. In Africa, that energy was directed towards Nkrumah and his brand of 
pan-Africanism.726 
724 “The Belgrade Conference”, [1961], CM(61)119, NATO-Archives; Circulaire, Couve de Murville to 
représentants diplomatiques de France à l’étranger, 9 September 1961, DDF, 1961, Tome 1, 374-376; Arnaud to 
affaires étrangères, 3 September 1961, DAO, Généralités, 124QO/412, AMAE; Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and 
the Nonaligned World, 63. 
725 Confidential note, “Pros and Cons of Message from President Kennedy”, [1961], NSF, Box 439, f: Non-
Aligned Conferences 1961-1963 Cairo-Belgrade [White House Memoranda], JFKL; Confidential letter, IRD to 
information office Belgrade, 16 August 1961, FO 1110/1421, TNA; Memcon, Foy Kohler to Charles Hulick, 23 
August 1961, Aide memoire, Federal Republic of Germany to Washington D.C., 26 August 1961, RG. 59, A1 
1587-M, Box 50, f: Belgrade Conference 1961, NARA. 
726 Memorandum, Rostow to Kennedy, “Neutralism and Foreign Aid; or Belgrade Reconsidered”, 27 September 
1961, DDRS; President Kennedy’s Remark to the 496th NSC Meeting, January 18, 1962, FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. 
8: National Security, 238-239; At the Foreign Office they believed the ‘novelty of conferences and international 
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The Challenge of Belgrade and the Year of Africa 
 
In the Western perception, the independence wave in Africa and the Belgrade Conference 
created a whole host of new problems that required innovative solutions. As Kennedy’s 
transition team and USIA officials noted in December 1960, the concern for an orderly and 
stable transition had been overtaken by the demand for economic growth. Kennedy’s Task 
Force on Africa was concerned that the American modernisation project would be flooded by 
the ‘revolutionary tides’ of anticolonialism – a destructive force in ‘emerging societies.’ 727   
When G. Mennen ‘Soapy’ Williams, the new assistant secretary of state for African 
affairs and his wife, Nancy, went on their Africa trip in March 1961 they were shocked to find 
that Africans knew little about the world. Williams was concerned about African impatience 
to get ahead, because without a clear project it could only lead to unfulfilled ambitions and 
frustration. Eugene A. Raymond, the chairman of the United Friends of Africa, wrote to 
Williams in a similar vein: ‘It seems these people in general desire our aid but for some 
strange reason lack the capacity for expressing gratitude.’728 
The dramatic social and economic challenges new African states faced and the fierce 
way in which African leaders wanted to guard their independence also made the British 
goodwill policy problematic. A benevolent image of imperialism could no longer be 
promoted. When A.W. Snelling of the CRO met with Nkrumah and his cabinet secretary, 
A.L. Adu on 23 March 1960, things quickly fell apart. Nkrumah started talking about ‘fake 
independence’ while he fulminated against the defence agreements France had concluded 
with its former colonies. Even though Nkrumah reassured Snelling that he was able to 
differentiate between the benevolent British policies and French neocolonialism, the British 
were not sure if the Africans on the receiving end of the Ghanaian campaign to mobilise pan-
African opinion would be able to make that distinction. To avoid trouble with Nkrumah the 
CRO realised it needed a communication strategy that differentiated between the French and 
the British record on decolonisation.729 
life’ made Africans ‘highly organization minded’, see confidential memorandum, “African Mental Attitudes”, 
[undated, 1961], FO 953/2076, TNA; Foreign service despatch, Amembassy Niamy, “Signs of Rapprochement 
between Niger and Several Casablanca Powers”, 21 March 1962, RG. 59, CDF 1960-1963, 670B.83/10-1261 – 
670J.00/3-2162, NARA. 
727 Confidential, “Report to the Honorable John F. Kennedy by The Task Force on Africa”, 31 December 1960, 
8- 10, Pré Presidential Papers, Task Force on Africa, Box 1073, f: Task Force Reports, JFKL. 
728 Letter, Eugene A. Raymond to Williams, [1961], G. Mennen Williams Papers, Box 16-N, f: Trips Africa 
March 1961, Bentley Historical Library; Sorensen, Kennedy, 646; Thomas J. Noer, Soapy: A Biography of G. 
Mennen Williams (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 226. 
729 Draft, “The Foreign Office General Instructions: Duties of Information Officers”, [January 1961], 2, 
Confidential memcon, R.A. Burrows, “Official Committee on Overseas Information Services Third Meeting”, 4 
May 1961, FO 953/2050, TNA; Letter A.W. Snelling to Hunt, 23 March 1960, DO 35/9424, TNA. 
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De Gaulle was confronted with a cascade of independence declarations in French 
Africa, a development that had been stimulated in part by the fact that Guinea remained afloat 
with Ghanaian support. Existing bilateral and multilateral agreements were hurriedly elevated 
to an official policy, known as Coopération. France provided economic, military and cultural 
aid, the Brazzaville group transformed itself in the Union africaine et malgache (UAM) and 
agreed to vote with France in the UN General Assembly. Members of the UAM thus played a 
decisive role in shaping Franco-African structures, received aid and as a group were better 
able to react against the Ghanaian and Guinean subversion and propaganda which destabilised 
their regimes. The agency of the leaders of French Africa is rarely explicitly acknowledged by 
French historians, who are more interested in de Gaulle’s decisions.730  
De Gaulle’s televised speech in which he defended this new form of cooperation in July 
1961 was indicative of the level of improvisation. The cost of empire had made 
disengagement inevitable, de Gaulle declared, in his calculated political vernacular. But if 
France could ‘establish new relations based on friendship and cooperation’, ‘tant mieux!’, all 
the better!731 It took the French government until 1963 to establish a commission – led by and 
named after Jean-Marcel Jeanneney – that was tasked with devising a doctrine for 
Coopération.732 Even the Francophonie, a cooperation among the totality of French speaking 
peoples, France’s cultural coating of postcolonial structures, was advocated by Jean Marc 
Léger in Québec and adopted by Senghor. The term ‘francité’ was more commonly used in 
the 1960s, until Senghor reintroduced the term in November 1962 in an article for Esprit that 
analysed the international position of the Francophonie. De Gaulle’s talent for adopting ideas 
that had been accepted and had proven to be workable led his personal Africa adviser, Jacques 
Foccart, who was building his network of African leaders at the Secrétariat general, to 
conclude that the general was not interested in Africa.733 
However, Foccart was wrong. De Gaulle was not the only leader overwhelmed by the 
postcolonial situation in Africa. Kennedy was anxious about anticolonial leaders who did not 
730 Turpin describes this process with flair and in great detail but only concludes that the formation of the UAM 
was a ‘succès pour la France’, see Turpin, De Gaulle, Pompidou et l’Afrique (1958-1974), 151–154; An 
exception is Chafer and Todd Sheppard, see Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa, 223–236; 
Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, 3–15. 
731 Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages, Vol. III (Parijs: Plon, 1970), 329–30. 
732 Migani sees the Jeanneney report as an example of the successful French management of decolonisation, but 
she does not explain why the report was only written after the cooperation structure had already been created, see 
Migani, “De Gaulle and Sub-Saharan Africa: From Decolonization to French Development Policy, 1958 - 1963”, 
264. 
733 Jacques Foccart, Dans les bottes du général. Journal de l’Élysée - III, 1969-1971 (Paris: Fayard/Jeune 
Afrique, 1999), 525, 530; Durand, L’Afrique et les relations Franco-Américaines des années soixante, 443–445; 
Lefèvre, Le soutien Américain à la Francophonie: enjeux Africains 1960-1970, 12. 
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have a socio-economic project to meet the aspiration of so-called emerging peoples, while the 
British were more concerned with the PR implications. Their fears were mirrored by and 
developed in synergy with an academic establishment that analysed Western led 
modernisation and the psychological effects of technological change.  
 
 
The Experts and Modernisation as a Psychological Problem 
 
Innovations in anthropology and the social sciences in the late 1950s had created an acute 
awareness of the need to devise modernisation schemes with an eye for the local context in 
which they were introduced. Where modernisation theorists such as Rostow and Milikan 
advocated economic aid alongside technical assistance and tactically assumed that cultural 
differences were only footnotes to their plan to attain modernity, cultural relativist 
anthropologists such as Bronislaw Malinowksi and Audry Richard at the LSE as well as 
Claude Lévi-Strauss at the Collège de France had made participation observation in so-called 
‘primitive’ societies popular.734 Technocratic optimism, but also anxiety about the adverse 
psychological effects of intervention shaped the diplomatic plans that sought to project 
modernity into the Third World; this, in spite of historians who claim that the promises of a 
bright modern future were never seriously questioned.735 
Pivotal in this dual view on modernity was Margaret Mead’s Cultural Patterns and 
Technical Change, a UNESCO sponsored book that went through numerous reprints and 
remained an important text into the 1970s.736 Mead found it necessary to think about the 
changes that were introduced by technical experts in order to protect the mental health of a 
world population in transition. Change introduced emotional tension, and that tension had to 
be addressed, or the individual would remain in ‘a state of maladjustment or frustration.’737 
African leaders also spoke this language of psychology to legitimise their development 
projects and promote new kinds of behaviour in the service of progress. Kenneth Kaunda, for 
734 Cooper points out that modernisation theorists were not merely driven by a hubristic attempt at making every 
problem technically legible, but he does not explain where this tension originated, see Scott, Seeing Like a State, 
343; Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 141; Joseph Morgan Hodge, Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines 
of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007), 254. 
735 See particularly Nick Cullather, “Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State”, Journal of 
American History 89, no. 2 (2002): 537. 
736 Ekbladh, The Great American Mission, 158. 
737 Margaret Mead, Cultural Patterns and Technical Change: A Manuel Prepared by the World Federation for 
Mental Health (New York: The New American Library, 1955), 270–273. 
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instance, mimicked Mead’s work when he wrote that political frustration was a psychological 
time bomb under the independence project.738 
In the post war United Kingdom, the World Federation for Mental Health promoted a 
psychological theory of development. In its estimation, cultural differences were 
psychological and formed at youth and therefore adaptable to modern Western models. 
Audrey Richards for instance wrote that development officers on the ground had to pay more 
attention to convincing locals. John Strachey – a British minister who had been involved in 
the abortive Tanganyika groundnut scheme – came to a similar conclusion when he reflected 
on the end of empire in 1959. He concluded that acquiring mastery of the physical 
environment would not be effective as long as the tensions that came from intercultural 
conflict were not managed. All the while Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism showed that all cultures 
shared underlying patterns and deep structures. Cultural differences were adopted in the 
younger years and could thus be unlearned if needed.739 
Unlike Macmillan who was only indirectly influenced by these changing academic 
positions or the case of France where governments were unsympathetic towards postcolonial 
intellectuals such as Sartre, Kennedy developed his views in synergy with the academic 
establishment of modernisation theory. Walt W. Rostow and the World Bank director, Eugene 
Black, believed modernity was ‘fundamentally, political and psychological rather than 
narrowly economic.’740 Nonetheless, Rostow’s weapon of choice remained economic 
aid because an industrial economy provided the most solid basis for political and social 
change.741 Kennedy also adopted Rostow’s fear that modernisation could awaken the latent 
hostility intrinsic to nationalism and anticolonialism. A report from Harvard’s Center for 
International Studies (CENIS) had already in 1955 informed its readers about the unsettling 
effects of a take-off process. 742 
738 Erik Linstrum, “Making Minds Modern: Experiments with Psychology in the British Empire” (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Harvard, 2012), 281; Kenneth D. Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa: Letters to Colin M. Morris 
(London: Longmans, 1967), 48–57. 
739 Conference Notes, Ricards, “Concept of the Lazy African”, 22 February 1961, Richards/14/12, LSE; 
Linstrum, “Making Minds Modern”, 285, 302; John Strachey, The End of Empire (London: Gollancz, 1959), 
242–45; David Richards, “Postcolonial Anthropology in the French-Speaking World”, in Postcolonial Thought 
in the French-Speaking World, ed. Charles Forsdick and David Murphy, Postcolonialism across the Disciplines 4 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009), 174–179. 
740 Rostow, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Foreign Aid, 43; For an analysis of the intellectual debates on 
modernisation see: Hodge, Triumph of the Expert, 207–253. 
741 Ekbladh, The Great American Mission, 173; Rostow, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Foreign Aid, 44. 
742 Millikan and Rostow, A Proposal, 142; Gilman, Mandarins of the Future, 194–195; Walt W. Rostow and 
Richard Hatch, An American Policy in Asia (New York: John Wiley with the Technological Press of MIT, 
1955), 50. 
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The vocal anticolonial image that the Belgrade Conference projected was seen in the 
West as a confirmation of what academics and policy makers had already established in the 
course of the Congo crisis. A vocal anticolonial discourse was the sign of a disturbance in the 
modernisation process, the expression that developmental aspirations had not been matched 
with a constructive modernisation programme. 
 
 
A Competition to Transform the Anticolonial Project 
 
Public diplomats in the global north wanted to transform the anticolonial project into a 
venture that was considered to be more constructive. They therefore sought to eliminate the 
roadblocks that prevented them from modernising these societies. The American assumption 
that modernisation was potentially dangerous and would inevitably reach down to the 
personality demanded a foreign policy that acknowledged those views.743 In Britain the 
obsession with African cultural uniqueness was considered to be the problem. All the while 
French officials ignored those psychological and cultural arguments. They argued that not 
enough economic development had caused new national leaders to turn on the West. 
Consequently a competition to harness anticolonial nationalism surfaced. 
 
  
British Decolonisation as an Extension of Pan-Africanism 
 
For the British Foreign Office, the ‘strongly-marked vein of sentimentality’ was an 
opportunity to present British aid as a form of support for African unity. A meeting of British 
officials from East and West Africa in May 1961 concluded that pan-Africanism would 
eventually serve as a dam against Soviet encroachment. Until that time, information officers 
had to show the British support for the pan-African aspiration. At the same time the support 
for the anticolonial pan-African position was not without risk. When the IPD did some 
research work in Kenya they concluded that the self-confidence of many Africans was born of 
ignorance and inexperience. Undemocratic, violent, and ‘tribal’ attitudes would re-emerge 
when under emotional stress.744  
In the interest of the British image, Ralph Murray, the director of the IRD, 
recommended that these doubts were not voiced ‘publicly’. British information policy had to 
743 Secret, “United States – United Kingdom Information working Group Meeting: the Congo as an Information 
Problem”, April 1961, FO 953/2029, TNA. 
744 Record of meeting, “Meeting of Her Majesty’s Representatives in West and Equatorial Africa”, 16-19 May 
1961, FO 371/154740, TNA; Confidential memorandum, McMullen, “United Kingdom Information Office, 
Kenya”, [1961], FO 1110/1447, TNA. 
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keep the idea of British support for the pan-African aspirations alive. In British Africa, the 
British Council promoted the UK as a ‘modern, progressive and far-sighted country’ willing 
to cooperate with African governments in attaining their goals. Additionally, they created a 
French language education programme to remove the language barrier, which the CIAS had 
identified as the biggest stumbling block on the road to unity. Old colonial information 
services were replaced with UK information offices, which received information brochures on 
pan-Africanism that could serve as the basis of propaganda.745 
The idea that all the colonial powers were in the same boat was abandoned. In the new 
information police for Africa the French became competitors. By 1963 this had not only 
become an issue of image building, but a matter of principle. BC officers believed that French 
aid had been ill conceived while French policy was seen as unsuited for the real needs of West 
Africa. The key was convincing leaders in French Africa that progress and stronger inter-
African cooperation could only be attained if they got to knew their English speaking 
neighbours, accepted technical aid outside of France and went to English language classes.746  
Nonetheless, the British made this shift quietly. When the French in the colonial talks 
asked for a joint front, J.C. Petrie of the Foreign Office nodded quietly while she evaded 
French requests to secure better BBC treatment of the French decisions in Africa and ignored 
the proposal to exchange information material that dealt with their colonial policy. Only when 
talking to the Americans – whose help was needed, did the British gesture that they would 
work to ease anti-French sentiments on the continent. Believing that officials within the 
Kennedy administration – though not necessarily Kennedy – were obsessed with the Cold 
War, the UK delegates told their American interlocutors that the French educational and 
cultural training in Africa was still a trump card in the Western hand.747  
745 Letter, Ralph Murray to FO, 3 May 1961, FO 371/154738, TNA; Confidential report, “Report on the 
Prospects of British Council Development in the Countries of French-Speaking West Africa”, 12 May 1963, 1, 
13, BW 143/1, TNA; Confidential memorandum, McMullen, “United Kingdom Information Office, Kenya”, FO 
1110/1447, TNA; A late example of the new British strategy is a pamphlet on Pan-Africanism: “‘Pan-
Africanism’, Prepared for British Information Services by the Central Office of Information”, 1965, Dabu 
Gizenga Papers, Box 128-21, f: Pan Africanism, MSRC. 
746 Memorandum, “Information Policy for Africa”, 30 June 1961, FO 953/2031, TNA;  Confidential Report, 
“Confidential Report on the prospects of British Council Developments in the countries of French-Speaking 
West Africa”, 12 May 1963, 13, BW 143/1, TNA; Letter, J.H.A. Watson to Roger, 27 April 1961, Letter, Roger 
Stevens to FO, 13 April 1961, FO 371/154738, TNA. 
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Andrew Defty’s conclusion, that the UK from 1948 onwards kept expanding its efforts 
to battle communist propaganda, thus requires some nuance. The British information 
operation in Africa did not fail because it focused too much on Cold War themes and ignored 
local realities.748 Rather, if there was a lack of success it has to be attributed to the illusion, 
entertained by the UK information services, that British aims and pan-African aspirations 
could be connected in an effort to further the British position. 
 
 
Making French Development Visible 
 
The French engagement with Africa was also changing. A research paper on pan-Africanism 
prepared by the Ministry of Cooperation and sent out to all the posts in Africa defined 
Ghana’s pan-Africanism as a utopian project. Cultural cooperation was a way to steer African 
societies away from this unattainable goal. Senghor’s claim, in 1956, that the French language 
was a modernising force uniquely suited to boosting African development was now expanded 
to the entire assistance operation. As Debré phrased it in 1963 there was a ‘spiritual need’ for 
France.749 It was important that the French action culturel contributed to the relief of societal 
needs and was clearly distinguishable from what the French territorial governments were 
doing.750 
Even though Debré founded the Ministry of Cooperation to manage the different 
bilateral cooperation agreements, it was at the meetings of the chiefs of missions where 
concrete decisions were made. In January 1961 it was decided that assistance projects had to 
be highly ‘visible’. Rather than simply a form of publicity, it was essential that projects were 
effective to elucidate that French aid had the power to develop societies. In that way France 
memorandum, “Sino/Soviet Economic Offensive and the Presentation of Western Aid”, 1962,  FO 1110/1522, 
TNA. 
748 Vaughan makes this argument about the British public diplomacy failure due to a British obsession with the 
Cold War in Vaughan, The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-57, 247; 
Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist, 258; John Jenks, British Propaganda and News Media in the Cold 
War (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 4. 
749 Letter, Debré to Couve de Murville, 3 January 1963, CM 8 1963, FNSP. 
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de la Coopération Culturelle et Technique, “Premiers éléments d’une étude relative aux programmes d’action 
culturelles des états africains et malgache d’expression française”, 16 March 1961, Ministère de la Coopération, 
Direction de la coopération technique et culturelle, 19810443/47, f: Historique de la DCT, CHAN; 
Memorandum, “Contribution à une définition du comportement psychologique africain en face de l’information 
et de l’action culturelle étrangères”, [1960-61], DAL, Généralités, 49QONT/69, f: AFR-III-1 Documentation 
générale sur la zone géographique,  AMAE. 
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would acquire a ‘moral advantage’ over its competitors and secure a good reputation.751 
Assistance was about more than aid-grants, it also represented a certain impression of France 
as a nation at the forefront of development. 
More precisely, the French cultural projection into Africa was less about creating an 
elaborate illusion of ‘great power status’ than it was about gaining genuine influence. French 
culture was offered as a form of development aid in exchange for the support of de Gaulle’s 
international policy. The decision to use French culture in a more political way in the early 
sixties did not mean, as many have argued, that cultural resources were used as propaganda to 
somehow entice the former African colonies to develop according to a French 
model.752 Cultural resources were more consciously granted to those territories that were 
expected to remain loyal to France. 
As historians such as Guia Migani have noted, France increasingly wanted to present 
itself as a special interlocutor for the Third World after 1961.753 What is striking is that de 
Gaulle’s choice for that course of action was far from unique. Similar to the British who 
sought to present their aid as an extension of the pan-African aims, the French goals were 
promoted as a form of support to nonalignment. France was the only country that had proven 
to be autonomous towards the superpowers. By offering French assistance in competition with 
Soviet and American aid, de Gaulle strove to break the bipolar mould and in doing so let the 
‘non-alignés’– among which de Gaulle counted himself – emerge.754  
 
 
Kennedy and Anticolonialism as a Destructive Force 
 
Unlike to the French and the British officials, JFK had been less confident about the possible 
tactical benefits of anticolonialism. Anticolonialism was the outcome of the half-hearted 
modernisation attempts of colonial regimes. Rapid social change and the breakdown of 
traditional control had led to psychological and social disruptions making Africa a ‘potentially 
dangerous place’.755 Further modernisation offered a solution but was not without risk. A 
751 ‘bénéfice moral’, see Rapport, “Conference des chefs de mission: Synthèse des rapports des chefs de 
mission”,  January 1961, 1-7, DAM, Généralités, 1089INVA/239 Coopération 1961-1975, f : Débuts politiques 
de la coopération (1961-1963), AMAE. 
752 Garret, “Conclusion: A Gaullist Grand Strategy?”, 302–303; Frank, “La machine diplomatique culturelle 
française après 1945”, 332; Rice, “Cowboys and Communists.” 
753 Migani, “De Gaulle and Sub-Saharan Africa: From Decolonization to French Development Policy, 1958 - 
1963”, 263. 
754 Quoted in Guia Migani, La France et l’Afrique Sub-Saharienne, 1957-1963 (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008), 
157. 
755 Speech transcript, “New Approaches to African Policy”, S.d., Theodore C. Sorensen Papers, Subject Files 
1961 – 1964, Box 34, f: Foreign Policy Africa, JFKL; 
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second moment of rupture could potentially strengthen the existing frustration, Kennedy 
reasoned. In his Foreign Affairs article – which had actually been written by speechwriter and 
close friend Ted Sorensen – Eisenhower was scolded for not understanding the forces of 
nationalism. ‘Modern nationalism’, he wrote ‘has a twin heritage. In one of its aspects it 
reflects a positive search for political freedom and self-development, in another it is the 
residue of disintegration and the destruction of the old moorings.’756  
His call to appreciate nationalism as a force outside of the Cold War framework has 
been seen as a plea for more understanding of Third World leaders. What is striking however 
was his assessment of nationalism as not necessarily a positive force for change. When 
Kennedy moved into the White House, he established a foreign policy that approached 
modernisation as a two-headed creature. In his inauguration speech he hinted at that duality 
when referring to man and his ‘power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of 
human life.’757 Rostow, Kennedy’s deputy to the national security assistant, had been writing 
at the same time about the disturbing character of the revolution of modernisation, and talked 
about individual men who were torn between the old and familiar way of life and the 
attractions of a modern way of life.758 
Kennedy therefore authorised the development of counterinsurgency programmes not 
only ‘to defend against communist rebellions in friendly, impoverished countries’,759 but more 
importantly to cushion the blows of development. The psychological rupture that the 
modernisation process brought with it had to be monitored. For Kennedy, providing military 
expertise to deal with guerilla warfare was only a first step. What was needed in the final 
analysis was a ‘a political effort.’ His interviewer, Joseph Alsop, noticed that Kennedy was 
obsessed with guerilla warfare, had closely studied the literature and even knew Mao Tse-
Tung’s dictum by heart: ‘Guerrillas are like fish, and the people are the water in which the 
fish swim. If the temperature of the water is right, the fish will thrive and multiply.’ 
Consequently, Kennedy believed that by controlling the temperature of the water, by 
managing the socio-economic conditions, the guerrilla fish would not be able to multiply.760 
 
 
756 John F. Kennedy, “A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs 36, no. 1 (October 1959): 44, 48. 
757 John F. Kennedy, “Inaugural Address”, 20 January 1961. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The 
American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8032. 
758 Walt W. Rostow, “Countering Guerrilla Attack”, in Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist 
Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 465–66. 
759 Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World, xxi. 
760 Quotes taken from an interview with Joseph Alsop, who in the past had worked for the British Information 
Service, see Stewart Alsop, “Kennedy’s Grand Strategy”, Saturday Evening Post, March 31, 1962, 14, 16.  
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The Counterinsurgency of USIA: Monitoring the Thermostat 
 
The USIA had to monitor the thermostat to prevent frustrations from turning violent and 
insurgency from occurring, but it would also disseminate leaflets in times of active insurgency 
such as the Vietnam War. The USIA became an important agency for the new 
counterinsurgency strategy of 1961 in which the need for early detection of latent insurgency 
was stressed. In the words of Sorensen, counterinsurgency specialists did not only have to 
work as ‘fire fighters’ who only handle insurgency after it breaks out, they had to prevent it.  
The USIA operated under an unspoken counterinsurgency logic, even in Africa where the first 
examples of initial or active insurgency were only found in 1963 when governments collapsed 
in Congo-Brazzaville, Liberia and the Somali Republic.761 
Although historians have applauded Kennedy for his ‘instinctive understanding of the 
power of the image’, it is clear that Kennedy saw public opinion as an obstacle that needed to 
be overcome, not as a tool to acquire power.762 He belittled the USIA’s traditional information 
task, as the selling of free enterprise and the description of the perils of communism. Instead 
he advocated the use of more traditional forms of diplomacy. As a presidential candidate he 
had criticised Eisenhower for exporting American cultural patterns to Africa and when Nixon 
returned from his trip in 1957, Kennedy stated that the people of Africa were interested in 
development and a decent standard of living, not doctrine. Despite C.D. Jackson’s attempt to 
plant at least an inkling of the political warfare problem in Kennedy’s mind, the USIA 
became a polling institute that measured global public opinion. It is no coincidence that Peter 
L. Koffsky only mentions Kennedy in passing in his official USIA history.763  
761 Secret letter, Edward V. Roberts to Frederic O. Bundy, “Internal Security Assessment of Africa”, 1 March 
1963, Memorandum, “Subject: Prospects in Brazzaville”, 17 May 1965, RG. 306, P 296, Box 2, f: C.I. West 
Africa, NARA; Official memorandum, “Liberia – USIA Program Summary”, [1962], RG. 306, P 296, Box 11, f: 
C.I. Field Visits, NARA; Airgram, Amembassy Mogadiscio to StateDep, “Internal Security – Somali Republic”, 
14 December 1963, RG. 306, P 296, Box 5, f: C.I. Somali Republic, NARA; Memorandum, Thomas C. Sorensen 
to Rowan, “Re-examining Counterinsurgency Policy and Programs”, 22 June 1964, RG. 306, P 296, Box 9, f: CI 
– Civil Action [Folder ½], NARA. 
762 This image of Kennedy refutes widely accepted claims in the historiography: Cull, The Cold War and the 
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Diplomatic History 25, no. 1 (2001): 63–84; Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World, xxiv, 259; 
Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans, 86; Amanda Kay McVety, Enlightened Aid: U.S. Development as 
Foreign Policy in Ethiopia: U.S. Development as Foreign Policy in Ethiopia (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 168. 
763 Kennedy, “A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy”, 48; Imperialism - The Enemy of Freedom, 2 July 1957, 
Public Papers of the President, 2013, 
http://www.jfklink.com/speeches/jfk/congress/jfk020757_imperialism.html; Speech draft, “New Approaches to 
African Policy”, S.d., Theodore C. Sorensen Papers, Subject Files 1961 – 1964, Box 34, f: Foreign Policy 
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162; Letter from C.D. Jackson to Edgar R. Baker, ‘Dear Ed’, 4 January 1961, Jackson, C.D.: Papers, 1931-1967, 
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Council, 14 January 1960, Papers as President, 1953-1961, NSC Series, Box 12, f: 432nd Meeting of NSC, 
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Kennedy’s rejection of a conventional battle for African minds was based on a simple 
calculation. If stomachs were hungry, minds did not care for ideas. If ideas were offered 
without providing an economic basis, the frustration would be exacerbated and sow the seeds 
for the American demise. Communication media, as social scientist Daniel Lerner had pointed 
out in 1958, were powerful modernisation tools that needed to be handled with care. Radios, 
for instance, enabled Third World peoples to imagine a better world, but also risked turning 
the revolution of rising expectations into a revolution of rising frustration if demands for 
development were not met.764  
All levels of the administration were in agreement on this point. The ‘New Frontier’ 
people in the Task Force saw anticolonialism as ‘a state of mind, a psychological hangover 
from the past.’ It provided African leaders with an excuse to not take the initiative: ‘The long 
colonial era produced habits of opposition not of responsibility […] acceptance of genuine 
responsibility tends to be postponed by blaming ‘colonialism’ for every problem and every 
dispute.’765 American development planning, the State Department maintained, offered the 
‘moral equivalent of anticolonialism.’766 The official American strategy towards the 
uncommitted nations therefore defined neutralism as only incidentally a reaction to the Cold 
War.767 Robert Good, fellow at John Hopkins and secretary of the Task Force, identified the 
prevention of communist intrusion in Africa as only ‘the minimal objective.’ Measures to deal 
with the negative emotion of anticolonialism were more important.  
Modernisation was supposed to go on where anticolonialism had stopped and turn 
frustrated and passive behaviour into a rational can do attitude. This was what Kennedy meant 
when he spoke about positive neutrality.768 Contrary to de Gaulle or Macmillan, who 
acknowledged the political opportunities created by anticolonialism, Kennedy could only see 
a threat to his modernisation project. 
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A Cross-National Diagnoses of ‘African Mental Attitudes’  
 
Because officials in Washington felt overwhelmed, they turned to the British for help. The 
British soothed their American colleagues by explaining that what was often understood as 
ingratitude, was simply an expression of the pre-colonial ‘client/protector system’ whereby 
strong men were supported as long as they maintained their power. The FO also agreed to 
research the African psychology and combine their know-how with French expertise. This 
exercise resulted in two psychological sketches of the so-called African attitude, which 
identified subtle differences between the new French, British and American approach to 
Africa and revealed areas of competition and cooperation.769 Once again, vague and diverging 
ideas about the developmental state of what was called the African psyche and culture, 
became the single most important factor shaping the trans-Atlantic relation on the ground in 
Africa. 
The FO for instance, turned to anthropology to understand pan-Africanism. After 
studying the ‘Davidson theory’, which saw a return of the old African patterns of life and the 
‘sceptical theory’ which regarded pan-Africanism as a purely anti-white propaganda stunt, the 
FO settled on a ‘pragmatic theory’. Whether ancient African civilisations had existed or not – 
and the FO believed the evidence to be sketchy – Africans wished that there had been such 
civilisations, making it a fact of life. ‘Much of their present touchiness’ and the centrality of 
African culture, the FO believed, came from feelings that the African peoples ‘were in the 
twentieth century without normal credentials.’ In this respect the French were believed to be 
more in touch with African reality because culture had ‘a far more central position’ in their 
policies.770 
Those French analysts were tolerant of the emotions of frustration. Unlike the FO, this 
stemmed not from an attempt to link up with pan-African goals, but was rooted in the belief 
that the African was the victim of the economic and social situation that conditioned his state 
of mind. Recent political independence combined with economic dependency had led them to 
behave like adolescents desperate to assert their independence, even if it is not in their best 
interest. Like the New Frontier people, they saw a tendency to blame every failure on 
colonialism. But contrary to the American view, the problem was not modernisation that had 
769 Confidential Memorandum, McMullen, “United Kingdom Information Office, Kenya”, [1961], FO 
1110/1447, TNA; Notes, J.C. Petrie, “Anglo-French Information Talks: Notes for meeting”, 19 December 1961, 
FO 953/2050, TNA. 
770 Memorandum, “African Mental Attitudes”, [undated, 1961], FO 953/2076, TNA. 
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happened too quickly but too little of it. Cultural and informational diplomacy had to 
contribute to economic development, not only provide propaganda.771 
Contrary to these extensive analyses, Nkrumah had given little thought to what the 
‘African Personality’ meant exactly. For him, the political utility of the term was what 
mattered. After 1960, however, a more circumscribed African ideology had to be promoted. 
An analysis of the concept written by D.B Sam, an editor of The Spark, ended up on 
Nkrumah’s presidential desk. In Sam’s memorandum, the historical narrative was maintained. 
After the Berlin Conference, the colonial powers systematically attempted to destroy the 
‘African Personality’; what was new was the attention paid to the socio-economic 
surroundings and its effects on mental attitude and physical behaviour. In this analysis, human 
development was the outcome of a continuous interaction between hereditary and 
environmental factors. Although Nkrumah never gave up on the spiritual side of pan-
Africanism, it is clear that the ‘African Personality’ could not escape the new gospel of socio-
economic modernisation that sought to influence by changing social structures, rather than 
personalities.772 
Everyone thus reached the same conclusion: to influence the attitudes of so-called 
‘emerging’ African peoples, socio-economic structures had to be targeted. At the same time 
there was disagreement about the specific gear that needed to be engaged to get the 
modernisation machine turning. Were modernisation efforts supposed to be more cautiously 
implemented to prevent frustration from happening? Or was too little socio-economic 
development the cause of emotional anticolonialism, as the French had concluded? Perhaps – 
French officials reasoned – the problem of emotionalism was blown out of proportion and 
more attention needed to be paid to the cultural sensitivities on the continent?  
The diverging views about the mental state of the so-called ‘African’ led the Kennedy 
administration to a particular division of labour. US officials were willing to compete with the 
European powers in the area of aid, but allowed France and the UK to remain active in 
education. Thus the Kennedy administration did not compete with the European powers 
because it was convinced that European influence on the continent was by its definition 
wrong, as argued by historians such as Philip Muehlenbeck who present a favourable image 
of Kennedy. Rostow, for instance, had described France as a partner in creating so-called 
771 Memorandum, “Contribution à une définition du comportement psychologique africain en face de 
l’information et de l’action culturelle étrangères”, [1960-61], DAL, Généralités, 49QONT/69, f: Folder : AFR-
III-1 Documentation générale sur la zone géographique, AMAE. 
772 Memorandum, D.B. Sam, “The Concept of African Personality”, 21 February 1962, RG. 17/2/800 
Miscellaneous1955-1964, PRAAD-Accra. 
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‘islands of responsibility’, places where the development process could be executed in an 
organised fashion.773 
 
 
Education: Human Resource or Ideological Weapon 
 
In their epoch making A Proposal of 1957, both Rostow and Millikan rejected the notion that 
modernisation could be fostered through the spread of ideas and education. This approach – 
preferred by the colonial state and by Eisenhower – had been fraught with difficulties and had 
proven to be ineffective. Values would be more quickly grasped and promoted through 
programmes of common action rather than through debate or education. They inverted the 
logic upon which Eisenhower’s drive for education and public diplomacy had been built. 
Essential for political responsibility was that individual men and women had the confidence 
that it was in their power to improve their own situation.  
According to Rostow, people would become more confident by seeing new factories, 
better farming methods, improved public health and education, and better transport. 
Nonetheless, Charles Douglas Jackson, Eisenhower’s advisor for psychological strategy, had 
referred to Rostow, a key thinker on modernisation in the Kennedy administration, as an 
expert in political warfare and saw him as the clearest thinker and most articulate expounder 
of psychological war.774 How then can we reconcile the image of Rostow as someone who 
targeted minds and at the same time rejected such an approach? 
For Rostow this was an issue of tactics. Changing an individual’s convictions was the 
aim of modernisation, but it required tangible action. More precisely, democratic values were 
not a prerequisite to economic development; concrete programmes provided the opportunity 
to demonstrate political democracy. Rostow’s approach actually corresponded with C.D. 
Jackson’s beliefs about the importance of words corresponding to deeds. The final report of 
the Jackson Committee concluded that the Cold War could not be won by words alone. What 
the US did was vastly more important than what it said.775 Rostow built upon Jackson’s 
assessment. 
Unlike Rostow, the strategic insights on education on the side of the former colonial 
powers were less elaborate. The British saw student exchanges and educational aid as a 
773 Memorandum, Walt W. Rostow for Mr. Bundy, “De Gaulle, Africa and Southeast Asia”, 13 May 1961, NSF, 
Box 2, f: Africa: General, 3/21/61-5/30/61,  JFKL; Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans, 155–156. 
774 Millikan and Rostow, A Proposal, 83; Letter, C.D. Jackson to Abbott Washburn, 2 February 1953, Jackson 
C.D Papers, 1931-1967, Box 63, f: Jackson Committee (2), DDEL. 
775 Osgood, Total Cold War, 81. 
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gateway to return to Africa, because Africans wanted ‘to prove now that a black or coloured 
man’ was ‘as good as a white’ man. Unlike the Kennedy administration, the British Council 
did not fear this trend but welcomed students who were eager to learn as quickly as 
possible.776 The French for their part were mainly preoccupied with bringing students back to 
their country of origin, which was important because they were relied upon to instigate French 
led development.   
American Education as a Human Resource 
 
In the Kennedy administration, education was a way to develop human resources. As 
Kennedy said in his message to Congress which dealt with foreign aid on 22 March 1961: 
‘Their primary need at first will be the development of human resources, education, technical 
assistance and the groundwork of basic facilities and institutions necessary for further 
growth.’777 The belief in education as a tool to teach values to Third World subjects would 
fade almost instantly.  
James J. Halsema of USIA was unhappy when he read the proposals of the Kennedy 
administration. He felt that the development of communication and education for its own sake 
was erroneous. He suggested it was akin to the US supplying people with guns without trying 
to convince them against whom they should be used. The first Assistant Secretary of State for 
Education and Culture, Philip Coombs, published his often quoted Fourth Dimension of 
Foreign Policy because he had not been able to realise his vision for a diplomacy of ideas and 
education within the Kennedy administration.778 Nonetheless, even Coombs acknowledged 
that education had to be part of the modernisation project aimed at assisting developing 
nations.779 The USIA was fighting a losing battle. 
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The End of the Baylor Philosophy 
 
To save the Baylor philosophy, Abbott Washburn proposed a possible presidential speech. 
The Wilsonian logic and the connection with America’s mission would have to be emphasised 
by quoting Jefferson, who had argued that we act ‘not for ourselves alone, but for the whole 
human race.’ The speech proposal went on to repeat the argument Eisenhower had made at 
Baylor University. A massive educational effort was needed if the peoples of Africa were to 
receive the basic skills required to build modern self-governing societies. In an attempt to 
appropriate the modernisation discourse he pointed out that food was only ‘one of the two 
great human needs of the newly emerging nations of Africa, Asia, and South America’, 
educated men and women were at least as important.780 
The Washburn-Nielsen education programme itself was also rewritten in a more 
combative style to dispel the doubts that were harboured by modernisation theorists. It 
blended concerns about instability with the new aspiration for socio-economic modernisation: 
‘Eventual political stability in these countries depends on an educated populace. A democratic 
government does not flourish on empty minds, any more than it does on empty stomachs.’781 
Washburn’s efforts were quashed during a 14-minute conversation with Kennedy in the 
Oval Office on the morning of 22 March 1961. As he gave the president the Sprague report, 
which Kennedy thumbed through in a way that suggested to Washburn he had never seen it 
before, the USIA’s deputy director began to complain about the scattered responsibilities and 
the need for additional funding. Throughout the conversation Kennedy nodded his head, 
expressed some interest but deflected the conversation towards a discussion about the 
February issue of Reader’s Digest. As Kennedy walked Washburn through the door, the 
deputy director did not realise that the meeting had been the end of his vision for overseas 
education.782 
It was a subtlety that also escaped others. George V. Allen wrote to his deputy director 
eight days later because he could not understand Washburn’s grievances. Allen felt that 
Washburn’s proposal was similar to Fulbright’s bill and could not understand why he did not 
support the new bill. At the UN, Eisenhower’s and Kennedy’s policies on education were 
difficult to separate. On 23 March 1961, Adlai E. Stevenson mentioned Eisenhower’s speech 
780 Annex to Washburn Paper, “Suggested Paragraphs for a possible presidential speech”, 14 February 1961, 
Washburn Abbott: Papers, 1938-2003, Box 12, f: Educational Development 1959-60 (7), DDEL. 
781 Letter, George V. Allen to Abbott Washburn, “A Program for the Development of Education in the Emerging 
Countries”, 30 March 1961, Washburn Abbott: Papers, 1938-2003, Box 12, f: Educational Development 1959-
60 (1), DDEL. 
782 Letter, Abbott Washburn to Waldemar Nielsen, 22 March 1961, Washburn Abbott: Papers, 1938-2003, Box 
12, f: Educational Development 1959-60 (7), DDEL.  
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at the 15th General Assembly in his own speech at the UN committee on Africa, which 
marked UNESCO’s new programme to advance African education. He gave Eisenhower’s 
words a new interpretation. African education was important, not because it furnished people 
with the mental tools to preserve and develop their freedom, but because of the clear 
relationship between education and an accelerated modernisation.783  
In the end, the Kennedy administration never believed that education alone could reach 
the goals of modernity. Education without real world results was considered to be 
meaningless. Moreover, this type of learning could create a dangerous situation in which 
people would be filled with aspirations and ideas that they would not have the possibility of 
realising.  
At the same time the Americans sought to exploit the growing disaffection among 
African exchange students who had been sent to universities in the Eastern bloc, most 
famously the Lumumba Friendship University. Students were confronted with low living 
standards and racism and turned to the US for help. An informal working group together with 
the British convened in Bonn in 1962, where the biggest number of Africans ended up 
requesting a transfer to the US.784 However, the Americans could not come to an agreement 
with the British and French about what to do with these renegade students, because in French 
and British eyes it were precisely these students, and their longing for a better education, that 
sustained their own educational reputation.  
 
A British-French Competition for Students 
 
Technical, scientific and language training had to turn students into essential links between 
the UK and Africa and at the same time increase the connections between French Africa and 
the British territories, particularly because there was a demand that was not being met by 
Peace Corps volunteers.785 The French on their part wanted to seal off their territories from 
American and British initiatives. 
783 Letter, George V. Allen to Abbott Washburn, “A Program for the Development of Education in the Emerging 
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In Ghana for instance, the British Council efforts were not only expanded but also 
propagated in pamphlets that outlined its work in past and present-day Ghana. At the same 
time, the Ghana Association of French and English Teachers, which was run by the British 
Council, invited seven French-speaking West African countries to send observerss to a four-
day teacher conference.786 By organising these conferences and housing the French Teachers 
Association’s library of textbooks and tapes, the BC paid lip service to the cause of African 
unity. Through talks with Nkrumah, BC officials also tried to gauge what form of help would 
be appreciated the most. When the director F.H. Cawson suggested the construction of a 
language laboratory in May 1963 and offered help with science education at the pre-
secondary school level, he noticed how the president’s face lit up. Aware of Nkrumah’s 
ambitions to turn Africa into a powerhouse of modernity and African unification, the Council 
activities were presented as educational assistance pure and simple and as a means to train 
Ghanaians for their work in other developing countries.787 
Most importantly, the cultural officers were more willing than ever to confront the 
French, the Americans, and even the information officers of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Like generals preparing for the spring offensive – with strategic maps to boot – the 
report on the Prospects of British Council Developments in the Countries of French-Speaking 
West Africa was presented on 12 May 1963. It aimed at undercutting the French presence in 
Africa. Elwyn Owen, director of the Africa department at the British Council, concluded that 
the French were only successful because of their willingness to invest hugely in technical 
assistance and personnel while aid and co-operation from other countries were actively 
excluded. In Owen’s estimation, the USIA and AID came in second because they delivered 
quality.788 
In practice, however, because of strict French control, British intrusion proved to be 
difficult leaving only Guinea and Mali as areas of influence. Instead French-speaking West 
Africans were invited to British Africa to learn English, which was presented as a form of 
support to pan-African integration. The French became willing to cooperate only when the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) emphasised the need for a common language in 1964. 
786 The association was presided over by Conor O’Brien, vice chancellor of the University of Ghana and a 
confidant of Nkrumah, see Memcon, “United States – United Kingdom Information Working group Meeting 
april 1961: United Kingdom Cultural and Educational Effort in Africa”, April 1961, FO 953/2029, TNA; 
Pamphlet, “The British Council in Ghana 1944-1963”, [1963],  BW 93/7, TNA; Timothy Nartey, “Big Talks in 
Accra”, Daily Graphic, February 26, 1963, 1. 
787 Memorandum, R.O. Ghana, “The Representative’s Interview with President Nkrumah”, 3 April 1963, Letter, 
F.H. Cawson to British Council London, “Interview with the President”, 22 March 1963, BW 93/7, TNA. 
788 Confidential Report, A. Elwyn Owen, “Report on the Prospects of British Council Development in the 
Countries of French-Speaking West Africa”, 12 May 1963, 1-8, BW 143/1, TNA. 
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After a discussion at the French embassy in London, Soutou, the director of the Africa section 
at the ministry of foreign affairs, agreed to write a joint history of Africa in French and 
English in order to counter what they saw as the pro-Marxist works.789  
Until 1963, de Gaulle had refused to cooperate with the British Council. The UK 
officers believed this was related to the fact that the English language would facilitate the 
entry of liberal and pan-African ideas. The fact that the French had been so unwilling to 
cooperate, however, was a consequence of the new goals that French education had set for 
itself. Through the provision of scholarships, but more importantly through radio education, 
an elite abroad needed to be formed that not only entertained a French cultural frame of 
reference, but more importantly followed French practices that could contribute to economic 
and social progress.790  
In the face of French and British competition, the USIS officers on the ground became 
increasingly uncomfortable with the technocratic view on language education of the Kennedy 
administration. On 11 April 1963, Assistant Secretary of State for Education and Culture 
Lucius D. Battle, asked Rostow to develop a clear strategy for English language teaching. He 
felt the USIA did not teach English for its own sake, but only as part of an information 
programme that projected American values.791 The USIS officers did not want to leave 
education to the British and French, because they still believed in the direct transmission of 
ideas. Rostow was more interested in economic aid – an area in which the Kennedy 
administration tolerated little competition. 
 
 
A Battle of Socio-Economic Principles: The Development Diplomat and the PR 
Side of Economics 
 
Debates about economic aid are characterised by stark contrasts. Did France harshly impose 
the French Franc zone and use economic aid to maintain its influence or was Coopération a 
way to aid developing nations? Did Britain’s weakening economic position compel the UK to 
789 Confidential, “Anglo-French Co-operation in Africa”, [1963], FO 924/1471, TNA; Memorandum, “E.L.T. in 
French-Speaking Africa”, [1963], BW1/645/1, TNA; Letter, R. Cecil to H.F. Oxbury, 13 February 1963, Letter, 
G.E. Millard to FO, 15 February 1963, Aide Mémoire, 22 January 1963, Letter, R. Cecil to Roger Stevens, 28 
January 1963, FO 924/1471, TNA. 
790 Letter, Hughes to Hall Lagos, 21 January 1963, FO 924/1471, TNA; Report, “Conference des chefs de 
mission: Synthèse des rapports des chefs de mission”, January 1961, 1-7, DAM, Généralités, 1089INVA/239, f: 
Débuts politiques de la coopération (1961-1963), AMAE. 
791 Letter, Lucius Battle to Rostow, “English Language Teaching as an Important Tool of Foreign Policy”, 11 
April 1963, Memorandum, “USIA Policy, Specific Goals and Characteristics of its English Teaching Program”, 
19 July 1962, 1-2, RG. 306, A1 1066, Historical Collection, Box 194, f: English Language Teaching, 1963, 
NARA.  
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leave or did British business interests reinforce military commitments? These were persistent 
questions. For instance, when the British Ministry of Overseas Development was founded in 
1965 it wanted to develop Africa while the FO and the CRO interjected that aid should 
improve the trading position of the UK. All these questions exemplify the extent to which 
economics after 1960 had become a moral issue at the heart of international politics. 
Acceptance of economic aid implied the acceptance of the donor’s ideas.792  
 
 
The American Development Diplomat and the Risk of Overselling Aid 
 
Despite Hamerskjöld’s plea to make aid available through the UN rather than on a bilateral 
basis, the UN decade of development became an era of competition in which many 
parameters were set by leading members of the Kennedy administration.793 Their struggle 
with the Soviet Union brought internal debates to the fore: was economic assistance in 
essence about furthering long-term humanitarian goals or was it to be used as a political 
weapon? However, another discussion about the transformational power of economic aid 
affected the arguments of realists and idealists alike. What was at stake was an item that is 
often overlooked in the catalogue of modernist fears – which not only included 
overpopulation and hunger, but also the psychological implications of intervention. Ever since 
the demographer Frank Notestein asserted that technology could adjust a peasant’s 
psychology, there had been some apprehension among development theorists about the effects 
of their interference. Those concerns were amplified by Rostow who saw modernisation as an 
integrated process where profound economic changes were spurred by non-economic 
motives.794  
These fears had already bubbled to the surface at an ICA conference on aid to Africa in 
May 1960. George V. Allen asserted that political developments in Africa had increased the 
‘expectations of American aid’ and doubted if the amount of American assistance could ever 
match African hopes or needs. Economic aid also introduced the dangerous psychological 
element of ‘let down.’ The US faced the ‘psychological dangers of over-selling a U.S. 
792 Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire, 427; Byrne, “Our Own Special Brand of Socialism”, 427. 
793 “Mr. Hammerskjold in Ghana”, Ghana Today, January 20, 1960, Vol. 3, No. 24, 6. 
794 Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, 2; Cullather, The Hungry World, 42; 
Frank Notestein, “The Economics of Population and Food Supplies: Economic Problem of Population Change”, 
in Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference of Agricultural Economists (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1953), 20. 
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government effort’ that was necessarily limited by financial constraints. The USIS 
propaganda efforts about the ICA therefore had to be held within certain confines.795  
The Kennedy administration was determined to integrate these side effects more 
effectively into its strategic thinking about aid programmes, in line with the changing 
formulae of modernisation that targeted societies to change people’s behaviour. In its Senate 
report of March 1960, for instance, the Center for International Studies (CIS) at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology had noted that the most basic economic change that 
would be required was ‘psychological’. People had to be shown that the world was not fixed, 
but could be manipulated by applying logic. In a memorandum to the president on foreign aid, 
Rostow stressed that decisions about investments had to be made with the absorptive capacity 
of developing nations in mind, a key point in A Proposal.796  
At the same time, he made the case for ‘shooting high to maximize the psychological 
and political effect’ of the cash flow towards underdeveloped areas. Rostow believed in the 
power of economics, but rejected the notion that people were driven solely by rational 
economic considerations and understood the risk of unfulfilled aspirations.797 As he wrote to 
Kennedy in 1961: ‘we have stirred great hopes in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin 
America [and] we must back our play or those hopes will fade.’798  
The manager of those hopes was the development diplomat, an idea launched by the 
director of the World Bank, Eugene Black, and a confidant of Rostow and Kennedy. This 
diplomat was supposed to be an artisan of economic development, who would use economic 
tools and other disciplines as best as he could to place opportunities in perspective and 
illuminate the choices before decision makers in the underdeveloped world. Henry Ramsey, 
the man at the State Department who had tried to convince Eisenhower of the need to support 
authoritarian development, welcomed the idea. It provided the US with a long-term solution 
795 Memorandum, Edward V. Roberts to George V. Allen, “Notes for Your Remarks at ICA Conference on 
Tropical Africa, 10:00 a.m. – 12:15 p.m., Tuesday, May 17, 1960”, 16 May 1960, 2-3, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, 
FRC 2, f. ICA, NARA; The Sprague Committee members had also written about the ‘psychological 
potentialities of foreign aid programs’, see “Conclusions and Recommendations of the President’s Committee on 
Information Activities Abroad”, December 1960, 13, U.S. President’s Committee on Information Activities 
Abroad (Sprague Committee) Records, 1959-61, Box 26, f: Printed Committee Report, DDEL. 
796 Gilman, Mandarins of the Future, 155–202. 
797 Memorandum, Rostow to Kennedy, “The Strategy of Foreign Aid 1961”, 22 December 1960, Pre-Presidential 
Papers, Transition files, Task Force Reports, 1960, Box 1074, f: Task Force Report, JFKL; In Pearce’s 
estimation, Rostow only referred to psychological and political effects as a move to convince Congress, see 
Pearce, Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid, 80, 93. 
798 Memorandum from the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to 
President Kennedy, 2 February 1961, FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. 9: Foreign Economic Policy, 208. 
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to insurgency that addressed the political and psychological problem of resistance against 
modernisation.799 
The effectiveness of development diplomacy did not only depend on the substantial 
amount of capital needed to create tangible proof that investments were paying off. What was 
further needed was contacts and lines of communication throughout the underdeveloped 
world. As a Senate Report by MIT experts had concluded, the communication of ideas was 
not meant to increase the admiration for the American standard of living, rather information 
had to be provided that could help the modernisation process advance.800 The USIA became 
the principal supplier of development diplomats. 
 
 
Playing up French and British Aid 
 
Unlike the development diplomat, the British and French were keen to emphasise that the aid 
they had on offer was unique. Where the French believed that French solutions were 
particularly suited for African development, British officials thought in terms of PR. In March 
1960, Macmillan gave a speech at the Commonwealth and Empire Industries Association 
designed to buttress an aid policy he denied the UK was executing. He denied that the British 
sought commercial benefits, limited aid to ‘large-scale projects of the maximum advertising 
value’ or that he was jealous of the assistance given by other governments. He did so, while 
the FO, in agreement with the CRO, were making plans to glamorise technical cooperation 
and other forms of aid.801  
After close study, the FO decided on a ‘wholesale overt propaganda’ campaign to 
remain credible in the face of competing aid offers. Yet, by 1961 this campaign was adjusted 
and more attention was paid to implying that there was a mutual interest between Africa and 
the non-communist world.802 The FO took its cue from the Soviets who appeared more 
799 Eugene Black, “The Diplomacy of Economic Aid”, Challenge 9, no. 3 (1960): 40; Eugene Black, The 
Diplomacy of Economic Development (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1960); Henry Ramsey, “Is the Service 
Ready for the Sixties: The Modernization Process and Insurgency” [1962], RG. 306, P 296, Box 8, f: C.I. 
Agency Doctrine and Organization, NARA. 
800 Report, “Economic, Social and Political Change in the Underdeveloped Countries and Its Implications for 
United States Policy”, 30 March 1960, MC 440, Ithiel de Sola Pool Papers, Box 96, f: U.S. Congress, MIT-
Archives. 
801 Letter, Miss Fell to James Hadfield, “Theme of Aid to Developing Territories”, 14 September 1960, INF 
12/882, TNA; Report, R.H.K. Marett, “Report on visit to East Africa by R.H.K.”, March/November 1960, 11-12, 
INF 12/863, TNA. 
802 Agenda Item UK Paper, “United States – United Kingdom Information Working Group Meeting: Information 
Treatment of Internal Communist bloc developments”, April 1961, FO 1110/1522, TNA; Secret, “United States 
– United Kingdom Information Working group Meeting: Sino-Soviet activities in Africa”, April 1961, FO 
953/2029, TNA. 
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successful because they overlaid their efforts with what the British called a ‘forward-looking 
philosophy.’ To be successful, a so-called ‘enlightened’ common Western philosophy on aid 
had to be promoted, particularly after the Sino-Soviet split.803 The British exaggerated their 
part in this common effort. 
Concretely, these views had already affected the Volta River Scheme in late 1960. 
Because most of the aid was American and Canadian and the UK only provided £5,000,000, 
the CRO initially wanted to remain low key. The CIO however wanted to emphasise the UK 
contribution to a joint Western aid effort, for instance by publishing a substantial pamphlet in 
June 1960 entitled ‘Britain’s Contribution to Economic Development Overseas’. When the 
CRO meeting went on to discuss the Indus Waters Scheme propaganda, FO officials wanted 
to stress the scale of the project, the large amount of the aid and the international co-operation 
it involved. While the US was doing everything it could to downplay its aid to limit the 
adverse effects of potential disappointment, the UK cared only about its prestige. 804 
In the Aid Publicity Working Group, established in April 1961 to discuss a joint UK-US 
approach, conflict became inevitable. The British zeal to promote aid efforts was met by the 
constant cautions of Ted Sorenson, Pierre Salinger and Ed Murrow. On colonialism the 
Americans appeared defeatist, according to the British delegation. They ‘tend to think that the 
best course is to batten down and weather the storm’ in the face of the emotional drive for 
independence. The American attitude towards the exploitation of Western aid was not much 
better for the British because Murrow refused to present American aid as part of a Western 
cooperative effort. He felt there would be too great an association with NATO.805 
At the same time, British eagerness to cooperate with the US deepened the conflict with 
France. Debré in particular felt double-crossed by Whitehall. They appeared so willing to 
follow Kennedy’s instructions about aid that it sapped their own prestige, causing what he 
called ‘psychological damage’ and a loss of African respect that could never be restored –
even with massive amounts of foreign aid. Moreover, aid was not only a tool to maintain 
influence, it was also the sole guarantee – with French cultural and economic tools working as 
803 FO Paper, “Ministerial Committee on Overseas Information Services Publicity for Aid to the Underdeveloped 
countries”, [1961], CO 1027/406, TNA; Memorandum, M.J. Moynihan, “Colombo Plan Publicity”, [undated, 
1960], 1, DO 35/8808, TNA; Agenda Item UK Paper, “United States – United Kingdom Information Working 
Group Meeting: Information treatment of Internal Communist bloc developments”, April 1961, FO 1110/1522, 
TNA. 
804 Britain’s Contribution to Economic Development Overseas (London: Central Office of Information, 1960); 
Letter, Miss Fell to Mr. Hadfield, 14 September 1960, INF 12/882, TNA. 
805 Memorandum, “Publicity for U.K. Aid to Underdeveloped Countries”, [1962], INF 12/882, TNA; Brief, 
“Background Note on Aid Publicity”, [1962], Report, “Report on the United States – United Kingdom 
Information Working Group which met in Washington, June 4-6”, 7 June 1962, FO 953/2084, TNA. 
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one – to attain the full socioeconomic development of Africa. Gabriel Lisette – minster of 
economic and foreign affairs in Chad – had already made that argument when the 
Communauté was drawn up, but it was now adopted by the people working at the ministry of 
cooperation.806 
 
 
Conflict about the Peace Corps 
 
The different rationales that buttressed foreign aid doctrines inadvertently clashed when 
Kennedy announced the establishment of the Peace Corps, an undertaking inspired by the 
volunteers of Crossroads Africa. Like the Alliance for Progress in Latin America it relied on 
the youth of America to execute US led development. On 24 March 1961, Sorensen met with 
director Sargent Shriver and they agreed that the USIA would have to perform an important 
role in making the Peace Corps a success, because the initiative was expected to have a major 
psychological impact.807 
That form of support, however, elicited certain questions from the people on the ground 
who were used to selling the US, while the general policy on the Peace Corps was to limit 
publicity, to limit the risk of frustration. ‘We cautioned against excessive publicity which 
might generate unwarranted expectations’ the USIA wrote. The success of the Peace Corps 
had to be gauged from its performance abroad. Adhering to this guideline, the IMS section 
was considering producing a film on the Peace Corps that would be general and factual.808 
Booklets on the Volta River were aimed at explaining clearly the opportunities and limits of 
the project. The fact that the Peace Corps did its work quietly thus had little to do with 
modesty or the idealism of the 1960s, as Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman has argued.809 
Despite their efforts to avoid publicity, the Peace Corps still provoked a response 
because others who were in the business of development reasoned about aid in terms of 
publicity and influence. The French Ministry of Cooperation had even been inspired to create 
their own so-called Volunteers for Progress, announced on 24 April 1963 with the first 
volunteers arriving in Dakar in September. The British felt less threatened because they 
806 Note d’information, 22 March 1961, 2 DE 66,f : Conversations Franco-Américains, FNSP; Bat, Le syndrome 
Foccart, 87. 
807 Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World, 175; Thomas C. Sorensen, “USIA Relationship with 
Peace Corps”, 24 March 1961, RG. 306, P 157, Box 1, f: Agency Position Papers – Peace corps – 1961, NARA 
808 Letter, John Pauker, Edgar D. Brooke to Sorensen, Bundy, “USIA Support of the Peace Corps”, 14 June 
1962, RG. 306, P 157, Box 1, f: Agency Position Papers – Peace corps – 1961, NARA. 
809 Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, All You Need Is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2000), 258; Stanley Meisler, When the World Calls: The Inside Story of the Peace 
Corps and Its First Fifty Years (Boston: Beacon Press, 2011), 1–30. 
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believed the Peace Corps had been inspired by their own Voluntary Service Overseas which 
enabled the British to present the Peace Corps as one component of a wider Western effort to 
develop the continent.810 
In spite of Nkrumah’s dubious stance towards foreign aid, the Kennedy administration 
sustained its effort to convince him. This was not an expression of Kennedy’s willingness to 
aid any African nation regardless of its political orientation, but fitted a worldview where 
anticolonialism in itself could never represent a positive force for change.811 The Americans 
used their information resources to downplay the possible effects of aid. The British set out to 
present their effort in concert with the US to play up their share in developing Africa, an 
unexplored dimension of what Walter Lippmann termed the ‘imperial gambit’,812 the 
supposed shared interests that were created by the parallel decline of the British empire and 
the rise of the American empire. All the while the French believed that the fact that their aid 
was more compatible with African societies would lead to better results and, therefore, greater 
prestige. 
 
 
Conclusion: Planting the Road Signs to Modernity 
 
From 1961 onwards policy makers exchanged their strategy of psychological modernisation 
for a policy of socio-economic modernisation, which had a significant impact on public 
diplomacy. What had been a key instrument to make minds modern in the 1950s, became a 
tool to deal with the adverse effects of economic aid after 1960.   
The stories of modernisation theorists in the Kennedy administration summon up 
images of a break with the past, of an unrivalled optimism that the world could be remade. It 
is a story where idealists who pushed for modernisation are often cast in a more positive light 
than the realists who chose to adhere to a Cold War outlook on the world. However, the 
doubts of the disruptive effects of modernisation connected both groups. For Kennedy, the 
behaviour of someone like Nkrumah’s was unsurprising. He understood his critique on the US 
and his talk of neocolonial ploys as the consequence of frustration.  
While the US administration did not distinguish sufficiently between neutralism, 
nonalignment, and anticolonialism, it is doubtful if a more precise identification of the diverse 
810 ‘Volontaires du progrès’, see Pierre-Michel Durand, “Le Peace Corps en Afrique française dans les années 
1960”, Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains n° 217, no. 1 (March 1, 2005): 91–104; Memorandum, A.B. 
Horn, 5 July 1961, CO 859/1448, TNA. 
811 Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans, xiii. 
812 Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 10. 
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concepts would have fundamentally altered the American diplomatic course, as Robert 
Rakove has argued.813 Eisenhower and Kennedy were both idealists who believed the US had 
to help the modernisation process on its course. Eisenhower, by contrast, was more positive 
about the ability of public diplomacy to change emerging people’s attitudes, while the 
Kennedy administration was sceptical about the ability of African peoples to behave 
rationally.  
De Gaulle and Macmillan, for their part, found it difficult to understand Kennedy’s 
novel approach to public diplomacy, but what was clear to them was the fact that they would 
have to stage a sustained propaganda campaign of their own if they wanted to remain relevant 
as agents of development. In comparison to Kennedy, and somewhat counter intuitively, 
anticolonialism posed less of an immediate threat. Rather than a problem, a strident 
anticolonial discourse was seen as an opportunity to improve the public image by promising 
to assist African governments in attaining their economic and political goals. 
Those differences played out in the areas of education and economic aid. The Kennedy 
administration never believed in education as a way to jumpstart modernisation, which left 
room for the British and the French to use the aspiration among young people to strengthen 
their image as the providers of development. In the area of economic aid, that confrontation 
between the socio-economic problem-solving attitude of the Kennedy administration and the 
PR logic of the British and French was more problematic. Where the USIA used its 
information resources to downplay the effects of aid, reluctant to oversell and perpetuate 
frustration, the British wanted aid to be promoted as a joint Western effort in which they 
played an important part. This British desire to cooperate with Kennedy was not appreciated 
by the French who felt that it was not the ‘Western’ but the ‘imperial’ aid effort that needed to 
be promoted if both the UK and France wanted to stand a chance against Kennedy’s aid 
offensive. 
Paradoxically, this turn towards socio-economic modernisation increased the concern 
about the subversive qualities of public diplomacy in the course of the 1960s, particularly 
among American and Ghanaian officials. Films or exhibitions in cultural centres and 
newspapers became powerful tools to steer developing societies in the right direction as they 
dealt with the ramifications of economic assistance. By that logic, competing ideas remained 
dangerous because they could increase the frustration about the development process or – in 
Ghana’s case – undermine the advance of the ‘African Personality.’ To ‘immunise’ their 
813 Rakove refers to the semantic confusion that came from using nonalignment as a synonym for neutralism, see 
Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World, 67. 
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target audiences against adverse ideas, Ghanaian public diplomats began to list the dangerous 
neocolonial plots that might ensue if African unity did not swiftly materialise as American 
public diplomats began to call attention to the advantages of US led modernisation. The next 
chapter will analyse this second task that the managers of modernization took on. 
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8. Immunisation 
 
Ghana’s New Public Diplomacy Strategy and the Demise of Pan-Africanism 
as a Political Project (1961-1963) 
 
It is the responsibility of our representatives to ensure that our policy is understood. Though almost all 
the African States appear to have at heart the liberty of Africa some seem to feel that there is no need to 
adopt a militant attitude. The imperialists will never willingly and without strong pressure relinquish 
what they still hold in Africa. 
 
– Notes of the conference of Ghana envoys in Africa, 7 – 23 October 1961.814 
 
Because of this new and increased competition, we will have to run faster to remain in the same place. 
 
– USIS-Accra faces harsh competition after 1960, 24 June 1960.815 
 
It is true that if some country, in Africa, were to adopt the Socialist system, that might mean that a few 
drops would be added to the bucket of Communism […] But the question arises as to what is Socialism 
in the view of all these people. Nasser, Nehru, Nkrumah, Sukarno, all of them have said that they want 
their countries to develop along Socialist lines; but what kind of a socialist is Nasser when he keeps 
Communists in jail? 
 
– Nikita Khrushchev in a conversation with Kennedy at the Vienna Summit, 3 June 1961.816 
 
 
After lunch, John F. Kennedy invited Nikita Khrushchev for a stroll around the lush gardens 
of the residence of the American ambassador in Vienna, which were in full bloom in June 
1961. As their interpreters tried to keep up, the president complained that his consultations 
with senators were time consuming, to which Khrushchev retorted: ‘Well, why don’t you 
switch to our system?’817 Some subtle wit was possibly needed to lighten the mood after their 
serious debates, which had ranged from the neutral status of Laos, to Berlin, ideology, and the 
capacity of both systems to spur development. Kennedy believed that the Soviet Union was 
seeking to eliminate free systems.  
Khrushchev replied that he was under the impression the US ‘wanted to build a dam’ to 
prevent the development of the ‘human mind and conscience’; an impossible endeavour. If 
‘we start struggling against ideas’, he suggested, conflicts and clashes between the US and the 
814 Confidential publication, African Affairs Secretariat, “Conference of Ghana Envoys Volume I: Notes of 
Conference of Ghana Envoys in Africa, Held at Accra 7th – 23rd October, 1961”, 1961, 36, Dabu Gizenga 
Papers, Box 128-16, f: 368, MSRC. 
815 Foreign service despatch, USIS-Accra to USIA, “Country Plan for Ghana”, 24 June 1960, RG. 306, UD-WW 
92, FRC 1, NARA. 
816 Memcon, “Vienna Meeting Between the President and Chairman Khrushchev”, 3 June 1961, 12-13, RG. 59, 
Records of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Miscellaneous Subject Files, 1961-1968, Box 65, f: Kennedy-
Khrushchev Talks, NARA. 
817 Memcon, “Vienna Meeting Between the President and Chairman Khrushchev”, 3 June 1961, 1-2, 3 PM, RG. 
59, Records of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Miscellaneous Subject Files, 1961-1968, Box 65, f: Kennedy-
Khrushchev Talks, NARA. 
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USSR would become inevitable. Reflecting on his obsession with guerrilla warfare, Kennedy 
interjected that Mao Tse Tung had declared that power was at the ‘end of the rifle’. 
Khrushchev replied that the USSR could not be held responsible if communist ideas 
developed. Ideas once born would continue to exist: ‘There is no immunization against 
ideas!’818 
By 1961, the notion of ideological immunisation was well established. Target 
populations did not only need to be convinced, they also needed to be educated about the 
perils of competing ideologies. The terms ‘immunisation’ and ‘vaccination’, known in circles 
of European psychological warfare specialists in the 1950s, were used by counterinsurgency 
experts in the 1960s and accepted by the leaders of young African states, if not in principle 
then at least in practice.819 As shown in chapter 7, pathologising metaphors were essential in a 
policy of modernisation and counterinsurgency where communism was characterised as an 
infectious disease and nonalignment as a psychological disturbance. According to Rostow, the 
communist virus spread mainly through guerrilla warfare. This conviction formed the basis of 
the ‘Rostow thesis’, which entrusted the military with directing the modernisation process 
while it also recommended the destruction of the external support of guerrilla insurgents. This 
strategy was rooted in Rostow’s basic logic: if people were motivated to improve their 
situation when they saw modernisation at work, modernity could also be achieved when 
populations were forced to experience modernity.820 
Having just emerged from colonialism, new African governments were wary of foreign 
ideas and reluctant to submit themselves to a new form of Western paternalism. They tried to 
fend off an emerging international discourse on human rights and democracy, which they 
perceived to represent potential interference in African affairs.821 Nonetheless, deeper 
ideological incentives were also at work. Nkrumah believed that his developing society 
needed sheltering from neocolonial propaganda. Less radical leaders, such as Hastings Banda 
in Malawi, were also adamant about the uniqueness of African ways. El Ferik Ibrahim 
Abboud of Sudan hinted at the threat posed by Western ideas at the Belgrade Conference. He 
818 Memcon, “Vienna Meeting Between the President and Chairman Khrushchev”, 3 June 1961, 12:45 PM, 4-5, 
RG. 59, Records of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Miscellaneous Subject Files, 1961-1968, Box 65, f: Kennedy-
Khrushchev Talks, NARA. 
819 By the late 1950s the ‘brainwashing’ scare – a fear that the Reds had cracked the problem of controlling 
human behaviour – had shifted to a more objective interest in ‘immunisation’, see Giles Scott-Smith, Western 
Anti-Communism and the Interdoc Network: Cold War Internationale (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 
34. 
820 Colleen Bell convincingly argues that ideas of immunisation are articulated in counterinsurgency strategy, see 
Colleen Bell, “Hybrid Warfare and Its Metaphors”, Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, 
Humanitarianism, and Development 3, no. 2 (2012): 231; Gilman, Mandarins of the Future, 197. 
821 Nugent, Africa Since Independence, 139. 
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defined ‘political ideology’ as a form of interference because it touched ‘on the belief and 
freedom of a nation’ and could lead to ‘political indoctrination’; while Selassie talked about 
‘engorgement’ – a gradual process that destroyed identity and personality.822  
The important role of public diplomacy in American counterinsurgency policy has 
become overshadowed by the repressive nature of the Rostow thesis, while the gross 
violations of human rights by Nkrumah’s generation have obscured the ideological incentives 
at work in the early 1960s.823 At least as important as foreign aid, but neglected in the history 
of post-1960 Africa is the work of public diplomats who were called upon to deal with the 
adverse consequences of the foreign aid strategy. Films or exhibitions in cultural centres and 
newspapers could become powerful weapons in the hands of people with communist 
sympathies because they could increase the level of frustration. Ghana was also vigilant about 
a so-called neocolonial propaganda campaign to undermine the advance of the ‘African 
Personality’, the term Nkrumah envoked to refer to his pan-African project. When French and 
British public diplomats after 1961 began to build cultural centres to promote their assistance, 
they actually strengthened the Ghanaian perception of the international environment. 
Although historians have taken an interest in counterinsurgency situations, their work 
tends to focus on how these programmes created an awareness of new security problems like 
hunger and overpopulation.824 The attempts to develop a public diplomacy programme in a 
counterinsurgency situation remains largely unexplored due to the fact that the bulk of the 
documents of the Special Group – a team created to set out the counterinsurgency strategy – 
were classified. With their declassification a first analysis has become possible. 
The immunisation logic behind public diplomacy sheds new light on two significant 
questions that are addressed here in two parts. Principally, why did Ghana begin an anti-
American campaign after 1961 when it was the Kennedy administration that provided the 
much-needed funds for its Volta Dam? Historians claim that the increasingly anti-American 
stance reflected Nkrumah’s growing appreciation for the USSR and its social model. Second, 
how did US diplomats deal with Ghana’s aggressive stance within the framework of their 
counterinsurgency strategy?  
822 Speech transcript, “Address by H.E. El Ferik Ibrahim Abboud President of the Supreme council of the Armed 
forces of the republic of the Sudan at the conference of the Non-Aligned countries held at Beograd, Yugoslavia”, 
September 1961, 11, FO 371/161222, TNA; Speech transcript, “Address Delivered by His Imperial Majesty 
Haile Selassie I to the conference of Non-Aligned states held at Belgrade, Yugoslavia”, September 1961, 11, FO 
371/161222, TNA. 
823 Gilman, Mandarins of the Future, 197; David French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 248. 
824 Connelly, Fatal Misconception, 181. 
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Part of the answer can be found in a radically different approach to public diplomacy, 
which fed and sustained US and Ghanaian misperceptions of each other’s aims. It requires a 
closer look at Ghana’s new public diplomacy strategy after 1960. Nkrumah’s shift to an 
emotional form of propaganda – with ‘Revolutionary Journalism’ – was considered crucial for 
reaching the African general public, but it made the pan-African project appear irrational in 
the eyes of modernisation theorists who saw this as a flaw in the development process. With 
France and the UK on the sideline after 1960, it is this story of misunderstanding between 
Ghana and the US that sealed the fate of the pan-African project internationally, an ideology 
that would be swiftly overtaken by the Cold War. 
 
 
A New Nonalignment Strategy:  Emotionalism and Ghana as the Modern Pan-
African Nation 
 
On 7 October 1961, all heads of mission in African countries were called to Accra to discuss 
how Ghana’s foreign policy could be explained more effectively. Nkrumah argued that the 
African diplomat had to create public opinion. In 1961 therefore, the ministry of foreign 
affairs began to invest in public diplomacy outside of Africa with exhibition windows in New 
York and London.825 Ambassadors had to make Ghana’s policy understandable and push 
other African independent territories into adopting a ‘militant attitude’ against interference in 
African affairs. In June 1960 a strategic paper of the BAA had already recommended a more 
aggressive propaganda campaign because the tensions between Ghana and other African 
countries were seen as a consequence of the lack of contact, which created suspicion about 
Ghana’s aims and motives.826 
Even though the spread of Ghana’s brand of pan-Africanism had always been an uphill 
battle in French Africa, where the belief in ‘assimilation’ was strong, the problem became 
more pressing after 1960. Leaders of other African countries which Accra had given political 
training or assistance began to resist Ghana’s plans for African unity.. Although Milton Obote 
in Uganda remained an ally, Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Moboya of Kenya, as well as the 
Tanzanian leader, Julius Nyerere, disagreed with Nkrumah on four issues. Nyerere, first of all, 
825 Kwame Nkrumah, “The Diplomat in Africa”, Voice of Africa, Vol. 4, No. 7 & 8, July-August 1964, 4-5; 
Letter, E.K. Okoh to Nkrumah, “Re-Organisation of Ministry of Information and Broadcasting”, 23 October 
1962, RG. 17/2/247 Correspondence, PRAAD-Accra. 
826 Confidential publication, African Affairs Secretariat, “Conference of Ghana Envoys Volume I: Notes of 
Conference of Ghana Envoys in Africa, Held at Accra 7th – 23rd October, 1961”, 1960, 1, 37, Dabu Gizenga 
Papers, Box 128-16, f: 368, MSRC; Memorandum, BAA, “Ghana’s Role in Emergent Africa”, 25 July 1960, 
BAA/RLAA/370 Correspondence with the President, 1960: BAA Reports, Correspondence (Nkrumah, 
Nationalist Organizations), PL. 
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advocated a regionalist approach and pushed for an East African Federation, whereas 
Nkrumah believed regional groupings would reduce the incentive for further integration. 
Additionally, Kenya and Tanzania wanted a gradual step-by-step plan for unity. Nkrumah’s 
third complaint was that the gradualists were unwilling to commit all their resources and 
energies to the cause. All the while these statesmen debated ways in which continental 
prosperity could be attained: with Nyerere’s plough and pickaxe, or being jet-propelled 
towards modernisation as Nkrumah argued.827   
At the foundational meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis 
Ababa on 25 May 1963, Nyerere stressed that continental unity could be attained only through 
practical steps, a statement he repeated a year later at the Cairo conference. He felt Nkrumah 
was willing to wreck the unification of Africa just so that some ‘stupid historian’ could record 
that he had wanted African unity when nobody else did. Even Nkrumah’s closest ally, Touré, 
declared it was not ‘philosophical formulae or doctrinal theories’ that Africa needed but co-
operation.828 In essence, the disagreements about the path to African unity centred on the role 
of persuasion and propaganda in attaining African unity. By 1963, pan-Africanism was alive 
as a project, but dying as an ideology. In an Africa clambering for material advancement, a 
policy of ideas sounded hollow.829  
 
 
Teleguided Diplomacy 
 
Nkrumah was unable to comprehend the hesitation on the part of his colleagues. He explained 
the lack of support by blaming the subtle manipulations of neocolonialists in the cultural and 
ideological sphere. Through so-called ‘teleguided diplomacy’, neocolonial states had been 
able to divorce leaders from their people. Other African leaders refused to cooperate with 
Ghana and reach African unity because the imperialists had convinced a number of truly anti-
imperialist states such as Kenya and Tanzania to compromise. Great Britain and France were 
seen as shady puppeteers pulling their vicious strings ‘to make us cut each other’s throat for 
the sake of their diabolical purposes in Africa’ Nkrumah wrote. As mere puppets, African 
827 Memorandum, “Ghana’s Role in Emergent Africa”, 25 July 1960, BAA/RLAA/370 Correspondence with the 
President, 1960: BAA Reports, Correspondence (Nkrumah, Nationalist Organizations), PL; Agyeman, 
Nkrumah’s Ghana and East Africa, 79–89; Hadjor, Nkrumah and Ghana, 91–98. 
828 Nkrumah’s vision received its final blow when on 15 June 1963 the East African Federation was founded, see 
Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 1957-1966, 307. 
829 Agyeman and Thompson both note that the Cairo conference signalled the end of Nkrumah’s pan-African 
ambitions, see Agyeman, Nkrumah’s Ghana and East Africa, 83; Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 242. 
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leaders were steered towards making decisions that went against the interests of their own 
people.830 
Ghanaian public diplomacy officials therefore began to target the African peoples rather 
than their political leaders. They presented Ghana as a modern nation with good international 
relations, capable of leading an African union. State visits and the projects of the development 
secretariat, such as the Tema Harbour, the Volta River Dam and Ghana Airways, were all 
organised with an eye for Ghana’s international reputation. Students who were in Accra on a 
government scholarship to study a technical profession were featured in Voice of Africa. A 
report on Haile Selassie’s state visit – entitled ‘Two African leaders speak’ – had to impress 
upon readers that Nkrumah was an important international statesman. A teacher diligently 
writing formulae on a blackboard, or experimenting with test tubes, had to convey that an 
intensive study of science was a crucial feature of Ghanaian education. Between 1961 and 
1964, 76 African students from Basutoland, Bechuanaland, South Africa, Kenya, Uganda and 
Somalia passed through the Government Secretariat School in Accra, technical schools, 
teacher training colleges, and universities.831 
The image of the modern nation was part of an emotional propaganda operation devised 
to target a mass audience. The style employed might be characterised as a published form of 
radio trottoir (pavement radio).832 Newspapers like The Spark and Voice of Africa were filled 
with bogus telegrams, cartoons, and rumours illustrating the dangerous neocolonial plots that 
might ensue if African unity did not materialise. Stories about the Portuguese brutality in 
Angola and Mozambique, transcriptions of Nkrumah’s rousing speeches, and articles about 
the alleged plans to build NATO bases (accompanied by detailed maps), were all motivated 
by this key concern. The attempt on Nkrumah’s life in Kulungugu on 11 August 1962, when 
the Ghanaian leader was handed a bomb concealed in a bouquet of flowers, was immediately 
seized upon as an opportunity to ‘strengthen the independent position of Ghana in African 
Affairs’, as Barden phrased it.833  
830 Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism, 239; Interview transcript, “Questions by Pravda 
Correspondent”, [1963] 8, RG. 17/2/538 Miscellaneous 1962-1966, TNA; Nkrumah, Axioms of Kwame 
Nkrumah, 6. 
831 Secret memorandum, 25 March 1961, SC/BAA/244, PRAAD-Accra; “Two African leaders speak...”, Voice of 
Africa, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1961, 16; “Ghana Trains Africans”, Voice of Africa, Vol. 4, No. 7&8, July-August 
1964, 4-5. 
832 Stephen Ellis launched the term, see Ellis, “Writing Histories of Contemporary Africa”, 19. 
833 “A Warning”, Voice of Africa, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1962, 16; “Speech Delivered by Osagyefo the President 
at Conference at Cairo on Sunday, 19th July 1964”, Voice of Africa, Vol. 4, No. 7&8, July-August, 1964; 
“Dangers of NATO War Bases in Africa”, Voice of Africa, Vol. 2, No. 10, 11&12, October-December 1962, 20-
21; Restricted note, Barden to Magnus George, “Anti-Neo-Colonialist Demonstration”, 12 August 1962, 
BAA/RLAA/424 Anti-Neo-Colonialist Demonstration, 1962: Memos, PL. 
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Contrary to historians who see the assassination attempt as the final cue for Ghana’s 
alignment with the Soviet Union, the Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs saw that crisis as an 
opportunity to make an emotional call to rise up against neocolonialism.834 Nkrumah 
personally ordered Barden to organise a demonstration against neocolonialism in Accra, albeit 
one that was to appear spontaneous and mobilise mass support outside of Ghana. The BAA 
director therefore asked every staff member of the bureau to write a slogan while a news item 
about the demonstration for the external broadcast was already being prepared. He wanted to 
gather no less than 50,000 demonstrators by bringing freedom fighters, CPP members, ex-
servicemen and the Asafo companies (a traditional warrior group), in wider Accra, Winniba 
and Swedru, to Accra.835 
Although this endeavour ultimately failed and was little more than a small gathering of 
children holding French flags and signs reading ‘Down with Neo-Colonialism and 
Imperialism’, the plan points to a sensitivity for public relations which had been less 
prominent before 1960 and shows that BAA operatives were eager to create the illusion of 
spontaneity that was felt necessary to acquire mass support for Ghana’s pan-Africanism 
throughout Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
834 Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 279; Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah. Vision and Tragedy, 308–310. 
835 Restricted note, Barden to Magnus George, “Anti-Neo-Colonialist Demonstration”, 12 August 1962, 
Directive, Magnus George, “Anti-Neo-Colonialist Demonstration: Meeting”, 13 August, 1962, BAA/RLAA/424 
Anti-Neo-Colonialist Demonstration, 1962: Memos, PL. 
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Illustration 21: The Spark was Ghana’s principal newspaper, which was also distributed abroad. It is a good 
example of radio-trottoir style journalism. This was the first issue in which stories about Spanish neocolonial 
ploys, cartoons and one of Nkrumah’s speeches were printed. Source: “Africa Recovers”, The Spark, December 
15, 1962. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I m m u n i s a t i o n  | 261 
 
Redefining Nonalignment in Propaganda Terms 
 
Ghana’s vocal propaganda campaign was part of Nkrumah’s inter-African struggle to 
establish African unity, not an indication of his growing sympathy for the Soviet Union. On 
the contrary, Nkrumah staunchly refused to play off East against West, even after Lumumba’s 
assassination, because he believed this was a game that Africa would lose. When Leonid 
Brezhnev visited Ghana in February 1961, visits from Tito, Senghor and Mennen-Williams as 
well as Nkrumah’s own visit to the US in March 1961 were deliberately scheduled in close 
proximity to reflect Ghana’s nonaligned stance, something that was not always understood in 
the West, nor appreciated by historians who have singled out Brezhnev’s visit to illustrate the 
degree of Soviet penetration.836  
The more theatrical form of nonalignment drew inspiration from de Gaulle and the New 
Left counterculture in the US, something historians have also overlooked. The ghostwriters of 
Neo-Colonialism, with Nkrumah’s approval, quoted The Invisible Government, a New Leftist 
piece of literature which defined the US government as ‘a loose amorphous grouping of 
individuals and agencies’ with the CIA at its heart. 837 De Gaulle proved that an assertive 
stance with a proposal to transform NATO, the creation of a nuclear ‘force de frappe’ and the 
rejection of Americanisation, could increase French grandeur and have favourable results.838   
In his critique of French colonialism Nkrumah could barely disguise his admiration for 
de Gaulle’s ‘effective penetration’; France had accomplished what Ghana aspired to do, 
namely the creation of particular ‘attitudes’ in Africa. In his 1964 book, Nkrumah described 
France as a colony of the American empire and de Gaulle, as someone who defied American 
power. The Sahara Atomic test, the intervention in Gabon, and de Gaulle’s visits to Cambodia 
and Latin America were all seen as ways to defect from American power.839 If de Gaulle and 
American beatniks defied American power, Nkrumah could not lag behind if Ghana was to 
establish a credible neutral position. Nkrumah indirectly became a silent ally of de Gaulle in 
his search for a world that was not dominated by the superpowers. That shared view would 
836 “Ghana Foreign Affairs, Vol. l, No. 2”, March 1961, Dabu Gizenga Papers, Box 128-16, f: 212 Ghana 
Foreign Affairs, MSRC; Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 159, 166–167; Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah. Vision 
and Tragedy, 223. 
837 Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism, 239–240. 
838 Frédéric Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 29–58; Anna Locher and Christian Nuenlist, “NATO Strategies toward de 
Gaulle’s France, 1958-1966: Learning to Cope”, in Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French 
Foreign Policies, 1958-1969, ed. Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Martin Garret (Lanham: Lexington 
Books, 2010), 87–88. 
839 Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (London: PanAf Books, 1963), 174–179; Ahlman, “Road to Ghana: 
Nkrumah, Southern Africa and the Eclipse of a Decolonizing Africa”, 33–34; Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, The 
Last Stage of Imperialism, 239–240. 
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eventually lead to the largely forgotten state visit of Ghana’s foreign affairs minister, Kojo 
Botsio, to France in June 1965.840  
More important in the early 1960s was Ghana’s renewed commitment to public 
relations, which prompted a redefinition of nonalignment in propaganda terms. That 
commitment affected Ghana’s bilateral relations, its stance on international organisations, and 
the implementation of its policy towards freedom fighters in Africa. Kojo Botsio explained 
that the appearance of nonalignment was at least as important as adhering to the principle. 
Above all, ‘the manner and timing of foreign policy statements’ was deemed essential. 
Bilateral trade relations, diplomatic representations and foreign aid relations could not be 
entered into lightly, even student scholarships had to be allocated in such a way that they were 
not only genuinely non-committed, but also ‘seen to be non-committed to any of the two 
power-blocs.’841  
Nkrumah further believed that international organisations had become institutions that 
supported states that defied the ‘world opinion’. The UNOC intervention in the Congo had 
destroyed Nkrumah’s trust in the UN as an organisation that would foster ‘international 
morality’842. Imperialists had abused the ‘resources and facilities’ of the UN to manipulate 
public opinion, something Ghana had to be vigilant about.843 
Nonalignment also had to facilitate the BAA assistance policy of aid for freedom 
fighters and avoid debates within the BAA about support for liberation movements, which 
were becoming splintered along Cold War lines. Diplomats such as Kwesi Armah demanded 
a ‘machinery’ with better-greased wheels to avoid a choice between, for instance, supporting 
Potloko Leballo’s Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) or Nelson Mandela’s African National 
Congress (ANC) in South Africa.844 
But, principally, nonalignment was a way to immunise Ghanaians from adverse foreign 
propaganda. Both the East and the West were explicitly barred from using Ghana as a 
‘propaganda forum’. S.A. Moore of the ministry of foreign affairs therefore scrutinised the 
840 Telex message, J.E. Bossman to Couve de Murville, “Telex Message from Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. 
President of the Republic of Ghana Addressed to his Excellency General Charles de Gaulle. President of the 
republic of France”, 2 June 1965, DAL, Ghana 1960-1965, 50QO/52, AMAE. 
841 “Ghana Foreign Affairs, A monthly Bulletin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”, July 1963, Dabu Gizenga 
Papers, Box 128-9, f: Foreign Relations – Ghana Foreign Affairs vol. 2 No. 2, MSRC. 
842 Transcript, “Television Recording made by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of Ghana at the United 
Nations, July 29,1958, in Ghana and the United Nations, published by Ghana Information Services”, October 
1958, Dabu Gizenga Papers, Box 128-5, f: Kwame Nkrumah Speeches, MSRC. 
843 Transcript, “Draft Portion of a Speech on Neutrality and Non-Alignment”, [1961] SC/BAA/366 U.A.R., 
PRAAD-Accra.  
844 Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 223. 
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press releases that were issued by every embassy in Accra.845  The USIS officers saw Ghana’s 
warning as a way to deal with the ‘increased propaganda competition’ on the continent.846 
USIS-officers therefore tolerated Nkrumah’s accusation that the USIA was planning a 
propaganda offensive against the developing countries. He had also been convinced that a 
psychological warfare strategy for Africa had found its way onto the agenda of NATO 
meetings.847  
Moreover, Nkrumah personally tried to convince other African leaders of the need to 
immunise their population against neocolonialist propaganda. In a letter to Nyerere in 
December 1961, Nkrumah wrote that too much democracy would only hand imperialists the 
sticks to beat them with. The linguistic differences in Africa were another example of an 
artificial division: ‘we can even make love without the help of any language!’ he quipped. 
The real dividing line between French and British Africa was drawn because French Africa 
still leant on its former coloniser, a problem that could not be resolved by economic 
cooperation alone. Sound economic integration needed a ‘stable political direction, force and 
purpose.’ In Europe, he wrote, there was still confusion because the continent failed to build a 
sound foundation for political action.848  
In a letter to Kenyatta, Nkrumah expressed concern about the foreign-owned press, 
which he described as ‘one of the formidable enemies of our political struggle.’ Formal 
independence had made intervention difficult, but the press was a ‘deadly weapon’ that 
remained in the imperialists’ arsenal, and they were more than willing to disseminate ‘vile 
propaganda’ that magnified internal differences. Nonetheless, ‘to all this there is happily an 
effective antidote’ Nkrumah wrote, ‘the establishment of a strong party press.’ He offered to 
send an expert from the Guinea Press, a corporation formed under the government-sponsored 
Industrial Development Corporation, who would bring samples and assist the local journalists 
in this endeavour.849  
 
 
 
 
 
845 Draft, “Points for Discussion with the Ghana Press Corps”, [1962], RG. 17/2/62 Miscellaneous, PRAAD-
Accra. 
846 Foreign service despatch, USIS-Accra to USIA, “Country Plan for Ghana”, 24 June 1960, RG. 306, UD-WW 
92, FRC 1, NARA. 
847 Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 1957-1966, 183; Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage of 
Imperialism, 239, 249. 
848 Letter, Nkrumah to Nyerere, 8 December 1961, Kwame Nkrumah Papers, Box 154-20, f: 12, MSRC. 
849 Letter, Nkrumah to Jomo Kenyatta, [1962-1966], 3, RG. 17/2/538 Miscellaneous 1962-1966, PRAAD-Accra. 
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Nkrumah’s Attempt to Separate Foreign Aid and Ideas 
 
How did Nkrumah reconcile his vigilance about so-called neocolonial intrusion with his 
acceptance of foreign aid? Nkrumah believed he could accept foreign aid so long as he 
guarded against the ideological accompaniments. Moreover, he wrote in 1957 that the 
Western-funded Volta Aluminum Company was crucial if Ghana wanted to enter the age of 
modernity and play a leading role in the attainement of African unity.850 In 1961, Mboya also 
told his audience at an Oxford meeting that Kenya accepted aid because it was needed, 
claiming he was ‘capable of gauging the ulterior motives’ of those who offered assistance.851  
For Nkrumah the ‘African Personality’ was not threatened as long as Ghana invested in 
ideological education. He instructed the freedom fighters in 1958 at the AAPC not to ignore 
the ‘spiritual side of the human personality’, because he felt Africans were still seen by the 
West as incapable of rising above their material needs.852 In Nkrumah’s view, the longing for 
material progress made them vulnerable to subjugation. If technical training was offered 
without an ideological component, students would become a liability to the nation even with 
an increase in productivity.853 The Spark also ran articles that rejected the philanthropic 
narrative advanced by ‘diplomatic missions, cultural centres and information offices’ which 
had become notable buildings in the African urban landscape of the 1960s. In contrast, 
articles described foreign aid as a form of trade that benefited recipient countries as well as 
the donor.854 Ghana’s ideological education had to neutralise the potential harm that came 
with foreign aid.  
The separation between ideas and aid was nowhere clearer than in Ghana’s response to 
the Peace Corps, which launched its first operation in Ghana. The Spark presented the 
American volunteers as innocent, but mocked the French ‘Volunteers for Progress’, 
describing them as the ‘volunteers of regress’. At the same time Nkrumah banned Peace 
Corps articles and a Volta cartoon strip in Daily Graphic, both of which had been prepared by 
the USIA. People in Nkrumah’s staff told the Peace Corps members that Nkrumah did not 
want to risk his ability to criticise American influence by permitting the Daily Graphic to 
850 Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, x. 
851 Quoted in Daniel Speich, “The Kenyan Style of ‘African Socialism’: Developmental Knowledge Claims and 
the Explanatory Limits of the Cold War”, Diplomatic History 33, no. 3 (2009): 451. 
852 All-African People’s Conference: Speeches by the Prime Minister of Ghana at the Opening and Closing 
Sessions on December 8th and 13th, 1958, 2. 
853 Foreign service despatch, Stephen Gurney Gebelt to StateDept, “Ghanaian Students To Study in Soviet Bloc”, 
12 December 1960, RG. 59, CDF 1960-1963, 545J.603/6-1062 – 551J.61/10-361, NARA. 
854 Julius, Sago, “The Western Concept of Foreign Aid”, The Spark, January 12, 1963, 2. 
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print Peace Corps material. This explains how Nkrumah could phone Shriver to apologise for 
the critical articles that had appeared in the Ghanaian Times that he himself had approved.855 
Nkrumah trusted the money, but fought the importation of ideas. In his understanding, 
modernisation and industrialisation were not flawed models, but powerful tools that had been 
wielded by the wrong people. With the instruments for advancement at their own disposal, 
leaders like Nkrumah, Kenyatta or Nyerere believed they could make a change and accept aid 
from different corners while shaping their societies in their own forms of African Socialism. 
 
 
The International Problem of the Ghanaian Propaganda Campaign 
 
The redefinition of nonalignment in propaganda terms, Ghana’s shift towards emotional 
propaganda and a radio-trottoir style of journalism was a decision aimed at reaching a broad 
audience. At the same time, this vocal anticolonial stance increased the perception of Ghana 
as a subversive force in Africa. It made the BAA the primary suspect when Sylvanus 
Olympio, the president of Togo, was murdered in 1963. Olympio had advocated the recreation 
of German Togoland and claimed parts of Ghana.856 
It was in this light that the West came to view Nkrumah, who not too long before had 
been considered an ally or, in the French case, a manageable threat because of his alleged 
mental problems.857 It was not Nkrumah’s flirtation with the Soviet Union, but his assertive 
attitude that caused nervousness at the USIA because it could rouse others ‘to vent their 
apprehensions and frustrations.’858 Reports of Ghanaian subversion time and again confirmed 
that Nkrumah was not turning towards the Soviets, yet his desire to export pan-African ideas 
was poised to cause problems. To Kennedy, Nkrumah’s behaviour was unsurprising. It 
855 “U.S. Peace Crops”, The Spark, December 15, 1962, 6; Letter, l’Ambassade de France au Ghana to Couve de 
Murville, “a/s. Peace Corps et Volontaires du Progrès”, 30 April 1963, DA, États-Unis, 91QO/529bis, Aide 
Americaine, AMAE; Memorandum, “Monthly Country Report – Ghana”, 14 June 1963, RG. 490, A1 27, Box 1, 
f: Ghana, NARA; Hoffman does not explain how Nkrumah’s could be enthusiastic and at the same time allow 
the Ghanaian Times to print articles that denounced the Peace Corps, see Hoffman, All You Need Is Love, 155. 
856 Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 10–11, 308–316. 
857 Confidential letter, M.C. Renner to Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Marriage de M. Nkrumah”, 2 January 1958, 
50QO/15, f: Politique Intérieure, AMAE; The British wanted to exploit the goodwill that had been created by 
Ghanaian independence, see Report, R.H.K Marett, “Report on visit to East Africa by R.H.K”, March/November 
1960, 12, INF 12/863, TNA; The International Cooperation Administration offered the best example of the 
American approach to Ghana when it described Nkrumah’s Pan-African conference as a first step towards 
African economic cooperation and development: Memcon, “International Cooperation Administration: Advisory 
Conference on Africa May 17 – 27, 1960: Pan-Africanism”, 27 May 1960, 2, RG. 469, P36, Box 11, f: Africa 
Advisory Conference, NARA. 
858 Research report, “The Ghanaian Propaganda Campaign against the U.S.: Motives and Implications”, 12 
August 1963, 18-19, RG. 306 USIA Research Reports 1960-1999, P142, Box 16, f: R-155-63, NARA; Earlier 
report: Research paper, “Ghanaian Subversion in Africa”, 12 February 1962, NSF, Box 99, f: Ghana General, 
1/62 – 3/62, JFKL.  
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angered him, but he never acted upon it. He understood the Ghanaian leaders’s actions as the 
product of frustration, something that was difficult to manage directly. By August 1963, 
however, certain officials within the USIA had grown tired of sitting on their hands and even 
advised reducing Ghanaian appeal by increasing the ‘African awareness of the extent of the 
communist influence in Ghana.’859  
In 1960, British diplomats fought over that question. The CRO eventually concluded 
that Nkrumah had no desire to throw in his lot with the communists, but they were still 
concerned – believing Ghana’s leader overestimated his ability to play with fire and not get 
burned. Only by 1963 the British realised that the Ghanaian influence in East Africa had 
increased at their own expense. The BAA divided trade unions in Uganda, circulated forged 
British telegrams in Kenya, and supported the opposition in Zanzibar. The French ambassador 
in Ghana, Guiringaud, warned the ministry of French foreign affairs that Nkrumah believed 
he was a ‘messiah’ with a god given mission to liberate Africa.860 
Ghanaian diplomats were very much aware of the damage caused by their leftist and 
anticolonial image and therefore urged the press corps to devote more attention to the way in 
which the country was presented.861 All this was to little avail. Western diplomats remained 
concerned about Nkrumah’s vocal anticolonial discourse, which brought stories of 
neocolonial plots to the attention of the African public. 
 
 
The Newspaper War: The Information Vacuum, Revolutionary Journalism and 
Ghanaian Ideological Education862 
 
The international impact of Ghana’s new public diplomacy strategy is demonstrated by the 
newspaper war, a war of words that erupted in the early sixties between Ghana on one side 
and the US and the UK on the other. The deviating journalistic practices strengthened the 
mutual misperception and even influenced the negotiations of the Volta River Project. 
 
 
 
859 Research paper, “Ghanaian Subversion in Africa”, 12 February 1962, NSF, Box 99, f: Ghana General, 1/62 – 
3/62, JFKL; Research report, “The Ghanaian Propaganda Campaign against the U.S.: Motives and Implications”, 
12 August 1963, 18-19, RG. 306 USIA Research Reports 1960-1999, P142, Box 16, Folder R-155-63, NARA.  
860 Memorandum, A.W. Snelling, “Ghana: The Lurch to the Left”, 1 December 1960, CAB 134/1357, TNA; 
CRO Print, “The Influence of Ghana in East Africa”, 27 September 1963, FO 1110/1692, TNA; Letter, de 
Guiringaud to DAL, “a/s: Le Nouveau Messie”, 3 February 1960, Ghana 1953-1965, 50QO/37, AMAE. 
861 Draft, “Points for Discussion with the Ghana Press Corps”, [1961], 3, 5, RG. 17/2/62 Miscellaneous, 
PRAAD-Accra; The document shows that the relation between the Ghanaian state and the press was less direct. 
862 A term used at the CRO in the aftermath of the French atomic bomb crisis: Secret letter, L.J.D. Wakely, to 
G.W. Chadwick, 26 February 1960, DO 35/9341, TNA. 
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Radio Troittoir and the ‘Information Vacuum’ 
 
On 20 March 1961 Kennedy personally asked Carl T. Rowan, the acting secretary of public 
affairs and first Afro-American director of the USIA, to prepare an analysis of the press in 
Africa which concluded that there was an ‘information vacuum’. After the departure of the 
colonial powers, many Africans had remained illiterate and could therefore not fully enjoy 
freedom, because the ‘very essence of freedom’, Rowan argued, was the ‘right and the 
opportunity to make a choice.’ Without the necessary skills, however, Africans remained ill-
informed about the choices that were available in terms of development, leaving them 
vulnerable to tyranny.  
According to Rowan, not a single aid programme could truly succeed unless the 
information vacuum was addressed by providing good reading material. The US had to act, 
because the door was left open for competitors from the Eastern bloc, as well as for Reuters 
and Agence France-Presse (AFP). While USIS Dakar asked the USIA to increase the 
American wire services, the USIA’s experienced assistant director for Africa, Edward V. 
Roberts, was not convinced that more wire services would solve the core problem. The public 
would only read articles if an African journalist – Roberts suggested a Nigerian – could be 
placed in Washington or at the UN. 863 
Already in 1958, USIS-Accra had noticed that the local newspapers rarely dealt with 
international subjects or supported US policy. The British on their part had invested 
immensely in information as a pillar of the newly independent state of Ghana, while even the 
French in 1961 were turning towards educating Africans in ‘world affairs’ instead of limiting 
their education to national and regional matters. The notion that Africa was struggling with an 
‘information vacuum’ was thus widely entertained and was strengthened when 
misinformation about the situation on the ground in Congo had severely handicapped the 
American ability to deal with the crisis.864 
Ghana’s stories about neocolonial plots, which were supposed to mobilise the public, 
would lead to trouble (illustration 21). In October 1961, for instance, Voice of Africa 
published a set of forged telegrams allegedly sent from the CRO. The words of the so-called 
authentic telegram were directed at the reader of the newspaper: 
 
863 Confidential memorandum for the president, Carl T. Rowan, “Subject: An Analysis of the Press in Africa”, 
24 March 1961, RG. 306, P 249, Box 10, f: Press in Africa [Folder ½], NARA. 
864 Cablegram, Accra to USIA, “RE USIA CA-852, October 4; USITO circular telegram 177, November 15”, 20 
November 1957, RG. 306, P 249, Box 10, f: Press in Africa [Folder ½], NARA; Memcon, “Anglo-French Talks 
on Information Expanded Record”, FO 953/2029, TNA. 
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You ought to know better what is really going on […] foolish not to realize that only by appearing to let 
you and the other white settlers down to some extent, can H.M.G. get the Africans to accept a plan that in 
fact is in your interests.865  
 
In March 1963 The Spark ran a sensationalist story about the secret war of the CIA entitled 
‘The Killer at Your Door’. The story contained pictures of a gun with a silencer, radio 
equipment and shoes with espionage material. The journalist further accused the CIA of 
planning Lumumba’s murder, it was claimed that Dean Rusk’s son had been stationed in 
Nigeria and estimated that 500 agents were active in Ghana. In the first issue of Voice of 
Africa, French colonial manipulations were exposed. A photo was printed showing a French 
policeman who allegedly made sure that people would vote for de Gaulle’s Algerian policy. 
Besides sensationalist stories, publications also became more visual with cartoons and large 
photographs: a strong African man strangling a white colonial officer, an armed African 
officer leading his men into battle or a large picture of a manhandled Lumumba filled the 
pages (illustration 22).866 
This blend of rumours, sensationalism, cartoons and emotional appeal – already tested 
in the campaign against the French bomb in the Sahara – was now becoming the working 
principle of the Bureau of African Affairs. A.K. Barden wanted to ensure that ‘as many as 
possible of the reading public’ would be ‘encouraged to buy and read The Spark’ Ghana’s 
main ideological newspaper which also had a French language edition L’Étincelle and was 
founded in 1961. Kofi Batsa, the newspaper’s chief editor, had to distil concrete ideas from 
Ghana’s vague pan-African ideology and crystallise Nkrumah’s thinking into specific 
policies.867 The paper aimed at educating the Ghanaian public, while it had to convince as 
many people as possible in the rest of Africa. What plagued the newspaper was not illiteracy – 
newspapers were read out loud in public and leaflets were a common mode of political 
communication, from Accra to the coffee houses of Mogadishu – but distribution problems. A 
network of agents was therefore established in February 1963. 868 
865 “The Secret Plot Discovered”, Voice of Africa, Vol. 1, No. 10, October 1961, 1-17. 
866 “The Secret War of the CIA: The Killer at Your Door”, The Spark, March 15, 1963, 1; “The Concept of 
Partnership”, Voice of Africa, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1961, 11; The Spark, December 15, 1962, 1; The Spark, 
December 20, 1963, 6; Conor Cruise O’Brien, “Africa and the United Nations”, Voice of Africa, Vol. 3, No. 11, 
November 1963, 15 
867 Letter, A.K. Barden to regional commissioner Ashanti Region, January 1963, BAA/RLAA/943 
Correspondence on The Spark, PL; Batsa, The Spark: From Kwame Nkrumah to Hilla Limann, 14 – 15. 
868 P.A.V. Ansah, “Kwame Nkrumah and the Mass Media”, in The Life and Work of Kwame Nkrumah: Papers of 
a Symposium Organized by the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Legon, ed. Kwame Arhin 
(Trenton: Africa World Press, 1993), 89; Foreign service despatch, “Somali-Ghanaian Relations Reach New 
Low in an Exchange of Leaflets”, 21 February 1962, RG. 59, CDF 54J.603/9-1062 to 551J.61/10-361, NARA; 
Memorandum, “Circulation of ‘Spark’”, 8 February 1963, BAA/RLAA/943 Correspondence on The Spark, PL; 
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The BAA also attacked its former coloniser and criticised the British newspapers for 
publishing sensationalist stories about Nkrumah’s authoritarian rule. British officials 
concluded that their attempts to establish a free press had failed. A.W. Snelling of the CRO 
asked Kweku Boateng, the Ghana minister of information, to consult him before any anti-
British material was published. He also struggled to understand how the UK could be 
presented as a cultural and economic imperialist in the newspapers when Nkrumah welcomed 
foreign investments in his radio addresses. Even though Boateng made excuses for his 
journalists by stating that Ghanaian writers were operating in a foreign language, making it 
difficult for them to be subtle, Snelling noted sarcastically that their knowledge of offensive 
English was impeccable. Despite these problems, the CRO was unconcerned.869 
The French ambassador, Guiringaud, who was used to criticism directed towards 
France’s role in Africa, also began to worry at the end of 1960 that the Ghanaian press could 
affect African attitudes across the continent. He asked the ministry of foreign affairs to send 
him an English language expert so that France could respond to allegations in a fitting way.870  
For American officials, Ghana’s behaviour confirmed the psychological profile of the 
anticolonial African. The newspapers were a ‘major outlet’ through which Nkrumah ‘vented 
frustration and anger toward outside forces’ he could not control, the US embassy reported.871 
Solving this problem was a technical matter. Rowan’s report to Kennedy suggested it would 
be useful to train African journalists.872 Instead of becoming less involved, as Nkrumah had 
hoped, the US felt compelled to intervene. 
Even though Kennedy saw it as an expression of frustration he still wanted to contain 
Nkrumah’s PR offensive. Unlike the British, the US embassy in Accra realised that the anti-
Western tone of Ghana’s newspapers was not a reflection of government policy. They 
understood that Nkrumah had separated his role as political agitator from his role as 
pragmatic government leader. What made American officials take action, however, was the 
fact that Nkrumah’s vocal anticolonial discourse could derail the American foreign aid 
strategy for Africa. With a foreign aid bill in Congress, post-colonial crises in Congo and 
Letter, E.N. Hanson to Barden, “Attitude of some Government Officials Towards ‘The Spark’”, 3 April 1963, 
RG. 17/2/796, Miscellaneous, PRAAD-Accra. 
869 Memcon, A.W. Snelling, “Note of Discussion with Mr. Boateng, the Ghana Minister of Information”, [1961], 
DO 195/34, TNA; Minutes, McMullen, 17 October 1962, DO 195/36, TNA. 
870 Note, Guiringaud to Direction des Archives, “a/s. Diffusion de la presse Ghanéenne”, 24 February 1960, 
Report, Guiringaud to DAL, “a/s: Action d’information”, 28 October 1960, DAL, Ghana 1960-1965, 50QO/34, 
AMAE. 
871 Telegram, Accra to StateDept, 4 December 1962, CDF 1960-1963, 551.42/3-3060 – 511.45R3/1-1860, 
NARA. 
872 Confidential memorandum for the president, Carl T. Rowan, “Subject: An Analysis of the Press in Africa”, 
24 March 1961, RG. 306, P 249, Box 10, f: Press in Africa [Folder ½], NARA. 
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Portuguese Africa and the case of the Aswan Dam in mind, the White House was battling 
against Congress and public opinion, which did not dismiss Nkrumah’s rants as expressions 
of frustration but demanded that aid purchased allegiance. Why else would the US invest in 
aid?873 
Even though the Kennedy administration saw the competition with Moscow as its most 
pressing task, the Volta River project became a tool to prevent the foreign aid strategy for 
Africa from disintegrating. Ambassador Russell recommended the implementation of the 
Volta project in February 1961, not solely because it would represent the sole Western 
foothold in Ghana, but also because backing down would create doubts in underdeveloped 
countries about the sincerity of Kennedy’s aid efforts. Only a month earlier he had indicated 
that financing the Volta River project was self-defeating if the anti-American campaign was 
maintained.874The allocation of foreign aid funds therefore had to be tactically employed so 
that Congress could be convinced that aid was an issue of strategy and assure the rest of 
Africa that US aid was sincere. 
This dual image could only be kept afloat by urging the Ghanaian leader to soften the 
harsh tones of the articles that were being published. A presidential commission headed by 
Clarence Randall – Eisenhower’s Africa expert – travelled to Accra in the week of 22 October 
1961, officially to investigate whether the US should go ahead with the project to finance the 
Volta River Project. However, Randall tried to convince Nkrumah of the need to improve 
public opinion about the US. In December 1961 Randall was send back to Ghana to convey to 
Nkrumah that Kennedy needed help in reassuring the American people. He urged the 
Ghanaian president to contact the embassy before information became ‘distorted in the press.’ 
The NSC meeting that was held upon Randall’s return confirmed that approving the Volta 
project was the only possible choice. A refusal to proceed would be misunderstood across 
Africa. Thus on 12 December 1961, the Volta project was approved.875 
Ghana’s journalistic practices became the core of American-Ghanaian relations. In 1963 
William Brubeck, the NSC specialist on Africa, included ‘information media’ and ‘posture on 
873 Letter, Accra to State Department, 4 December 1962, Papers of President Kennedy, NSF, Box 100, f: Ghana-
General 11/62-12/62, JFKL; Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World, 177. 
874 Memorandum, Donald Dumont to G. Mennen Williams, “Critique of Ambassador Russell’s 
Recommendations, Conclusion of the Volta River Project Agreements and Regarding the Nature of the 
Commitment”, 29 September 1961, Papers of President Kennedy, NSF, Box 388, f: Volta River Project 9/61 – 
11/61, JFKL; Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War, 198. 
875 U.S. News & World Report, “Taking U.S. Aid – And Red Ideas: Question Now: More Dollars for Ghana?”, 6 
November 1961, 61, Dabu Gizenga Papers, Box 128-10, f: 232 the USA, MSRC; Montgomery, “The Eyes of the 
World Were Watching: Ghana, Great Britain, and the United States, 1957-1966”, 168; Memorandum, George 
Ball, 16 December 1961, NSF, Box 388, f: Volta River Project 9/61 – 11/61, JFKL.  
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major international issues’ among his eight criteria for evaluating future development activity 
in Ghana.876 William P. Mahoney, the new American ambassador to Ghana in 1962, noted on 
1 February 1963 that only a major alteration of Ghana’s propaganda policy would lead to 
good Ghana-US relations. Mahoney’s primary task was therefore to improve the public image 
of the US in Ghana by establishing a personal relationship with Nkrumah.877 
Ultimately, the Volta river project strengthened Kennedy in his conviction that public 
opinion was a liability, not an opportunity, for attaining his policies. Until Kennedy’s 
assassination, Edgar Kaiser, the CEO of the aluminium company that had taken on the Volta 
project, visited Nkrumah every few weeks to plead for moderation. When the exiled 
opposition leader, Kofi Busia, testified in the US senate about Ghana in December 1962 and 
Senator Thomas Dodd began talking about the ‘first Cuba in Africa’, Kaiser visited 
Nkrumah’s office once again.878 ‘How can president Kennedy go on with his foreign aid 
program, how can he risk the whole foreign aid program?’ Kaiser asked.879 More than any 
flirtation of Ghana with the Soviet Union, it was this question that shaped US-Ghana 
relations.  
 
 
 
876 Memorandum for Mr. Carl Kaysen, William Brubeck, “Criteria for Evaluation Future Ghanaian Activities”, 1 
February 1963, Papers of President Kennedy, NSF, Box 100, f: Ghana-General 2/1/63-2/10/63, JFKL; The State 
Department agreed: Position paper on Ghana, William C. Trimble, 19 November 1962, RG. 59, A1 3112J, Box 
1, f: US-UK talks 1962, NARA. 
877 Telegram, Mahoney to secretary of state, 31 January 1963, Papers of President Kennedy, NSF, Box 100, f: 
Ghana, General 1/21/63 – 1/31/63, JFKL. 
878 “Hearing before the Subcommittee to investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other 
Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, Eighty-Seventh Congress, 
Second Session, Testimony of K.A. Busia”, 3 December 1962, “Senator Says Ghana is Cuba of Africa: 
Washington Denies it is first African Satelite”, 15 July 1963, “Sen. Dodd’s View of Ghana: Red”, 16 September 
1963, Dabu Gizenga Papers, Box 128-10, f: 232 The USA, MSRC. 
879 Incoming telegram, Accra to secretary of state, 19 January 1963, Papers of President Kennedy, NSF, Box 
100, f: Ghana, General 1/1/63 – 1/20/63, JFKL. 
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Illustration 22: An image of an African man rousing African troops to go to battle, a visual way to reach mass 
audiences through newspapers. Source: The Spark, December 20, 1963, 6. 
 
 
Revolutionary Journalism  
 
The newspaper war not only made its mark on the American policy towards Africa but also 
affected the Ghanaian understanding of how imperial propaganda actually worked. Attacks in 
the press persisted despite complaints from the Kennedy administration, which in turn only 
strengthened the Anglophone perception that something needed to be done to improve the 
information resources on the continent.  
From 1962 onwards, journalists were informed that the wording and the style of foreign 
news could contain secret messages. It was therefore forbidden to copy news stories from 
Western newspapers. In 1963 the BAA began publishing The African Chronicler, a 
newspaper in which journalistic pieces coming from The New York Times, The Christian 
Science Monitor and The New York Herald were reprinted in a dry and factual style. Written 
for Africans by Africans there was a guarantee that this bulletin did not conceal any secret 
ideological messages. Accordingly, when the Afro-American magazine Ebony began its 
operations in Ghana, The Spark was quick to warn that the periodical could poison the 
atmosphere in Africa with neocolonialist theories and create disunity.880 
880 Memorandum, H.K. Mould Research Officer to the Executive Secretary, 27 May 1963, Memorandum, 15 
May 1963, BAA/RLAA/941 African Chronicler, PL; “Ebony: An Instrument of Imperialism”, The Spark, 
November, 22 1963. 
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By 1964, Richard Wright at the Ghana Institute of Journalism turned this push against 
foreign news into a coherent theory. The institute had to impress upon its students that 
objectivity was a constructed Western notion. In his classes, Wright stressed how Western 
newspapers systematically distorted stories and he unveiled the Cold War bias of news 
organisations. He indicated that even the most objective of the Western papers used the term 
‘free world’ even though countries such as South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Portugal and 
Spain were included in that definition. 
The practice of revolutionary journalism was based on the conscious adoption and 
adaption of other writing styles to reach the maximum effect. Wright argued that an African 
style of journalism had to replace the journalism that wanted to adopt Western moral and 
political values and imitate the BBC.881 By contrast, Africa journalists should write for a 
broad African audience and simplify their prose so that everything was easily understandable.  
The calls to arms for the freedom fighters were a thing of the past for Wright. He 
believed journalism was not about the slogans or jaded clichés, but about inciting people to 
action. He praised the Soviet style because the selection of materials and the blending of facts 
and commentary clearly showed the political orientation of the nation. From the French, 
Ghanaian journalists could learn nothing because Wright considered their style to be literary 
and vague. The Americans, on the other hand, had a good style with short and lively 
sentences. Their adherence to objectivity was the only problem. For Wright, this was a sign of 
mediocre intellectual capabilities and the product of morally dubious societies. The 
revolutionary journalist, by contrast, was required to have a solid ideological background, an 
extensive knowledge of Africa, and the ability to differentiate between friend and foe in his 
treatment of the news. The journalist was an instrument of the African revolution in which 
everyone, not only those who were politically active, was involved.  
Nkrumah’s strategic shift towards emotional appeals to the African population thus 
deepened the animosity between the US and Ghana. Even though Wright integrated Western 
journalistic principles, Western notions of ‘emotionalism’ were strengthened and the political 
project of African unity was marginalised.  
 
 
 
 
 
881 William Gardner Smith Director of Ghana Institute of Journalism, “Revolutionary Journalism”, [1964], 2, 
RG. 17/2/683 Political Relations with Rhodesia/Miscellaneous 1957-1965, PRAAD-Accra. 
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The Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute and Ideological Training 
 
If information could never be objective, education also needed to go beyond the transmission 
of technical skills. Teachers had to mould the new nation by counteracting the education of 
colonialism and present Ghana as a modern nation.882 At the opening of the Institute of 
African Studies in October 1963, Nkrumah maintained that education was not merely a 
development tool, but a ‘gateway to the enchanted cities of the mind.’883 Exchange students 
were valued, not as nodes in a political network but as living PR dispensaries for Ghana. 
Scholarships, for instance, were awarded for students to study in Ghana’s schools, in spite of 
language difficulties and insufficient qualifications.884  
The majority of these students ended up at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute 
(KNII) in Winneba, of which the foundation stone was laid on 18 February 1961. Only a 
small section was sent to the University of Ghana, in Legon.885 The KNII had been founded in 
Winneba, a traditional CPP stronghold. Its mere existence exemplified the degree to which 
pan-Africanism had become a fully-fledged interventionist ideology. The institute was 
preoccupied with research in the ideological training section, but was also actively involved in 
projecting the ideology abroad, in the Positive Action Training Centre. Book projects such as 
the ‘Great Lives in Pan-Africanism Series’ and courses in political science presented the 
institute as a serious academic enterprise. Even the more practical courses on nutrition, 
agricultural organisation, and social welfare were never approached as purely technical 
matters. Knowledge was never objective: it had to serve the pan-African cause.886 
By 1961, a ten-week training programme had been developed. Students would be taught 
the basics of political organisation, learn ideological theory and become intimately acquainted 
with Ghana. Four weeks of theory were combined with two weeks of practical experience and 
two weeks of evaluation in which problems were discussed. The practical part of the training 
consisted of rallies and visits to the CPP Headquarters, Trade Union Congress, Young 
Pioneers, Builders Brigade, National Council of Ghana Women and Farmers Council. The 
882 Quoted in Haizel, “Education in Ghana, 1951-1966”, 55. 
883 Obeng, “44. Opening of the Institute of African Studies, Legon October 25, 1963”, 277. 
884 Confidential publication, African Affairs Secretariat, “Conference of Ghana Envoys Volume I: Notes of 
Conference of Ghana Envoys in Africa, Held at Accra 7th – 23rd October, 1961”, 1961, 3-4, Dabu Gizenga 
Papers, Box 128-16, f: 368, MSRC. 
885 W. Scott Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State, 
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), 160; Letter, T.K. Impraim to A.K. Barden, “Scholarship 
schemes for Kwame Nkrumah Institute”, 5 October 1961, BAA/RLAA/423 Kwame Nkrumah Institute Winneba, 
1961-63: Memos, Reports (Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute), PL. 
886 Pamphlet, “Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Economic and Political Science: Prospectus”, [1961], RG 11/1/357, 
PRAAD-Accra; Malcolm X: The Evolution of a Revolutionary Pan-Africanist, Great Lives in Pan-Africanism 
Series 1 (Accra: Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, S.d.). 
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theoretical part consisted of five elements: communication techniques, positive action 
techniques, principles of party organisation, organisation of elections and other subjects 
according to the needs of the nationalist students.887  
This curriculum remained midway between the BAA’s network strategy and a full-
blown ideological offensive for the people. Since most students came from countries that 
were not necessarily wedded to socialism, the BAA – which devised the external course – 
decided to remove socialism from the curriculum. Instead, ‘Positive Action’ techniques 
received more attention, as well as the organisation of policies and procedures for political 
parties, such as elections, party branches and propaganda vans.888 That decision, to give public 
relations priority over ideological training, led to a fight between A.K. Barden and Secretary 
of the National Council for Education A.L. Adu. The latter wanted to give the institute a more 
academic direction, staffed by highly qualified academic staff. A.K. Barden on the other hand 
wanted people who fully understood African liberation and ‘Nkrumahism’.889 
At the KNII, Ghana’s newly extended hand to the general population was a difficult 
step leading to a propaganda fiasco with disgruntled students. It is not known how many 
students attended the ten-week training courses, but a great number of them were unhappy 
with the quality of their training. They demanded a Western-style education with its 
technocratic gloss because it cradled the promise of progress. In December 1961, a group of 
40 Somalis, for instance, travelled to Accra on Ghanaian scholarships to receive short-term 
training in accountancy, nursing and midwifery, agriculture and chemistry. However, they 
went on a hunger strike because they were unhappy with the Ghanaian living standards. In the 
end, very few foreign students, only 2.8%, were admitted on a full-time basis. In the second 
academic year, 1963-1964, the total student population of the institute was 205, while 247 
new students were admitted. In total, 373 were Ghanaian, 7 were senior ranking officers, and 
7 were non-Ghanaian.890  
887 Draft Memorandum, “Development of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute, Winneba, as the Institute of political 
science”, [1961], BAA/RLAA/423 Kwame Nkrumah Institute Winneba, 1961-63: Memos, Reports (Kwame 
Nkrumah Ideological Institute), PL. 
888 Memorandum, [14 September 1961], Draft memorandum, “Development of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute, 
Winneba, as the Institute of political science”, [1961], BAA/RLAA/423 Kwame Nkrumah Institute Winneba, 
1961-63: Memos, Reports (Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute), PL. 
889 A.L. Adu Secretary National Council for education to A.K. Barden, 3 February 1962, BAA/RLAA/423 
Kwame Nkrumah Institute Winneba, 1961-63: Memos, Reports (Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute), PL; 
Letter from Barden to Adu, “Development of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute Winneba, as the Institute of 
Political Science”, 1 February 1962, BAA/RLAA/423 Kwame Nkrumah Institute Winneba, 1961-63: Memos, 
Reports (Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute), PL. 
890 Foreign service despatch, “Somali-Ghanaian Relations Reach New Low in an Exchange of Leaflets”, 21 
February 1962, RG. 59, CDF 1960-1963, 54J.603/9-1062 to 551J.61/10-361, NARA; Again in October 1964 
students were deported back to Kenya because they showed more interest in activities outside of the classroom, 
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American Public Diplomacy as Counterinsurgency: Damming Frustration 
 
Despite US concerns about the quality of Ghanaian journalism, it was American newspapers 
that started a tenacious rumour about the Russian arms shipments to Ghana in 1961. Even 
though weapons had also been purchased in the West, journalists claimed that these deliveries 
were meant to supply liberation fighters. Although the Ghana Information Service denied 
such a connection in 1961, the Ghanaian archives reveal that on 14 September 1964, in a 
conversation with the Soviet ambassador Georgi Rodionov, Nkrumah confirmed that he had 
agreed to channel Soviet arms to Agostinho Neto, the leader of the Movimento Popular de 
Libertação de Angola (MPLA) who had Marxist sympathies. The documents thus confirm a 
suspicion harboured by historians.891  
In Voice of Africa, Nkrumah began to support the so-called armed revolution. His turn 
to violence was an issue of tactics and did not stem from a disappointment about non-violence 
as was already clear at the AAPC. His shift towards the peoples of Africa compelled him to 
resort to guerrilla warfare because he noticed that it even appealed to unskilled farmers. 
Ghana would need to tap into that source of popular support.892 
However, rumours about arms deals and Nkrumah’s turn towards violence made 
policymakers, particularly in Washington, nervous about what might happen when their 
modernisation policies got out of hand and turned violent. NSC staffer, McGeorge Bundy was 
aware that the ideological confrontation in the Third World favoured and intensified internal 
conflict, particularly when the support of one of the two superpowers was enlisted.893 It is in 
this context that the USIA became an important player in the American counterinsurgency 
strategy. In Africa, the fragile state structures of Congo became an important source of 
concern. 
see “Jackson Kaithula of Kenya”, 18 March 1963, BAA/RLAA/423 Kwame Nkrumah Institute Winneba, 1961-
63: Memos, Reports (Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute), PL; Letter, D. Busumtwi-Sam to permanent 
secretary ministry of education Nairobi, “Kenya Students in Ghana”, 1 October 1964, Report, “Kwame Nkrumah 
Ideological Institute Director’s Report for the year 1963/64”, November 1964, SC/BAA/507 Documents to 
Osagyefu, PRAAD-Accra. 
891 Copy, “Shipments to Ghana Stir Suspicion, the Christian Science”, 15 May 1961, Dabu Gizenga Papers, Box 
128-10, f: The USSR, MSRC; Memorandum, “Angola”, [1964], RG. 17/2/683 Political Relations with 
Rhodesia/Miscellaneous 1957-1965, PRAAD-Accra; Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 224. 
892 See also chapter 4; Kwame Nkrumah, “Tasks of Non-Aligned Nations”, Voice of Africa, Vol. 4, No. 11, 
November 1964, 3; Kwame Nkrumah, Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare: A Guide to the Armed Phase of the 
African Revolution (London: Panaf Books, 1968), 95. 
893 His interdepartmental committee agreed, consisting of representatives of the State Department, Department of 
Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, USIA, CIA and the United States Agency for International Development, see 
Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, “Subject: Counterinsurgency Doctrine”, 13 August 1962, 3, Papers of President 
Kennedy, NSF, Box 338, JFKL. 
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In December 1961, USIA director, Murrow was asked to become a member of the 
Special Group on counterinsurgency.894 The USIA integration into the group stemmed from 
Kennedy’s views on the USIA as an agency that was important for the counterinsurgency 
strategy. Ted Sorensen, JFK’s special advisor and former USIA officer, also preferred hard 
persuasion and was disdainful about a long-term engagement based on cultural diplomacy.895 
Murrow accepted Sorensen’s view of the job, in part because it enabled him to elevate USIA 
officers to the status of diplomats, instead of being perceived as marketers, a deep-seated 
frustration among USIA’s personnel.896   
The new mission of the USIA came out of Murrow’s lecture at the Interdepartmental 
Seminar on the Problems of Development and Internal Defense on 31 July 1963 where he 
noted that the USIA’s role had changed somewhat over the years. To his own contentment, he 
noted that the old public relations mission of the USIA had been discarded: ‘The first 
sentence, “to help achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives” does not say we are to make 
friends, it does not say we are to publicize the activities of USIA. It does not say that we are 
obliged to tell a full and fair picture […] It makes of us a foreign policy oriented agency to 
support U.S. policy objectives.’897 That transformation of the USIA into a psychological 
instrument of foreign policy had already begun under Eisenhower, with the Sprague Report 
that recommended the USIA should take on a psychological task: making sure programmes 
were presented in such a way that resentment would be minimised.898 
Specifically, the USIA took on three new tasks. First, it was entrusted with the 
‘immunisation of those sectors of foreign society’ which were most likely to be the ‘breeding 
ground for insurgency.’ In a transitional society, Rostow argued, the government’s 
psychological, political, and administrative grip on a country was weak. This was a moment 
when guerrillas could thrive. The USIA therefore had to foster the relationship between 
894 Secret Report, Counter Guerrilla Warfare Task Force, “Elements of US Strategy to Deal with Wars of 
National Liberation”, 8 December 1961, NSF, Box 414, f: counterinsurgency special group 12/61, JFKL. 
895 Although Cull claims that Murrow was fond of saying this phrase, see Cull, The Cold War and the United 
States Information Agency, 190. 
896 Richard T. Arndt, The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century 
(Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 320 –325, 458. 
897 MR 72-91:1 Murrow Speeches: Question and Answer Session with USIA Staff Members Edward R. Murrow 
24 March 1961 USIA reference copy, JFKL; Lecture transcript, “Problems of Development and Internal Defense 
Seventh Session: The Role of USIA in Modernization and Internal Defense by the Honorable Edward R. 
Murrow”, 31 July 1963, 4, RG. 306, P296, Box 11, f: Edward R. Murrow – Speech July 31, 1963, NARA; 
Kennedy signed off on USIA’s new mission statement in 1963, see John F. Kennedy, Memorandum for the 
Director of the United States Information Agency, 25 January 1963, f: Subjects, Administrative Matters, 9/62-
11/63, Box 290, JFKL. 
898 Report, “Conclusions and Recommendations of the President’s Committee on Information Activities 
Abroad”, December 1960, 6, U.S. President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague 
Committee) Records, 1959-61, Box 26, f: Printed Committee Report, DDEL. 
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governments and their people. In the memorandum outlining the counterinsurgency doctrine, 
General Maxwell D. Taylor agreed that developing societies required professional advice and 
assistance for their public information services and ‘psychological operations’ to be effective 
and keep the channels of communication open.899   
Murrow himself was enthusiastic about the transistor radio as a medium, convinced that, 
one day, historians would recognise it as a major revolution in communications. He believed 
the new communication media allowed USIS officers to reach 10 million peasants otherwise 
untouched by so-called normal communications. In the Congo, for instance, weekly newsreels 
in French, Lingala and Swahili as well as the publication of Perspective Americaines, had 
nothing to do with winning friends for the United States or the exploitation of the American 
way of life. For Murrow, the purpose of those activities was to legitimise Adoula’s 
leadership.900 
This subtlety was lost on the British who wanted to promote their assistance to the new 
Congolese state as a way to create a favourable impression of the UK. Because they realised 
their efforts paled in comparison to the US they asked the Americans if they would be willing 
to include British material in the audio material they provided to the Congolese information 
services. Unlike their American counterparts the British – like the French – felt comfortable in 
their new role as salesmen, glad to shed the trauma of Kenya, Malaya, Palestine and Cyprus. 
Like advertisers who could conduct scientifically based consumer research to reveal hidden 
impulses, they wanted to know what drove their target audiences.901 
Secondly, the information agency advisory function became more important. 
Departments had to seek advice if they were considering policies that could affect foreign 
public opinion. The financing of the Volta Dam, Murrow argued, did the US more good in 
899 Conference paper, “A Review of Behavioral Sciences Research In Support of Air Force Programs in Counter-
Insurgency and Limited Warfare by James L. Monroe”, 18 April 1963, MC 440, Ithiel de Sola Pool Papers, f: 
Westpoint meeting 4/18/63, MIT-Archives; Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, Maxwell Taylor, “Subject: 
Counterinsurgency Doctrine”, 13 August 1962, 30, Papers of President Kennedy, NSF, Box 338, JFKL. 
900 Confidential, “Guidance for USIA Programs and Operations”, [1963], RG. 306, P 296, f:  C.I. Agency 
Doctrine and Organization, Box 8, NARA; Lecture transcript, “Problems of Development and Internal Defense 
Seventh Session: The Role of USIA in Modernization and Internal Defense by the Honorable Edward R. 
Murrow”, 31 July 1963, 19, 4, 13-14, RG. 306, P 296, Box 11, f: Edward R. Murrow – Speech July 31, 1963, 
NARA; Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, “Subject: Counterinsurgency Doctrine”, 13 August 1962, 30, Papers of 
President Kennedy, National Security Files Meetings & Memoranda, Box 338, JFKL. 
901 The term ‘salesmen’ was used in Report, W. Wilson, “Inspector’s Report on Information Work in 
Leopoldville”, [July 1961], FO 953/2050, TNA; Confidential Memorandum, McMullen, “United Kingdom 
Information Office, Kenya”, [1961], FO 1110/1447, TNA; Confidential, “U.S./U.K. Information Working Group 
Meeting, Washington April 28-30, Item C6: Audience Research and Reaction in Asia and Africa”, [1964],  FO 
953/2175, TNA; For the French perspective, see Report, Jean Desparmet to DAL, “Mission d’etude des moyens 
d’information francais en afrique centrale et orientale”, 6 May 1964, 33, DAL, Nord Est Afrique 1960-1965, 
35QO/8, AMAE. 
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other areas of the continent than in Ghana because it provided others with a concrete example 
of economic aid that had been offered irrespective of the policies of the recipient. That 
expertise was further used in the Interdepartmental Seminar on the Problems of Development 
and Internal Defense. The USIA organised the five-week course at the Foreign Service 
Institute where the leading lights of modernisation theory such as Rostow and Pye lectured 
with materials and case studies prepared by the agency.902 
Lastly, as counterinsurgency experts, USIA officers became ‘less publicists for 
America, more propagandists for progress.’ Concretely, this meant that ‘social reforms, 
economic programs and self-help themes’ were promoted. A small healthcare project in the 
Sudan was the subject of a film made in an attempt to get others to follow this example. This 
is what Rostow called the demonstration effect: by exhibiting the advantages of modernity 
others would follow; a process that was also described by communication experts such as 
Ithiel de Sola Pool.903 
As a propagandist for progress and with its immunising and advisory functions, the 
USIA became important in making counterinsurgency more ‘people oriented’ rather than 
‘hardware oriented’, as MIT researchers phrased it.904 The crucial playing field for a more 
people-oriented counterinsurgency in Africa was the cultural centre where the misperception 
between the US and Ghana deepened further, while the UK and France stood on the sideline 
and tried to promote their aid. 
 
 
The Cultural Centre as a Battle Ground: The Demonstration Effect and Cultural 
Imperialism. 
 
With the new working principles of the Ghanaian BAA and USIA as well as the British and 
French officers who had become shrewd salesmen, operations on the ground expanded 
rapidly. At the same time this was a counterintuitive development: new close personal 
relations between leaders of new African states and the former colonisers, particularly in 
France, seemed to push the African public into the background while cultural assistance was 
902 Lecture transcript, “Problems of Development and Internal Defense Seventh Session: The Role of USIA in 
Modernization and Internal Defense by the Honorable Edward R. Murrow”, 31 July 1963, 8, 13-14, RG. 306, P 
296, Box 11, f: Edward R. Murrow – Speech July 31, 1963, NARA; Official report, “Foreign Service Institute 
Department of State: Instructor’s Course in National Internal Defense Doctrine A701, 6 August – 17 1962”, 
1962, Papers of President Kennedy, NSF, Box 414, f: counterinsurgency special group 5/62-8/62, JFKL. 
903 Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, 27; Ithiel de Sola Pool, “Information 
Goals”, Foreign Service Journal, July 1963, 23–25. 
904 Report, James Monroe, “A Review of Behavioral Sciences Research In Support of Air Force Programs in 
Counter-Insurgency and Limited Warfare by James L. Monroe”, 18 April 1963, MC 440, Ithiel de Sola Pool 
Papers, f: Westpoint meeting 4/18/63, MIT-Archives. 
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overtaken by the socio-economic modernisation project that operated on the assumption that 
cultures would become more homogenised. However, African leaders also asserted their 
cultural difference, which fitted uncomfortably with the Western gospel of modernity and 
rationality. 
 
 
Exhibiting Modernity, Fighting Cultural Intrusion, Promoting Development 
 
The Americans were convinced they could counter the counterproductive effects of 
modernisation and calm frustrated anticolonial voices by displaying the advantages of an 
emerging world culture. British academics like Audry Richards agreed, arguing that the 
failure of development schemes in the 1930s was the fault of the agricultural officer, not the 
‘lazy African’. Peasants had been forced to plant crops, but had not been shown the 
advantages ‘of a dramatic change’.905 This exhibition of modernity was what Rostow termed 
the demonstration effect. 
Nkrumah interpreted this technique as an aggressive move to influence Ghanaian 
society. Nonetheless, his resistance and anticolonial discourse was believed to be beneficial in 
the long run. Rostow argued that external intrusion made leaders launch their societies into 
modernity. The leaders of a traditional society would not be prepared to break down the social 
structures for the prospect of more profit, but would only choose the path of development 
when they felt threatened by more advanced foreigners. Rostow called this ‘reactive 
nationalism’.906 Meanwhile, the French and British relied on cultural diplomacy activities to 
prop up their position, which only fed the existing Ghanaian concern about neocolonialism.  
Public diplomacy became a self-enforcing cycle of misunderstanding. The views about 
the ways in which public diplomacy affected target audiences were so radically different that 
an attempt to improve relations could end up causing an aggressive response. Public 
diplomats all agreed that the developmental state of their African target audiences was the 
problem, but their assessment of what was needed to address the issue differed. 
The Americans, for instance, saw themselves as part of the solution. USIA operatives 
wanted to get societies out of the semi-developed phase of colonialism, because the 
suboptimal preconditions for take-off resulted in a longing for the pre-colonial past, not a 
forward thrust.907 John Brown, prolific writer and public diplomacy thinker, poignantly 
905 Conference notes, Ricards, “Concept of the lazy African”, 22 February 1961, Richards/14/12, LSE. 
906 Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, 120–121; Gilman, Mandarins of the 
Future, 194. 
907 Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, 28. 
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identified the problem. The globalisation of popular culture where ‘people all over the world 
wear blue jeans’ occurred simultaneously with a renewed appreciation for ‘chauvinistic forms 
of intensely local culture.’908 Public diplomats therefore had to work to make the 
demonstration effect less shocking for those who valued ancient African cultures.  
The Ghanaians for their part were keen on exploiting the perceived emotionalism of the 
broader population. The general public, African students, leaders, and women were now 
integrated in a PR campaign for Ghana bent on projecting the image of a modern Ghana ready 
to lead Africa. Public diplomats therefore looked for a way to appeal to a mass audience and 
turned to film to reach a broad target audience. 
Unlike Ghana, the French saw too little development as a problem because Africans 
were not able to understand French policies and culture. African news media therefore had to 
be relied upon to ‘psychologically prepare the terrain’ for the import of French culture. 
Informational diplomacy could be used to increase the knowledge of French culture not only 
for the political figures and intellectuals, but also for the rural and urban population.909 
The British bought into Nkrumah’s pan-African narrative and identified the cultural 
background as the key determinant of African behaviour and opinion. They also turned their 
operation into a propaganda effort where they overthought how they could best influence 
intellectuals and the general public.910 In short, while the former colonial powers saw the 
promotion of their image as the main aim of their activities, USIS wanted to demonstrate 
development while Ghana’s operation defied both by asserting the ‘African Personality’. 
 
 
The Universalisation of the Cultural Centre 
 
Nonetheless, all these different techniques came together at the cultural centre (illustration 
23). Because of the success of the American cultural centres, which were visited by Africans 
to obtain language education and foreign publications, the concept of the cultural centre 
became widely adopted by other actors in the field. The British Council, for instance, was 
encouraged to abandon the strict separation between informational diplomacy and cultural 
assistance, and instead create cultural centres with reading rooms, exhibition spaces, and a 
908 Article draft, “The Cultural Attaché: His Formation, Function, and Future – (Some Observations on the 
Conduct of Intellectual Exchanges)”, S.d., 5-6, John Brown Papers, f: Cultural Affairs Officer 52/1/457, Box 
52a, Georgetown University Library. Brown’s view was part of an academic discussion, he refers to a book: 
Quincy Wright, ed., The World Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948). 
909 Letter, Guiringaud to DAL, “Information politique”, 14 Mai 1960, 2, DAL, Ghana 1960-1965, 50QO/72, 
AMAE. 
910 Memorandum, “African Mental Attitudes”, [1961], FO 953/2076, TNA. 
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cinema, following the USIS example. In reality, the sources of inspiration were more varied. 
In Fort Lamy, the British had been impressed by the French cultural centre, designed by Le 
Corbusier in 1960, proving to the British that the French stuck to their strategy of high 
culture.911 
Admittedly, the cultural centre in the capital of Chad was steeped in the French tradition 
of cultural diplomacy, with a museum, an auditorium, and a youth centre.912 However, in the 
face of Ghanaian propaganda efforts, the local French operatives like David Weckselmann, a 
French teacher of the Alliance Française at the University of Ibadan, had wanted to emulate 
the successful centres of USIS and the British Council with their audiovisual rooms and 
libraries.913 
The cultural centres established through the bilateral cooperation agreements with the 
new nations in French Africa were now meant to promote France. Jean Desparmet, who 
travelled to the newly opened embassies in Central and East Africa to study their 
informational strategy, came to the conclusion that the exhibitions, films and radio 
programmes provided through these centres were the most effective way to promote France. 
He saw ‘information as a technique, but above all a mental attitude.’914  
Ghana could not lag behind. The envoy conference of 1961 therefore decided that 
‘Africa’s cultural unity’ made the ‘cultural medium the best means of promoting political 
Unity in Africa’ and an expansive cultural plan were approved. The African Affairs 
Secretariat began producing appealing pamphlets, troupes of dancers were sent to the 
neighbouring African states, an Arts Festival in Accra was proposed and the study of African 
culture became essential at the universities. The Voice of Africa ran articles on Ghana’s 
cultural heritage. In 1962, the Ghana government printing press published Fifty Unknown 
Facts about the Africa with Complete Proof, in which G.K. Osei reminded historians that the 
black races, Egyptians and Ethiopians, had cradled civilisation. New Ghanaian cultural 
911 Letter, BC Chad to BC, September 1962, BW 154/1, TNA 
912 Ministère de la Coopération, “Note sur le centre culturel de Fort-Lamy”, 8 November 1962, DAM, 
Généralités, 1089 INVA/239 Coopération 1961-1975, f: Débuts politiques de la coopération (1961-1963), 
AMAE. 
913 Letter, David Weckselmann to Couve de Murville, “a/s: Report de fun d’année universitaire”, 1 June 1960, 
Afrique Pays M à Z 1958-1963, f: Nigeria-Ibadan, AF. 
914 ‘L’information est une technique, mais c’est surtout une attitude mentale’, see: Jean Desparmet, “Mission 
d’étude des moyens d’information français en Afrique centrale et orientale”, 6 May 1964, 15, DAL, Nord Est 
Afrique 1960-1965, 35QO/8, AMAE. 
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centres, with tape recorders, recordings of Ghanaian tunes, films, and pictures about Ghana 
became essential to illustrate the unity of all of Africa’s cultures.915  
In that strategic vision, USIS officers became the enemies because, unlike Ghana, they 
assumed that societal norms and cultural identities would converge. On 11 January 1963 
Manhoney received a note requesting the removal of William B. Davis, the Cultural Affairs 
Officer and Carl C. Nydell the regional medical officer. Nydell had been arrested on a plane 
on the runway in Accra where Kofi Baako, the minister of defence, personally notified him 
that plans for a coup had been found in his suitcase. When Edgar Kaiser and Chad Calhoun 
pointed out that this could endanger the Volta river project, Nkrumah backed down and 
Kennedy resumed the financing of the Volta River project.916 The Americans did not 
understand what they had done wrong. But the eviction of cultural officers in Ghana, Guinea 
and Mali was resisted because USIS officers feared that without their cultural centres, African 
leaders would only increase and escalate the tensions of the transition process, making Soviet 
intrusion only a matter of time.917 Contrary to their mission to build more understanding, the 
cultural centres thus became the focal point of conflict in Africa.  
 
 
915 G.K. Osei, “Fifty Unknown Facts About The African. With Complete Proof”, Dabu Gizenga Papers, Box 
154-44, f: 29 fifty, MSRC; Confidential publication, African Affairs Secretariat, “Conference of Ghana Envoys 
Volume I: Notes of Conference of Ghana Envoys in Africa, Held at Accra 7th – 23rd October, 1961”, 1961, 3-4, 
Dabu Gizenga Papers, Box 128-16, f: 368, MSRC; Kwame Nkrumah, “Ghana Cultural History”, Voice of Africa, 
Vol. 2, No. 10, 11 & 12, October-December 1962, 3-5, 11. 
916 Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, 18 January 1963, Papers of President Kennedy, NSF, Box 100, f: 
Ghana General Subject 1/1/63 -1/20/63, Relations with Ghana, JFKL; Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War, 
217. 
917 Outgoing telegram, StateDept/USIA to Amembassy Bamako, 24 May 1961, RG. 59 CDF 1960-63, 
511.703/6-161 -511.70E3/6-161, NARA. 
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Illustration 23: The Cultural Centre is still a lively place of cultural activities in African cities. This picture 
shows the centre of the Alliance Française in present day Accra where film screenings, cultural manifestations 
and French language education are organised, March 2012. Source: photograph taken by the author. 
 
 
Conflicting Public Diplomacy Techniques  
 
USIA’s entire operation was pressed in the service of the demonstration effect.  For Murrow 
for instance, English teaching had to facilitate the emulation of American modernity. The 
emerging parts of the world wanted to ‘share our knowledge and emulate our machine age 
productivity’, and the learning of English was seen as a good way to attain this. More 
importantly, the USIA was looking for ways in which the marvels of modernity could be 
demonstrated without offending African target audience and their attachment to the idea of an 
ancient African culture. One way of doing this was by drawing parallels between the 
American experience and African realities. In 1962, the VOA produced a radio show that told 
the story of an African student coming to the US for study, to facilitate the connection of the 
listener with American modernity. 918  
That attempt to connect so-called ‘African’ realities and American ideas, stemmed in 
part from the perceived success of Ghanaian propaganda. A comic book was printed called 
They Wanted Freedom: Life Stories and Legends of West Africans, Americans and Others 
who Served Their Peoples (illustration 24). The booklet drew parallels between West African 
and American drives for freedom. It was a hybrid propaganda product that combined the 
918 Newletter, USIA Correspondent, “Know Your Agency – English Teaching”, 1962, RG. 306, A1 1072, Box 
194, f: English Language Teaching 1962, NARA. 
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ancient history of African kingdoms with American Comic books. On the left page Askia 
Mohammed, the leader of the Songhai Empire, is described as a man who ‘wanted freedom 
for the mind and spirit, freedom to teach.’ On the right page George Washington’s story is 
recounted, how he fought the British and as first president laid the foundation for the republic, 
implying both Africans and Americans shared similar notions of freedom. 919  
Ghana interpreted this propaganda approach in a very different way. They remained 
anxious about possible neocolonial intrusion, believing that modern media could exert a secret 
but powerful impact. The Office of the President therefore tried to exploit those powerful 
weapons themselves to reach a wide audience; for instance by producing a movie called The 
Ghanaians, which was to be dramatic and full of special shots, because ‘the devil doesn’t 
have to have all the good tunes’. Audiences by now had been exposed to ‘sophisticated 
techniques used – and abused’ in film, TV, newspapers and other mass-communications 
media. The Office of the President therefore hired a British director, Terry Bishop. 
In the opening scene, audiences saw a plane flying over the Volta River followed by a 
scene of the slave forts of Elmina, Cape Coast, and Christiansborg where despite slavery the 
‘way of life of the people remained intact’. The ‘African Personality’ was further presented as 
one of the three sources of Ghana’s wealth besides gold and cacao as well as a source of 
happiness, underscored by the Highlife music playing in the background. The final part of the 
film transported audiences to a university where students critically engaged with their 
lecturer, amidst a school building that was still under construction – showing a ‘willingness to 
innovate’. Other housing projects were shown with children staring at them in awe: ‘So much 
achieved, in so short a time!’920 The film signalled in a very explicit way that other African 
countries should follow the modern nation of Ghana.921 
In the meantime, the French on the ground began to pay more attention to publicity. In 
defiance of Paris, where officials considered French cultural assistance as a development tool, 
local officers also tried to use French cultural assistance as a way to acquire influence and 
control. When Radio Ghana started emissions in French, France concluded a technical 
assistance agreement so they could provide Accra with a French radio expert. In that way 
France wanted to retain some control over what was being broadcast. The governments of the 
UAM were also assisted in the setup of radio education. At the same time a 30-minute radio 
919 Booklet, “They Wanted Freedom: Life Stories and Legends of West Africans, Americans and others who 
served their Peoples”, [1964], Washburn, Abbott: Papers, 1938-2003, Box 104, f: USIA (8), NARA. 
920 Script, Terry Bishop, “The Ghananaians: Masterscene Script written by Terry Bishop for the Ghana Film 
Industry Corporation”, [1963], RG. 17/2/48 Miscellaneous 1956-1965, PRAAD-Accra; E.K. Okoh to Dr. Conor 
Cruise O’Brien, 1 November 1963, RG. 17/2/256 Correspondence, PRAAD-Accra. 
921 E.K. Okoh to Dr. Conor Cruise O’Brien, 1 November 1963, RG. 17/2/256 Correspondence, PRAAD-Accra. 
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package was sent to the radio stations in French Africa, tailored to what radio listeners had 
asked their radio stations to inform them about, ranging from international news to sports.922  
In the sixties, the French suddenly started to pay attention to the comfort of filmgoers in 
French theatres because they noticed that the comfortable and spacious theatres in which the 
Americans offered high quality colour film attracted many of customers and therefore had a 
big propaganda value. Jean Desparmet wanted to form a clientèle for the post and make the 
public relations effort permanent, a term that returned throughout his correspondence with 
Paris.923 The French in Kenya also decided to cancel the viewing of commercial French films 
because it was estimated that the African public would not appreciate those movies and 
started looking for more popular films. For the first time, French officers wanted to know 
what their African target audience preferred. Paul Tate, cultural attaché in the French 
Embassy of Accra, deliberately stayed in a second-rate hotel that was often frequented by 
Africans to make contact with them.924 
The British Council concentrated on the distribution of books to improve the British PR 
image. This turned the cheap book programme into an area of competition. When the BC 
officer, Paul Sinker, drove Barbara Ward, an anthropologist on Africa and one of Kennedy’s 
advisers, to the airport he therefore impressed upon her that American assistance was 
unnecessary. The British Council was more than qualified to handle the big demand for 
teachers and teacher trainers, and the liaison with teachers and books.925 The increase of 
books for Africa under Murrow in 1962, however, was less aimed at publicity and had to 
support the modernisation process. He asked for books in English, and more importantly in 
French, to communicate what modernity meant.926  
Nonetheless, the renewed emphasis on the demonstration effect for the Americans did 
not mean that public diplomats had lost sight of the possible PR advantages for the American 
image. Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Carl Rowan, for instance, wanted to offer 
922 Letter, Grousset to Couve de Murville, [1961], Ghana 1960-1965, 50QO/34, AMAE; Report, “Note sur 
l’activité de la société en 1961”, [1961],  Ministère de la Coopération, Direction de la coopération technique et 
culturelle, 19780282/14, CHAN. 
923 ‘[F]ormer une sorte de ‘clientèle’ du poste’, see Jean Desparmet, “Mission d’étude des moyens d’information 
français en Afrique centrale et orientale”, 6 May 1964, 33, DAL, Nord Est Afrique 1960-1965, 35QO/8, AMAE. 
924 Letter, Guiringaud to DAL, “Information Politique”, 14 May 1960, 2,  Report, Stephane Golmann, “Report de 
Mission Effectue Par Monsieur Stephane Golmann Pour le Compte de La Direction Generale Des Affaires 
Culturelles et Techniques du Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres Du Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres Francaises au 
Ghana”, 31 December 1960, 8, DAL, Ghana 1960-1965, 50QO/72, AMAE. 
925 Brief, “Heads of Mission Conference”, [1963], BW 93/7, TNA; Journal Entry, Barbara Ward, “African 
Journal October 10th – December 7th 1963”, 10 October 1963, Barbara Ward Papers, Box 6, f: 34 Naval War 
College Papers: Problems of Communism, Georgetown University Library. 
926 Draft, Peter L. Koffsky, “The United States Information Program in Africa, 1945-1970: A History & 
Interpretation”, 2-1, RG. 306, A1 1072, Box 9, f: African Program, Historical Background 1970, NARA. 
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assistance mainly on a person-to-person basis, because it was more difficult for an African 
student or businessman to go home and show a ‘lack of gratitude’ towards an individual than 
towards an organisation.927  
In short, what the Americans saw as the demonstration effect was interpreted in Ghana 
as an attempt at intrusion and by the French and British as a competing propaganda stunt. 
What had been cultural assistance in the 1950s, now became a weapon in the Ghanaian 
perception. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
927 Confidential, memorandum for the president, Carl T. Rowan, “Subject: An Analysis of the Press in Africa”, 
24 March 1961, RG. 306, P 249, f: Press in Africa [Folder ½], NARA. 
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Illustration 24: Comic book that presents American values of freedom and democracy as part of ancient African 
history. Source: Booklet, “They Wanted Freedom: Life Stories and Legends of West Africans, Americans and 
others who served their Peoples”, [1963], Washburn, Abbott: Papers, 1938-2003, Box 104, f: USIA (8), NARA. 
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Conclusion: Modernity and Neocolonial Intrusion 
 
The exchanges between Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Kenyatta represent some of the most 
intriguing artefacts from the archives. Their correspondence elucidates how inter-African 
conflict about national borders, and the strategy to create African unity, motivated Nkrumah 
to choose a more emotional form of propaganda, a course of action that ultimately weakened 
his international position. After 1960 he began to voice his disappointment about pan-
Africanism while at the same time he proposed African unity as a solution, which some have 
seen as the sign of an irrational obsession. In fact, for Nkrumah this sort of plea was a tactic to 
mobilise the majority of the population behind his plan for direct unification. Nkrumah 
believed that leaders who questioned his approach had become subjected to teleguidance, the 
victim of French and British manipulation. Therefore African peoples rather than leaders had 
to be counted on to reach African unity.928  
The Americans at USIS posts and the State Department failed to understand Ghana’s 
new strategy. Nkrumah’s impassioned propaganda campaign validated what modernisation 
experts such as Rostow had been saying: vocal anticolonialism was a form of frustration that 
came with the modernisation process, a call to intervene and manage that process. All the 
while the UK and France sat on the sidelines and produced propaganda as a substitute for real 
influence. Ironically, they had learned many of their public relations techniques from USIS 
officers, who after 1961 became less interested in propaganda battles and more interested in 
demonstrating the effects of modernisation. 
The US and Ghana thus had diametrically opposing views on what public diplomacy 
was supposed to achieve. The Ghanaian attempt to warn Africans of the machinations of 
neocolonialism, and ‘immunise’ them from this threat, was interpreted in the US as a 
disturbance in the ongoing modernisation process. It prompted the Americans to intervene 
more rather than less. Nkrumah’s ‘Revolutionary Journalism’ was in the American analysis 
the result of an ‘information vacuum’ created by the departure of the colonial administrators. 
Conversely the demonstration effect, embraced by the Americans to enhance modernisation, 
was interpreted in Ghana as an attempt to intrude upon the ‘African Personality’.  
On a continent that was preoccupied with African cultural uniqueness and embroiled in 
debates about militant pan-Africanism, cultural centres became battlegrounds and cultural 
928 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah. Vision and Tragedy, 320; In 1963 Nkrumah realised what the House of Foreign 
Relations Committee would conclude in a 1964 report: ‘Certain foreign policy objectives can be pursued by 
dealing directly with the people of foreign countries […] Through the use of modern instruments […] of 
communications’, see Osgood, Total Cold War, 4. 
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officers carried dangerous ideas. In an international environment obsessed with economic aid 
and socio-economic modernisation, Nkrumah’s choice for emotional propaganda and radio 
trottoir – with its fake telegrams, cartoons and rumours – marginalised pan-Africanism as an 
irrational political project. Modest changes in day-to-day public diplomacy tactics, aimed at 
creating a more positive attitude, actually increased tensions and deepened the animosity 
between Ghana and the US. 
Nonetheless, in an African context where ideas were mistrusted, but aid welcomed, the 
superpowers had a competitive advantage. Rather than propagating their input like the British 
did, or branding technical aid as conspicuously French – analysed in chapter 7 – the US and 
the USSR went to great lengths to present their aid as the best and only road to modernity.  
The superpowers believed and convinced African governments that their assistance 
programmes were a matter of technocratic efficacy not of ideology. Leaders like Nkrumah 
believed they could safely accept aid as long as they kept ideas out. 
However, in a world where aid had become an ideologically charged weapon of the 
Cold War, the principles of a donor could not be separated from the assistance he offered. By 
1963, Nkrumah’s highly emotional discourse on the ‘African Personality’ sounded out of 
touch to officials in Africa, Europe and the United States in a world where power came to 
those who could offer a rational, technocratic solution to social problems. It is this 
fundamental historical shift that will be discussed in the conclusion. 
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Conclusion  
 
How Postcolonial Sub-Saharan Africa became a Cold War Battle Ground 
 
  
The history of the ideological scramble for Africa is built on two claims: the importance of 
African agency and the multi-centric nature of change in African international history after 
1945. Developments in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1950s and 1960s were never directly the 
result of a Cold War dynamic in which the competition between East and West limited the 
African space to act. The Cold War was the backdrop of a more immediate confrontation 
between French, British, American, and Ghanaian public diplomats. Specifically, Ghanaian 
decision-making was motivated in more direct ways by inter-African conflict about the shape 
of African unity. At the same time the disagreements among the NATO allies about the future 
of colonialism determined what the public diplomacy strategy looked like.  
Yet many African scholars929 and Africanists930 argue that it was the Cold War that 
limited Nkrumah’s space to speak from a position of nonalignment. It is assumed that the 
bipolar struggle forced the Ghanaian leader to take the so-called real balance of power into 
account. Instead of articulating a utopian programme for African unity, Nkrumah had to 
concentrate on Ghana’s survival – leading him to seek rapprochement with the USSR. 
Conversely, international historians stress that anticolonial leaders skilfully exploited the 
East-West competition to extract gains. At the same time it is stressed that when this strategy 
was executed poorly – Lumumba being an often-quoted example – it would open the door to 
the disruption and violence that came with the clash of Cold War ideologies and superpower 
interventions.931 This thesis, on the contrary, argues that Nkrumah was not simply a realist 
who played off the Cold War superpowers against each other, but someone who had an 
ideological plan – African unity – that required him to keep the Cold War out. 
Still, from 1964 onwards – when the Cubans landed in Guinea-Bissau to aid Amílcar 
Cabral – Africa was drawn into the zero-sum game of alliances and proxy wars, characteristic 
of the global south in the 1970s.932 What needs explaining then is how a continent captivated 
929 Rahman, The Regime Change of Kwame Nkrumah, xiii. 
930 The best examples are Allman, “Nuclear Imperialism and the Pan-African Struggle for Peace and Freedom”, 
83; Ahlman, “The Algerian Question in Nkrumah’s Ghana, 1958–1960”, 69. 
931 Jason Parker, “Decolonization, the Cold War, and the Post-Columbian Era”, in The Cold War in the Third 
World, ed. Robert J McMahon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 131; Westad, The Global Cold War, 
137–139. 
932 Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2002), 185; Piero Gleijeses, The Cuban Drumbeat: Castro’s Worldview, Cuban Foreign 
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by postcolonial problems and pan-African beginnings became an arena of the Cold War from 
the mid-1960s onwards, particularly when the first generation of African leaders – to which 
Nkrumah belonged – had been so wary of outside intervention. A conclusive answer to this 
question cannot be given here: the relation between African decolonisation and the Cold War 
is infinitely more complex and requires an integrated analysis of the so-called ‘Second 
Liberation’ of the 1970s in Portuguese and Southern Africa. 
Nevertheless, the research presented here suggests that a more modest approach can 
provide the first fragments of an answer if we ask the same question from an Africa-centred 
standpoint, namely why was pan-Africanism overtaken by the Cold War? More concretely: 
why did pan-Africanism fail to become a fully developed interventionist ideology, capable of 
rivalling communist and capitalist proscriptions for African development? The key to 
answering that question lies in the Congo crisis when international discourses on progress 
shifted from psychological to socio-economic modernisation, which created a situation in 
which Ghanaian, American, French and British misperceptions of each other’s plans were 
reinforced.  
The Congo crisis and the independence wave of 1960 were the turning points in this 
history, but not because the continent became the arena of Cold War conflict. American, 
French, British, and Ghanaian decision making during the Congo crisis was not simply a 
response to the Soviet threat. More importantly, the atrocities in Leopoldville signalled to 
Western public diplomats that so-called ‘African minds’ could not be developed into the 
modern mindset. Therefore Western leaders turned to aid-grants to spur the modernisation of 
African societies and maintain a degree of influence. The new importance of economic aid 
after 1960 – further stimulated by the missionary zeal of Kennedy’s national security adviser, 
Walt Rostow – not only made economics the moral issue at the heart of international 
politics,933 but also turned Nkrumah’s vocal pan-Africanism into an irrational and unpractical 
set of ideas, incompatible with the Western norms of modernity and rationality. Moreover, 
like other African leaders, Nkrumah believed he could accept foreign aid as long as he kept 
ideas out and vocally promoted his project for African unity, while the Cold War powers and 
the colonial powers assumed that the acceptance of aid implied the approval of their ideas.  
This argument of mutually reinforced misperception is built upon three key conclusions 
that surface from the history that is presented here. First and foremost, it is argued here that 
Policy in a Hostile World (Salt Lake City: Seagull Books, 2009), 16–24; Westad, The Global Cold War, 211–
212. 
933 Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire, 427; Byrne, “Our Own Special Brand of Socialism”, 427. 
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Ghanaian diplomats between 1953 and 1963 operated in an environment that was determined 
less by the Cold War and more by what the NSC aptly termed a set of ‘contradictory forces’, 
which included pan-Arabism, pan-Africanism, nationalism and Négritude, in addition to 
France and Britiain’s new liberal notions of empire and development.934 In that setting, public 
diplomacy turned into an instrument of development, not a tool to fight a Cold War battle of 
words.  
Secondly, public diplomats on the ground adopted and adapted each other’s successful 
techniques, which led to educational programmes and information campaigns that were 
surprisingly hybrid and cross-national. At the same time, however, diverging opinions of the 
power of culture – how exactly public diplomats thought that their operation would create 
influence – became the single most important factor shaping the relationships between public 
diplomats. For Americans, cultural centres after 1960 became a space to present the 
advantages of modernisation. They believed it would stimulate a desire to become more 
modern. Nkrumah, however, felt African audiences had to be sheltered from those ideas, 
which would only diminish African self-confidence and undermine his pan-African project. 
The French and British used cultural centres to play up their efforts as aid providers. In short, 
while all actors agreed African societies needed to be modernised, diverse views on how 
public diplomacy affected African attitudes determined if public diplomats saw each other as 
allies or enemies. 
These two arguments about the strategic aims and techniques of public diplomacy are 
sustained by a sense that the chronology of Western policies in Africa needs to be refined, 
which is the third claim put forward here. Modernisation theory was not only Kennedy’s 
signature policy and hailed by the French and British as an alternative to colonial 
development schemes in the 1960s. In the 1950s the belief that the so-called ‘native mind’ or 
‘native personality’ could be remade by modernising ‘minds’ through education, remained the 
widely accepted form of engagement with so-called underdeveloped peoples, in an 
international system that was still shaped by imperial thought.935 It is argued here that the 
934 NSC paper, S. Everett Gleason acting executive secretary to government agencies, “U.S. policy toward Africa 
South of the Sahara Prior to Calendar Year 1960”, 26 August 1958, 4, WH Office, NSC Series, Policy Papers 
Subseries, Box 25, Folder: NSC 5818 Africa South of the Sahara, DDEL; Robert Murphy, made the same point 
in the tripartite talks with the UK and France on 16 April 1959: ‘The Africans were on the whole immature and 
unsophisticated and were subject to many pressures – Communist, Pan-African, Islamic – all of which made it 
difficult for those African leaders who were Western minded to keep their followers on the right path’, see Secret 
record, “Summary Record of the first meeting at Ambassadorial level held on April 16”, 16 April 1959, 2, FO 
371/137966, TNA. 
935 Mark Mazower has argued that British imperial thought provided an important contribution to the formation 
of the United Nations, see Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, 13. 
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independence wave of 1960 opened the door to socio-economic schemes of modernisation 
that targeted societies rather than mentalities. This paradigm shift in thinking about 
development and international relations provides the essential backdrop to many of the policy 
decisions concerning Africa. 
How these three key insights about the international environment, as well as the aims 
and techniques of public diplomats in Africa and the specific views on modernisation, 
influenced the scramble is discussed here. Further, while the thesis does not principally 
address the issue of deep causation, a multi-centric history of public diplomacy cannot avoid 
addressing the question of how interstate competition and cooperation modified national 
strategies and techniques and how these changes propelled the ideological scramble forward. 
In the final paragraph, the relationship between pan-Africanism and the Cold War will be 
assessed. But first, the impact of shifting ideas of modernisation and African agency upon 
public diplomacy strategies will be addressed.  
  
A Multi-centric History of Public Diplomacy 
 
Ghanaians and other anticolonial statesmen shaped Western decisions at every critical stage in 
counterintuitive ways. A firm goodbye from Nkrumah’s mouth sounded like a call for help to 
Western ears. The small-scale disturbances in Africa after the war, for instance, were seen as 
the result of too little information and cultural assistance. The Accra riots of 1948 led the 
British to look for new ways to clarify their colonial policy as the French tried to restrict the 
number of USIS posts in Africa. Eisenhower believed colonialism was on the way out and 
therefore wanted to prepare leaders for the responsibilities of self-government, which rejects 
the argument that the American president wanted to avoid Africa as much as possible or 
sacrificed the legitimate drive for independence in light of the Cold War. 
At the Bandung Conference of 1955, the leaders of newly independent nations wanted 
to debunk the myth of the civilising mission that they were unable to manage their own affairs 
or act independently in international relations. In their speeches Nehru and others further 
accused the colonial powers of promising development but delivering destruction. Asian 
leaders therefore committed to offering African colonies aid, to speed up their march to 
independence. Historians have ignored Bandung’s developmental aspirations and have 
therefore concluded that the West had no response to the meetings. They overlook how the 
critique of botched Western-led development led the West to improve its schemes of cultural 
assistance and aid. Paradoxically, Bandung did not lead the colonial powers to a ‘hurried 
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scuttle’ – as Churchill suggested, but compelled them to deepen their commitment to the 
colonial project.936 Likewise, Nasser’s assertive nationalism, in the course of the Suez crisis of 
1956, made Eisenhower no less reluctant to intervene. It only stressed the need to separate 
American aid from the French and British efforts.  
Furthermore, Ghanaian independence in 1957 and the tumultuous decolonisation of 
Guinea in 1958 did not affect the faith in a guided transition that was held by de Gaulle, 
Lennox-Boyd, and Eisenhower, who maintained that African leaders needed to be prepared 
for the responsibilities of independence. Public diplomats on the ground therefore did not 
begin a war of words to counter the strident anticolonial propaganda they were faced with. 
Instead they looked for ways to better showcase their aid. The fact that African target 
audiences did not attend the activities of the cultural centres did not signal a rejection of 
Western led-modernisation; it indicated that the aid on offer had to be showcased in a better 
way. 
Similarly, when the Congo crisis and the propaganda campaign against the Sahara bomb 
brought to the fore Africans who violently rejected colonial guidance, the Americans, British 
and French could only see the failure of their psychological approach to development. 
Consequently, socio-economic structures became the target of development projects. When 
Nkrumah shifted to a more emotional form of propaganda to draw African peoples into his 
project for African unity, he was seen in the West as someone who was frustrated, an attitude 
brought about by the tensions of the modernisation process. Conversely, Nkrumah believed he 
could protect his populations from foreign ideas and yet still accept economic aid, a 
miscalculation on his part. 
 
 
Modernity and African Agency: between African and Western International Perceptions  
 
Explaining this recurring disconnection between African and Western ideas is difficult 
because, even fifty years later, the hold on the imagination of the ‘year of Africa’, 1960, as 
well as Kennedy’s mission to modernise the Third World through foreign aid is still strong. It 
requires us to attend to African agency and the changing nature of modernisation theory.  
First, the African nationalist diplomats who suddenly appeared at the UN might have 
enjoyed prestige on the continent but they were not taken seriously by the West – who could 
not conceive of non-whites as diplomats with proper foreign policy objectives of their own.937 
936 Churchill uttered these words in the context of the decolonisation of India, see Toye, Churchill’s Empire, 272. 
937 The African prestige in the UN is emphasised by Irwin, Gordian Knot, 9. 
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In March 1960, for instance, de Gaulle and the British ambassador in Paris mocked the 
‘eccentricities’ of the Afro-Asian members whose presence made the UN useless.938 
A second, less tangible, but more profound development was the transition from a 
psychological brand of modernisation to a socio-economic conception of modernisation, 
which divides the scramble into two periods. In the 1950s, the belief that the so-called 
‘African man’ could be remade by developing him into the modern mindset through education 
remained influential. The independence wave of 1960, however, opened the door to socio-
economic schemes of modernisation that targeted societies rather than mentalities. The 
theorists behind psychological modernisation became discredited because of their share in the 
oppression in Algeria and Kenya. However, the atrocities in the Congo showed Western 
public diplomats that psychological modernisation had failed. Instead, the switch was made to 
socio-economic modernisation.939  
The transition from psychological to socio-economic modernisation, and the diverging 
views about the extent to which African diplomats were able to act independently on the 
international stage, directly influenced Africa’s position in the world. 
 
 
Revising National Historiographies: Entangled Public Diplomacy 
 
The emergence of Eisenhower and Nkrumah as key protagonists in Africa not only undercuts 
longstanding views in the literature of a president who only took ad-hoc decisions and an 
African nationalist leader who zigzagged between the Cold War superpowers. What is also 
brought into focus is how difficult it was for the French and the British to rethink the logic of 
what had been archetypal instruments of the civilising mission: education and information. In 
the 1950s, the colonial powers found themselves being forced to offer cultural assistance to 
keep up with Ghanaian ideological training schemes and the efforts of the American 
International Cooperation Administration (ICA). In spite of a persistent decolonisation 
narrative that presents decolonisation as a planned enterprise, the colonial powers were never 
able to plan the relinquishment of their colonial responsibilities.  
Under the impulse of Leopold Senghor, French cultural influence was projected to 
British Africa after the Bandung Conference of 1955. The violent counterinsurgency 
measures in Algeria discredited France on the international stage and French attention had to 
be redirected towards increasing the welfare of Africans who could benefit from learning the 
938 Letter, Jebb Gladwyn to Selwyn Lloyd, 2 March 1960, PREM 11/2888, TNA. 
939 Gilman, Mandarins of the Future, 11. 
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French langue. For France, assistance was not about creating and selling an image of French 
grandeur. In a comparative perspective, it becomes clear that cultural assistance was about 
striking a deal: French cultural aid was offered in exchange for support of de Gaulle’s 
international stance.940 French cultural diplomacy has been characterised as schizophrenic and 
contradictory, because doubts about the status of French culture coexisted alongside the belief 
in the superiority and universality of French culture.941  
Yet, French operatives constantly doubted the way in which French culture was offered, 
French culture itself was never questioned. If Africans did not come to their cultural centres, 
the French reasoned, there had to be something wrong with the way France presented what it 
had to offer. To reach more people, the French ambassador to Ghana, Louis de Guiringaud, 
started imitating the PR methods of his competitors from 1958 onwards, much to the dismay 
of de Gaulle and his prime minister, Michel Debré. Admittedly, the French plan for cultural 
expansion of 1959 allowed for a more political use of French culture but this did not mean 
that French culture would be promoted. Instead, cultural resources were more consciously 
granted to those countries that were expected to remain closely allied with France, particularly 
after 1960. 
From the moment the UK organised elections in its colony of the Gold Coast in 1951, 
the British believed that the dismantlement of old imperial structures would earn them enough 
respect to maintain their influence on the continent. Accordingly, a propaganda campaign in 
defence of the British Empire was considered to be unnecessary. Instead the radio and press 
infrastructure of the territories was developed to produce stability and gratitude. After the 
Bandung Conference of 1955, the British government increased the funding for the British 
Council, an institution that had been founded in 1934 to organise British education and 
cultural activities abroad. When in 1958 Guinea became independent, the British began to 
disseminate the notion that they were committed to a guided decolonisation process together 
with the French.  
After the French atomic bomb and the Congo crisis, however, Macmillan realised that 
colonialism could no longer be sold as a benevolent enterprise. Instead, UK cultural assistance 
began to pay lip service to the aims of African unity. English teaching in French Africa for 
instance was presented as a way to foster integration between British and French speaking 
Africa.  
940 Rice, “Cowboys and Communists.” 
941 Dubosclard, L’action artistique de la France aux États-Unis, 1915-1969, 350–351; Dueck, The Claims of 
Culture at Empire’s End, 138; Trimbur et al., Entre rayonnement et réciprocité, 15–24. 
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The British information operation outside of Europe did not fail because it focused too 
much on Cold War themes and ignored local realities;942 rather, the lack of success has to be 
attributed to the illusion that British aims and pan-African aspirations could be connected. By 
1961, the French and the Americans also believed they could jump on the pan-African 
bandwagon and transform anticolonial nationalism into something less hostile. Statesmen like 
Nasser or Ben Bella, who consciously exploited the Cold War for their own gain, found the 
company of their Western counterparts who in turn tried to extract gains from anticolonial 
internationalism, but presented themselves as primary providers of aid.  
That anticolonial project was most eloquently defended by Nkrumah, who remained 
steadfastly neutral in the Cold War, even after Lumumba’s assassination and the emergence 
of a group at the Belgrade Conference that prioritised economic and political gain over the 
Third World project that sought to create a more equal international system. He believed this 
was the only way to shield the continent from the icy winds of the Cold War. Moreover, his 
emotional call for African unity, while political support from other African leaders 
diminished, was not the result of an irrational obsession. On the contrary, in the symbolic 
fight that decolonisation had become, his belief in the ability of propaganda to rouse the 
African leaders, and later the African peoples, in support of pan-Africanism was a reasonable 
choice.  
The thesis further demonstrates that Eisenhower had a coherent strategy for Africa that 
was built on education and optimism about the abilities of the African to learn and apply 
American ideas. By contrast Kennedy, who was wary of public opinion and let his aides do 
most of the work, was pessimistic about the African ability to behave rationally and comply 
with international norms. For those in the White House after 1960, anticolonialism was a 
sentiment expressed by nationalist leaders who felt frustrated by the slow pace of progress 
and who harboured resentment towards the colonisers and the US. Public diplomats had to 
manage those feelings through an integrated counterinsurgency campaign. The perspective of 
the ideological scramble reverses a persistent perception of a sclerotic Eisenhower presidency 
and the dynamic Kennedy administration. In the paternalistic mindset of the 1950s and 1960s, 
Eisenhower actually gave Africans more credit than Kennedy ever would.  
 
 
 
942 Vaughan makes this argument about the failure due to an inappropriate connection with the Cold War in 
Vaughan, The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-57, 247. 
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The ‘African’ as a Security Concern: Foreign Aid, Strong Men and the American Liberal 
World Order 
 
All these separate public diplomacy strategies were driven by a common concern about the 
developmental state of formerly colonised peoples and what independence would mean for 
the international system. It was not racial war, but denied opportunities for progress that 
became the key issue in the position of the African continent within the international 
system.943 Taking Eisenhower’s commitment to cultural assistance as well as Kennedy’s 
critical attitude towards public diplomacy and anticolonial aspirations into account, forces a 
revision of longstanding claims in the literature about US engagement with the developing 
world – especially in the area of economic aid, but also in the use of more coercive means, 
authoritarian rule and counterinsurgency. The conviction that Africans needed cultural 
assistance profoundly influenced the strategy of the preeminent power in the international 
system of the 1950s and 1960s: the United States. 
The fact that economic aid in real numbers remained low under Eisenhower, even 
though he vocally supported aid programmes in the Third World, was rooted in the 
president’s belief that foreign aid could only be effective in unison with educational and 
information assistance. His support of authoritarian leaders is often cited as evidence that the 
American president saw Africans as incapable of understanding democracy. However he was 
hesitant about that support, as he maintained that long-term stability could only be achieved 
by educating leaders how to organise a democratic society. He approved a practice whereby 
American training programmes for the military forces were complemented by a civic 
education programme that was meant to transfer American democratic leadership skills.  
Conversely, the question of whether Kennedy’s economic assistance was in essence 
about furthering long-term humanitarian goals or attaining political goals was within the 
administration itself overtaken by a discussion about the transformational potential of foreign 
aid. Realists and idealists alike believed they had to manage the adverse psychological effects 
that foreign aid could create. The modernisation of societies, it was believed, introduced 
emotional tension and could exacerbate the state of postcolonial frustration if the hopes and 
needs of the African were not matched with sufficient amounts of aid. 
Kennedy therefore authorised the development of counterinsurgency programmes not 
only ‘to defend against communist rebellions in friendly, impoverished countries’,944 but, 
943 Connelly, “Taking Off the Cold War Lens”, 765; Connelly suggests that Eisenhower, de Gaulle and even 
Kennedy all feared the North-South conflict, but overlooks the optimism that characterised calmer periods. 
944 Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World, xxi. 
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more importantly, to cushion the blow of its own modernisation efforts. By demonstrating the 
positive effects of modernisation, the USIA had to prevent the frustrations from becoming 
violent and avoid insurgency. Kennedy’s commitment to modernisation theory thus also 
comprised the fear of a modernisation process turned sour, which historians tend to 
disregard.945   
 
 
‘Drivers’ behind the Scramble 
 
As C.A. Bayly writes in his classic The Birth of the Modern World,946 most historians want to 
know why things changed. The question is difficult because drivers of change are often the 
result of a complex interplay of factors. Nonetheless, the question is pressing in a multi-
centric history of public diplomacy that presents African leaders as independent actors on the 
international stage and at the same time acknowledges the limits of their success. Nonetheless 
the Western states were not the ‘prime movers’ of this story. What sustained the competition 
was the complex interaction between, on the one hand, policy makers who assigned a 
particular role to public diplomacy within their Africa strategy and, on the other hand, public 
diplomats on the ground who had their own ideas about the power of culture and what public 
diplomacy could achieve. It is these two drivers on a high level and a lower level that are 
addressed here. 
  
 
The First Catalyst of the Scramble: The Power of Culture  
 
The scramble accelerated when public diplomats in one office noticed they had been deceived 
by colleagues from other countries that were active in Africa or, even worse, when local 
officers felt they had underestimated the effect of a competitor’s propaganda on the African 
target audience. The settlers provide us with the clearest example. The settler government and 
the Colonial Office believed that information could only be effective if it was clearly 
explained, thus they considered the American operation in Kenya to be harmless and even 
useful as an extra provider of aid. When the USIA shifted to personal contacts with the 
African population after 1958, the settlers began to complain because they felt it could give 
945 Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World; Irwin, “The Gordian Knot”; Dallek, An Unfinished 
Life; Grubbs, Secular Missionaries, 1–18; Westad, The Global Cold War. 
946 C. A Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 5. 
                                              
C o n c l u s i o n  | 301 
 
Africans an inflated sense of self-worth, and have destabilising effects on the attitudes of the 
African population.947 
Thus the prominent presence of the US and Ghana did not imply a preponderant amount 
of ‘soft power’ in Africa. An examination of the propaganda techniques reveals that the 
perception of American power or Ghanaian influence was often determined by external 
factors: the medium employed or the alleged inability of the African target audience to 
understand the messages they received. The supposed lack of expertise on the ‘African mind’ 
among the ranks of competing public diplomacy services exacerbated the situation because 
those operatives underestimated the adverse effects of their actions for the development of the 
Africans. Neither the French nor the settlers were happy with the personal approach of the 
USIS officers, because – allegedly – it inflated the sense of African self-worth. 
For the British and the French, Africans in the 1950s were only socio-economic 
subjects, while the American outlook presented Africans as potential political agents. When 
public diplomats on the ground came to see the so-called ‘native mind’ or ‘native personality’ 
as a threat to international security they acted upon it by setting up educational projects that 
would foster democratic citizenship. Because neither the British nor the settlers believed the 
‘African mind’ to be suited to western organisational models, they welcomed USIS projects 
as development assistance. The French held comparable views, but considered education to be 
the source of their colonial power and therefore thought the Americans wanted to erode the 
basis of French influence.  
After the Bandung Conference of 1955, Western public diplomats believed they could 
maintain their influence by offering better quality assistance. However, the preferences of 
African target populations were not taken into account; this oversight turned out to be a 
mistake. At Ghanaian independence it dawned on Western diplomats that they had to 
showcase their assistance if they wanted to be noticed among an oversupply of plans for 
Africa. Because the question of how to attract African target audiences had hardly ever been 
posed, public diplomats began to adopt and adapt the techniques that had made their 
competitors successful. The French ambassador to Ghana, Louis de Guiringaud, became a 
particularly eager student of propaganda techniques, ploughing through stacks of periodical 
and Ghanaian propaganda leaflets.  
What becomes apparent when looking at the exchange of different public diplomacy 
techniques among public diplomats on the ground is that not only were the Western means of 
947 Secret letter, E Barring to Carstairs, 19 April 1958, FCO 141/6731, TNA. 
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communication adopted by anticolonial activists, such as the Algerians, but the reverse was 
also the case: Ghanaian propaganda techniques became a source of inspiration for Western 
public diplomats. There was no binary opposition between a homogenous coloniser and a 
powerless mass of subjects, as Edward Saïd claims.948 So-called ‘Western’ and ‘Oriental’ 
actors borrowed and re-invented methods to attain influence in a global and intercultural war 
for the soul of the new Africa.  
More important was the divide between the high-level policy makers and the public 
diplomats on the ground, who were forced to make it up as they went along. In light of the 
situation in Guinea in 1958, USIS officers urged their chiefs to pay more attention to the 
threat coming from the ‘high impact’ type projects of Soviet development, while the 
conferences of British information officers decided that radio and printing presses should only 
be offered if the UK would be able to monitor and guide the messages that were produced 
with these communication means. Undoubtedly the most striking example of this tension 
between the higher and lower level was the confrontation between the old style of de Gaulle 
and the PR approach of Guiringaud. While both man believed in the value of the French 
language as a development tool, Guiringaud realised that he had to court Africans instead of 
assuming their interest in French initiatives. Eventually, however, higher levels came around 
to the PR way of thinking, elucidating how little planning mattered in a constantly evolving 
situation where improvisation and constant recalibration were the only appropriate response.  
In the 1960s, new ideas about the African attitude and mental state emerged. For the US 
that attitude was a potential liability to the modernisation of societies, because the transition 
from tradition to modernity introduced emotional tensions. Conversely, Nkrumah believed 
that Africans were susceptible to anticolonial propaganda and needed to be immunised against 
it or sheltered from it. What Rostow therefore saw as the demonstration effect, whereby the 
advantages of modernity were exhibited, was perceived by Nkrumah as an attempt to infiltrate 
society ideologically.  
The fact that the Kennedy administration never believed in education as a means to 
jumpstart modernisation allowed the British and the French to use the educational aspirations 
among young people to strengthen their image as the providers of development. The 
diverging conceptions of how economic aid affected African attitudes created more problems. 
While the Americans wanted to downplay the possible effects of their aid programme to limit 
948 Dueck, The Claims of Culture at Empire’s End, 148; Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, 4; Edward W. Saïd, 
Orientalism (London: Routledge, 1978). 
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the possibility of disappointment and frustration, the UK and France wanted to promote their 
efforts, making cooperation in the area of aid impossible. 
The complaints about the intrusiveness of American culture, the outcry about 
neocolonialism or the loathing of anticolonial propaganda – which all emerged at one point or 
another during the scramble – were the outcome of the diverging beliefs held about the power 
of cultural intervention. The single most important factor shaping relations on the ground in 
Africa was therefore not the Cold War, but opposing conceptions of the power of culture, and 
how exactly public diplomats thought that their operation would create influence. 
 
 
The Second Catalyst of the Scramble: Alliances Rooted in Misunderstanding 
 
The scramble was accelerated not only by conflicting ideas about the power of culture, but 
also by broken promises and rude awakenings. Africa’s relative isolation from the Cold War 
allowed for different and unexpected alliances that went beyond East-West and North-South 
divides. Often these coalitions unravelled as quickly as they had come about, because they 
were built on a host of misunderstanding about aims and techniques.  
The most famous example is the break between Eisenhower and his NATO allies after 
the Suez crisis of 1956. Eisenhower and Dulles understood after 1956 that the colonial powers 
were not interested in preparing African peoples, or other ‘emerging’ nations for that matter, 
for a stable transition. Before Suez, both men had been convinced that they shared a 
commitment to fostering self-government while writing Churchill and Mendès-France. 
Eisenhower regained some confidence when he saw how de Gaulle engaged Algeria and 
Africa in 1958, using a formula similar to Eisenhower’s mix of cultural assistance and 
cautious foreign aid.949 Nonetheless, the point Dulles made in 1956 remained valid: colonial 
control had to be opposed if the US wanted to end up on the right side of history.950 
In 1961 Nkrumah and Kennedy became each other’s allies because both men believed 
they shared in the belief that anticolonialism and nonalignment were essential determinants of 
Africa’s postcolonial condition. However, for Nkrumah anticolonialism was a way to resist 
intervention, a Monroe doctrine for Africa. By contrast, Kennedy saw anticolonialism as a 
form of frustration brought about by years of oppression and kindled by the momentous 
changes of the modernisation process. His positive approach to Non-Alignment therefore 
949 ‘Thus it was that those nations that elected to take the route to independence via the French Community did 
so with relative smoothness’, see Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 572. 
950 Memorandum of Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of the NSC, November 1, 1956, AWF, NSC Series, f: 302nd 
Meeting of the NSC, DDEL. 
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meant exactly that: turning frustrated and passive behaviour into a rational can do attitude for 
development, a call for action. Their alliance was thus bound to fail. While there was a 
difference between the Non-Aligned Project, nonalignment and neutralism and the Kennedy 
administration recognised the difference tactically, in reality many of these movements were 
conflated as the manifestation of frustration.951  
The British stubbornly stuck to the illusion that their organised relinquishment of 
colonial responsibility had earned them ‘goodwill’. Even when agents of the Ghanaian Bureau 
of African Affairs were caught in Kenya with subversive propaganda material in their bags 
and Ghanaian money in their pockets, the information officers still believed they could do 
business with Nkrumah. After 1960 they even believed British aims for Africa were 
compatible with the pan-African targets because activities in favour of the English language 
and culture would indirectly lead the Africans in the French territories to know their English 
speaking neighbours, bringing African unity one step closer.  
After independence, on 6 March 1957, the Eisenhower administration and the 
Macmillan government had still viewed Nkrumah as an ally in their attempt to bring about an 
orderly transition to self-government while the French ambassador, Marc Renner, did not see 
the Ghanaian leader as a threat because he believed Nkrumah suffered from a mental 
illness.952 As time went on, Nkrumah turned out to be a serious threat to French claims in 
Africa, something Renner’s successor, Guiringaud, addressed directly. However, after 1960 
the Franco-Ghanaian relations silently improved. Nkrumah became an ally of de Gaulle 
outside of Africa because both wanted a world that was not dominated by the superpowers. 
The French and British cooperation had always been tumultuous. The British plans to 
jointly promote imperialism as an enterprise that had brought development and progress was 
sabotaged by the explosion of the French atomic bomb in the Sahara. For France, however, 
international cooperation had to give the French more leeway, not make imperialism 
palatable, which was Macmillan’s intention. When Macmillan started cooperating more 
closely with the Americans after 1960, particularly in the area of foreign aid where they 
funded the Volta River project, the French Prime Minister Debré felt betrayed because it 
951 Robert Rakove refers to the semantic confusion that came from using nonalignment as a synonym for 
neutralism, see Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World, 67. 
952 Confidential letter, M.C. Renner to minister of foreign affairs, “Marriage de M. Nkrumah”, 2 January 1958, 
DAL, 50QO/15, f: Politique Intérieure, AMAE; The British wanted to exploit the goodwill that had been created 
by Ghanaian independence, see Report, R.H.K Marett, “Report on visit to East Africa by R.H.K”, 
Marc/November 1960, 12, INF 12/863, TNA; The International Cooperation Administration described 
Nkrumah’s Pan-African conference as a first step towards African economic cooperation and development in 
Official memcon, “International Cooperation Administration: Advisory Conference on Africa May 17 – 27, 
1960: Pan-Africanism”, 27 May 1960, 2, RG. 469, P36, Box 11, f: Africa Advisory Conference, NARA. 
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made the aid grants of the former colonial powers seem trivial. The French had always been 
suspicious of the American intentions in Africa and were therefore dismayed that the British 
broke the colonial alliance. De Gaulle failed to understand that his insistence to test the 
French atomic bomb in the Sahara made the British side with its territories in Africa rather 
than France. 
That British switch in 1960 already hints at what is argued here. The vital accelerator of 
the scramble was the intensification of inter-African diplomatic disagreement about the 
eventual shape of African unity and the means by which unification could be achieved. Ghana 
and the BAA had invested in building a revolutionary network that by 1960 was collapsing as 
its members – such as Nyerere, Mobya, and Kenyatta – turned their backs on Accra. In 
response, Nkrumah embarked on a demonstrative propaganda campaign that he believed 
would convince the African peoples to follow him. At the same time he wanted to warn them 
about the neocolonial powers that had a hold over the African leaders who refused to 
cooperate with Nkrumah. However, Kennedy caught wind of the Ghanaian press campaign, 
which further eroded Nkrumah position. When he began supporting armed insurgency in the 
late 1960s, because it attracted young uneducated Africans to the cause, Nkrumah lost all 
support.  
However, unlike Fanon, Nkrumah did not consider violence in itself ‘a cleansing force’. 
According to Nkrumah, violence did not free ‘the native from his inferiority complex and 
from his despair and inaction’, nor did it make him ‘fearless’ or restore his ‘self-respect’.953 
Violent resistance had to be buttressed by an effort to strengthen the self-confidence of the 
African and spread the ‘African Personality’ and culture. Public diplomacy and newspapers 
therefore remained important. Nkrumah’s shift to violence – despite what some historians 
have suggested – did not express disappointment with the Ghanaian model that was based on 
non-violence and the spread of ideas.954 
Taken together these relations elucidate how complex modes of conflict rooted in the 
changing political situation on the continent, rather than clear-cut North-South or East-West 
divides, determined policymaking. 
 
 
 
953 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 94. 
954 Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa: Documentary Evidence of Nkrumah’s Interference in the Affairs of Other 
African States, 6; Ahlman, “Road to Ghana: Nkrumah, Southern Africa and the Eclipse of a Decolonizing 
Africa”, 1, 36; Ahlman, “The Algerian Question in Nkrumah’s Ghana, 1958–1960”, 76. 
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The Political Project of Pan-Africanism and the Emergence of the Global Cold 
War 
 
African scholars and Africanists tend to assume that it was the Cold War that limited 
Nkrumah’s space to speak from a position of nonalignment.955 Conversely, international 
historians stress that anticolonial leaders exploited the East-West competition to extract gains. 
However, Nkrumah saw the world through a pan-African and anticolonial lens, in terms of 
imperialists and anticolonialists. To fully understand why pan-Africanism was overtaken by 
the Cold War ideologies and failed to become a successful international ideology it is 
therefore necessary to asses Ghana’s diplomacy.  
 
 
Pan-Africanism and the Shift from Ideas to Assistance as a Source of Power 
 
Admittedly, Nkrumah’s failure to turn pan-Africanism into a viable ideological alternative 
was a matter of financial power. Nkrumah was unable to provide credible amounts of foreign 
aid. Although Kofi Baako, the first secretary of the Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs, 
might have lined the pockets of political activists with dollar bills and brought students to 
Ghana’s schools, Accra could not finance the construction of the symbols of modernity such 
as dams, schools, or agricultural and industrial projects. With the French and the British being 
selective about aid grants, economically weakened and discredited by the colonial experience, 
the USSR – with the PRC – and the US emerged as attractive alternative beacons of 
assistance. The country plan that the PAO in Accra, Mark B. Lewis, wrote in 1963, mentions 
the USSR as its only adversary in the area of development, while in earlier versions France 
and the UK had been cited as interfering with US development plans.956  
At the same time, decolonisation and the Cold War were also about ideas, not just about 
hard economic and military interests. To understand why Cold War ideologies became more 
appealing on a continent that had tried to resist East-West intrigues, and to explain why 
Ghana’s pan-African message gained less traction in the 1960s, Ghana’s changing public 
diplomacy techniques need to be examined. As freedom fighters became national leaders and 
turned their back on Ghana, Nkrumah realised he had to reach over the heads of African 
leaders and mobilise the population by producing emotional propaganda full of rumours about 
neocolonial plots to illuminate what might happen if Africa did not unite. 
955 Rahman, The Regime Change of Kwame Nkrumah, xiii. 
956 Foreign service despatch, Mark B. Lewis to USIA, “Country Plan”, 7 August 1962, RG. 306, UD-WW 92, 
FRC 1, NARA. 
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Internationally, however, Nkrumah’s shift to emotionalism backfired because the 
prevailing ideas about nation building had changed. Whereas in the 1950s African minds had 
been targeted to ascertain the orderly transition to a modern future, after 1960 the socio-
economic structure became the instrument to change the African man. The – perceived – 
everyday conditions in which African peoples were forced to live in the Sixties became the 
decisive variable in explaining behaviour. In effect, the success of the modernisation project 
was decoupled from the African ability to learn, an essential tenant of psychological 
modernisation.  
Triumph in the state-building project after 1960 hinged on acquiring control over the 
physical surroundings and the socio-economic development process leading to the rational 
future. In Western eyes, however, Africans became more susceptible to manipulation because 
the modernisation process introduced tensions and resentment towards Western – ‘colonial’ – 
ideas, leading to frustration and emotionally driven, irrational decisions. Public diplomats 
were therefore preoccupied with managing those feelings because anti-American, anti-French 
or anti-British charges would more easily be believed. The West believed that the hesitant 
colonial attempt to modernise societies had created a target audience that was more receptive 
to those interpretations.957  
American power, Ghanaian influence, and the Soviet threat were now measured by the 
ability to deliver on the promises of development rather their capacity to change the African 
psychology. Economic aid had become the paramount international issue and its acceptance 
implied the approval of a donor’s principles, at least in the West.958 Sorensen, for instance, 
acknowledged in his analysis of the USIA that world leadership could no longer be claimed 
by confronting the Soviet. The US could only come out on top internationally if it addressed 
the problems of birth control, agricultural modernisation, industrialisation, urban congestion, 
education, and the development of viable political, economic, and social institutions.959 
Guerrilla leaders like Amilcar Cabral in Guinea-Bissau, realised this early on and therefore 
cloaked their struggle with ‘scientific Marxism’, not pan-Africanism or other nativist 
conceptions. In his party directive of 1965 Cabral was clear: 
 
957 Research report, “The Ghanaian Propaganda Campaign against the U.S.: Motives and Implications”, 12 
August 1963, 10, RG. 306 USIA Research Reports 1960-1999, P142, Box 16, f: R-155-63, NARA. 
958 Byrne, “Our Own Special Brand of Socialism”, 427–428. 
959 Thomas C. Sorensen, The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 
303–304. 
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Always remember that the people are not fighting for ideas, nor for what is in one man’s mind. The 
people fight and accept the sacrifices demanded by the struggle in order to gain material advantages to 
live better and in peace, to benefit for progress and for the better future of their children. 960 
 
The stress put on the material dimension of the African future is all the more striking when it 
is juxtaposed with Nkrumah’s remarks at the AAPC in 1958: 
 
And here we must stress that the ethical and humanistic side of our people must not be ignored. We do 
not want a simple materialistic civilisation which disregards the spiritual side of the human personality 
and man’s need of something beyond that filling of his stomach and the satisfaction of his outward 
needs.961 
 
By 1963, Nkrumah’s talk about an ‘African Personality’ and ‘immunisation’ sounded old-
fashioned, painfully out of touch in a world where international influence came to those who 
could offer a guaranteed, ‘scientific’, route to modern material progress. It was precisely this 
issue that had divided the delegates at Belgrade in 1961: was the Third World still relevant as 
an ideological project in the face of developmental challenges? 
In an international system where rationality and technocratic skill were the norm, pan-
Africanism appeared an increasingly less credible alternative. Irrational and naively 
‘ideological’, it no longer fit with the march to progress as defined by the West. Nkrumah’s 
tactical shift to loudly appeal to African populations, in a radio trottoir fashion, may have 
been appropriate in the African context but it confirmed Western notions of ‘emotionalism’.  
At the same time, Nkrumah had no qualms about accepting foreign aid provided that 
sufficient time and effort was devoted to ‘immunising’ the peoples against foreign ideas. 
However, for the Europeans and the Americans the line between foreign assistance and ideas 
had become increasingly blurred in a postcolonial world. Paradoxically enough, African 
leaders had learned to separate ideas and assistance at universities in the West where they had 
listened to Daniel Bell who had proclaimed the end of ideology.962 At the same time the US 
and the USSR convinced African leaders in the 1960s that their aid was about technocratic 
superiority, not about ideas.  
In a way, therefore, Nkrumah and Eisenhower were kindred spirits. Eisenhower also 
worried that the wrong form of modernity – communism – would emerge if American values 
were not explicitly exported alongside foreign aid. Kennedy, by contrast, lived in a different 
age. For Kennedy, and for Rostow, it was industrial development that could demonstrate the 
960 Quotation taken from: Nugent, Africa Since Independence, 260. 
961 All-African People’s Conference: Speeches by the Prime Minister of Ghana at the Opening and Closing 
Sessions on December 8th and 13th, 1958, 4. 
962 Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1960). 
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values of American-led progress. The USIA only had to counteract the risk that African heads 
would be filled with aspirations that might not be met, leading to disappointment and 
frustration with the US. Consequently, aid coming from the US and the USSR expanded in a 
fairly unproblematic fashion as pan-African ideas deteriorated. As a man of the old world of 
the 1950s, Nkrumah was unable to find an appropriate response. 
 
 
 The Cold War as Seen From Africa, a Complicated Question 
 
In contrast to the argument about pan-Africanism, the narrative can only hint at how 
decolonisation influenced the East-West struggle on the continent. What is clear is that the 
conflict was more complex in Africa than in Europe where the USSR did not have to deal 
with an emerging Chinese competitor. The US also did not have to compete with the 
European powers for influence, although admittedly there was constant mediation and 
compromise. Moreover, the sharp contrast between the European ‘Long Peace’ and the 
bloody, destructive global Cold War does not hold true for the 1950s and early 1960s.963 The 
Cold War and decolonisation were two symbolic battles that merged at the cultural centres in 
Africa, but a conventional propaganda war was all but possible, because Africans were 
considered to be in need of development. Information services became the providers of 
cultural assistance, not the nerve centres of ideological war against the USSR. 
What is less obvious is how the African experience of decolonisation influenced the 
way in which the Cold War played out on the continent.964 In a multi-centric history of Sub-
Saharan Africa, the Cold War emerges not simply as a continuation of colonialism with other 
means, nor as a system or a period. At different times, to different actors, it was a bargaining 
chip, a distraction from questions about independence, and a way to discredit an African 
leader or Western diplomats who offered aid. USIS officials were therefore constantly forced 
to look for ways to fight the Cold War without mentioning the communist adversary because 
African nationalists did not allow their countries to become ‘propaganda battlegrounds’. 
Cultural centres faced closure in Ghana and Guinea and had always been subject to tough 
negotiations. 
At the same time, Western actors did not hesitate to use the Cold War threat to create an 
Africa that would fit neatly into their own plans. The French kept on convincing the 
963 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), 1–10. 
964 Westad by contrast has no doubt that the ‘Cold War in the South’ was ‘a continuation of European colonial 
interventions’, see Westad, The Global Cold War, 5. 
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Americans that the French presence was the only guarantee against communist takeover. 
Macmillan referred to the Cold War during the Sahara bomb crisis to avoid talking about the 
constitutional future of African territories. In 1963, the USIA even suggested increasing the 
‘African awareness of the extent of the communist influence in Ghana’ so that Nkrumah’s star 
could rise no further.965 It is clear that between 1953 and 1963, the Cold War lens was flexible 
when it came to affairs in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
In the end, combining an Africa-centred perspective with a multi-centric history approach 
reveals how Sub-Saharan Africa was not a heart of darkness, located outside of the normal 
dealings of diplomacy. Indeed, every time Western actors made that assumption, they were 
forced to rethink their programmes. The leaders of postcolonial states were not realists 
without an ideological project who exploited the only weak spot of the Western powers, 
namely the fact that their foreign policy was shaped by ideology: Liberal capitalism or 
communism. Pan-African experimentation encountered its limits because it did not adhere to 
the new gospel of modernity. By combining these two approaches, I reject a persistent 
narrative in which non-Western actors remain subaltern agents who have significant influence 
but lack the ability to present a viable alternative to Cold War pressures that they can only 
resist or utilise.966 The possibility that the actions of African leaders might have actually 
altered the boundaries of the Cold War system as it unfolded on the African continent and in 
other parts of the Third World is underestimated. Defining the conceptual limits of the global 
Cold War in light of the broader 20th century might thus lead to Africa, where the Cold War 
conflict unfolded in unexpected ways. 
 
 
 
965 Research report, “The Ghanaian Propaganda Campaign against the U.S.: Motives and Implications”, 12 
August 1963, 18-19, RG. 306, P 142, Box 16, f: R-155-63, NARA.  
966 Excellent examples are: Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution; Schmidt, Cold War and Decolonization in 
Guinea, 1946-1958; Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism. 
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Appendix 1 
 
The Public Diplomacy Network. 
 
 
At the end of World War II a network of information and cultural agencies was hesitantly 
established and expanded into Africa during the 1950s. The British programme divided 
planning and operation among the Foreign Office (FO), the Commonwealth Relations Office 
(CRO), the Board of Trade, and the Central Office of Information (COI). Policy control was 
vested in the Foreign Office (FO) where the Information Policy Department (IPD) emerged as 
the key agency for the Britain’s information officers. In 1948 the Information Research 
Department (IRD) was established as a FO department that focused on intelligence and the 
production of anti-Soviet material. The BBC had created an empire broadcast service in 1932 
targeting white, English speaking listeners while in 1934 the British Council had been 
founded as a non-official institute of cultural diplomacy.967 In Africa they were productive in 
the most consistent way. This multitude of institutions ended the stronghold that London, 
together with the Ministry of Information (MOI), had over colonial administrations that had 
also established colonial information offices. Every problem therefore led to intense 
discussion between British Council representatives, colonial information officers and UK 
information officers.968 Until 1960 these agencies would remain active only in British Africa. 
The French cultural operation also consisted of a haphazard set of organisations. The 
cultural sections of French embassies were the main coordinators of policy, the Direction 
générale des relations culturelles (DGRC), founded in 1945 as a successor to the Service des 
œuvres françaises à l’étranger, supplied most of the material. When in 1956 the ‘Service de 
cooperation technique’ was created its name was changed to Direction générale des affaires 
culturelles et techniques (DGACT).969 Both had relations with a private organisation: the 
Alliance Française, which had been founded in 1883 to spread the French culture and organise 
language education.970 While this gave the ‘action culturel’ a non-political colour, it also 
hindered the use of the alliance as a political tool.971 As the post-war era progressed 
ambassadors grew more and more dissatisfied with the confusing and overlapping 
967 Vaughan, The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-57, 16; Potter, 
Broadcasting Empire, 47. 
968 Morris, British Techniques of Public Relations and Propaganda for Mobilizing East and Central Africa 
during World War II, 445. 
969 When scientific cooperation with the industrialised countries became important the name was changed again 
in 1969 by creating the Direction générale des relations culturelles, scientifiques et techniques (DGRCST). 
970 Dubosclard, Histoire de la Fédération des Alliances Françaises aux Etats-Unis, 155. 
971 Frank, “La machine diplomatique culturelle française après 1945”, 337. 
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responsibilities, but also had room to craft their own strategy.972 In the words of Jean M. 
Desparmet, consul in Salisbury: 
 
The information material that is actually sent to the diplomatic posts is produced by the Direction 
générale des affaires culturelles et techniques, the Direction des services d’information et de presse, the 
Direction des archives diplomatiques et de la documentation. The posts can hardly distinguish between 
the different sources from which these documents emanate. Their viewpoint is purely pragmatic. The 
only thing that interests them is that the material is immediately usable.973  
 
In 1957, Roger Seydoux, the DGACT director, proposed an expansion plan, which focused 
more on a political use of culture and the newly independent states and was approved by de 
Gaulle in 1958. The ‘Ministère de la Coopération’, was responsible for the ties between 
French Africa and France and had a Direction de la cooperation technique et culturelle and 
was particularly active over the radio waves, through SORAFOM.974 The French became 
active outside of their own territories in a more coherent way in 1955. 
The United States Information Agency (USIA) was founded by Eisenhower in 1953 
with a network of local United States Information Services (USIS), which had been 
established right after the war in liberated countries.975 The Jackson Committee – appointed 
by the president to devise a global propaganda plan – encouraged every USIS post to develop 
its own policy.976 The International Cooperation Administration (ICA), founded on 30 June 
972 Report, Leopold Senghor, “Voyage officiel en Afrique occidentale britannique, du secrétaire d‘Etat à la 
Présidence du Conseil 22 Septembre – 7 Octobre 1955”, October 1955, 21, 2, DAL, Généralités 1953-1959, 
49QONT/66, AMAE. 
973 Le materiel d’information actuellement adressé aux postes émane soit de la Direction Générale des Affaires 
Culturelles et Techniques, soit de la Direction des Services d’Information et de Presse, soit de la Direction des 
Archives diplomatiques et de la Documentation. Les postes font assez mal la différence entre les origines de ces 
documents. Leur point de vue est purement pragmatique il leur importe seulement que le matériel soit 
immédiatement utilisable, see Report, Jean Desparmet to DAL, “Mission d’etude des moyens d’information 
francais en afrique centrale et orientale”, 6 May 1964, 13, DAL, Nord Est Afrique 1960-1965, 35QO/8, AMAE; 
Letter, Louis de Guiringaud to DAL, “Information politique”, 14 Mai 1960, 2, DAL, Ghana 1960-1965, 
50QO/72, AMAE. 
974 Frank, “La machine diplomatique culturelle française après 1945”, 346–348; Rapport de présentation, [1958], 
19780282/12 Activités ‘58-’61, CHAN. 
975 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, x. 
976 The Report of the President’s Committee on International Information activities, 30 June 1953, FRUS 1952-
1954, Vol. 2: National Security Affairs, 1872; In 1960, a new report confirmed that ‘the decentralization […] has 
been largely achieved.’, see Sprague Report, Sprague to Eisenhower, “Conclusions and Recommendations of the 
President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad”, December 1960, 8, US President’s Committee on 
Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee): Records, 1960-61, f: Printed Committee Report, 16, 
DDEL; Report, AmembBru to State Dep, “United States Information Service Brussels Report”, October 1949, 
appendix, RG. 59, UD-WW 1559 General Records of the Department of State Records Relating to International 
Information Activities 1938-1953, Lot. 560, Box 165, f: Belgium (effectiveness reports) 1949, NARA; USIS-
Circular, “Eighty-Eight Country Plans”, [1952], 14-15, RG. 306, A 1066 Subject Files 1953-2000, Box 222, f: 
Country plans report 1953, NARA. 
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1955, operated in the field of education in anticipation of a plan that the USIA deputy 
director, Abbott Washburn’s was drawing up, but never realised.977 
In Ghana, the Bureau of African Affairs (BAA) was officially a non-governmental 
organisation that coordinated financial and moral aid to freedom movements and the 
populations in dependent African territories. Founded in 1959, it was separate from the 
African Affairs Secretariat, which in its turn was part of the Office of the President and 
detached from the Ministry of External Affairs, which changed its new name to Foreign 
Affairs. George Padmore asked K.B. Asante – the later principal secretary – to join the 
African Affairs Secretariat after a visit to Tunis, where Asante was then working at the 
diplomatic post. After an early supper, they discussed the future of Ghana over whisky. In 
1961, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became responsible for the public diplomacy operation 
outside Africa, for instance in exhibition windows in New York or London.978  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
977 Shenin, America’s Helping Hand. 
978 Author’s Interview with K.B. Asante, conducted on March 13, 2012, in Labadi, Accra, Ghana; Thompson, 
Ghana’s Foreign Policy, xxiii; Haizel, “Education in Ghana, 1951-1966”, 252; Restricted memorandum, “Ghana 
Missions in Africa Staff postings as at 20th September 1965”, 20 September 1965, RG. 17/2/60 Miscellaneous, 
PRAAD-Accra; Letter, E.K. Okoh to Nkrumah, “Re-Organisation of Ministry of Information and Broadcasting”, 
23 October 1962, RG. 17/2/247  Correspondence, PRAAD-Accra. 
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